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Introduction
Thematized in the last two decades by a certain strand o f Continental political philosophy, the 
question of Nihilism has recently been brought to the fore in non-academic political debates -  
talk-shows and newspapers 1 - as well as in a number o f publications which touch upon the 
problem of the «end of the political».2 3It is in questioning the possibility of freedom and peace 
within the nihilistic horizon, announced by Nietzsche, o f the «post-modem condition», that 
Vattimo has recently drawn the attention, with a renewed and positive accent, to the 
«aesthetic» inclination of the so-called post-modem civilization as the condition for (political) 
freedom against and beyond the proliferation of religious and ideological fundamentalism.
What this thesis focuses upon is, more precisely, the relationship between nihilism and 
the «aestheticization» of the political, which, against the backdrop o f the more radical 
question of the possibility o f re-thinking the political beyond nihilism, attempts to provide a 
contribution, in the line of the studies of authors such as Jean-Luc Nancy and Roberto 
Esposito, to a reflection on the different «aesthetic» declinations of the political.
The key to the plural dimension of the «aesthetic» inclination/declination of the 
concept o f politics and the political is provided, as Vattimo points out, in Nietzsche’s 
aphorism 356 in the fifth book of the Gay Science, where the increasing «aestheticization» of 
European society is pictured in the decline of the figure o f  the “architect”, o f the great builder
1 On 29 September 2001, the newspaper La Repubblica published an article by André Glucksmann entitled 
"Terrorism and nihilism are not invincible". A leading figure, with French philosopher Bernard-Henry Lévy, of 
the movement of the "Nouveau Philosophes" in the 1970's, Glucksmann had contributed to the réintroduction of 
the notion of'totalitarianism' in the political and intellectual debate in France (Traverso, 705-706). Glucksmann's 
argument attempts to explain the Terrorist attack of the 11 September within the framework o f a nihilist "culture 
of death", tracing back to de Sade's reveries o f  perpetual crime. Individual terrorism is described as the logical 
outcome o f nihilism, and is identified with the 20th century delirium of destruction foreseen by Dostoevskji in his 
Demons. Glucksmann's understanding of the notion of nihilism as comprehending religious ideologies of 
collective suicide, in contrast with a more common-sense definition o f the term as 'absence o f belief , is not 
original, but, as 1 intend to show, echoes the argument of Albert Camus’s L ’Homme révolté.
2 From A. Gnoli, “Mille voci per raccontare la fine della politica”, interview with Esposito and Galli in 
Repubblica (15 April 2000). With the precise intention of bringing different ways of thinking the political into 
focus, Roberto Esposito and Carlo Galli introduce the term nihilism in the political lexicon o f their Enciclopedia 
del pensiero politico (2000). In the same year Esposito, Galli and Vitiello devoted a collection o f essays 
CNichilismo e politica, Laterza, Bari, 2000) to the relationship between nihilism and the Pplitical, which they 
dedicated to a project of rethinking the relationship between philosophy and the political outside the horizon of 
“political philosophy” (Ivi, p. VII). The collection included a translation o f three fragments by Jean-Luc Nancy 
on Nihilism and the Political dated between 1994-95.
3 Along with Nietzsche, Vattimo identifies nihilism as the loss or retreat from a unitary meaning (telos) of 
history, conceived as rational objectivity. Nietzsche defines nihilism as the awareness o f the meaninglessness, 
aimlessness and absence of a logical development of becoming: the “death o f God” is neither a theory nor the 
“truthful” discovery o f the objective structure o f the world. Vattimo’s interpretation of Nietzsche’s Übermensch, 
precisely, emphasizes the image of the “tourist” in the garden o f History, in other words, the capacity to replace 
the perspective of the will to truth with an aesthetic, i.e., an antifoundational and perspectivist look upon 
different cultures (see G. Vattimo, “Libertà e pace nella condizione post-modema”, in Nichilismo ed 
emancipazione. Etica, politica, diritto, Garzanti, 2003, p.p. 59-68.
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of the political body -  societas in the traditional sense o f a  construction, which is founded on 
human matter, sacrificed to the tremendous power o f  making calculations and promises, and 
of programmatically foreseeing the future -  and is overshadowed by the emergence of the 
comedians or play-actors. Replacing the belief in the capacity to last -  which was common to 
the Athenians o f the age o f Pericles and to the 19th century Americans -  to be able to play all 
roles, the comedian is the embodiment o f  the truth that «We», Europeans Nihilists, are no 
longer matter for a society.
The artistic/architectural metaphor, as the mark o f the poietic and teleocratic paradigm 
of the political, has been the object o f  extensive research into the (self-)representation o f  
Nazism,4 since Brecht and Benjamin coined the formula o f  the «aestheticization o f politics» 
or the «politicization of art» in 1935-36.5
Arendtian scholars are well acquainted with the critique o f the fabrication (poietic) 
paradigm o f political action, structured around the Platonic metaphor of the statesman as 
artisan, which emerges from Hannah Arendt’s exploration into the “elements” o f  
Totalitarianism in the Fifties. Dana V illa’s work, in particular, has brought into focus the j
existence, in Arendt’s writings, o f  two distinct «aesthetic» models o f the political, the j
“productionist’Varchitectural and the performative/theatrical.6
Although Villa relates Arendt’s “aestheticization” o f the political, especially through 
an interrogation of her appropriation o f  the thought of Nietzsche and Heidegger, to nihilism, 
which is identified with the break-down o f the tradition, and the loss of the moral and 
religious guideposts for human action (loss o f authority and the retreat of the world); the 
problem o f nihilism retains, among the Arendtian scholarly critique, an unquestioned moral 
connotation, which relegates it almost automatically to the margins o f political theory, as a  
problematical, or even disturbing, concept-limit o f the political.
In this thesis, I take the (critique o f the) question o f nihilism as the essential link 
between Arendt’s political reflection and Albert Camus* philosophical work. Beside the 
«disparate comments [which] are indicative o f some personal and intellectual affinities and 
connections between Arendt and Camus»,7 which Jeffrey Isaac essentially traces back to the
4 J.P. Stem, “Nazisme et représentation”, Critique, Tome XLIII, n. 487, décembre 1987, pp. 1019- 1034.
5 Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe devotes a chapter, in his book on Heidegger and the fiction of the political, to the 
«artistic politics» o f  National-Socialism (H. Brenner) and the Nazi identification of the Third Reich with a work 
of total art (see P. Lacoue-Labarthe, La fim io n e del politico. Heidegger, Varte e la politico, op. cit., pp. 79-ff.)
6 Dana Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil. Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization o f Political Action”, Political 
Theory, Vol. 20, No. 2, May 1992, 274- 308; D. Villa, Arendt and Heidegger. The Fate o f the Political, 
Princeton UP, 1996, and Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essays on the Thought o f Hannah Arendt, Princeton UP,
1999.
7 J. Isaac, Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion, Yale University Press, New Haven-London, 1992, pp. 17-18.
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political debate promoted by Nicola Chiaromonte and Dwight MacDonald in Partisan Review 
and Politics in the Forties and Fifties,8 1 suggest that nihilism constitutes an essential element, 
which is still largely overlooked in a  comparative analysis o f the work of these two authors, 
and which can throw further light on their contribution to 20th century political thought.
It is significant that two major works by these two authors, Albert Camus’ L  'Homme 
révolté and Hannah Arendt’s The Origins o f Totalitarianism, were both published in 1951, 
and that in both these texts the term “nihilism” is recurrent in its designation o f the totalitarian 
form of tenor and (total) domination. Heinrich Blücher’s letter to Hannah Arendt in June 
1952, drawing the latter’s attention to Camus HR as essential for the critique o f  nihilism,9 
provides, in my view, the evidence that, around that time, Arendt -  who had expressly met the 
French writer in Paris to discuss the essay in April o f the same year -  may have been brought 
to question further the meaning and political significance o f nihilism as a result of her 
researches into the elements o f totalitarianism. It is my precise intention to explore this link, 
by reading the works by these two authors side by side, in order to bring forth their specific 
contribution toward a re-thinking o f the political, in the aftermath o f the collapse of the 
totalitarian systems, and of their disquieting heritage,10 which will take into account, and think 
through the problem of nihilism.
In this sense, the thesis places itself in the continuum of a line of research, disclosed 
by Jeffrey C. Isaac’s “pioneering” study on Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion (1992) -  at 
present, the only comparative analysis o f the political thought o f these two authors -  although, 
in a certain sense, it reverts the emphasis or the «antecedence».
Approaching the political question from an inquiry into the problem of Nihilism -  
rather than the other way round, i.e., resorting to the (rather nebulous and ideologically laden) 
concept o f nihilism to sanction the condemnation o f a certain political situation, as was often 
the case in the Totalitarianism debate from the Thirties to the Fifties - 1 deliberately start from
8 A friend of Camus since 1941, the anti-Fascist writer Nicola Chiaromonte became an important trait-d'union of 
the French author’s work with the American post-war debate, and especially with Mary McCarthy and Dwight 
MacDonald, who, as Stephen Withffeld points out, did much to shape the American definition of totalitarianism 
in the decade prior to the publication of Arendt’s Origins (Into the Dark: Hannah Arendt and Totalitarianism, 
Philadelphia, 1980, p. 11). As one of the editors of Partisan Review, and the founder of Politics (1944), 
MacDonald translated and drew attention to the work of Albert Camus. The selection published in Partisan 
Review is significant: two chapters from the Mythe de Sisyphe, translated by William Barrett, in voi. 13, n. 2, 
1946; Between Yes and No (the title suggests a translation o f the essay «Entre Oui et Non» from the collection 
L 'Envers et l  "endroit published in Algeria in 1937) in vol. 16, n. 11, 1949; the chapter on Art and Revolt from 
L Homme révolté, translated by J. Frank, in voi. 19, n. 3,1952, and A Writer and His Time, in voi. 22, n. 3, 1955.
9 H. Arendt, Within Four Walls, op. c it, 190.
10 For the debate on the totalitarian heritage, see, in particular, Roberto Esposito, «Il Nazismo e noi», 
MicroMega. Almanacco dì Filosofia, 5/2003, pp. 165-174, Paolo Flores d’Arcais, «Hannah Arendt e il 
totalitarismo nelle democrazie», Ivi, pp. 110-135, Simona Forti, «Spettri della totalità», Ivi, pp. 198-209.
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a careful examination o f Camus* work, for whom the question o f nihilism had been a pivotal 
concern throughout his life, and, who, as I intend to show, stands at the margins o f so-called 
«essentialist» philosophical approaches to totalitarianism.11 12
As early as 1960, Nicola Chiaromonte traced the meaning o f the French author’s 
(political) engagement in the question o f nihilism and the absurd (two terms which are by no 
means the same). But it is only in more recent times that critics have started to question the  
problem o f  nihilism in Camus’ writings seriously, mainly referring to the 1951 essay on revolt 
(Isaac, 1992), which Franco Volpi describes as «uno tra gli studi piu illuminati e profondi 
sul problema del nichilismo».13 What, I argue, is missing in the scholarly critique o f Camus’ 
political thought is a  systematic exploration of the notion o f  nihilism, which would shed some 
light on the numerous shifts and developments o f the author’s ethical-political reflection. This 
thesis attempts to provide a contribution in this sense, by exploring the emergence and the 
evolution o f  the question o f nihilism between 1942 and 1952, as developing in parallel, and 
informing the author’s political thought from Combat to l’HR.
In Chapter 1 I attempt to reconstruct, through a close textual reading, the different 
acceptations o f  the term ‘nihilism disclosed in the Camus’ prière d'insérer to the Mythe de  
Sisyphe in September 1942. This text is particularly significant for it provides the key to the 
reading of the philosophical essay on the absurd, defined by its author as «un essai de 
définition passionnée» o f modem  nihilism (E, 1666). What I suggest is that the (declared) 
attempt to define modem nihilism does not exhaust the meaning and intention o f the MdS, 
but, rather, that this essay contains another dimension beyond the «historical» one, that is, 
beyond the reconstruction o f what he defines as the sensibility of the 20th century.
Admitting that this modern sensibility, to which Camus refers as an absurd sensibility, 
resumes the so-called modern nihilism , the MdS is also and, I would argue, more importantly, 
the author’s attempt to think in the margins of the latter: «Il s’agit de savoir si l’on peut 
définir un bon nihilisme» (E, 1666).
My reading o f the MdS challenges the possibility o f defining a good  form of nihilism 
in the essay on the absurd. I argue that the successive dismissal of a qualitative distinction 
between good  and bad nihilism - in 1951 he wrote: «Il n ’y a pas un bon et un mauvais 
nihilisme, il n ’y a qu’une longue et féroce aventure dont nous sommes tous solidaires. Le
11 See, also, S. Forti, II totalitarisme, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2001, pp. 67-ff.
12 An exception in this sense is D. Crosby’s The Specter o f  the Absurd Sources and Criticisms o f Modern 
Nihilism, State University o f New York Press 1988.1 will come back to this text, from which I distance myslef 
in the interpretation o f Camus’ “philosophy o f the absurd”, in Chapter 1.
13 Volpi, Franco, II nichilismo, Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1999, p. 84.
tv
courage consiste à le dire clairement et à réfléchir dans cette impasse pour lui trouver une 
issue» (E, 734-735) -  develops in the wake of the thought disclosed by the original proposal, 
as the refusal o f  a certain concept o f  nihilism, identified with a deviation (from the right path) 
or with an exogenous disease to be expelled from the healthy body of the community.
I suggest that it is precisely through the method o f thinking outlined in MdS that the 
problem of nihilism is identified by Camus, between 1943 and 1950, as lying at the core o f 
the political as touching upon the definition of human action under the finite conditions o f the 
absurd.
In Chapter 1 ,1 analyse the écriture de l'absurde, that is, the metaphoric constellations 
through which Camus conveys the feeling and the notion o f the absurd in the MdS: in Section
1.1., I argue that the metaphoric definition of the absurd brings forth a stylistic and textual 
correspondence with the work and thought of Friedrich Nietzsche. The reconstruction, 
through the only two existing inventories (Arnold, 1979 and Favre, 2004) of Camus’ readings 
o f the work o f the German philosopher, and the comparative study o f the French editions of 
Nietzsche’s works, which Camus took up at different moments o f his life, is essential in order 
to trace the emergence and development of the conception o f nihilism in the French writer’s 
political reflection.
The textual analysis confirms the generally acknowledged affinity between the 
raisonnement absurde and Nietzsche’s anti-foundational «perspectivism».14 But it also 
suggests that in the short “gap” between the mise au point o f  the philosophical essay in 1941 
(where the term “nihilism” is remarkably absent) and the 1942 prière d* insérer, where the 
notion eventually makes its first appearance to describe the MdS, Camus may have read, and 
drawn upon the acceptation(s) of nihilism in Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments. This source,
I argue, is essential not only to confirm and elucidate the identification of the «sensibilité 
absurde» evoked in the MdS as/with modern nihilism, but also sheds further light on Camus’ 
declared attempt to think in the margins o f the latter.
In the light o f Nussbaum’s illuminating remarks on tragic poetry, I suggest that, for 
Camus’ work, as for the Greeks, the content is not separable from its (poetic) style, «[s]tylistic 
choices — the selection o f [...] certain patterns of image and vocabulary -  are taken to be 
closely bound up with a conception o f  the good».15 This is strongly pointed out by Marie-
14 Luigi Rustiche! li, La profondità della superfìcie. Senso tragico e giustificazione estetica dell'esistenza in F: 
Nietzsche, Milano, Mursia, 1992, and Tracy B. Strong, “Nietzsche’s Politica] Aesthetics”, in M.A. Gillespie and 
T.B. Strong (Eds.), Nietzsche ’s New Seas. Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics and Politics, University of 
Chicago Press, 1988, 159.
15 Martha Nussbaum, The Fragility o f Goodness, op. cit., p. 15.
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Louise Audin in her pivotal study o f the semiotics of the MdS, and is confirmed by Camus’ 
scattered notes on the aesthetics o f the absurd, which link l 'écriture de Vabsurde to  
«/ 'imagination précise», among the faculties o f  human thought that are the “closest” to  
sensory experience, and are thus the most “faithful” to the anti-metaphysical (Nietzschean) 
perspective disclosed by modem nihilism.
Without ignoring the plurivocity of the notion o f the absurd throughout Camus’ work, 
and the author’s undeniable shifts in both the language, and in the thought between 1938 and 
1950, what I suggest is that on a close textual reading, the metaphoric definition(s) of the 
absurd in the MdS bring to the fore a number o f elements which allow us to identify Camus’ 
concept o f «good» (whose meaning must still be defined) in the author’s emphasis on the 
Iiminal experience of the sensory exposure o f man-to-the-world and the world-to-man -  
which I define, borrowing Nancy’s terminology, as the aisthetic dimension o f  the absurd 
(Section 1.2.).
The focus on the sensory con-tact (disthesis) as one dimension o f Camus’ 
understanding o f the absurd, from the 1938*39 lyrical essays to the MdS, brings forth the 
notion o f limit as already inscribed in a  certain - «honest» or lucid — thought opened by/to the 
absurd, namely, as being constitutive o f the judgment o f la chair which de-fines man’s 
finitude.
Without wishing to reduce the different aspects o f Camus’ thinking o f the absurd to a 
univocal and simplifying interpretation, which would attempt to “square the circle” of the 
author’s open contribution as a  finite  thought of the finite, the (more modest) aim o f  the thesis 
is to draw attention to a series o f elements contained in the pages o f  MdS, which can be 
grouped in the constellation o f aisthesis, which concur, in my view, a) in the definition o f  
Camus’ «good», and consequently, b) in his understanding o f a «good» nihilism against the 
backdrop o f the modem «desease», and, finally, c) which constitute a  sort o f  f i l  rouge 
between the 1942 essay and his later ethico-political thought.
The «good» disclosed by the metaphoric treatment o f the absurd in MdS, and brought 
forth by the emphasis on the positive moment o f the aisthetic experience, as Iiminal, finite 
awareness o f man’s exposedness here and now touches upon and sheds further light on the 
identification o f the absurd and nihilism. What I argue in Section 1.3. is that Camus’ 
definition o f the absurd cannot be reduced to a mere loss o f signification - to which the 
problem of nihilism is traditionally reduced. While incorporating the modem experience of a 
loss or absence o f a transcendent meaning {retreat o f  the world), identified in the historically 
situated sentiment de Vabsurdité {modern nihilism), the metaphors o f the absurd expose a
VI
meaning (sens) -  not absolute and transcendent, but a finite meaning, which is disclosed in/as 
sentir (aisthesis). By taking place in/as aesthetic judgement (the “révolte de la chair"), the 
absurd is (already) meaning(ful).
The focus on the aisthetic moment of the absurd reasoning adopted in the thesis allows 
us, in my view, to trace in Camus’ notion o f absurd creation (of Nietzschean memory), seen 
as a peculiar kind o f  praxis-poiesis, the anti-foundational horizon for a («aesthetic») way out 
of the nihilistic tabula rasa o f transcendent values. It is significant, in this sense, that in MdS 
Camus chose the conqueror, the actor and the artist -  three figures that recur in the French 
edition o f  Nietzsche’s La Vólontê de Puissance - 16 to illustrate the absurd man.
The aim o f  Section 1.3. is to reconstitute the line o f argument (absurd logic) -  without 
attempting to assess its validity, nor pretending to provide an exhaustive presentation of 
Camus’ life-long and tormented re-thinking over these matters - which links the aisthetic 
awareness of the absurd revolt o f la chair to the lucid action as passion passive, and to 
creation, as touching upon the possibility o f moral action beyond (transcendent) morality.
As I intend to show, in the MdS, Camus conceives the possibility of a transfiguration 
of the absurd evidence of the transcendent meaninglessness and valuelessness o f  the world 
(modern nihilism) into a norm of action or moral conduct which is mediated through the 
concept o f creation -  as a kind of discipline. I suggest that the notion o f creation highlights in 
the coincidence o f the finite thought (o f the finite) and the useless action o f the absurd man a 
normativeness, which is in the act (of existing).
The thesis challenges the existence in the work o f  Camus and Arendt o f  different 
declinations of creation which are seen as developing out o f their reflection on a certain form  
(namely, absolute or radical) o f  nihilism. The emergence o f  a positive acceptance o f creation 
in the MdS, and the shifts in Camus’ understanding of the relationship between art/the artist 
and the political from 1941 to 1957 are read next to Arendt’s reflection on the «aesthetic» 
dimension of the political or public space drawn by action: from OT, where the term is 
employed to designate the relationship between boundless action and totalitarian omnipotence 
(hubris), to the 1956/58 use o f the term creative art to address the specific reifying dimension 
concealed in the philosophical concept o f the political, and to her efforts to re-think creative 
action outside the vertical power structure of dominion. The comparative textual analysis 
highlights an affinity between Camus’ conception of revolt as creative (act) in HR and 16
16 VPII,§ 657, fr. 1883-1887.
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eventually discloses the irreparable breakdown of Cartesianism and o f the metaphysical 
fallacy o f  the un-conditioned Ego, in which he traces the Nazi loss o f  lucidity as an 
incomplete or inconsequent form of nihilism.
Camus1 diagnosis o f  the Nazi attitude seems to suggests that the lucid thought - as a 
possible, although not the only, outcome of the nihilistic tabula rasa o f traditional values, 
which he designates in the MdS as an honest thought, i.e., consistent with the absurd 
premises -  is not only an attempt to think in the margins o f  modem (nihilistic) thinking, in the 
sense o f  a good use o f  nihilism, i.e., coherent with the evidence o f the absurd, but, also, that 
he might have conceived this consistent or coherent nihilism as taking over the Nietzschean 
heritage o f  an active or complete nihilism.
Thus the thesis challenges Camus* belief in the possibility in 1943 «de lier à une 
philosophie absurde une pensée politique soucieuse de perfectionnement humain et plaçant 
son optimisme dans le relatif» (E, 1423), by reading the author’s recurring themes o f bonheur 
(tragique), amour, beauté -  which belong to the absurd constellation o f aisthesis -  against the 
association, dramatized in the novel La Peste, of the murderous powers o f  abstraction with the 
totalitarian politics o f  achievement. Moreover, the aisthetic dimension o f Camus’ definition of 
the absurd provides, in my view, the key to the author’s main objection to Sartre’s 
existentialist philosophy, and o f philosophy tout court as generally identified with the Hegelo- 
Marxian Philosophies o f History.
Rejecting the title o f philosophe,17 Albert Camus places himself at the margins of 
political philosophy, while at the same time remaining an “outsider” o f professional 
philosophy and o f  professional politics, 18 who was profoundly critical of the “organic” 
intellectual, and o f the Sartrian «esprit de système» - 19 «Pourquoi suis-je un artiste et non un
17 «Je ne suis pas un philosophe. Je ne crois pas assez à la raison pour croire à un système. Ce qui m’intéresse, 
c’est de savoir comment il faut se conduire. Et plus précisément comment on peut se conduire quand on ne croit 
ni en Dieu ni en la raison » (Interview to Servir, 20th December 1945, E, 1427). Also E, 743,753. 
n  As Jeanyves Guérin points out, «[il] est capital que Camus ait été étudiant non pas à la Sorbonne mais à la 
Faculté des Lettres d’Alger. Si René Poirier a dirigé son Diplôme d’études supérieurs, c’est Jean Grenier qui lui 
a tenu lieu de père. Sans F Essai sur l ’esprit d ’orthodoxie, aurait*on pu lire Ni Victimes ni bourreaux ou 
L ’Homme révolté7 Choisir de passer la licence de philosophie, c’est suivre cet éveilleur qui s ’intéresse à 
l’hindouisme, au taoïsme et à l’islam et, dans ses cours, fait la part belle aux écrivains et aux peintres. Il écrit à 
La Nouvelle revue française depuis la fin des années 1920 et si [...] il finira sa carrière en Sorbonne, c’est 
comme titulaire de la chaire d’esthétique. Il a consacré sa thèse à Lequier. À ses étudiants il fait lire Kierkegaard, 
Palante, Chestov. Sa philosophie n ’est pas la  philosophie des professeurs.» (J. Guérin, « Camus, philosophe 
pour classes terminales ? », in Albert Camus et la philosophie, PUF, Paris, 1997, p. 86).
Moreover, Camus’ anti-conformism toward party politics and directives emerges as early as 1935- 37 during his 
problematic engagement in the PCA.
9 Jeanyves Guérin, « Les hommes politiques français lecteurs de Camus », in Camus et la politique, 
L’Harmattan, Paris, 1986, p. 25.
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philosophe? C’est que je pense selon les mots et non selon les idées » (C il, 146).20 21A s h e  
added in his notebooks a few months before his death: « Je suis un écrivain. Ce n’est pas m o i 
mais ma plume qui pense, se souvient ou découvre» (CIII, 275). As an author, he is , 
according to Hannah Arendt’s definition, a public figure (MDT, 95), and it is precisely th is  
peculiar position * to use Galli’s effective description o f  Arendt’s own work, which is  
radically inside and partially outside (rather than against) modem political thought -  that, o n  
the one hand, makes his perspective relevant for an inquiry into the relationship betw een 
Nihilism and the Political, while, on the other, it requires it to be dealt with with a particular 
attention.
This partly justifies the greater detail in the analysis o f  the French writer’s work in  a  
comparative inquiry into the political thought o f  Camus and Arendt: as Isaac correctly p o in ts  
out, while the work of the latter has undergone a significant revaluation in the last thirty years, 
and is widely studied by scholarly critics in political theory, Camus is «excluded altogether 
from [the] canon» o f academic political theory, together with thinkers such as Simone W eil, 
Ignazio Silone, George Orwell and Walter Benjamin.22
By exploring Camus’ approach to the problem o f  Nihilism, the thesis attempts to m ake  
a contribution toward the re-interpretation and revaluation o f  the author’s political thought, in  
the light o f the writer’s défi to «professional» political philosophy,23 which takes into account 
the author’s effort to re-think philosophy, as the exercise o f thought, in the margins o f th e  
Platonic philosophical tradition: «On ne pense que par image. Si tu veux être philosophe, écris  
des romans» (CI, 23). This explains the specific focus o f the thesis on the «aesthetic» 
dimension: my aim is to explore the political implications o f the figure o f the artist, a s  
creator, and of the author’s conception of the work o f art, as emerging and developing 
consistently with the finite method traced in the MdS.
I argue that, in Camus’ reflection, the artist situates himself at the lim it, and exposes 
the paradoxes of nihilism(s) as touching upon a twofold «aesthetic» paradigm of the political 
-  what I define in Chapter 2 as the fabrication paradigm of the (traditional) politics o f  
achievement, which Camus traces from the 1944 articles o f  the journal Combat at the core o f
20 «Je ne suis pas un philosophe, en effet, - he wrote in i952 -  et je ne sais parler que de ce que j ’ai vécu. J ’ai 
vécu le nihilisme, la contradiction, la violence et le vertige de la destruction.» (E, 753).
21 Carlo Galli, “Hannah Arendt e le categorie politiche della modernità”, in R. Esposito (Ed.), La pluralità 
irrappresentabile. Il pensiero politico di Hannah Arendt, Urbino, Quattroventi, 1987, p. 16.
22 J. Isaac, op. cit., p. 12. Roberto Esposito ranges Weil and Benjamin, as well as Arendt, in the «Impolitìcal» 
tradition o f political thinking, as parallel and alternative to the Western tradition of political philosophy and the 
authoritative «canon» of modem political thought (see R. Esposito, C. Galli, Ed., Enciclopedia del pensiero 
politico, Laterza, 2000, p. 335).
23 Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi, « Si tu veux être philosophe... », Albert Camus et la philosophie, op. cit., p. 22.
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the power policies o f  Nazism and o f  the 20* century Philosophies of History, and the 
paradigm of creation, delineating a politics of dignity and freedom.
The numerous affinities with the Arendtian critique o f the poietic model of political 
action, and her emphasis on (a certain reading of) Kant’s “aesthetic” judgment to rethink the 
political beyond totalitarian terror, are spelt out in detail in Sections 2.1. and 2.2. The 
emergence o f a  politics of dignity between 1944 and 1949, described in the articles in the 
journal Combat and in the American conferences, as an alternative way of conceiving the 
political, which Camus developed against the backdrop o f  the European moral and political 
vacuum in the aftermath of the collapse o f the Nazi regime, and which stemmed from the 
author’s personal engagement in the French Resistance, comes close to Arendt’s pages on 
political action in HC.
As Vattimo recently pointed out, in the contemporary post-metaphysical horizon 
disclosed by nihilism, which does away with the (transcendent) Foundation, ethics can only 
be re-thought in the sense o f  a radical aestheticism, in the sense that the will to Truth is 
replaced by coherence:24 I argue that both Arendt and Camus are deeply aware of the 
ambiguity and the dangers inherent in introducing the aesthetic perspective of 
consistency/coherence (as opposed to the philosophical, i.e. Platonic, perspective of 
adequacy, as founding the principle o f non-contradiction) in the political realm. By reading 
Camus’ HR next to Arendt’s essay on Hermann Broch in MDT, I attempt to show that the 
French writer’s critique of romanticism, in the pages on de Sade and the Dandies, coincides 
with the critique o f a certain project o f aestheticization o f the political, which historically 
culminated in the totalitarian identification of Politics with Total Art, as the re-making 
(poiesis) o f the world according to the iron consistency o f the aesthete (as the Architect’s 
abstract system -  as illustrated in the ideological fabrication o f the «objective enemy».
The focus on the aisthetic dimension (Chapter 1) allows us, in my view, to trace two 
conflicting «aesthetic» constellations o f the political; the first is structured around 
achievement/domination/abstraction, as related to the idea o f the fabrication o f the political 
community as work o f art, and to the making/changing o f the finite human condition through 
a systematical reduction (terror) o f men into things; and the second is articulated around the 
terms creation/freedom/dignity//a chairy which, I argue, is founded on Camus’ (Nietzschean)
24 «[...] il primo nome che mi viene in mente è quello di Michel Foucault, per il quale la moralità è in fondo la 
costruzione della propria vita come una coerente opera d’arte, senza alcuna implicazione decadentistica o 
dannunziana, ma piuttosto con la preoccupazione di ime scelta di stile o di una coerenza che non è affatto meno 
obbligante di un imperativo etico nel senso corrente della parola» (Gianni Vattimo, Nichilismo ed 
emancipazione. Etica, politica, diritto, Garzanti, 2003, p. 65.
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notion o f  grand style (Section 2.4.). Tracing an affinity between Arendt’s storytelling, as a  
responsen to men’s striving for immortalizing, and Camus’ pages on art and revolt, I suggest 
that the latter’s Libertarian political thought be read in the fight of the artist’s grand style (as  
disclosing, and in a way anticipating, the «aestheticizing» solution to the moral tabula rasa  o f  
nihilism defined by Vattimo) as an attempt to think an alternative politics - what I have 
defined as a politics o f transfiguration,, as opposed to the totalitarian politics o f  
transformation — which would take over the moral heritage of the Resistance.
For Camus, as for Arendt, to (re-)think the world, beyond the break-down o f  th e  
tradition and the contemporary loss o f meaning and value (modern nihilism), is to name it, 
that is, to provide the world with a language. The political relevance o f language is w hat 
justifies, in my view, a focus on tragedy, against the more obvious choice of the novel.
As I intend to show, tragedy represents the «irrepresentability» of freedom, that is, th e  
murderous outcomes of all attempts to make or realize freedom as total presence, as the ab ­
solute object or truth to be achieved  according to a superior Idea, which silences and d e ­
peoples the plural and living world o f  men (fie cercle de la chair”). In this sense, Caligula in  
Camus* 1941 version of the homonymous tragedy, makes visible the ambiguity o f the figure 
o f the artist, which is played at the core o f  the absurd freedom of the MdS («la liberté [...] d u  
condamné à mort»): identified w ith the aesthetic trope o f  the architect/maker/pedagogue, it 
exposes the tragic relation between art and the political.
I argue that tragedy is, in this sense, the absurd “space”, disclosed by la chair as the  
finite horizon o f the aisthetic present (hic et nunc), and aesthetically founded, in the 
Nietzschean sense of drawn out or de-limited, by a (tragic) language in which the question o f  
man’s aesthetic drives - traced at the core of revolt, and identified with his metaphysical 
desire for unity - is played on the fragile limit or threshold in which a consistent, good , 
nihilism is endlessly exposed to the risk o f slipping into its reverse, of falling into the 
metaphysical fallacy of an inconsistent or absolute nihilism -  in this sense, Caligula is 
defined as «une tragédie de Inintelligence», «l’histoire de la plus humaine et de la plus 
tragique des erreurs» (T, 1730).
Section 2.3.2. is devoted to the analysis o f the sources of the notion o f absolute 
nihilism, as a third acceptation o f  the term, which makes its appearance in the analysis o f  




with the dandy’s aestheticizing attitude is suggested by Camus’ metaphoric treatment in the 
chapter on «La révolte historique»).
Camus’ appropriation o f Rauschning’s thesis in the French edition of La r¿volution du 
nihilisme must be reconsidered, in my view, in the light o f the author’s reading o f  Berdiaev’s 
Sources et sens du communisme russe in 1947. As I intend to show, this work by the Russian 
philosopher, in exile in Paris, plays a crucial part in the shaping of Camus* interpretation of 
the notion of «totalitarian revolution» in HR, and for his critique of the Communist 
philosophy of History, and offers some important insights into the author’s appropriation of 
the (Conservative) «secular religions» thesis. Absolute nihilism, as the mark o f the 
totalitarian ideology of « Vimmortalité de Vespèce» (HR, 649) can thus be conceived, in a 
Nietzschean sense, as an incomplete form of nihilism, which brings about the will to power as 
«frénésie historique» (HR, 629).
The comparative analysis o f Berdiaev and Rauschning’s works as sources for Camus’ 
argument on the relationship between absolute nihilism and the totalitarian mass fabrication 
o f corpses and the terrorist manipulation of the human condition in HR, provides the link, and 
the essential backdrop, to Arendt’s argument in OT. In Chapter 3, the systematic exploration 
o f the manifold acceptations o f the notion of nihilism, from the OT to the 1954 Concern with 
Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought, brings to light the relevance o f the 
critique o f  nihilism in the development o f Arendt’s political thought between 1949 and 1958, 
by tracing the notion -  against all reductive dismissal as being a mere moral problem, and 
thus, marginal for a political inquiry -  at the core o f the Western concept of the political.
What I attempt to argue through a close textual analysis o f the different parts o f  OT, is 
that the question o f nihilism in Arendt’s work cannot be exhausted, as J. Isaac seems to argue 
in his book, by a critique of the cynical divertissements of the intellectual elite o f the so-called 
“Front generation”, rooted in the post-war «atmosphere in which all traditional values and 
propositions had evaporated (after the nineteenth-century ideologies had refuted each other 
[...] ». Such a reading, by failing to give an adequate account of the nuances in Arendt’s use 
of the term ‘nihilism’, is ultimately incapable o f avoiding a certain embarrassment when 
trying to explain the author’s recourse to this notion -  o f  which Conservative political 
thinkers were particularly fond of in the Forties and Fifties -  in her analysis o f  totalitarian 
domination. 26
26 J, C. Isaac, Ivi, p. 95.
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I argue, in contrast, that Arendt distinguishes (at least) two main concepts of n ih ilism , 
which emerge from the various scattered passages in which the term ‘nihilism’ recurs, a n d  
around which it is possible to organize her political reflection.
In Part II o f OT “nihilism” designates a «vulgar superstition o f  doom», which rep laced  
the 19th century (Idealistic and Positivistic) belief in progress - «[that] preached au tom atic  
annihilation with the same enthusiasm that the fanatics o f  automatic progress had preached  
the irresistibility o f economic laws» - and was particularly conspicuous in France at the tu r n
th io f the 20 century and in Germany in the 1920’s (OT,144). By relating this acceptation o f  
nihilism to the modem concept o f  history, and thus to the Historicist faith at the root o f  th e  
bourgeois philosophy of power at the turn of the century, Arendt traces the bourgeoisie’s  
attraction to the political principles o f  the mob, namely to its cynical “realism”, by reso rting  
to a second acceptation o f  nihilism as freedom from  all principles. As I intend to show, t h e  
nihilist «antihumanist, antiliberal, anti-individualist, and anticultural instincts [...] b rillian t 
and witty praise o f  violence, power and cruelty» o f the literary élite o f  the *20’s -  as a th ir d  
occurrence o f nihilism, also pointed out by Isaac - is simply a restatement o f  the seco n d  ! 
acceptation, which Arendt identifies with the 19 century principle that «everything i s  
permitted», and traces in the attitude o f the mob as the nihilistic offspring o f  the bourgeois 
power policy, stripped of its hypocritical double morality.
I argue that to reduce nihilism , as Isaac seems to do, to the question o f the m o ra l j 
bankruptcy o f the early 20th century would entail, from an Arendtian perspective, judging th a t  
historical moment from the Archimedean (god-like) standpoint o f some transcendent (m oral) j 
values, which is precisely what prevents, in her view, the «spokesmen o f humanism a n d  j
i
liberalism» from grasping the political significance o f this peculiar concept o f nihilism, w h ich  : 
is summed up in the totalitarian «everything is possible» as related to emergence in the 2 0 th 
century o f  an entirely new and unprecedented concept o fpow er and o f  reality (OT, 417). !
i
I suggest that the distinction between the two concepts o f nihilism -  between th e  
«everything is permitted» o f an early nihilism, and the «everything is possible» o f totalitarian 
nihilism -  is inseparable in Arendt’s argument from the definition o f two distinct concepts o f  
power: the material power of (traditional) liberal political thought, as related to th e  
(bourgeois) utilitarian reasoning and calculation o f material interests, in which Arendt roots 
the cynical principle that «everything is permitted»; and the organizational power o f  
totalitarian systems, as a de-materializing production o f «force through organization», w hich 
explodes the utilitarian categories o f modem liberal thinking.
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In the Concluding Remarks to OT Arendt traces the key to organizational 
omnipotence, as the essential principle of totalitarian domination, in a radical resentment 
against mere existence, in other words, against the unique and unchangeable singularity of 
what is given by birth - which she refers to as the psychological basis o f  contemporary 
nihilism. The relationship between resentment against mere existence and the political notion 
o f organization - which Arendt identifies in terms that anticipate HC as the «aesthetic» 
capacity o f men to produce a common world by acting together with equals (OT, 301) -  
brings forth the difficulties inherent in her definition of totalitarian omnipotence as the 
conviction that everything can be done through organization (the nihilistic belief that 
«everything is possible»), and in the totalitarian identification o f (political) organization with 
the police.
I suggest that by interpreting the figure o f the alien, the stateless masses through 
which mere existence erupted on the political scene in the early 20th century - «one of the 
oldest perplexities o f  political philosophy» - in the light o f  the (Nietzschean) notion of 
resentment of mere givenness in OT, the problem o f nihilism is brought to the very core o f the 
Western concept o f the political, as founded, since the Greek, on the notion o f organization. 
The focus on the relationship between nihilism as omnipotence and total organization o f life 
under the totalitarian police regimes - as replacing the homo faber's  limited mastership o f the 
world by the measureless and boundless (hubristic) notion o f creation -  brings forth the 
twofold logic of incorporation-dematerialization which lies at the core of totalitarianism.
Roberto Esposito has similarly drawn the attention to the co-implication o f the logics 
of (in)corporation and o f incorporeality («scorporazione») at the core o f Western (political) 
philosophy, which, in his view, is exposed and exploded by the collapse of the totalitarian 
regimes.27
Between 1949 and 1954, through the gestation of Part III of OT in her research on the 
Western tradition o f political philosophy, which culminated in her political theory in HC, 
Arendt develops her critique o f nihilism, and finally dismisses a certain use of the term: in the 
1954 Tradition and the Modern Age, Arendt distinguishes the 19th century «rebellions against 
tradition» - that echo Camus’ pages on Metaphysical revolt in HR -  from the 20th century 
«denial o f everything given», which she defines as a  radical nihilism (BPF, 34), against the 
vulgarizations of the term, commonly used to designate the (Nietzschean) dismantling of the
27 «[...] un movimento di oscillazione fra una spinta alla corporazione ed un’altra, simmetricamente contraria, 
alla scorporazione che al contempo le si oppone e la riproduce, [ . . . ]  dialettica apparentemente inesauribile di 
scorporazione e reincorporazione» (R. Esposito, Immunitas, op. cit., pp. 142-143).
XV
a u i i i j
Tradition. What I suggest is that the critique of nihilism in Arendt’s writings between 195 2  
and 54 opens up a meta-critique o f a certain concept o f  the political: by exploring the P laton ic  
shift from the (political) striving for immortalizing to the philosophic concept o f  immortality , 
Arendt traces the (Nietzschean) concept of resentment against mere existence at the core o f  
the philosophers’ concept of the political at the roots o f  the Western tradition of political 
thought.
It is in challenging the relationship between totalitarianism and the tradition o f  
political philosophy that Arendt’s attention is drawn to the «aesthetic» paradigm at the core o f  
the Platonic conception of political action, which is structured on the model o f fabrication o r  
craftsmanship (poiesis) as justification of a vertical relation of dominion ruler/ruled, a n d  
entails a strong emphasis on reification -  the state as work o f  art and as «One man of gigantic 
dimensions» 0incorporation). In this sense the lecture on Karl Marx and the Tradition o f  
Western Political Thought provides an important link between Arendt’s inquiry into th e  
Platonic work-model of action and her analysis o f totalitarian ideology and terror developed j 
after 1953: the association of terror to the notion o f (ideological) consistency brings into focus 
the relationship between the aestheticization of the political -  of what Arendt rejects as th e  
fallacy o f the identification o f politics as art, and o f  government as work o f art (BPF, 153), a s  
pointed out in the essay on Hermann Broch in MDT -  and the unprecedented concept o f  
reality brought about by totalitarian omnipotence.
I suggest that in the in the extermination camps, as "laboratories” where changes in  
human nature, i.e., the annihilation o f  human dignity, spontaneity and unpredictability, w ere  
tested for the sake of the consistency o f an ideological super-sense, the totalitarian 
«everything is possible» (radical nihilism) brings the poietic  realization o f the philosopher’s 
Idea (logic o f  incorporation) to the extreme point where creation -  identified in the W estern 
tradition with the political artefact - «changes polarity», giving way to its reverse, that is, to  
the erosion o f  reality (what I have addressed as the interiorization or de-materializing o f the  
political).
This is where, I suggest, Camus’ and Arendt’s critiques o f  nihilism, although 
proceeding from and reflecting different philosophical backgrounds and perspectives, 
ultimately converge in bringing forth the co-implication of (a certain understanding of) 
creation and omnipotence as internal to political action qua potentially boundless. I argue that 
the comparative reading of their attempts to re-think the (Nietzschean) notion o f creative 
action in the political horizon incised by the experience o f  totalitarianism and war exposes a 
radical understanding of the problem of nihilism, which exceeds the traditional (moral)
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approaches, particularly conspicuous in the post-war political debate, and situates the two 
authors among the contemporary thinkers who, rejecting the shortcomings of restoration, have 
challenged the possibility of an «aesthetic» politics beyond nihilism.
From this perspective, I argue, the attempt to consider Arendt’s own project of 
«aestheticization» o f  political action 28 in the sense o f a «politique esthétique [...] sans la 
réification de Taction narrative en “œuvres”»,29 30by doing away with the dimension of 
incorporation, which is implicit in the aesthetic-po/etfc paradigm o f political action of the 
philosophical tradition, would, nevertheless, leave unquestioned the other dimension, brought 
forth in our analysis of totalitarian omnipotence -  namely, the de-realizing logic at the core of 
the notion o f creation.
Chapter 4 focuses on Arendt’s re-thinking o f the notion of (political) creation, and 
reads the latter next to Camus’ own appropriation o f the Nietzschean concept in his reflection 
on revolt and art. It is in the light of the Nietzschean «aestheticization o f action» that I suggest 
we read, with Dana V illa,30 Arendt’s solution to the question of meaninglessness ( What is 
Freedom?) as a shift from the fabrication paradigm o f the political -  illustrated by the 
Platonic model o f “creative” arts (BPF, 153) -  to a performative approach to action. Socrates’ 
exercise o f critical thinking, on the one hand, provides, in the Lectures on Kant *s Political 
Philosophy, an example of art, in the sense o f a sheer performance with undeniable political 
implications, as alternative and opposed to the (Platonic) plastic art trope of the political; on 
the other, I attempt to reconsider Arendt’s appropriation o f the pre-philosophic or 
tragic/theatrical focus on praxis (Aristotle), as an alternative «aesthetic» approach to the 
political, on the backdrop of Nietzsche’s Genealogy o f  Morals.
The rejection o f the figure o f the ruler as artist -  and, I argue, Nietzsche’s «artist of 
violence» is to the philosopher’s genealogy o f moral categories, what the ruler as craftsman is 
to Arendt’s genealogy of the political categories o f the Western Tradition, as rooted in the 
Platonic productionist model o f action -  goes together, in my view, with Arendt’s 
genealogical reconstruction, from HC to OR, o f the origin o f political freedom in an-arche, as 
men’s acting and speaking together under conditions of no-rule, that is, inter pares. By 
reading Arendt’s emphasis on the faculty o f promise and remembrance in HC next to 
Nietzsche’s pages on the conduct of free men inter pares, and especially in the light of the
28 Dana Villa, « Beyond Good and Evil. Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization o f Political Action”, in 
Political Theory, vol. 20, No. 2, May 1992, 274-308. Developed in Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger. The Fate 
o f the Political, Princeton UP, 1996.
3* Julia Kristeva, Le génie féminin. /. Hannah Arendt, Fayard, Paris, 1999, p. 356.
30 Cf., Villa, FP, 81.
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relationship between freedom, creation and the sovereign individual (as opposed to  t h e  
master), I argue that the Genealogy provides Arendt with the elements to re-think, in the a n t i -  
foundational horizon of modem and radical nihilism, the moral question as inherent i n  
political action, as creative action.
I propose to interpret Arendt’s tragic or “dramaturgical” model of political action i n  
HC, extensively analysed by the scholarly critique,31 together with her scattered remarks o n  
tragedy, as an attempt to think o f an alternative paradigm o f aesthetic politics, which o p p o ses  
the poietic  constellation o f a politics o f  achievement with the performative constellation o f  a  
politics o f  dignity. This, I argue, is where Arendt’s reflection meets Camus’ political p ro je c t, 
in expressing a common effort to replace a political perspective of the what with a p o litica l 
perspective o f  whoness. It is, precisely, in the identification o f the (Homeric) “hero” with t h e  
(moral) person , as disclosing in words and deeds the who o f the actor, that tragedy acqu ires, 
in Arendt’s OR as well as in Camus’ political reflection, a twofold significance within th e  
project o f the «aestheticization» o f  the political beyond the impasse o f (modem and rad ica l) 
nihilism.
The comparative analysis o f  Arendt’s reflection on absolute goodness and the F ren c h  
Terror in M elville’s Billy Budd  and Camus’ pages on tragedy in the 1955 conference S u r  
l'avenir de la tragédie allows us, in my view, to trace the moral framework in tragedy to  
think free political action under conditions o f equality, as acting and speaking together, 
outside and against the simplifying terrorist «alibi o f the (Evil) Enemy».32
In his ambitious attempt to systematize Arendt’s scattered references on tragedy a n d  
theatricality into the definition o f a  «politics o f tragedy»,33 Pirro fails, in my view, to s itua te  
the former in the specific (historico-political) context o f the author’s argument. What I in ten d  
to show is that, in HC and in OR, the two texts on which I focus my analysis, the reference to  
tragedy is textually contiguous with, and acquires its full meaning on, the backdrop o f  
Arendt’s critique of Historicism, whose nihilistic implications in sustaining an «aesthetic» 
(Platonic) politics of achievement (what Cavarero defines as a politics of the what)34 sh e  
stresses repeatedly.
31 See for instance, Allen Speight, “Arendt and Hegel on the tragic nature of action”, Philosophy and S o cia l 
Criticism, vol. 28, N. 5, pp. 523-536. For a sociological approach see also Ramón Ramos Torre, “Homo 
tragicus”, Política y  Sociedad, 30 (1999), Madrid, pp. 213-240.
32 Paolo Flores d’Arcáis, “Hannah Arendt e il totalitarismo nelle democrazie”, Micro-Mega, yflmanacco di 
Filosofía, 5/2003, p. 135.
33 Robert Pirro, Hannah Arendt and the Politics o f Tragedy, Northern Illinois University Press, 2001.
34 Adriana Cavarero, “Politicizing Theory”, Political Theory, August 2002.
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The moral-and-political dimension of language is brought forth in the literary genre o f 
tragedy, as related to Arendt and Camus’ common concern with the possibility o f  recovering 
an alternative «tradition», conceived in the sense o f the Weilian notion of enracinement, as 
the capacity of striking roots against and beyond the 20th century break-down of the Tradition.
In the conclusions, I thus propose to interpret Arendt’s and Camus’ appropriations of 
tragedy as challenging the traditional approaches to the question o f (political) 
representation,35 and shedding further light on the «new republicanism» o f the former and the 
«measured anarchism» of the latter, as consistent with their attempt to re-think an «aesthetic» 
politics beyond the radical nihilism brought forth in the plastic art trope o f the political. 
Ankersmit’s recent attempt to define an aesthetic approach to the question o f  political 
representation allows us, in this respect, to measure the originality of Camus and Arendt’s 
own efforts to re-think the political in the margins o f the three main traditions of 
contemporary political philosophy -  which Ankersmit outlines in «the liberal tradition (as 
exemplified by Rawls or Dworkin), that of republicanism (as exemplified by John Pocock), 
and that o f communitarianism (as exemplified by Alisdair MacIntyre, Charles Taylor, or 
Amitai Etzioni)» -36 37and disclosing, through the notions of grand style and political creative 
action, an aesthetic or tragic perspective o f the (political) community against and beyond the 
impasse o f the totalitarian bio-political programme.
35 R. de Aguila suggests that the tragic tension between necessity and liberty be interpreted in the sense of a 
political conflict between two opposite models: the rules of necessity in the “reason of state”, aiming «to 
overcome the tensions and contradictions of political action» on the one hand, and the virtu (as knowledge and 
courage) of the political actor acting in plurality and competition on the other. Identifying the “path o f necessity” 
with the emancipatory tradition, from Jacobinism to Leninism, and the radical movements (nationalism, 
fascism), de Aguila remarks that «this way o f thinking about politics has attained security and certainty at the 
expense of liberty». The latter can be secured, he suggests, only in a political context o f plurality and 
competition, which open the space for what he defines as “tragic choice”, in the sense of a capability of 
conceiving alternative courses of action. (R. de Aguila, op. ciL, pp. 16-ff.)
36 F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics. Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value, Stanford UP, California, 
1996, p. 7.
37 R. Esposito, «11 Nazismo e noi», Micro-Mega. Almanacco di Filosofia, 5/2003, op. cit., p. 165-174.
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C h a pter  1. T h in k in g  in th e  m a r g in s  o f  m o d e r n  n ih il is m : fo r  a  d e fin it io n  o f  tr a g ic
THOUGHT.
In the prière d ’insérer to the MdS in September 1942, Camus uses the term “mhilism’Tor the 
first time to describe a psychological state i f  désarroi') caused by, and related to the 
unbearableness of, a profound change in the com-prehension o f the world:
L ’intelligence moderne souffre de nihilisme. Pour guérir, on lui propose d’oublier son mal et de revenir 
en arrière. Ce sont les « retours » : au Moyen-Âge, à la mentalité primitive, à la vie dite « naturelle », à la 
religion, à l’arsenal des vieilles solutions. Mais pour accorder à ces baumes une ombre d’efficacité, il faudrait 
nier l’apport de plusieurs siècles, simuler l’ignorance de ce que nous savons, feindre de n’avoir rien appris, 
effacer ce qui est ineffaçable. Cela est impossible. Cet essai [Le Mythe de Sisyphe] tient compte au contraire des 
lumières que nous avons prises de notre exil. Il propose à l’esprit de vivre avec ses négations et d’en faire le 
principe d’un progrès. Vis-à-vis de l’intelligence moderne, il fait acte de fidélité et de confiance. Dans ce sens, 
on ne peut le considérer que comme une mise au point, la définition préalable d’un « bon nihilisme » et, pour 
tout dire, une préface.1
The textual analysis allows us to highlight a threefold conceptual distinction: modem 
intelligence suffers from nihilism, identified in a note in the Carnets with the loss of 
traditional metaphysical standpoints (a); vis-à-vis this phenomenon, the MdS is defined as the 
“preliminary definition” of a good nihilism (b), which «fait acte de fidélité et confiance» to 
modem thought. Camus conceives the position developed in MdS as being, at the same time, 
distinct from, and opposite to, a generalised tendency in contemporary thought towards the 
systematic “removal” o f the loss o f  meaning, addressed in the intellectual debate as 
« nihilism ».
The adjective “good” suggests that there be an opposite - a “bad*f - form o f nihilism 
(c), which, as will be examined, historically appears under the two forms of a total negation of 
meaning (E, 865) and the total affirmation o f an absolute and transcendent meaning - «Ce
O. Todd, op. cit, p. 303. A draft in the Carnets (mars 1942) attests of another version of the same text which 
sheds further light on the former: « L’intelligence moderne est en plein désarroi. La connaissance s’est distendue 
à ce point que le monde et l'esprit on perdu tout point d’appui. C’est un fait que nous souffrons de nihilisme. 
Mais le plus admirable sont les prêches sur les « retours ». Retour au Moyen-Âge, à la mentalité primitive, à la 
terre, à la religion, à l’arsenal des vieilles solutions. Pour accorder à ces baumes une ombre d’efficacité, il 
faudrait faire comme si nos connaissances n’existaient plus -  comme si nous n’avions rien appris -  feindre 
d’effacer en somme ce qui est ineffaçable. Il faudrait rayer d’un trait de plume l’apport de plusieurs siècles et 
l’indéniable acquis d’un esprit qui finalement (c’est son dernier progrès) recrée le chaos pour son propre compte. 
Cela est impossible. Pour guérir, il faut s’arranger de cette lucidité, de cette clairvoyance. Il faut tenir compte des 
lumières que nous avons pris soudain de notre exil. L’intelligence n’est pas en désarroi parce que la 
connaissance a bouleversé le monde. Elle est en désarroi parce qu’elle ne peut pas s’arranger de ce 
bouleversement. Elle ne « s’est pas faite à cette idée ». Qu’elle s’y fasse et le désarroi disparaîtra. Il ne restera 
que le bouleversement et la connaissance claire que l’esprit en a. C’est toute une civilisation à refaire. » (Cil, 
26).
1
sont les « retours » : au Moyen-Age, à la mentalité primitive, à la vie dite « naturelle », à la 
religion, à l ’arsenal des vieilles solutions ». This distinction, repeatedly overlooked by the 
critiques of Cam us’ thought, has its premises in the absurd argument in the MdS and, I argue, 
is essential for an understanding of the author’s ethical and political reflection, culminating in  
the “genealogy o f nihilism” o f  L’HR.
It is nevertheless significant that all attempts to detect an explicit use, as well as a  
systematic exploration, of the notion o f “nihilism” in the 1942 philosophical essay -  as 
developed, by contrast, almost ten years later in HR -  would prove unsuccessful.
In discussing the argument o f the MdS in his letter to Francis Ponge in January 1943,2 
Camus would insist on «la possibilité d ’être tout à fait personnel, c’est-à-dire de penser en  
marge de ce nihilisme moderne dont le Mythe est très exactement un essai de définition 
passionnée. Quoiqu’il n ’y paraisse pas, cette étude [le MdS] a un aspect historique et, pour 
bien la juger, il faut aussi se placer sur ce plan.» (E, 1666). The « historical aspect » o f the 
MdS is resumed in the «passionate definition» o f modern nihilism, and what we can draw 
from these lines is as follows: firstly, that, in the 1942 philosophical essay, the problem o f  
modern nihilism is addressed as, and may be identified with, what Camus defines as the 
absurd sensibility or the (modem) feeling o f  absurdity (sentiment de Vasburditê, MdS, 101)- 
« Les pages qui suivent traitent d’une sensibilité absurde qu *on peut trouver éparse dans le 
siècle -  et non d’une philosophie absurde que notre temps, à proprement parler, n’a pas 
connue » (MdS, 97); 3 secondly, that there is something in the MdS which exceeds this 
historical dimension: as I intend to argue, the so-called modem nihilism evoked in the text 
does not exhaust, in Camus’s own view, an interrogation on the question o f  nihilism - «Je Tai 
dit dans ma prière d ’insérer: “ Il s’agit de savoir si l’on peut définir un bon nihilisme» (E, 
1666).
What I intend to provide in the present section is a “genetic” reconstruction o f 
Camus’s understanding of nihilism through a comparative analysis of the MdS with other 
texts, letters and notes, dated between 1942-45, which, by taking M.L. Audin’s invaluable 
study into the semiotics of the essay on the absurd into account,4 brings forth the French
2 « Lettre au sujet du Partis pris de Francis Ponge » (27th January 1943), E, 1662-1668.
3 (My italics). As Compte-Sponville points out, the absurd in the MdS is at the same time clearly situated as a 
feeling (E, 97), and carefully defined as a notion (E, 119-120), André Comte-Sponville, « L’absurde dans Le 
Mythe de Sisyphe », in A.-M. Amiot, J.-F. Mattéi (Eds.), Albert Camus et la philosophie, Paris, PUF, 1997, p. 
16!.
4 M.-L. Audin, Pour une sémiotique du Mythe de Sisyphe de Camus: thèmes et métaphores au service de 
l'absurde. Thèse de doctorat d’état en Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Université de Nancy II, 1984/85.
2
writer’s indebtedness to Nietzsche’s work, and the “parentage” between the raisonnement 
absurde o f the MdS and the German philosopher’s notes on nihilism.
1.1. C a m u s  a n d  N ie t z s c h e : t r a c in g  a n  “a esth etic” p a r e n t a g e .
The issue at stake in the MdS is formulated in the opening lines:
Il n’y a qu’un problème philosophique vraiment sérieux: c’est le suicide. Juger que la vie vaut ou ne 
vaut pas la peine d ’être vécue, c’est répondre à la question fondamentale de la philosophie. Le reste, si le monde 
a trois dimensions, si l ’esprit a neuf ou douze catégories, vient ensuite. Ce sont des jeux ; il faut d ’abord 
répondre. [...] Si je me demande à quoi juger que telle question est plus pressante que telle autre, je réponds que 
c’est aux actions qu’elle engage. [...] beaucoup de gens meurent parce qu’ils estiment que la vie ne vaut pas la 
peine d’être vécue. J’en vois d’autres qui se font paradoxalement tuer pour les idées ou les illusions qui leur 
donnent une raison de vivre (ce qu’on appelle une raison de vivre est en même temps une excellente raison de 
mourir). Je juge donc que le sens de la vie est la plus pressante des questions. (MdS, 99)s
The philosophical question lies in the relationship between two judgements, the first 
concerning the senselessness o f  life («la vie n'a pas de sens»), the second stating the 
worthlessness of living, which implies an experience of a loss o f  value, and brings in the 
problem of suicide (the truism «on se tue parce que la vie ne vaut pas la peine d ’être 
vécue»).5 6 * Now, in his letter to Pierre Bonnel (18th March 1943), Camus defined the absurd 
problem - as illustrated in the first section o f the MdS * in its initial movement as a process of 
annihilation («l’absurdité parfaite serait le silence», E, 1423), which brings about an active 
extraction o f all meaning and value from the world - «Et pourquoi pas? Mais à ce compte on 
retire du monde ce qui en vaut la peine [...]»  (E, 1423).
The metaphoric constellation o f  the absurd, employed in the MdS to convey 
« l’absence de toute raison profonde de vivre, le caractère insensé de cette agitation 
quotidienne et l ’inutilité de la souffrance» (MdS, 101), offers an essential insight into 
Camus’s approach to the question o f loss o f meaning and value.
In order to describe the feeling o f absurdity, Camus resorts to a metaphor in 
praesentia, which associates two paradigms, of destruction (divorce) and play/acting (feu):
5 My italics.
6 « En vérité, il n 'y  a aucune mesure forcée entre ces deux jugements. [...] L’absurde commande-t-il la mort, il 
faut donner à ce problème le pas sur les autres [...]. La réflexion sur le suicide me donne alors l’occasion de 
poser le seul problème qui m’intéresse : y-a-t-il une logique jusqu’à la mort ? » (MdS, 103). My italics.
* Focusing on the MdS as a symbolic work, M.L. Audin insists on the “signifying”, not merely decorative, value 
of the images that weave the text. She therefore suggests a five-level reading o f the essay: linear or syntagmatic; 
retroactive (“re-lecture mémorielle”); intertextual; paradigmatic; and “non-classic” (through the recourse to the 
Index Hiérarchique and the Index Alphabétique de l’Institut National de la Langue Française), in M. L. Audin, 
op. cit., pp. 65- 84.
«Ce divorce entre Vhomme et sa vie, l ’acteur et son décor, c ’est proprement le sentiment d e  
Vabsurdité » (MdS, 101). “Divorce”, as the break of a (formal) union, introduces a particular
o
form of negativity, which, as Audin carefully underlines, operates against a certain kind  o f  
unity: not against the unity between man and life tout court, but between man and his life . 
The syntagmatic dependence from the couple actor/scene-painting {décor) underscores th e  
artificial, counterfeited, character o f the latter.* 9
This is confirmed in what follows: «Un monde q u ’on peut expliquer même avec d e s  
mauvaises raisons est un monde familier. Mais au contraire, dans un univers soudain p r iv é  
d ’illusions et de lumières, l ’homme se sent un étranger» (MdS, 101 )10. Depending o n  
« lumières », which translate the intellectual guiding points for the mastering o f experience, 
the term “'familier’’, logically linked to “expliquer”, evokes a unity between man and universe, 
which bestows a total meaning on existence.
Now, the traditional positive connotation of these terms is reversed by th e ir  
association with “mauvaises raisons” and the metaphor in absentia “illusions” (a lso  
belonging to the constellation o f jeu), which evoke the fictive  nature of the original situation. 
The notions o f  rupture and loss thus associated to the metaphor-definition of the absurd, an d  
repeated in the satellite-metaphors ("étranger”, “exil”), acquire an actively positive 
connotation, which convey the deconstruction of a counterfeited symbiosis between man an d  
his (illusory and familiar) world, and the opening up o f a new  positive condition.11 12
The intertextual study of the metaphors in the MdS allows us to shed further light o n  
l ’écriture o f the absurd, and reveals a striking correspondence with the metaphoric 
constellations that recur in the works o f the German philosopher F. Nietzsche, whose 
«.affinity» with the French author’s writings has been repeatedly pointed out, 12 but whose 
influence is far for having been fully explored.
* See M.L.Audin’s analysis of the metaphor in her Pour m e sémiotique du MdS, op. cit, pp. 122-139.
9 According to Audin, the metaphorical constellation of “game” (Jen) is negatively connoted from the beginning 
of the MdS (E, 99): associated with the notions o f « dilettantisme » - « distanciation » - «désengagement», « jeu  
[de Pesprit] » denotes an intentional treachery and lie, confirmed in the relation jeu-acteur-décor. While evoking 
a notion of unity (the universe o f the stage), décor states an illusion o f reality (the painted scenes), which, 
through the complicity of the actor, turns the latter into a deceiver («spéculateur de mensonges»). As we will see 
further on in the text, the sub-group in the linguistic constellation o f  “game” concerning theatre escapes this 
devaluation; see Audin, op. cit., p. 136.
10 My italics.
11 M.L.Audin, op. c it, p. 145.
12 Maurice Weyemberg, « Camus et Nietzsche. Evolution d’une affinité », in Albert Camus ou la mémoire des 
origines, De Boeuck&Larcier, Paris, Bruxelles, 1998, pp. 41- 62.
Integrating and annotating James Arnold’s catalogue o f the works by and on Nietzsche 
in the French writer’s private library,13 Frantz Favre has recently confirmed that « Camus fut 
en effet un lecteur, et un lecteur attentif, de Nietzsche. Le grand nombre de soulignements et 
d’annotations, que comportent les ouvrages de Nietzsche, qui figurent dans sa bibliothèque, 
suffirait à nous en persuader ».I4 The comparative study o f the inventory of the various 
editions of Nietzsche’s work, all in French translation,15 that were in Camus’s possession, 
with the reading notes in the Carnets, offers some important elements to trace the sources and 
the genesis of the French writer’s conception of nihilism, which, as I intend to show, plays a 
crucial role in the development o f Camus’s political thought.16
13 A. James Arnold, « Camus lecteur de Nietzsche », in Albert Camus 9. La revue des lettres modernes, Paris, 
Minard, 1979, pp. 95- 99.
14 F. Favre, « Quand Camus lisait Nietzsche », Albert Camus 20, « Le premier homme » en perspective, La revue 
des lettres modernes, Paris, Minard, 2004, p. 197.
15 As Frantz Favre points out, with regards to the important Nietzschean documentation in Camus’s possession, 
« [on] ne saurait [...] souscrire au reproche que Sartre adressait à  Camus : « Mais quelle manie vous avez de 
n ’aller pas aux sources ». Un recours au sources qui restait néanmoins limité chez Camus, parce que son 
ignorance de l’allemand ne lui permettait pas d’apprécier l’exactitude des traductions. », in F. Favre, « Quand 
Camus lisait Nietzsche », Albert Camus 20, op. c it, p. 197.
Works by Nietzsche found in Camus’s library -  
editions ante 1941:
11
Ecce homo, Translation Henri Albert, Paris, Mercure 
de France, 1921. Highlightings 
L 'Origine de la tragédie, Translation J. Mamold et J. 
Morland, Paris, Mercure de France, 1923. 
Highlightings
Le Crépuscule des idoles, Translation Henri Albert. 
Paris, Mercure de France, 1920. Highlightings 
Aurore, Translation Henri Albert. Paris, Mercure de 
France, 1930. Highlightings and annotations.
Humain, trop humain, Part I. Translation A.-M. 
Desrousseaux. Paris, Mercure de France, 1899.
La Naissance de la tragédie à l ’époque de la tragédie 
grecque. Translation by Geneviève Bianquis, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1938.
Œuvres posthumes. Translation H.J. Bolle, Paris, 
Mercure de France, 1934. Highlightings and 
annotations.
La Volonté de puissance, Tomes I and IL Translation 
by Henri Albert. Paris, Mercure de France, 1923. 
Highlightings and annotations.
La Volonté de puissance. Translation Geneviève 
Bianquis, Paris, Gallimard. Tome 1: 1935 ; Tome II : 
1937. Highlightings and annotations 
Lettres choisies, Paris, Stock, 1931.
Works by Nietzsche in Camus’s library- published 
between 1941 and 1947:
Par de-là le Bien et le Mal. Translation Henri Albert, 
Paris, Mercure de France, 1941.
Ainsi parlait Zarathoustra, Translation Maurice Betz, 
Paris, Gallimard, 1942.
Memorandum. Maximes et textes receuillis par 
Georges Bataille, Paris, Gallimard, 1945.
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According to the notebooks, Camus completed the MdS in 1941; the draft o f a preface 
to the essay, in which the term “nihilism” first recurs, dates between January and August 1942 
(CII, 26). As James Arnold points out, «[d]ans la plupart des cas il est impossible de dire à  
quel moment Camus lisait ou annotait ces volumes [de Nietzsche]».17 *The bibliographical 
notes to the juvenile Essai sur la musique, a critical review o f  Schopenhauer and Nietzsche’s 
aesthetics, published in the Algerian review o f literature and art Sud  in June 1932, attest tha t 
at that date Camus had read La Cos Wagner and Nietzsche contre Wagner, and had only  
«consulted» La naissance de la tragédie. Even though we cannot exclude that Camus cam e 
into possession of, and (re)-read, his copy o f L*Origine de la tragédie after ’32, it is  
interesting to observe that
«[l]es phrases soulignées se trouvent exclusivement dans «l’essai d’une critique de soi-même» et 
notamment à la Sème section presque toute une page. Notons en particulier cette phrase : « [...] cette  
singulière proposition, que l ’existence du monde ne peut se justifier que comme phénomène esthétique » (p. 10). 
Et encore un dieu purement artiste, absolument dénué de scrupule et de morale, pour qui la création ou la
destruction, le bien ou le mal sont des manifestations de son caprice indifférent et de sa tout-puissance ; qui se 
débarrasse, en fabriquant des mondes, du tourment de sa plénitude et de sa pléthore, qui se délivre de la  
souffrance des contrastes accumulés en lui-même [...] » (p. 10). Ces phrases sont soulignées, contrairement à  
l’habitude de Camus, à l’encre, très soigneusement, d ’une main très ferme ».**
The only significant exception is represented by the copy of Ecce Homo, which is 
signed by Camus and dated 1932. That same year, the young author also carefully signed and 
dated the manuscripts of his first (inedited) collection o f essays, under the Bergsonian heading 
o f Intuitions. This would suggest that Camus accorded a particular importance to Nietzsche’s 
autobiographical work in the development o f his own thought at a date-charnière, which 
marks the beginning o f his literary production.
It is significant to observe, with James Arnold, that among the pages o f Ecce Homo 
underlined by Camus, there is a passage from the Crépuscule des Idoles, concerning the 
psychology o f the tragic poet: « L’affirmation de la vie meme dans ses problèmes les plus 
étranges et les plus ardus ; la volonté de vie [ . . . ] -  c ’est ce que j ’ai appelé dionysien, c’est en 
cela que j ’ai cru reconnaître le fil conducteur qui mène à la psychologie du poète tragique» ,19 
There are plausible reasons to believe that Camus was reading and annotating the Crépuscule
Works by Nietzsche in Camus ’ library- editions post 
1947:
La généalogie de la morale, Translation Henri Albert, 
Paris, Mercure de France, 1948.
Poésies complètes, Translation G. Ribemont-
Dessaignes, Paris, Seuil, 1948._________________ __
17 A. James Arnold, « Camus lecteur de Nietzsche », art. cit., p. 96.
Ivi, pp. 97-98. My italics.
19 F. Nietzsche, Ecce homo, Mercure de France,Paris, 1909, p. 92.
des Idoles between 1938 and *39. A page number in a note in the Carnets, dated August 1938, 
allows us to trace, in the Mercure de France edition o f Nietzsche’s work, the source of 
Camus’ reflection on conscious death, which plays an important part in the lyrical essays of 
Noces, and in the MdS, whose redaction dates precisely around this time:
Sur la mort consciente, cf. Nietzsche. Crépuscule des Idoles, p. 203.
C’est aux âmes les plus spirituelles, en admettant qu'elles soient les plus courageuses, qu’il est donné de 
vivre les tragédies les plus douloureuses. Mais c ’est bien pour cela qu’elles tiennent la vie en honneur, parce 
qu’elle leur oppose son plus grand antagonisme. [...] (CI, 119).20
The Nietzschean echoes in Camus’s «certitude consciente d'une mort sans espoir» (H, 
63) in Le vent à Djémila ofFer an essential insight in the understanding of the absurd argument 
in MdS:
Mais Djémila... et je sens bien alors que le vrai, le seul progrès de la civilisation [...], c’est de créer des 
morts conscientes, [...] les hommes meurent malgré eux, malgré leurs décors. On leur dit: «Quand tu seras 
guéri... », et ils meurent Je ne veux pas cela. [...] Pour moi, devant ce monde, je ne veux pas mentir ni qu’on 
me mente. Je veux porter ma lucidité jusqu’au bout et regarder ma fin avec toute la profusion de ma jalousie et 
de mon horreur. [...] Créer des morts conscientes, c fest diminuer la distance qui nam sépare du monde, et entrer 
sans joie dans l’accomplissement [...]. (E, 64-65) [My italics]
The rejection o f hope (in som ething  beyond this world, in another life after this one), 
as an artificial screen which separates man from the world, and counterfeits his finite sensory 
exposedness, is inscribed in the lucid experience of the sensual “eternal” present, o f which the 
Algerian nature is the symbolic reference.21 2
In analogous terms, hope {espoir/espérance) is defined in the MdS as “Vesquive 
mortelle”, «tricherie de ceux qui vivent non pour la vie elle-même, mais pour quelque grande 
idée qui la dépasse, la sublime, lui donne un sens et la trahit» (MdS, 102-103). The opposition 
between the metaphorical constellation o f  espoir/décorsZ sens illusoire and that of 
absurde!divorce -  which, in the text, is reinforced by the semantic constellation o f light/vision 
(lucidity, clairvoyance), as the unveiling insight which dismantles all artificial and illusory 
meaning (« [ ...] les décors s’écroulent», MdS, 106) -  compels us to consider, as Camus
20 The page number cited by Camus in the notebooks corresponds to the passage in the 1899 edition o f the 
Crépuscule des Idoles by “Mercure de France”: « Pour amour de la vie on devrait désirer une mort [...] libre et 
consciente » (in « Morale pour médecins », p. 203).
21 «Il faut sans doute vivre longtemps à Alger pour comprendre ce que peut avoir de desséchant un excès de 
biens naturels. II n’y a rien ici pour qui voudrait apprendre, d’éduquer ou devenir meilleur. Ce pays est sans 
leçons. Il ne promet ni ne fait entrevoir. Il se contente de donner, mais à profusion. Il est tout entier livré aux 
yeux et on le connaît dès l'instant où l ’on en jou it. Ses plaisirs n’ont pas de remèdes, et ses joies restent sans 
espoir. Ce qu’il exige, ce sont des âmes clairvoyantes, c’est-à-dire sans consolation. Il demande qu’on fasse un 
acte de lucidité comme on fait un acte de foi. » (E, 67). [My highlighting]
22 According to Audin the use o f the metaphors o f light suggests a positive connotation of the absurd experience 
as «authentic» (in M.-L. Audin, op. cit., p. 139).
7
limself suggests in the MdS, the question o f meaning in the light of Zarathustra’s 
announcement that «God is dead»: «Par hasard, c’est la plus vieille noblesse du monde. Je l ’ai 
endue à toutes les choses quand j ’ai dit qu’au-dessus d’elles aucune volonté étemelle ne 
/oulait» (MdS, 114).
I argue that the raisonnement absurde inscribes itself in, and can be fully grasped only 
n  the light o f  the author’s personal appropriation o f Nietzsche’s anti-foundational 
perspective, generally addressed in terms o f aestheticism, and that the latter plays a pivotal 
part in the definition of Camus’s absurd or finite thought. It is not surprising to observe a  
dose textual correspondence between this passage of the MdS and the sixth chapter o f  
Nietzsche’s Crépuscule des Idoles:
«L*homme a projeté en dehors de lui ses trois « faits 
intérieurs », ce en quoi il croyait fermement, la 
volonté, l’esprit, le moi -  il déduisit d ’abord la notion 
d’être de la notion du moi, il a supposé les « choses » 
comme existantes à son image, selon sa notion du moi 
en tant que cause. Quoi d ’étonnant si plus tard il n ’a 
fait que retrouver toujours, dans les choses, ce qu 'il 
avait mis en elles ?»
{Crépuscule des Idoles, LES QUATRES GRANDES 
ERREURS, § 3 )  [M y  h ig h lig h tin g ]
«L’hostilité primitive du monde, à travers les 
millénaires, remonte vers nous. Pour une seconde, 
nous ne le comprenons plus puisque pendant des 
siècles nous n ’avons compris en lui que les figures et 
les dessins que préalablement nous y  mettions, 
puisque désormais les forces nous manquent pour user 
de cet artifice. Le monde nous échappe parce qu’il 
redevient lui-même. Ces décors masqués par 
l’habitude redeviennent ce qu’ils sont. [...] cette 
épaisseur et cette étrangeté du monde, c'est 
l’absurde.»
(MdS, 108) [My highlighting]
Now, it is possible to highlight a close textual correspondence between Camus’ MdS 
and the German’s philosopher posthumous fragments, concerning the question o f the finite 
and aesthetic character of human knowledge:
La philosophie ne peut plus à présent qu’insister sur le 
caractère rela tif de toute connaissance, sur son 
caractère anthropomorphique et sur la force partout 
présente de l'illu s io n f..]  Pour nous seul le jugem ent 
esthétique fa it loi. (VPI, §559, «Le problème de la 
vérité »).23 4 [My highlighting]
L’homme, en dernière analyse, ne retrouve 
dans les choses que ce qu 'il y  a mis lui-même ; ce qu’il 
retrouve s’appelle science, ce qu’il introduit s ’appelle 
a rt religion, amour [...] (VPIL §135, p. 314).________
Comprendre le monde pour un homme, c ’est le réduire 
à l’humain, le marquer de son sceau. [...] Le truisme : 
« Toute pensée est anthropomorphique » n’as pas 
d’autre sens. (MdS, 110)) [My italics]
[...][nous ne] comprenons plus [le monde] puisque 
pendant des siècles nous n'avons compris en lui que 
les figures et les dessins que préalablement nous y  
mettions, [...]. » (MdS, 108) [My italics]
23 See Luigi Rustichelli, La profondità della superficie. Senso tragico e giustificazione estetica dell 'esistenza in 
F: Nietzsche, Milano, Mursia, 1992. On Nietzsche’s aesthetic approach to the problem of attaining collective and 
individual understanding, see also Tracy B. Strong, “Nietzsche’s Political Aesthetics”, in M.A. Gillespie and 
T.B. Strong (Eds.), Nietzsche’s New Seas. Explorations in Philosophy, Aesthetics and Politics, University of 
Chicago Press, 1988,159.
241 will return later on the Volonté de Puissance as a source for Camus’s s thought.
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Ramener quelque chose d’inconnu à quelque chose de 
connu allège, tranquillise et satisfait l'esprit, et procure 
en outre un sentiment de puissance. L’inconnu 
compone le danger, l’inquiétude, le souci -  le premier 
instinct porte à supprimer cette situation pénible. [...] 
la première représentation par quoi l’inconnu se 
déclare connu fait tant de bien qu’on la tient pour 
vraie.» (<Crépuscule des Idoles, § 5. EXPLICATION 
PSYCHOLOGIQUE).
Illusion de croire qu’une chose est connue, parce que 
nous en tenons la formule mathématique. La chose est 
désignée, décrite, rien deplus ! (VPI, §203, p. 100)
Absurdité de la « chose en soi ». Si je  supprime par la 
pensée toutes les relations, toutes les « qualités », 
toutes les « activités » d’une chose, la chose disparaît ; 
car la qualité de chose est une fiction introduite par 
nous, pour des besoins logiques, afin de pouvoir 
désigner et comprendre (VPI, § 178)
Notre intellect n’est pas organisé pour concevoir le 
devenir, il tend à démontrer la fixité universelle, 
puisqu’il tire son origine des images. (VPI, §104, p.
ÉIÏ_____________________________________
Pourtant toute la science de cede terre ne me 
donnera rien qui puisse m’assurer que ce monde est à 
moi. Vous me le décrivez et vous m’apprenez á le 
classer. [...] Vous m’expliquez ce monde avec une 
image. Je reconnais alors que vous en êtes venus à la 
poésie : je  ne connaîtrai jamais. [...] Ainsi cette 
science qui devait tout m’apprendre finit dans 
l’hypothèse, cette lucidité sombre dans la métaphore, 
cette incertitude se résout en œuvre d'art. (MdS, 112) 
[My italics)
The textual evidence produced above brings the question o f  the limits of knowledge to 
our attention. I suggest that Camus, like Nietzsche, recurs to the semantic constellation o f 
ait/jeu (‘figure’, ‘dessin’, ‘image’, ‘imagination*, ‘décor’, ‘artifice*, ‘illusion’, ‘idée/idéal’) in 
order to express the relative and limited character of human thought:
Nous ne pouvons comprendre que des processus 
intellectuels : nous ne connaissons de la matière que ce 
qui est (ou peut devenir) visible, audible, sensible ! 
C'est-à-dire : nous comprenons nos transformations 
dans l ’action de voir, d'entendre, de toucher. Les 
réalités, pour la perception desquelles nous ne 
possédons pas de sens, n’existent pas pour nous [...]. Il 
en va de même des passions et des instincts : nous n’en 
saisissons que le processus intellectuel qui les 
accompagne. Nous n’en comprenons pas l’essence 
psychologique, mais seulement les rares sensations qui 
se rattachent à eux. Faire de tout une question de 
volonté -  déformation bien naïve ! [...] (CEP, 119)25
De qui et de quoi en effet puis-je dire : ‘Je connais 
cela !’ Ce cœur en moi, je puis l'éprouver et je  juge 
qu’il existe. Ce monde, je  puis le toucher et je  juge 
encore q u ’il existe. Là s’arrête toute ma science, le 
reste est construction. Car si j ’essaie de saisir ce moi 
dont je m ’assure, si j ’essaie de le définir et de le 
résumer, il n’est plus qu’une eau qui coule entre mes 
doigts. (MdS, 111)
25 In Camus’ s private library A. James Arnold found a copy o f the 1934 French edition of the Œuvres 
Posthumes (« Mercure de France »). Although it is not possible to know without doubt whether Camus had read 
this work before 1942, we nevertheless observe interesting affinities between the MdS and Nietzsche’s 
fragments.
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The strong positi visât ion o f sensory experience, which emerges in Camus’ emphasis 
on the the sensual hic et nunc in the lyrical essays and in the MdS, finds an important source 
in Nietzsche’s work for exploring the link between the raisonnement absurde and its anti­
metaphysic and anti-foundational conclusions. We read in Le Crépuscule des Idoles:
[...] le mensonge de l’unité, le mensonge de la réalité, de la substance, de la durée...[...] Les sens n e  
mentent pas en tant qu'ils montrent le devenir, la disparition, le changement...Mais dans son affirmation q u e  
l ’être est une fixion  Héraclite gardera éternellement raison. Le « monde des apparences » est le seul réel : le  
« monde-vérité » est seulement ajouté par le mensonge » (La « RAISON » DANS LA PHILOSOPHIE, § 2 )
[...] Aujourd’hui nous ne possédons de science qu’en tant que nous nous sommes décidés à accepter le  
témoignage des sens. (Ivi, § 3). [My italics]
In the MdS, understanding is defined as an inexhaustible attempt of reductio at unum  
o f the dispersed and senseless «éclats miroitants» o f sensory experience in order to satisfy the 
human «exigence de familiarité, appétit de clarté»: «Quels que soient les jeux de mots et les 
acrobaties de la logique, comprendre c ’est avant tout unifier. [...] Cette nostalgie d’unité, cet 
appétit d ’absolu illustre le mouvement essentiel du drame humain» (MdS, 110).
The paradoxes and contradictions o f human reason unveil its impossibility to discover 
«dans les miroirs changeants des phénomènes, des relations étemelles qui les puissent 
résumer et se résumer elles-mêmes en un principe unique» (MdS, 110). The initial metaphor 
o f the divorce between « l’homme et sa  vie » (MdS, 101) recovers its full meaning here: the 
ordinary well-ordered, familiar and meaningful, life o f l habitude - associated to the metaphor 
o f scene-painting {décor) -  discovers its fictional character, pointing out man’s artistic or
A/
poietic drive towards the creation o f an artificial unity.
The association between décor and mensonge leads us to reconsider the question o f  
meaning in the light of the couple espoir-tricherie, as the restless attempt of human thought to 
escape the confines o f sensory evidence («la vie elle-même») by means of a pure (abstract) 
construction (some «grande idée qui la dépasse, la sublime, lui donne un sens et la trahit», 
MdS, 103). For Camus, as for Nietzsche, « [1]’homme cherche Ta vérité’ : un monde qui ne 
puisse se contredire, ni tromper, ni changer, un monde vrai -  un monde où l’on ne souffre pas 
[ ...]»  (VPII, 10, § 6A): « ‘Une chose en soi’ -  absurdité égale au ‘sens en soi’, à la 
‘signification en soi’ [...] » (VPI, §204-206) « Le monde apparent et le monde mensonger, 26
26 «Devant cette contradiction inextricable de l’esprit, nous saisirons justement à plein le divorce qui nous sépare 
de nos propres créations. Tant que l’esprit se tait dans le monde immobile de ses espoirs, tout se reflète et 
s’ordonne dans l’unité de sa nostalgie. Mais à son premier mouvement, ce monde se fêle et s’écroule [...]» 
(MdS, 111). [My ital ics]
WWW
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c’est là l’antagonisme. Ce dernier s’est appelé jusqu’ici le « monde vrai », la « vérité », 
« Dieu ». C’est celui-là qu’il nous faut détruire » (VPI, §210). Camus wrote in similar ternis :
Je ne sais pas si ce monde a un sens qui le dépasse. Mais je sais que je ne connais pas ce sens et qu’il 
me impossible pour le moment de le connaître. Que signifie pour moi une signification hors de ma condition ? je 
ne puis comprendre qu’en termes humains. Ce que je  touche, ce qui me résiste, voilà ce que je  comprends. 
(MdS, 136)
It is in the light of Nietzsche’s thought that we fully grasp the meaning o f  Camus’ 
methodological instructions in the opening pages o f the essay: in approaching the problem of 
suicide, that is, o f the relation between senselessness and valuelessness of existence, the 
author points out that «[s]ur tous les problèmes essentiels [ . il n’y a probablement que deux 
méthodes de pensée, celle de La Palisse et celle de Don Quichotte. » (MdS, 99). These two 
characters trace the finite “perimeter” o f the absurd thought, replacing the will to truth by 
the aesthetic notion of coherence:27 8 29it is precisely in the « équilibre de l’évidence et du 
lyrisme» (Id.), symbolically de-limited by La Palisse and Don Quixotte, that the author 
defines his own method of thought as «une méthode [...] d ’analyse et non de connaissance 
[...] [qui]confesse le sentiment que toute vraie connaissance est impossible. Seules les 
apparences peuvent se dénombrer et le climat se faire sentir» (E, 106) - “true” knowledge 
being the knowledge of a transcendent Principle, which is not there, and does not take place 
in the here-and-now o f sensory existence.
In the MdS, the rejection of a foundational approach, entailed by the absurd awareness 
o f the un-attainability of the “essence” o f existence,30 leads to the substitution of the logic of
27 « Au seuil de MdS, Camus dresse deux sentinelles, deux gardes en armes: d’un côté, La Palisse, vêtu de 
l’armure de l’évidence ; de l’autre, Don Quichotte, muni de l’épée ou de la flèche du lyrisme. La réflexion, et 
donc le texte, ont a passer entre ces gardiens opposés et complémentaires. [...] si la signification symbolique de 
chacun de ces héros délibérément antithétiques est parfaitement explicite, 1’ « évidence » et le « lyrisme » sont 
considérés moins comme modes d’expression, que comme des « méthodes de pensée », permettant de définir la 
relation de l’être au monde, à la mort, et à sa propre vie. », Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi, « Entre La Palisse et Don 
Quichotte», Camus et le lyrisme, Paris, SEDES, 1997, p. 35. Camus noted in his Carnets in 1939: «Don 
Quichotte et La Palisse. La Palisse: « Un quart d’heure avant ma mort, j ’étais encore en vie. Ceci suffit à ma 
gloire. Mais cette gloire est usurpée. Ma vrai philosophie est qu ’un quart d ’heure après ma mort, je  ne serai plus 
en vie ». Don Quichotte : « Oui, j ’ai combattu des moulins à vent. Car il est profondément indifférent de 
combattre les moulins à vent ou les géants. Tellement indifférent qu’il est facile de les confondre. J ’ai une 
métaphysique de myope ». (CI, 185) (My italics).
28 The key question of MdS being «y a-t-il une logique jusqu’à la mort ?» (MdS, 103), « honnêteté », « véritable 
effort» (MdS, 104), «ténacité» (Id.) in maintaining the absurd premîses define cohérence as the (anti- 
foundational) logic of the « raisonnement absurde ».
29 Camus uses the expression «polythéisme abstrait» to address the ideas or essences of metaphysical thought: 
«Kierkegaard s’abîmait dans son Dieu, Parménide précipitait la pensée dans l’Un. Mais ici la pensée se jette dans 
un polythéisme abstrait. II y a mieux : les hallucinations et les fictions font partie elles aussi des « essences extra­
temporelles ». Dans le nouveau monde des idées, la catégorie de centaure collabore avec celle, plus modeste, de 
métropolitain » (E, 131).
30 « Le contraste qu’on trouve ici [dans la Naissance de la tragédie] n’est pas entre un monde vrai et un monde 
apparent ; il n’y qu’un seul monde et il est faux, cruel, contradictoire, captieux, absurde... Un monde ainsi fait
1 1
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explanation, implicit in the reconciliatory narratives o f traditional metaphysics, with a n  
aesthetic approach, that is, one that points out the “descriptive” and “creative” capacity o f  
thought vis à vis the fragmentary plurality o f  phenomena.31 Echoing Nietzsche, Camus w rites 
in his notebooks in 1942 : « Le monde absurde ne reçoit qu’un justification esthétique » (C il ,  
65).32
The awareness o f the poetic/poietic power o f the intellect, brought forth by th e  
unveiling o f the metaphysical “illusions”, opens the way to a finite, “perspective” , 
understanding: « La seule pensée qui ne soit pas mensongère est donc une pensée stérile » , 
that is, aware o f  the « murs absurdes » that de-limit its claims, a thought that makes « tabu la  
rasa » o f the delusory « maisons d’idées », chosing the «route aride et desséchée de l’effo rt 
lucide » (MdS, 137) -  «L’absurde, c’est la raison lucide qui constate ses limites» (MdS, 134):
Tout ce que je puis dire, c’est qu’en effet cela passe ma mesure. Si je  n’en tire pas une négation,33 d u  
moins je ne veux rien fonder sur rincomprébensible. On me dit encore que l’intelligence doit ici sacrifier 
son orgueil et la raison s’incliner. Mais si je  reconnais les limites de la raison, je ne la nie pas pour autant, 
reconnaissant ses pouvoirs relatifs. Je veux seulement me tenir dans ce chemin moyen où l ’intelligence p e u t 
rester claire. Si c’est là son orgueil, je  ne vois pas de raison suffisante pour y renoncer. Rien de plus profonde, 
par exemple, que la vue de Kierkegaard selon quoi le désespoir n’est pas un fait mais un état : l’état même d u  
péché. Car le péché c ’est ce qui éloigne de Dieu. L’absurde, qui est l’état métaphysique de l’homme conscient, 
ne mène pas à Dieu. [...] l’absurde, c’est le péché sans Dieu. (MdS, 127-8) [My itaïics]
But, in order to clarify in what sense the anti-foundational perspective, which informs 
the raisonnement absurde o f the MdS, provides, in Camus’s own words, a «passionate 
définition» of m odem  nihilism, we need to take an additional source into account.
est le monde vrai. Nous avons besoin du mensonge pour triompher de cette réalité, de cette « vérité », c’est-à- 
dire pour vivre... Que le mensonge soit nécessaire à la vie, cela même fait partie de ce caractère effroyable est 
suspect de l’existence.
La métaphysique, la morale, la religion, la science sont considérées dans ce livre comme des formes 
diverses du mensonge [...]. « II fau t que la vie inspire confiance » : le problème ainsi posé est monstrueux. Pour 
le résoudre, il faut que l’homme soit déjà menteur par nature, il faut qu’il soit avant tout un artiste. Et il l’est en 
effet : la métaphysique, la religion, la morale, la science sont autant de produits de sa volonté artiste, de sa 
volonté de mentir, de fuir la « vérité », de nier la ‘vérité’. [...] la faculté qu’il a de maîtriser la réalité par le 
mensonge, cette faculté artiste par excellence [...]. » (VPII, §8, p. 269).
31 Mathieu Kessler (Nietzsche ou le dépassement esthétique de la métaphysique, PUF, 1999) and Luigi 
Rustichelli (La profondità della superficie. Senso del tragico e giustifïcazione estetica dell’esistenza in F. 
Nietzsche, Milano, Mursia 1992) both employ the expression « aesthetic perspective » to define an approach that 
refuses the absolute cognitive and moral values o f the metaphysical tradition in favour of an artistic conception 
of man as creator o f  meaning and values in a provisional and plural context
32 « Je me suis toujours efforcé de me démontrer Y innocence du devenir [...]. Ma première solution a été de 
tenter la justification esthétique de l ’existence » (F. Nietzsche, VPII, § 465, p. 175).
33 As Camus himself points out further on about the absurd and God, the negation (of God or a Principle which 
would transcend the limits of sensory evidence) would still entail its affirmation. Camus’ method o f thought 
echoes in many respects Husserl’s epoché, suspending all judgement beyond the reach of the senses. By doing so 
it opens up an aisthetic “space” in which the absurd thought is ex-posed to/in its limits.
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According to James Arnold, in his earlier reading o f Ecce homo Camus had devoted a 
particular attention to the chapter on La Naissance de la Tragédie (in “Pourquoi j'écris  de si 
bons livres”):
[...] relevons surtout cette phrase, soulignée et rappelée dans la marge par une double barre : « [...] les Grecs 
parvinrent à en finir avec le pessimisme [...] La tragédie précisément est la preuve que les Grecs n ’étaient pas 
des pessimistes. [...] Socrate y est présenté [dans VOrigine de la Tragédie] pour la première fois comme 
l’instrument de la décomposition grecque, comme le décadent-type. La « raison » s’y oppose à l’instinct La 
« raison » à tout prix apparaît comme une puissance dangereuse, comme une puissance qui mine la vie. Dans le 
livre tout entier, il y  a un silence profond et hostile pour tout ce qui touche le christianisme. Celui-ci n’est ni 
apollinien ni dionysien ; il nie toutes les valeurs esthétiques, les seules que reconnaisse YOrigine de la tragédie ; 
il est nihiliste au sens le plus profond [...] ».34[My italics]
In this passage, carefully underlined by the young reader, Nietzsche uses the term “nihilist’ to 
address the Christian- moral and metaphysical attitude as opposed to the tragic or Dionysian 
“yes-saying” (affirmation) to life.35
What I suggest is that it is not in this acceptation that, between 1941 and September 
1942, Camus resorts to the term “nihilism” in order to describe the absurd argument in the 
MdS, but that he draws upon a different source in order to address the problem o f the loss of 
transcendent meaning and the anti-foundational tabula rasa o f  all traditional value, namely, to 
Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments, published in the French editions of the Œuvres 
Posthumes and La Volonté de puissance. One month after finishing the MdS, Camus noted in 
his Carnets (March 1941): «L’Absurde et le Pouvoir -  à creuser (cf. Hitler)» (CI, 225).36 37It is 
plausible that he resorted to Nietzsche’s posthumous texts in order to elucidate this relation.
Echoing Nietzsche’s posthumous notes in La Volonté de puissance, in which the term 
nihilism is related to a process o f introduction/extraction o f (man-created) values in/from the 
world (antropomorphism), brought forth by the (modem) decline of the traditional highest 
values, and which disclose the possibility for a transvaluation o f values in contemporary time;
34 A. James Arnold, art. cit., 96.
3Î The term “nihilism” recurs in this same acceptation, as synonym of “Christian’’ and “will-negating” (with 
reference to Schopenhauer), in § 21 of “Flâneries Inactuelles” in Crépuscule des Idoles -  which, according to the 
Carnets, Camus was reading in 1938.
36 This short note suggests that Camus might have been reacting to an idea that was probably circulating in the 
intellectual clandestine debate in Occupied France, concerning the political implications of the anti-metaphysical 
and anti-foundational argument of the Absurd, in other words, of Nihilism. See Cahiers Albert Camus 4, 
Caligula, suivi de La poétique du premier Caligula, A. James Arnold Ed., Paris, Gallimard, 1984, p. 169.
37 We know that Camus was in possession of two copies of La Volonté de puissance, in the “Mercure de France” 
edition, translated by Henri Albert (1923), and in the Gallimard edition, edited in two volumes (1935; 1937) by 
Friedrich Wiirzbach and translated into French by Geneviève Bianquis, as well as of the first edition of 
Nietzsche’s Œuvres posthumes (1934), a collection of 893 fragments from the Kröner edition, translated by 
Henri Jean Bolle. Although the date o f the editions in his possession does not allow us to say precisely when 
Camus actually read these texts for the first time, we cannot exclude that he was already acquainted with these 
works around 1942-43. Frantz Favre’s article does not exclude this hypothesis (cf., Frantz Favre, «Quand Camus 
lisait Nietzsche», in Albert Camus 20, La Revue des Lettres Modernes, Paris, Minard, 2004, p. 201).
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in a letter to Pierre Bonnel (March 1943), Camus identifies the question of the absurd  with an  
analogous process o f extraction o f all meaning and value from the world (E, 1423) -  
« L’effort de la pensée absurde (et gratuite), c’est l’expulsion de tous les jugements de valeur 
au profit des jugements de fait » (ibid).
Que signifie le nihilisme? Que les valeurs supérieures se déprécient Les fins manquent ; il n’est pas de 
réponse à cette question : « A’ quoi bon ? » .38
In sections A and B o f  Nietzsche’s fragment on the Fall o f  cosmological values 
(November 1887-March 1888), 39 cosmological refers to (all) “higher” values, in that they 
determine the sphere o f becoming and transiency in which human life is inscribed. The de­
valuation of cosmological values, grounding and bestowing value upon everything that is, 
brings about the de-valuation o f  what is, o f being as a whole: nihilism thus coincides with the 
feeling that everything is devoid of value, the feeling of the nothingness o f the universe. 
Nihilism as the de-valuation o f the highest values is identified with the emergence o f a feeling  
o f total loss of value -  nihilism as a psychological state:
Le nihilisme, en tant qu 'état psychologique, se manifestera en premier lieu quand nous aurons cherché 
dans tous les faits le “sens” qu’ils ne comportent pas ; tellement que le chercheur en perdra courage. [...] Ce 
« sens de la vie » aurait pu consister à découvrir dans tout le devenir « l’accomplissement » de quelque canon 
moral élevé, l’ordre moral de l’univers ; ou un accroissement d’amour et d’harmonie entre les êtres ; ou 
l’approche d’un état de félicité universelle ; ou même l’élan vers un néant universel -  une fin quelle qu’elle soit 
est tout de même un sens. Le trait commun de toutes ces conceptions, c’est que le processus tend vers un terme ; 
et de nos jours on a compris que le devenir ne tend à rien, n’atteint rien ...La déception au sujet d ’une prétendue 
fin  du devenir est donc une des causes du nihilisme
Le nihilisme psychologique se manifeste en deuxième lieu quand on a supposé une totalité, une 
systématisation, voire une organisation à l’intérieur des faits et entre tous les faits [...]. On imagine une manière 
d’unité, une forme quelconque de «m onism e» [...] «L e bien général exige le dévouement de 
l’individu »...mais voici que cette généralité n 'existe pas ! Au fond, l ’homme a perdu la foi dans sa valeur 
propre dès qu’à travers lui ce n’est pas une collectivité précieuse qui agit ; c ’est dire qu’il a imaginé cette 
collectivité afin de pouvoir croire à sa propre valeur.
Le nihilisme psychologique a encore une troisième et dernière form e. Une fois ces deux faits admis, que 
le devenir est sans but et qu’il n ’est pas dirigé par quelque grande unité dans laquelle l’individu puisse plonger 
totalement comme dans un élément de valeur suprême, il reste une échappatoire possible : c’est de condamner 
tout ce monde du devenir comme illusoire, et d’inventer un monde situé au-delà, qui serait le monde vrai. Mais 
dès que l’homme découvre que ce monde n’est bâti que sur ses propres besoins psychologiques [...], on voit se 
dégager la dernière forme de nihilisme qui implique la négation du monde métaphysique et qui s’interdit de 
croire à un monde vrai. Parvenu à ce stade, on avoue que la réalité du devenir est la seule réalité, on s’interdit 
tous les chemins détournés qui ramèneraient la croyance à d’autres monde et à des faux dieux -  mais on ne 
supporte pas ce monde que l'on n 'a déjà plus la volonté de nier. . .40
By identifying the first condition for the emergence o f nihilism as psychological state 
in man’s quest for a meaning or end (sens) in ail that happens, the dominion o f nihilism is
38 Nietzsche, VP, II, p. 50, § 100.
39 Cf., Martin Heidegger, Il nichilismo europeo, Milano, Adelphi, 2003,
40 F. Nietzsche, La volonté de puissance, II, texte établit par Friedrich Würzbach, traduit par G. Bianquis, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1995, pp. 54-55. [My italics]
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equated to the dominion o f the absence o f meaning (sens), which Nietzsche uses 
interchangeably in the sense o f absence o f value.
Now, we are inclined to see a correspondence between the absurd argument in the 
MdS and the “intermediate phase” o f the third and last form o f  nihilism, as the negation o f  the 
meta-physical world, that is, o f the belief in a true supra-sensory world beyond this one. The 
true world is “unmasked” as illusory artefact, fabricated through the insertion o f the 
categories o f meaning, unity and truth in sheer becoming; the sensory/sensual evidence o f this 
world remains the only reality (the innocence of becoming).
At this stage, the “nihilistic” thought rejects all escape («on s’interdit tous les chemins 
détournés qui ramèneraient la croyance à d’autres mondes et à des faux dieux») - 41 42what 
Camus addresses in the MdS as Vesquive mortelle, rejected by the lucid thought o f the 
absurd. But, as it is - that is, deprived o f meaning and value -  the world is felt to be 
unbearable. In a note in the Carnets, dated between February and May 1943, we read:
Imaginons un penseur qui dit: « Voilà, je sais que cela est vrai. Mais finalement les conséquences m'en 
répugnent et je recule. La vérité est inacceptable même pour celui qui la trouve. » On aura ainsi le penseur 
absurde et son perpétuel malaise. (Cil, 82) [My italics]
The « unbearable truth » can easily be identified in the MdS with the absurd feeling  in 
face of the evidence o f  the meaninglessness and strangeness o f a world in-difFerent to the 
categories of reason.43 4It is around September 1943 that James Arnold dates the famous 
sentence from the tragedy Caligula, 44 «Les hommes meurent et ils ne sont pas heureux» (T, 
16).45 This sentence is inserted in the dialogue between Caligula and Hélicon (Act I, scene 4), 
which in the definitive version o f  the play is preceded by Caligula’s words: «Ce monde, tel 
q u 'il est, n'est pas supportable. J ’ai donc besoin de la lune, ou du bonheur, ou de 
l’immortalité, de quelque chose qui soit dément peut-être, mais qui ne soit pas de ce monde » 
(T, 15).
The unbearableness of the absurd “truth” (MdS, 121), expressed by Caligula, 
elucidates the relationship between nihilism as a psychological state, i.e., as a the feeling  of
41 F. Nietzsche, VPII, § 111 A, p. 55.
42 « L’equive mortelle qui fait le troisième thème de cet essai [MdS], c’est l’espoir. Espoir d’une autre vie qu’il 
faut « mériter », ou tricherie de ceux qui vivent non pour la vie elle-même, mais pour quelque grande idée qui la 
dépasse, la sublime, lui donne un sens et la trahit » (MdS, 102-103).
43 «11 faut se décider à introduire dans les choses de la pensée une distinction nécessaire entre philosophie 
d’évidence et philosophie de préférence. Autrement dit, on peut aboutir à une philosophie qui répugne à l’esprit 
et au cœur mais qui s'im pose. Ainsi ma philosophie d’évidence c'est l'absurde [...] » (Cil, 82).
44 CAC4, p.189, n.42.
45 A. James Arnold places the «révision de l’attitude de Camus envers Nietzsche» around 1943, in particular of 
the “Nietzscheanism” of his juvénile writings, which may presumably hâve coincided with the reading o f the 
posthumous notes on nihilism.
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the meaninglessness and nothingness o f  the universe,46 and pessimism - « Ce qui découle d u  
pessimisme, c ’est la doctrine de l’absurdité de l’existence, l’idée que la douleur et le p laisir 
n’ont aucun sens, que I’TjSoufj ne peut être principe. C’est pour le siècle prochain. Doctrine d e  
la grande lassitude : « À quoi bon ? Rien n’en vaut la peine ! ». ».47 48«Le pessimisme, form e
«e
préliminaire du nihilisme ».
Nietzsche’s notes on nihilism as a psychological state not only shed further light o n  
the relationship between ultimate meaninglessness (loss or retreat of the world) and th e  
problem of suicide, identified in the MdS with the judgement that life is worth/not worth  
living (MdS, 99) as the fundamental question o f philosophy, but also help to elucidate further 
Camus’s sentence in the Carnets'.
L’intelligence moderne est en plein désarroi. La connaissance s’est distendue à ce point que le monde e t  
l’esprit ont perdu tout point d’appui. C’est un fait que nous souffrons de nihilisme. (Cil, 26)
By evoking the feeling o f absurdity (sentiment de l ’absurdité), and treating «une 
sensibilité absurde qu’on peut trouver éparse dans le siècle» (MdS, 97), the MdS may be  
described as a passionate definition o f  modem nihilism. However, what I suggest is that 
Camus’s metaphorical treatment o f  the absurd in the MdS refutes all pessimistic «doctrine o f  
the absurdity o f existence».
1.2. Fo r  a n  a is t h e t ic  a pp r o a c h  t o  t h e  a b s u r d .
Camus resorts to the metaphor o f  divorce in order to introduce the notion o f the absurd:
Si j ’accuse un innocent d’un crime monstrueux, si j ’affirme à un homme vertueux qu’il a convoité sa 
propre sœur, il me répondra que c’est absurde [...]. L’homme vertueux illustre par cette réplique l’antinomie 
définitive qui existe entre l’acte que je  lui prête et les principes de toute sa vie. « C’est absurde » veut dire : 
« c’est impossible », maïs aussi : « c’est contradictoire ». Je vois un homme attaquer à l’arme blanche un groupe 
de mitrailleuses, je  jugerai que son acte est absurde. Mais il n’est tel qu’en vertu de la disproportion qui existe 
entre son intention et la réalité qui l’attend. [...] l ’absurdité sera d’autant plus grande que l’écart croîtra entre les 
termes de ma comparaison. [...] le sentiment de l’absurdité ne naît pas du simple examen d’un fait ou d’une 
impression mais [...][qu’]il jaillit de la comparaison entre un état de fait et une certaine réalité, entre une action 
et le monde qui la dépasse. L’absurde est essentiellement un divorce. I l n ’est n i dans l ’un ni dans l ’autre des 
éléments comparés. Il naît de leur confrontation. (MdS, 119-120) [My italics]
46 It is difficult not to notice a resemblance between this definition o f psychological nihilism and Camus’ 
prologue to the MdS - «les pages qui suivent traitent d ’une sensibilité absurde qu’on peut trouver éparse dans le 
siècle» A variant o f the manuscript reads: « Il y a du provisoire dans les pages qui suivent. Elles traitent d’une 
sensibilité éparse dans les gestes et les actes de notre temps. » (E, 1430, note 2 to p. 97). [My italics]
47 F. Nietzsche, VPII, § 99 (1II-XII1884), p. 50.
48 Ivi, § 92, p. 48.
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As the author emphasises in the opening lines o f  the chapter, «[I]e sentiment de 
l ’absurde n ’est pas pour autant la notion de l ’absurde. Il la fonde, un point c ’est tout. Il ne 
s ’y  résume pas, sinon le court instant où il porte son jugement sur l ’univers. Il lui reste 
ensuite à aller plus loin. Il est vivant, c ’est-à-dire qu ’il doit mourir ou retentir plus avant.49 » 
(MdS, 119) It is at the intersection between sentiment and notion of the absurd that we can, in 
my view, grasp the meaning and the implications o f Camus’ definition of the absurd, vis-à- 
vis the traditional acceptations of the term, 50 as beginning (commencement), a  liminal 
experience, which shatters the regime o f  necessity, represented by the unity/uniformity of a 
“vie machinale” (MdS, 107).
It is in this « court instant où [le sentiment de l ’absurde] porte son jugement sur 
l ’univers » - in which, according to the author, the feeling is fully comprehended in the notion 
of the absurd - that the meaning of the latter is made visible,51 52not as mere absence of 
meaning, but rather as an inaugurating «event», as surprise («Le sentiment de l’absurdité au 
détour de n ’importe quelle rue peut frapper à la face de n’importe quel homme», MdS, 105) 
or beginning («commencement»), which opens up time, provoking «le movement de la 
conscience» (MdS, 107):
It arrive que les décors s’écroulent. Lever, tramway, quatre heures de bureau ou d’usine, repas, 
tramway, quatre heures de travail, repas, sommeil et lundi mardi mercredi jeudi vendredi et samedi sur le même 
rythme, cette route se suit aisément la plupart du temps. Un jour seulement, le «pourquoi » s'élève et tout 
commence dans cette lassitude teintée d'étonnement. (MdS, 106-107). [My italics]
It is in/as this «syncope» in/of temporality, conceived as succession and as 
necessity, that Camus defines the absurd through a second metaphor in praesentia:
49 My italics.
30 As A. Nicolas points out, «Les critiques ont eu tendance à ramener l’absurde camusien à l’absurde classique, 
qui est un constat de non-signification» (quoted by M.L.Audin, op. cit, p. 34).
51 «Jusqu’ici, c’est par l’extérieur que nous avons pu circonscrire l’absurde. On peut se demander cependant ce 
que cette notion contient de clair et tenter de retrouver par l’analyse directe sa signification d’une part et, de 
l’autre, les conséquences qu’elle entraîne » (MdS, 119).
52 I suggest that we read these passages next to Jean-Luc Nancy’s analysis of the relation between time and 
surprise: « La surprise [...] offre dans le “cours” lui-même le retrait du cours du temps [...]. La surprise est déjà 
inscrite au cœur de toutes les analyses philosophiques de la temporalité, et singulièrement des analyses de 
l’instant présent : sur la limite entre l’avoir-déjà-été et le ne-pas-être-encore, le présent s’est toujours avéré aussi 
bien comme limite de présence [...]. Ce qui est la structure de la surprise (et celle-ci formerait donc l’exact 
revers de la structure du présent) : elle a lieu sans être arrivée ; ell n’aura donc pas eu lieu, mais elle aura ouvert 
le temps [...]. Le temps ouvert pourra être le temps de l’étonnement, du bouleversement, ou celui de 
l’interrogation, del’explication. [...] Mais ce temps qu’on prendra [pour répondre à la question : « Pourquoi ? »] 
n’aura été ouvert que par la surprise [...]» (J.-L. Nancy, L ’expérience de la liberté, Galilée, Paris, 198S, p. 147). 
A similar intuition may be found, in my view, in Camus’ definition of the absurd as “beginning”, opening up the 
temporal succession o f “la vie machinale’’ - the time of «l’habitude» expressed by metaphor of the «chain» 
(MdS, 107) - and disclosing a time of astonishment ( “lassitude teintée d'étonnement") and for questioning: «La 
suite, c’est le retour inconscient dans la chaîne, ou c’est l’éveil definitif» (MdS, 107). A focus on the moment of 
wonder, as the mark o f surprise, would, thus, allow to read «les origines de l’absurde» (MdS, 107) in the sense
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De même et pour tous les jours d’une vie sans éclat, le temps nous porte, Mais un moment v ien t 
toujours où il faut le porter. Nous vivons sur l ’avenir : « demain », « plus tard », « quand tu auras une situation »  
[...] Ces inconséquences sont admirables, car enfin il s’agit de mourir. Un jour vient pourtant et l’hom m e 
constate ou dit qu’il a trente ans. Il affirme ainsi sa jeunesse. Mais du même coup, il se situe par rapport a u  
temps. Il y  prend sa place. Il reconnaît q u ’il est à un certain moment d ’une courbe qu’il confesse d evo ir  
parcourir. Il appartient au temps et, à cette horreur qui le saisit, il y  reconnaît son pire ennemi. Demain, il 
souhaitait demain, quand tout lui-même aurait dû s’y refuser. Cette révolte de la chair, c ’est l ’absurde. (M dS, 
107) [My italics]
The experience of the absurd, which lakes place as a time opened up for and b y  
questioning (the original “w/ty?”), situates the individual in relation to time; in other w ords, 
by interrupting “ordinary” time, it opens up a “space”, the hic et nunc of the body, in w hich 
the living being is “positioned” in the exposedness o f  his existing.53
Now, the “mise en position”, brought forth in/as the experience o f the absurd, 
expressed by the second metaphor in praesentia (MdS, 107), short-circuits the  
phenomenological understanding o f le corps as the objective correlate o f  a subject 
(conscience). Without being reduced to the mere “presence” o f  sheer physicality, in the sense 
of an unreflective and unrelated immanence, I argue that the «chair révoltée» entails, always 
and already, what Nietzsche addresses as an aesthetic judgement: 54
Le beau, le répugnant, etc., voilà le premier jugement. Dès qu’il prétend à la vérité absolue, le jugement 
esthétique se transforme en exigence morale.
Dès que nous nions la vérité absolue, il nous faut renoncer à toute espèce d'exigence absolue et nous retrancher 
dans des jugements esthétiques. Voici la tâche : créer une foule de jugements esthétiques également ju stifiés , 
dont chacun soit pour un individu la réalité dernière et la norme des choses.
Réduction de la morale à l’esthétique ! ! (VPII, §437, and (EP, §497)
Thus, Camus’ notion o f the absurd must be understood - at least in its initial moment, that is, 
in that « court instant où [le sentiment de l’absurde] porte son jugement sur l’univers » - as 
aesthetic judgement, in the sense o f Nietzsche’s fragment. This is confirmed by the opening 
Unes of the chapter «Les murs absurdes» in the MdS:
Comme les grandes œuvres, les sentiments profonds signifient toujours plus qu’ils n’ont conscience de 
le dire. La constance d ’un mouvement ou d ’une répulsion dans une âme se retrouve dans des habitudes de faire 
ou de penser, se poursuit dans des conséquences que l’âme elle-même ignore. Les grands sentiments promènent 
avec eux leur univers, splendide ou misérable. Us éclairent de leur passion un monde exclusif où ils retrouvent 
leur climat. [...] Un univers, c’est-à-dire une métaphysique et une attitude de l’esprit. Ce qui est vrai des 
sentiments déjà spécialisés le sera plus encore pour des émotions à leur base aussi indéterminées, à la fo is aussi
of «[c]e qui «arrive» sans arriver, c’est-à-dire sans provenir d’une origine mais en pro-venant ou en sur-venant à 
l’origine (comme le cri, peut-être, surviendrait à l’orifice d’origine de la bouche, et n ’en proviendrait pas) [...]» 
(J.-L. Nancy, op. cït., p. 147)
53 Cf. J.-L. Nancy, op. cit., p. 145.
54 « II me faut renoncer non seulement au dogme du péché, mais à celui du mérite (de la vertu). Ce qui subsiste, 
ce sont, comme dans la nature, les jugements esthétiques.» (VPII, §459)
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confuses et aussi « certaines », aussi lointaines et aussi « présentes » que celles que nous donne le beau ou que 
suscite l ’absurde. (MdS, 105) [My italics]
The anti-foundational perspective outlined in the raisonnement absurde prevents the attentive 
reader from falling into the (linguistic) pitfall of a substantialist interpretation of the absurd; 
the meaning of the absurd as a peculiar kind of (aesthetic) judgement is further elucidated by 
another passage:
Dans rattachement d’un homme à la vie, il y a quelque chose de plus fort que toutes les misères du 
monde. Le jugement du corps vaut bien celui de l ’esprit et le corps recule devant l ’anéantissement. Nous 
prenons l’habitude de vivre avant d’acquérir celle de penser. Dans cette course qui nous précipite tous les jours 
un peu plus vers la mort, le corps garde cette avance irréparable. (MdS, 102) [My italics]
I suggest that we interpret the opposition vivre/penser in the light of the author’s 
(Nietzschean) rejection o f all «fiction», identified with the meta-physical or meta-sensory 
products (iartefacts) -  and denoted as «les décors masqués» (MdS, 108), «les jeux de mots et 
les acrobaties de la logique» (MdS, 110) - of the abstract powers o f human thought. This idea 
is further elucidated in a short note in the Carnets in 1938: «La pensée est toujours en avant. 
Elle va trop loin, plus loin que le corps qui est dans le présent. Supprimer l’espérance, c’est 
ramener la pensée au corps. Et le corps doit pourrir. » (CI, 128).55
«La révolte de la chair» would, thus, coincide with the awareness of the man’s being exposed 
to the sensory limit, which de-fines existence in the “here-and-now” of physical/sensual 
presence (aisthesis).56 As we read in another note in the Carnets:
Dans les chemin au-dessus de Blida, la nuit comme un lait et une douceur, avec sa grâce et sa 
méditation. Le matin sur la montagne avec sa chevelure rase ébouriffée de colchiques, - les sources glacées. -  
l’ombre et le soleil, - mon corps qui consent puis refuse. L’effort concentré de la marche, l’air dans les poumons 
comme un fer rouge ou un rasoir affilé, - tout entier dans cette application et ce surpassement qui l’efforcent à 
triompher de la pente, - comme une connaissance de soi par le corps. Le corps, vrai chemin de la culture, il nous 
montre nos limites. (CI, 90). (17th October 1937) [My italics]
Camus’s understanding o f the absurd exceeds sheer absurdity, which also recurs in 
Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments as the irrationality and meaninglessness of the world and 
o f man’s mortal condition. It is precisely through the experiences o f absurdity -  above all, the
55 My italics.
56 «Ce cœur en moi, je puis l’éprouver et je juge qu’il existe. Ce monde, je  puis le toucher et je  juge encore qu’il 
existe. Là s’arrête toute ma science, le reste est construction. [...] Entre la certitude que j ’ai de mon existence et 
le contenu que j ’essaie de donner à cette assurance, le fossé ne sera jamais comblé. Pour toujours, je serai 
étranger à moi-même. En psychologie comme en logique, il y a des vérités mais point de vérité. Le « connais-toi 
toi-même » de Socrate a autant de valeur que le « soi vertueux » de nos confessionnaux. Ils révèlent une 
nostalgie en même temps que d’une ignorance. Ce sont des jeux stériles sur des grands sujets » (MdS, 111)
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/^experience o f  death,57 58as the elementary , sensory evidence «[de] ce corps inerte ou u n e  
gifle ne marque plus» (MdS, 109) — that the aisthetic dimension of the absurd is b rought 
forth:
Je disais que le monde est absurde et j ’allais trop vite. Ce inonde en lui-même n’est pas raisonnable, 
c’est tout ce qu’on en peut dire. Mais ce qui est absurde, c'est la  confrontation de cet irrationnel et de ce d é s ir  
éperdu de clarté dont l'appel résonne au plus profond de l'homme. L’absurde dépend autant de l’homme que d u  
monde. Il est pour le moment leur seul lien. Il les scelle l’un à l’autre comme la haine seule peut river les êtres. 
(MdS, 113) [My italics]
The “absurd” relation between man and the world can be fully grasped in the 1939 lyrical 
essay Noces à Tipascr.
Aux mystères d’Éleusis, il suffisait de contempler. Ici même [à Tipasa], je  sais que jam ais je  n e  
m ’approcherai assez au monde. Il me fau t être nu et puis plonger dans la mer, encore tout parfumé des essences 
de la terre, laver celles-ci dans celles-là, et nouer sur ma peau l’étreinte pour laquelle soupirent lèvres à lèvres 
depuis si longtemps la terne et la mer. Entré dans l’eau, c'est le saisissement, la montée d’une glu froide e t  
opaque, puis le plongeon dans le bourdonnement des oreilles, le nez coulant et la bouche amère [ . . . ] ;  la course 
de l’eau sur mon corps, cette possession tumultueuse de l’onde par mes jambes -  et l’absence d ’horizon. Sur le  
rivage, c’est la chute dans le sable, abandonné au monde, rentré dans ma pesanteur de chair et d ’os [...] Il n’y a  
qu’un seul amour dans ce monde. Éteindre un corps de femme, c ’est aussi retenir contre soi cette joie étrange qui 
descend du ciel vers la mer. Tout à l’heure, quand je me jetterai dans les absinthes pour me faire entrer le 
parfum dans le corps, j ’aurai conscience, contre tous les préjugés, d ’accomplir une vérité qui est celle du so le il 
et sera aussi celle de ma mort. (E, 57-58) [My italics]
I suggest that the sensual experience of being «abandonné au monde», described in  
these pages, allows us to re-interpret the absurd in the sense o f  what Jean-Luc Nancy defines
CD
as the «près-enee de la présence sensible», that is, as a “closeness” between, or a touching- 
upon 0toucher-à), o f man-to-the-world and to-himself, that exposes the unbridgeable 
liminality inherent in the sensory (aisthetic) relationship o f sentant/senti (aisthesis =  
‘perception’), which «dans l’unité espaçante de son contact, implique le rapport, sous la  
forme de l’être-affecté-par, et par conséquent de Vêtre-affectable-par, ou de Vêtre-passible-de 
(dont l’intellection, et le sens intelligible, ne sont après tout qu’une modulation ou une 
modalisation, voire une affection de l’affect lui-même » .59
It is from this perspective that the rich metaphorical texture o f Camus’s writing, in the 
lyrical essays as well as in the 1942 philosophical essay, acquires its full meaning.
We read in the lyrical essays o f Noces:
57 «C’est qu’en réalité, il n’y a pas d’expérience de la mort. Au sens propre, n’est expérimenté que ce qui a été 
vécu et rendu conscient. Ici, c’est tout juste s ’il est possible de parler de l ’expérience de la mort des autres » 
(MdS, 108).
58 J.-L. Nancy, Le Sens du monde, op. cit., p. 196.
S9J.-L. Nancy, Ivi. It is precisely in the awareness o f  Vètre-affecté-par that we recognize Camus’s notion o f  
passion passive in the Carnets (Cl, 83), as the convergence of suffering, the lucid awareness of the absurd man, 
and revolt (défi), which provides, as we will show, the bridge between the MdS and the political notes and 
writings o f 1943-44.
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À Tipasa, je  vois équivaut à je  crois, et je  ne m’obstine pas à nier ce que ma main peut toucher et mes 
lèvres caresser. Je n’éprouve pas le besoin d’en faire une œuvre d’art, mais de raconter, ce qui est différent 
Tipasa m’apparaît comme ces personnages qu’on décrit pour signifier indirectement un point de vue sur le 
monde. Comme eux, elle témoigne, et virilement Elle est aujourd’hui mon personnage et il me semble qu 'à le 
caresser et le décrire, mon ivresse n 'aura plus de fin . Il y a un temps pour vivre et un temps pour témoigner de 
vivre. [ . Il me suffit de vivre de tout mon corps et de témoigner de tout mon cœur. (E, 59) [My italics]
What the Algerian nature o f Tipasa and Djémila « signifies », in Camus’s work, is 
precisely an aisthetic perspective, from which the expérience o f  duality (1 ’envers et l  ’endroit) 
and the nostalgia for a Plotinian Unity (E, 75) are re-comprised in the sensoiy/sensual être- 
au-monde. The m otif of union/fusion (noces) with the world (E, 76) describes the being- 
brought-to-the-limit, which is inscribed in the aisthetic présent (here-and-now) as the mutual 
exposedness (toucher-à) of man and world:60
Comme le galet verni par les marées, j ’étais poli par le vent, usé jusqu’à l’âme. J’étais un peu de cette 
force selon laquelle je  flottais, puis beaucoup, puis elle enfin, confondant les battements de mon sang et les 
grands coups sonores de ce cœur partout présent de la nature. Le vent me façonnait à l’image de l’ardente nudité 
qui m’entourait. [...] Ce bain violent de soleil et de vent épuisait toutes mes forces de vie. À peine en moi ce 
battement d’ailes qui affleure, cette vie qui se plaint, cette faible révolte de l’esprit Bientôt, répandu aux quatre 
coins du monde, oublieux, oublié de moi-même, je  suis ce vent et dans le vent, ces colonnes et cet arc, ces dalles 
qui sentent chaud et ces montagnes pâles autour de la ville déserte. Et jam ais je  n ’ai senti, si avant, à la fo is mon 
détachement de moi-même et ma présence au monde.
Oui, je suis présent. Et ce qui me frappe à ce moment, c’est que je  ne peux aller plus loin. Comme un 
homme emprisonné à perpétuité -  et tout lui est présent (E, 62). [My italics]
In the pages o f Noces, we observe a link between the notion of absurdity and the 
aisthetic unity o f  world and man: «Cette union que souhaitait Plotin, quoi d’étrange à la 
retrouver sur la terre? L ’Unité s ’exprime ici en termes de soleil et de mer. Elle est sensible au 
cœur par un certain goût de la chair qui fa it son amertume et sa grandeur » (E, 75 ).61 Here 
again « la chair » déclarés the impassable confines o f existence («je ne peux aller plus loin», 
« comme un homme emprisonné à perpétuité »), experienced in the aisthetic «patrie de l’âme 
où devient sensible la parenté du monde, où les coups de sang rejoignent les pulsations 
violentes du soleil de deux heures » (E, 75) :
Entre ce ciel et ces visages tournés vers lui, rien où accrocher une mythologie, une littérature, une 
éthique ou une religion, mais des pierres, la chair, des étoiles et ces vérités que la main peut toucher. [...] Tout 
ce qui exalte la vie, accroît en même temps son absurdité. (E, 74-75) [My highlightings]
60 See J.-L. Nancy, Le Sens du monde, op. cit., pp. 196-ff. As F. Noudelmann confirms: «Le corps à corps 
amoureux de l’homme et de la terre met naturellement en valeur le toucher [...]. La main touche le monde et le 
monde la touche dans ce toucher. Merleau-Ponty définira plus tard ce chiasme des mains à la fois touchantes et 
touchées, afin d’approcher l’entrelacs du corps humain et de la chair du monde. Ce que reçoit la main est aussi 
ce qu’elle est, chair contre chair, D’où l’accueil des humeurs, des sucs dont les choses regorgent. Le narrateur de 
Noces apprend à goûter ces écoulements [...]»  (F. Noudelmann, « Camus et Sartre : le corps et la loi », Albert 
Camus et la philosophie, op. cit, p. 145-6).
61 My italics.
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Now, it is precisely the aisthetic present o f la chair consciente which allows us to  
grasp the meaning o f the absurd as that «présence commune [et] seul lien qui [...] un isse  
[l’homme et le monde]» (MdS, 120) - the continuity between the lyrical essays and the M d S  
being visible in the recurring association of conscience-clairvoyance-chair-mort. We read in  
Le desert :
Ce sont les cortèges étincelants qui mènent les mystes dionysiens à Eleusis. C ’est dans la joie q u e  
l’homme prépare ses leçons et, parvenue à son plus haut degré d’ivresse, la chair devient consciente et consacre 
sa communion avec un mystère sacré dont le symbole est le sang noir. [...] Double vérité du corps et d e  
l ’instant, au spectacle de la beauté, comment ne pas s’y accrocher comme on s’agrippe au seul bonheur attendu, 
qui doit nous enchanter, mais périr à la fo is . [...]. (E, 82) Mais qu’est-ce que le bonheur sinon le simple accord 
entre un être et l’existence qu’il mène ? Et quel accord plus légitime peut unir l’homme à la vie sinon la double  
conscience de son désir de durée et son destin de mort ? On y apprend du moins à ne compter sur rien et à 
considérer le présent comme la seule vérité qui nous soit donnée par « surcroît ». (E, 85) [My highlighting]
The aesthetic moment («spectacle de la beauté»), described in the pages o f  the essay, 
recalling «l'air raréfié de la beauté» o f Fiesole and Florence (E, 84-85), brings forth th e  
aisthetic “truth” o f  the hic-et-nunc, which de-limits the material “space” o f la chair devenue 
consciente of its finitude {destin de m ort).62 What already emerges in the lyrical essays, and 
is fully developed in the MdS, is Camus’ attempt to define a  fin ite  thought o f finitude.
In the philosophical essay, the absurd  conscience {clairvoyance) is not so much th e  
“conscience” o f some-thing (the Absurd) but can, instead, be traced in the very touching- 
upon-the-borders o f man to the world, and of man to himself {«les murs absurdes» - M dS, 
105).62 3
It is by putting the aisthetic dimension of the absurd into focus that we grasp the 
meaning o f  a note in 1943:
62 Camus writes in Le désert : « Le matérialisme le plus répugnant n’est pas celui qu’on croit, mais bien celui qui 
veut nous faire passer des idées mortes pour des réalités vivantes et détourner sur des mythes stériles l’attention 
obstinée et lucide que nous portons à ce qui en nous doit mourir pour toujours » (E, 82-83). I suggest that we 
read this passage next to Nancy’s définition o f «la finitude concrète» : «La naissance et la mort espacent, dé­
finitivement, un temps singulier. [...] il a lieu [...] comme une matérialité singulière, inappropriable, d’un ici- 
maintenant. Disons : comme une jouissance» (J.-L. Nancy, Une pensée fin ie , op. cit., p. 39.
63 «Un degré plus bas et voici l’étrangeté: s ’apercevoir que le monde est « épais », entrevoir à quel point une 
pierre nous est étrangère, nous est irréductible, avec quelle intensité la nature, un paysage peut nous nier. Au 
fond de toute beauté gît quelque chose d ’inhumain et ces collines, la douceur du ciel, ces dessins d’arbres, voici 
qu’à la minute même, ils perdent le sens illusoire dont nous les revêtions, désormais plus lointains qu’un paradis 
perdu. [...] cette épaisseur et cette étrangeté du monde, c ’est l ’absurde. Les hommes aussi secrétent de 
l’inhumain. Dans certaines heures de lucidité, l’aspect mécanique de leurs gestes, leur pantomime privée de sens 
rend stupide tout ce qui les entoure. [...] l ’étranger qui, à certaines secondes, vient à notre rencontre dans une 
glace, le frère familier et pourtant inquiétant que nous retrouvons dans nos propres photographies, c ’est encore 
l ’absurde.» {MdS, 107-8) [My italics]
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Le monde absurde d'abord ne s’analyse pas en rigueur. Il s ’évoque et il s ’imagine. Ainsi ce monde est le 
produit de la pensée en générale, c ’est-à-dire de l ’imagination précise. C’est l'application à la conduite de la vie 
et à l’esthétique d ’un certain principe moderne. Ce n’est pas une analyse. (Cil, 8I).64 65[My italics]
Reconsidered from the perspective of the intentional application o f a modem principle 
— which we could identify, in the light o f the letter to Ponge (1943), with modern nihilism , as 
the anti-foundational and post-metaphysical “aestheticization " o f the world, in other words, 
with the unmasking o f metaphysical constructions, and the extraction o f all (man-made) 
absolute meanings and moral values - Y  écriture de Vabsurde in the MdS can be seen as 
developing in/as the aisthetic moment - «l ’imagination précise» represents, in Camus’ 
reflection, the faculty o f human thought that is closest to sensory experience, and therefore 
more concrete, with words and images prolonging the sensory/sensual touching-upon (E, 
59).“
I argue that the lucid or absurd conscience, in the MdS as well as in the lyrical essays, 
is the aisthetic être-à (face à face) o f man-to-the-world: «Et qu’est-ce qui fait le fond de ce 
conflit, de cette fracture entre le monde et mon esprit, sinon la conscience que j ’en ai? Si donc 
je  veux le maintenir, c ’est par une conscience perpétuelle, toujours renouvelée, toujours 
tendue. » (MdS, 136).
Beyond the apparent Kantian terminology, the metaphysical presumption inherent in 
the subject-object dualism is shattered:66 there is no objective correlate to a subjective pole of 
consciousness, properly speaking, and the evidence o f er-istence is all that offers itself in/as 
the aisthetic toucher-à. Thus, I argue, the absurd is brought forth as the -à  of that finite and 
sensory être-à
Éprouver, toucher de-limit the finite thought Ç*pensée humiliée”), defining the 
existence o f  the world-to-man and o f man himself to-himself: « L’esprit arrivé aux confins 
doit porter un jugement et choisir ses conclusions. [...] A ce point de son effort, l’homme se
64 «Mais une fois ce monde tracé à grands traits, la première pierre (il n ’y en a qu’une) posée, philosopher 
devient possible -  ou plus exactement, si on a bien compris -  devient nécessaire. L’analyse et la rigueur sont 
exigées et réintroduites. C’est le détail et la description qui triomphent [...] -  D’où une étude précise et 
rigoureuse -sans conclusions -  sur la révolte. » (Cil, 81).
65 According to Nancy, «[dans la littérature], l’existence [...] des pierres n ’est pas le rapport de celles-ci à une 
subjectivité. C’est l’inverse : une subjectivité se distend, dans l’écriture, jusqu’à toucher, comme du bout du 
doigt, cela sans quoi il n’y aurait rien à écrire, et qui reste dehors, et qui est le monde, et qui pourtant, c’est vrai, 
ne se présente « existant » que dans ce geste d’écriture.» (J.-L. Nancy, Une pensée finie, op. cit., n. 1, p. 25).
66 « Ce cœur même qui est le mien me restera à jamais indéfinissable. Entre la certitude que j ’ai de mon 
existence et te contenu que j ’essaie de donner à cette assurance, le fossé ne sera jamais comblé. Pour toujours, je 
serai étranger à moi-même. En psychologie comme en logique, il y  a des vérités mais point de vérité. Le 
« connais-toi toi-même » de Socrate a autant de valeur que le « sois vertueux » de nos confessionnaux. (...) Ce 
sont des jeux stériles sur des grands sujets. » (MdS, 111). « Je veux délivrer mon univers de ses fantômes et le 
peupler seulement des vérités de chair dont je  ne peux nier la présence» (MdS, 179).
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trouve devant l’irrationnel. Il sent en lui son désir de bonheur et de raison. L’absurde naît de 
cette confrontation entre l’appel humain et le silence déraisonnable du monde » .67 68
The notion o f the absurd is defined as «la première de mes vérités», that is, o f  the 
finite, relative (E, 75) and aisthetic truths: «L’unique donnée est pour moi l’absurde» (MdS, 
121), not so much in the sense in which something is given, as an object to a subject, but 
rather in the sense that the aisthetic conscience o f the absurd is (in) the con-tact o f man-and- 
worid, in their mutual ex-position.
It is not possible to understand Camus’ critique o f the nihilistic drifts in contemporary 
thought without fully acknowledging the relationship between his definition o f  the absurd and 
what we have called the aisthetic here-and-now {lucidity). It is in the aisthetic present that the 
absurd is “given” as the “appearance” of that être-à which constitutes the ex- (ex-position, ex-
/a
istence) o f the finite:
[...] l’absurde n’est pas dans l’homme (si une pareille métaphore pouvait avoir un sens), ni dans le 
monde, mais dans leur présence commune. Il est pour le moment le seul lien qui les unisse. Si j ’en veux rester 
aux évidences, je sais ce que veut l’homme, je  sais ce que lui offre le monde et maintenant je puis dire que je  sais 
encore ce qui les unit. [...] La singulière trinité qu’on met ainsi à jour n’a rien d’une Amérique soudain 
découverte. [...] Le premier de ses caractères à cet égard est qu’elle ne peut se diviser. Détruire un de ses termes, 
c’est la détruire tout entière. Il ne peut y avoir de l’absurde hors d’un esprit humain. Ainsi l’absurde finit comme 
toutes choses avec la mort. Mais il ne peut non plus y avoir d’absurde hors de ce monde, (MdS, 120-121).
Contrary to André Compte-Sponville’s definition, according to whom «l’absurde est 
dans / ’homme-au-monde ou dans le monde-avec-l’homme, et c ’est par quoi il est comme le 
troisième terme qui, au cœur de cette dualité (et la transformant [...] en « singulière trinité » 
[ ...]» , 69 the emphasis on the aisthetic moment allows to trace the absurd in the ~à o f  the
67According to Arnaud Corbic, «définir l’absurde comme ce qui “naît de cette confrontation entre l’appel humain 
et le silence déraisonnable du monde », c’est penser le monde comme devant avoir un sens a priori, ce qui est 
discutable » (A. Corbic, Camus, L ’absurde, la révolte, l ’amour, Éditions de l’atelier, Paris, 2003, pp. 51-52). I 
would argue that Camus’ définition of the absurd precisely rejects such presupposition: Nancy’s work provides 
in this sense a better key for understanding the man-world relation in MdS, as his analysis of the question o f the 
world, centred around the notion of entendement, shows to be doser to Camus’ argument (E, 136): «Et si [...] il 
ne faut pas étendre l ’existence (1’ “ek-sistence”) [...] au-delà de l’homme, la comprendre plus largement que 
comme seulement humaine. Question difficile [...] que Heidegger n’a pas envisagée. C’est au fond la question 
de Vexistence du monde. Non pas seulement « quel est le sens de l’existence (humaine) ? », mais, si le monde 
n’est pas séparable de celle-ci, s’il n’est pas le contexte contingent d’une existentialité, mais le lieu même de 
l’existentiellité, « pourquoi y-t-il le monde, en sa totalité ? » [...] A ce compte, il fait bien avouer que « la pierre 
à même la pierre » peut difficilement être réduite à une immanence « pure », ou bien il faut pouvoir reconnaître 
que toute « immanence » est aussi en quelque manière « à soi ». Alors, la pierre n’est pas une essence (et sinon, 
comment sa dureté se ferait-elle sentir dure ?), et il n’y a d’essence que pour l ’entendement [...]. » (J.-L. Nancy, 
Une pensée fin ie , op. cit., p. 24, n. 1 ).
68 « Quello che Camus chiama l’assurdo, altro non è che il finito, dunque. L’esistenza che è separata dal tutto e 
collocata nell’orizzonte del tempo chiuso», P. Flores d ’Arcais, “L’assurdo e la rivolta: Albert Camus filosofo del 
finito”, in Micro-Mega. Almanacco di Filosofia, 1996, p. 203.
69 André Compte-Sponville, L ’absurde dans le Mythe de Sisyphe, art. cit., p. 162.
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être-au-monde of man, which is at the same time the être-à-l ’homme of the world, and which 
is an être-avec explusively in the sense o f an appearing-together (com-pearance).
Therefore, the absurd should be understood not so much as a third term or “entity” 
between man and world, but rather, as the limit or threshold on which the ex- o f existence is 
immediately and irreparably exposed in/as the cum- (what Camus repeatedly addresses as 
“contradiction”) of the con-tact to the absurd walls (MdS, 113).70 It is in this sense that I 
suggest we interpret Camus’s third metaphor of the (notion of the) absurd in the chapter on 
“Le suicide p h ilo so p h iq u e «La singulière trinité [homme-monde-absurde] qu’on met ainsi à 
jour n’a rien d’une Amérique soudain découverte. Mais elle a  ceci de commun avec les 
données de l’expérience qu’elle est à la fois infiniment simple et infiniment compliquée » 
(MdS, 120).
This reading o f the absurd in the MdS is confirmed by Camus’ notes on love.71 72In the 
lyrical essays and the MdS, love is not previous to but co-original with the absurd: both lie in 
the fragility of the sensory contact (aisthesis), in which the ex- o f  existence is experienced as
«intimate exteriority».73 He notes in his Carnets in 1940 :
L’amour est-il si loin lorsque, dans la grande maison carrée au-dessus de la mer, les deux corps se 
rejoignent et se pressent après être montés dans le vent et que, du fond de l’horizon, la respiration sourde de la 
mer monte jusqu’à cette chambre isolée dans le monde? Nuit merveilleuse où l’espoir d’amour ne se sépare pas 
de la pluie, du ciel et des silences de la terre. Juste équilibre de deux êtres unis par ¡'extérieur et rendus 
semblables par une commune indifférence à tout ce qui n’est pas ce moment dans le monde » (CI, 196). [My 
italics]
Love is not defined as the indistinct and total fusion of the lovers: the sensual union, as 
a finite union « par Vextérieur », that exposes, in the fragile nakedness of their ex-istence, the
70 «c’estpar ¡'extérieur que nous avons pu circonscrire l’absurde» (MdS, 119).
71The position I hold is opposed to Arnaud Corbic’s : «[...Jn’oublions pas que l’amour, comme consentement à 
la vie sous-jacent à la révolte, faisait objet des deux premières œuvres de Camus [L'Envers et l ’endroit et 
Noces). L’amour y apparaissait déjà comme antérieur à l’expérience de l’absurde, et il occupait, comme nous 
l’avons signalé, la position d ’origine par rapport à l’absurde qui constitue un commencement à proprement 
parler» (A. Corbic, op. c it, p. 124). The focus on Camus’ aisthetic perspective collapses the distinction between 
love (origin) and absurd (commencement), rejecting thè diesis of as a discontinuity between the lyrical essays 
and the MdS.
72 He notes in his Carnets in Mai ’36: «Tous les contacts= culte du Moi? Non. Culte du moi présuppose 
amateurisme ou optimisme. Deux foutaises. Non pas choisir sa vie, mais l ’étendre » (CI, 38). [My italics]
73 «Infatti gli amanti percepiscono appieno la fragilità del loro comparire. E poiché nella fragile gloria 
dell’esistente il cum della loro comunità è qui anche un affidamento reciproco -  fidando l’uno nel tocco dell’altra 
-  essi si affidano. [...] questo è la comunità; una relazione che costituisce resistente in quanto intima 
esteriorità», Adriana Cavarero, “Nascita, orgasmo, politica”, in MicroMega, Almanacco di Filosofia 1996, p. 
146.
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irreducible distinctiveness (unicity) o f the lovers, and takes place in hic et nunc o f the  
aisthetic present, proclaiming its irreparable finitude:74 5 76«Plus on aime et plus l’absurde se  
consolide» (MdS, 152).
It is not surprising that Don Juan figures as one of the « illustrations » of the absurd:
On ne comprend bien Don Juan qu’en se référant toujours à ce qu’il symbolise vulgairement : le 
séducteur ordinaire et l’homme à femmes. Il est un séducteur ordinaire. A cette différence près qu’il est 
conscient et c ’est par là qu’il est absurde. Un séducteur devenu lucide ne changera pas pour autant Séduire est 
son état [...] Mais on peut dire qu’à la fois rien n’est changé et tout est transformé. Ce que Don Juan met en 
acte, c’est une éthique de la quantité, au contraire du saint qui tend vers la qualité. Ne pas croire au sens profond  
des choses, c'est te propre de l ’homme absurde. Ces visages chaleureux ou émerveillés, il les parcourt, les 
engrange et les brûle. Le temps marche avec lui. L'hom me absurde est celui qui ne se sépare pas du temps. D on 
Juan ne pense pas à « collectionner » les femmes. Il en épuise le nombre et avec elles les chances de vie. 
Collectionner, c’est être capable de vivre de son passé. Mais lui refuse le regret cette autre forme de l’espoir. II 
ne sait pas regarder les portraits. (MdS, 154) [My italics]
Don Juan embodies the lover - but «[i]l est ridicule de le représenter comme un 
illuminé en quête de l’amour total. M ais c’est bien parce qu’il les aime avec un égal 
emportement et chaque fois avec tout lui-même, qu’il lui faut répéter ce don et cet 
approfondissement » (MdS, 152). Not an absolute and ideal (transcendent) love, but the finite, 
sensual love that is consumed and infinitely repeated in the aisthetic “present” of the lovers’ 
naked being-exposed to, and touching upon each other. The rejection o f an ultimate, 
transcendent meaning («sens profond des choses») divests life o f the “qualities” 
(metaphysical, social, personal) that divert man from time (the “here-and-now” o f the lucid 
“pensée ramenée au corps"). In the aisthetic present, ex-istence is restored to its naked in- 
difference and fragility. Repetition in the present - as opposed to “collection”, which
74 « Perchè la sola distinzione in atto è ora invece quella di due irripetibili unità, le quali, comparendo insieme, 
appunto si distinguono. Non c’est dunque alcuna fusione degli amanti nell’unità, nonostante la fabula che da 
millenni abbiamo sentito raccontare. [...] La mitica comunità perfetta, che divora l’individuo, è di nuovo 
all’opera. Le due esistenze, fondendosi nell’uno-tutto, scompaiono così nel gorgo del nessun luogo: proprio lo 
stesso luogo, dice una notissima variante della fabula, da cui erano venuti, ossia la madre. Nascita e morte, 
nell’eterna seduzione dell’inorganico, sarebbero dunque la stessa cosa. Purché il finito, qualora gli sia concesso 
un qualche rapido splendore, bruci nell’atto della sua annichilazione. [...] Ma, a dispetto della fabula antica, gli 
amanti non vogliono affatto morire Puna nell’altro. Essi vogliono invece il pieno splendore del finito secondo la 
reciproca unicità che li espone e li distingue nel cum. Amandosi, essi semplicemente rinascono alla fragilità 
inaugurale e relazionale della loro esistenza. [...] Essi non tornano nel ventre della madre, anzi, escono di nuovo 
nella nudità inaugurale dell’apparenza. » (A. Cavarero, “Nascita, orgasmo, politica”, art. cit., pp. 144-5). See 
Camus’ note in 1936 (CI, 23).
75 Residing in the aisthetic «dénuement» (CI, 46-47), the physical nakedness in which the lucid man experiences 
his bareness («l’homme délivré de l’humain»), Camus’ notion of love is associated with the image of an «accord 
de la main et des fleurs» which, brings the emphasis on the unbridgeable liminality and fragility of the relation: 
love confirms, rather than overcome, the finitude. See also Noces (E, 60).
76 The “ethics o f quantity” embodied by Don Juan’s repetition of the act of love can be read, with A. Cavarero, 
in the sense o f the nakedeness and in-difference of existence experienced by the lovers in the aisthetic “here-and- 
now” of sensual union. The latter strips the lovers o f their personal and social qualities, repeating the denuement 
o f birth and making their finitude visible: «Il rito sessuale, dunque, non è quello della fusione che annienterebbe 
l’unicità, vanificando l’atto stesso. E’, se mai, il rito di ripetere l’inizio: esponendo ancora la nuda esposizione,
requires a retrospective look, which is necessarily inattentive to the hic et nunc -  
characterises the fragility of the lovers’ appearing-together,77 78as an infinitely being-bom and 
dying in the aisthetic «espacement» of their finite unicity:7*
Don Juan sait et n’espère pas. Il fait penser à ces artistes gui connaissent leur limites, ne les excèdent 
jamais et, dans cet intervalle précaire où leur esprit s’installe, ont toute la merveilleuse aisance des maîtres. Et 
c’est bien là Je génie : Vintelligence qui connaît ses frontières. Jusqu’à la frontière de la mort physique, Don Juan 
ignore la tristesse. Depuis le moment où il sait, son rire éclate [...]. Il fut triste dans le temps où il espéra. 
Aujourd’hui, sur la bouche de cette femme, il retrouve le goût amer et réconfortant de la science unique. (MdS, 
152) [My highlighting]
The «unique science» of the absurd man is our key to the question o f the loss or 
absence of meaning, introduced in the first chapter of the MdS as the problem of the absurd:
Cette raison universelle, pratique ou morale, ce déterminisme, ces catégories qui expliquent tout, ont de 
quoi faire rire l’homme honnête. Ils n’ont rien à voir avec l’esprit. Ils nient sa vérité profonde qui est d’être 
enchaîné. Dans cet univers indéchiffrable et limité, le destin de l’homme prend désormais son sens. (MdS, 113) 
[My italics]
Don Juan’s resonant laugh is the laugh of the honest man, whose unique knowledge 
lies in the finite thought (le savoir de ne pas savoir) of the finitude of ex-istence -  the absurd 
walls, as boundaries or limits, experienced in/as the aisthetic present.
The terms absurd/absurdity employed in the MdS disclose two distinct levels o f  
analysis, which are essential in order to grasp the complexity of the author’s investigation into 
the question of nihilism. If  Audin and Comte-Sponville agree in pointing out that in the MdS 
the absurd cannot be reduced to the traditional acceptation o f the term of “absence o f
non ancora coperta da alcunché, che inaugura l’apparire dell’esistenza. A saperlo guardare, infatti, il nuovo nato 
è il prototipo stesso dell'esistenza senza qualità. [...) Comparendo nell'indifferenza verso le loro qualità — 
indifferenza che si fa  massima nell'orgasmo -  g li amanti, dunque, vengono a ripetere l'inizio della loro 
esistenza. [...] È infatti proprio l’esperienza dell’orgasmo ad essere spesso identificata con la morte in quanto 
comunità perfetta: dove il piacere coinciderebbe appunto con rannichilirsi dell’individuo nella logica autonoma 
e impersonale della carne. Tuttavia, ciò che qui muore, anzi, è già morto, non è nient'altro che il soggetto 
paludato delle sue qualità. La perdita di senso di cosa uno è e sa d i essere, ossia la totale dimenticanza delle 
proprie qualità personali e delle proprie qualificazioni sociali viene così scambiata con la morte di sé. Eppure si 
tratta di una ripetizione della nascita, esperita da un sé senza qualità che, proprio per questa magnifica 
spoliazione, può improvvisamente ricordare roriginario coincidere di vita ed esistenza. Il prevalere del corpo è 
qui infatti soltanto inerenza dell’esistente ad esso: ossia spiritualità della carne e carnalità dello spirito, che fanno 
della loro in distinzione il miracolo dell’unicità. Gli amanti si sono spogliati per accarezzare il loro corpo nudo: e 
tuttavia solo nell’orgasmo la nudità dell'esistente è veramente tede in quanto non vestita di alcuna qualità.» (A. 
Cavarero, “Nascita, orgasmo, politica”, art. cit-, pp. 145-6) [My highlighting]
77« [Don Juan] apporte avec lui tous les visages du monde et son frémissement vient de ce qu’il se connaît 
périssable. Don Juan a choisi d ’être rien.» (MdS, 155). «Tutta la fragilità del finito, infatti, è di nuovo qui: 
nell’interezza dell’esistente che rifiuta, anzi, irride ogni distinzione interna fra la sua came e il suo spirito e tocca 
un altro esistente. Perché la sola distinzione in atto è ora invece quella di due irripetibili unicità, le quali, 
comparendo insieme, appunto si distinguono.» (A. Cavarero, “Nascita, orgasmo, politica”, art. cit., p. 144).
78 «[...] L’homme absurde multiplie encore ici ce qu’il ne peut unifier. [...] Il n’y a d ’amour généreux que celui 
qui se sait en même temps passager et singulier. Ce sont toutes ces morts et toutes ces renaissances qui font pour 
Don Juan la gerbe de sa vie. C’est la façon qu’il a de donner et de faire vivre. Je laisse à juger si l’on peut parler 
d’égoïsme. » (MdS, 155).
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meaning'\ properly speaking, the absurd cannot be defined as “contradictory meaning” : the
error would be to fall back into a substantialist approach to the raisonnement absurde, w hich, 
I argue, contradicts its anti-foundational premises. There is an essential difference between 
stating, with Comte-Sponville, that the meaning o f the absurd is contradictory, and saying, as 
Camus does in ‘45, that the absurd is «contadictoire en existence»:
[L’absurde] exclut en fait les jugements de valeur et les jugements de valeur sont Ils sont parce qu’ils 
sont liés au fait même d’exister. (E, 1696-97)
The 1950 essay L  'Énigme sheds further light on this point:
[...] il n 'y a pas de nihilisme total. Dès l’instant où l’on dit que tout est non-sens, on exprime quelque 
chose qui a du sens. Refuser toute signification au monde revient à supprimer tout jugement de valeur. Mais 
vivre, et par exemple se nourrir, est en soi un jugement de valeur. On choisit de durer dès l’instant qu’on ne se 
laisse pas mourir, et l’on reconnaît alors une valeur, au moins relative, à la vie. (E, S65).
AA
Defined as the « cette confrontation» entre l’appel humain et le silence déraisonnable 
du monde » (MdS, 117-118),81 we have traced the absurd in the aisthetic awareness o f the 
être-à, which coincides with the lucid unmasking of the fictitious décors that traditionally 
comprehended the world in a familiar unity -  that is, that gave its meaning to existence. The 
echoes o f Nietzsche’s aestheticism resound in Camus* identification of the absurd with the 
lucid awareness of the absence of meaning: o f the ultimate meaning or foundation il n *en est 
rien, it does not take p lace , it is not (nihil) in the sense o f the sensory espacement “here-an- 
now” which delimits the evidence o f  the absurd thought.
One first meaning o f  nihilism in the MdS can thus be traced in the finite thought o f the 
finite. From the aisthetic perspective -  which, as we have shown, pervades the lyrical essays 
o f  Noces, and is developed by Camus in the 1942 philosophical essay - existence lacks 79801
79 «[I]’absurdité n ’est [...] p a s Vabsence de sens: ces expressions ont bien un sens (c’est bien parce qu’elles ont 
un sens qu’elles peuvent être absurdes), mais ce sens est contradictoire. De même quand un homme se jette sabre 
au clair contre un nid de mitrailleuses : son acte peut bien avoir un sens, et même il en est sans doute un, mais il 
n ’en sera pas moins jugé absurde « en vertu de la disproportion qui existe entre son intention et la réalité qui 
l’attend, de la contradiction que je  puis saisir entre ses forces réelles et le but qu’il se propose » (MdS, 120). Qui 
dit absurde dit donc dualité, rencontre (mais rencontre impossible ou paradoxale), affrontement [.*.]» (A. Comte- 
Sponville, « L’absurde dans le Mythe de Sisyphe », op. c it, p. 161).
80 «[...] l’absurdité naît d’une comparaison. Je suis donc fondé à dire que le sentiment de l’absurdité ne naît pas 
du simple examen d’un fait ou d’une impression mais qu’il jaillit de la comparaison entre un état de fait et une 
certaine réalité, entre une action et le monde qui la dépasse. L’absurde est essentiellement un divorce. Il n’est ni 
dans l’un ni dans l’autre des éléments comparés. U naît de leur confrontation.» (MdS, 120).
81 «Le monde pour [l’esprit absurde] n’est ni aussi rationnel ni à ce point irrationnel. Il est déraisonnable et il 
n ’est que cela » (E, 134) : the term « déraisonnable » contains the mutual toucher-à o f man, with his desire for 
clarity, and world. Comte-Sponville correctly points out that «[q]ui dit absurde dit donc dualité, rencontre (mais 
rencontre impossible ou paradoxale), affrontement» (art. cit., p. 161), but this duality can only be apprehended in 
the être-à of the terms, in their con-tact that makes their exposition visible.
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nothing.n  In the absurd argument of the MdS, the reduction to the so-called «factual 
judgements» has no other meaning than the replacement o f explanation - the will to truth as 
reductio ad unum, drawing the dispersed multiplicity of the éclats miroitants o f experience 
into the pre-sentation o f some Un-presentable -  with a modest effort of description or 
enumeration o f appearances within the limits o f the aisthetic experience (MdS, 106, 112). In 
this sense, the finite thought of the MdS is not
une pensée de l’abîme et du néant, mais une pensée de I’in-fondement de l’être : de cet « être », le seul, 
dont l’existence épuise toute la substance et toute la possibilité.
Une pensée de l’absence de sens comme le seul gage de la présence de l’existant. [...] il n’y a pas de 
sens final, mais un sens fini, du sens fini, des sens finis, une multiplication d’éclats singuliers de sens prélevés 
sur aucune unité ni substance.*1
The aisthetic refusal, implicit in Camus* definition of the absurd, to appeal to an 
absolute principle or meaning - ab-solutus from sensory experience, but nevertheless to be 
found  in the world - excludes the hypostatisation o f this absence (total nihilism).
To derive from the aisthetic nihil of a transcendent meaning the conclusion o f the 
total meaninglessness o f existence, in this sense, would be to “dishonestly” take one step 
beyond the absurd as defined in the MdS. This is why the finite thought developed by Camus 
in the 1942 essay, questioning the problem of meaning, cannot be ranged among those 
«pensées abattues, égarées ou déprimées, pensées du peu-ou-pas-de-sens».82 34 85For Camus, there 
can be no “honest” thought of little or no meaning: as he points out in VÉnigme, the very act 
of existence means that we accord life a meaning, as a philosophical position total nihilism is
AC
inconsistent, and refuted by the very fact of living.
But the value that we accord to life in and by the act of existence is not less absolute -  
that is, fundamental and unquestionable -  because it is relative. I suggest that we trace the 
meaning of the term “relative” (E, 865), once again, back to the aisthetic awareness o f  the hie 
et nunc which constitutes existence as the being-exposed to the limits (absurd). In this sense, 
the relativity o f the value o f life coincides with the lucid awareness o f  the infinite finitude o f
82 Which is not to deny that man does not feel the lack of an ultimate foundation - «la nostalgie de l’unité 
profonde de Punîvers, la nostalgie de la parole qui résumerait tout [...], du verbe enfin qui illumine.» (E, 1666) 
[My italics]- which is inscribed in the very definition of the absurd as relation: the absence of meaning or 
foundation is precisely what constitutes the ex- of existence as the incessant toucher-à of a man and a world 
«arc-butant l’un sur l’autre».
83 J.-L. Nancy, Une pensée finie, op. cit, p. 49.
84 Ivi, pp. 28-29.
85 « [...] il se fait que nous existons, et que nous “comprenons” que cela (nous-mêmes) n’est pas l’in-sensé d’une 
signification résorbée, annulée. Dans la détresse et dans la nécessité, nous « comprenons » que « nous », ici, 
maintenant, est encore, à nouveau, responsable d’un sens singulier. » (J.-L. Nancy, Une pensée fin ie , op. cit, p. 
31).
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existence, made visible in the liminality (ëtre-à) of the aisthetic living here-and-now,86 w hich 
suspends all question about the ultimate ground.
Thus, if Camus’ argument o f  the absurd in the MdS develops a nihilistic thought in the  
very specific acceptation that we have tried to outline above o f an “aesthetic”, that is, finite 
and anti-foundational, perspective, it does not, however, justify an absurdist position.87 89A s 
defined in the MdS, the absurd is relative: it is the lien between man and world (as their 
toucher-à and ëtre-à) that constitutes existence as finite; in this sense, it cannot be absolutized 
nor substantialized. This, I argue, is the key to Camus’ critique o f Existential philosophies in 
the chapter on “philosophical suicide” .
1.3. Cr e a t io n  a n d  t r a g ic  th o u g h t :
According to the author, the so-called philosophies existentielles -  from Kierkegaard to 
Chestov, to Jaspers and Heidegger, to the phenomenologists and Scheler -  have diagnosed the
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absurd, but «[p]ar un raisonnement singulier, partis de l’absurde sur les décombres de la 
raison, dans un univers fermé et limité à l ’humain, ils divinisent ce qui les écrase et trouvent 
une raison d ’espérer dans ce qui les démunit » - « [...] toutes, sans exception, me proposent 
l ’évasion » (MdS, 122).
Alien to philosophical language, the term « hope » (espoir/espérer) acquires a 
precise metaphysical dimension in the MdS by virtue o f its semantic opposition to the 
constellation o f the Absurd. From the opening pages of the essay, the traditional positive 
connotation o f the term is reversed into an absolute negativity: «L’esquive mortelle qui fait le 
troisième theme de cet essai, c’est l ’espoir» (MdS, 102).
86 As Nancy points out, « une pensée du sens fini est essentiellement une pensée “matérielle” de la “matérialité” 
de l’accès au sens. Parce que le sens est fini, on n’y accède pas hors de ce monde. Parce qu’il n’y a pas de 
« dehors », on n ’accède pas. » (Une pensée fin ie , op. cit., p. 35). The stress on the aisthetic dimension in Camus’ 
absurd thought, as a “pensée matérielle”, supports the interpretation of the author’s use of the term relative” to 
characterise the value of life in the sense of a fin ite  meaning within the « material » limits of sensory experience.
87 On this point I agree with F. H. Willhoite Jr., in Beyond Nihilism, Albert Camus's Contribution to Political 
Thought, Louisiana State UP, Baton Rouge, 1968, p. 27.
88 «[...] sur le plan logique et sur le plan moral, toute une famille d’esprits, parents par leur nostalgie, opposés 
par leur méthodes ou leur buts, se sont acharnés à barrer la voie royale de la raison et à retrouver les droits 
chemins de la vérité. [...] tous sont partis de cet univers indicible où régnent la contradiction, l’antinomie, 
l’angoisse ou l’impuissance » (E, 114).
89 As M.L.Audin points out, the term espoir is associated, through the indirect evocation of a Promised Land, to 
the transient and transitional character of death as disclosing another life (Pour une sémiotique..., op. cit., p. 
160).
30
Identified with ‘esquive hope is integrated in the metaphoric constellation of jeu , as 
‘illusion’ (;mensonge), «tricherie de ceux qui vivent non pour la vie elle-même, mais pour 
quelque grande idée qui la dépasse [...] » (MdS, 102-3). Hope is associated to suicide, as «jeu 
mortel qui mène de la lucidité en face de l’existence à l ’évasion hors de la lumière » (MdS, 
100) -  where « lumière » designates a specific type of knowledge : « Cet essai [Le Mythe de 
Sisyphe] tient compte au contraire des lumières que nous avons prises de notre exil ». Man is 
exiled in a “disenchanted” world,* 91 92the “lights” o f modem thought coinciding with the anti- 
foundational awareness o f  the absurd walls that de-limit the finitude of existence. From this 
perspective, hope is characterized as a  form o f intellectual cowardice, as an “escamotage” to 
evade the absurd «univers ferm é  et limité à l’humain» of the finite.
What Camus points out in authors such as Shestov, Kierkegaard, Jaspers and Husserl 
is a common “mystical” reversal o f the absurd argument, from the initial evidence o f the 
échec o f human reason, to the positive affirmation of the “essence” o f existence («l’être de 
l’expérience et le sens supra-humain de la vie», MdS, 122). From this perspective, Camus 
insists that:
[_]le raisonnement que cet essai poursuit laisse entièrement de côté l’attitude spirituelle la plus
répandue dans notre siècle éclairé: celle qui s’appuie sur le principe que tout est raison et qui vise à donner une 
explication au monde. Il est naturel d’en donner une vue claire lorsqu’on admet qu’il doit être clair. Cela est 
même légitime, mais n’intéresse pas le raisonnement que nous poursuivons ici. Son but, en effet, c’est d’éclairer 
la démarche de l’esprit lorsque, parti d'une philosophie de la non-signification du monde, il finit par lui trouver 
un sens et une profondeur, (MdS, 129) [My italics]
Husserl’s rationalistic «métaphysique de consolation» (MdS, 132), which «restitue sa 
profondeur à l’expérience » (MdS, 131) by grounding the dispersed miroitement o f 
appearances, brought forth by phenomenological thought, in a plurality of «essences extra- 
temporelles» (Id.),93 figures in the MdS as one side o f the spectrum of philosophical 
escamotage, which has its opposite extreme in Shestov and Kierkegaard’s irrationalistic 
solutions, and finds an almost caricatural illustration in Jaspers.94
^E squive” -  "Esquiver", du haut allemand “avoir peur" (italien: “fuir”) ; utilisé dans la terminologie sportive 
(terme de boxe, 1922) ; « Action d’éviter avec adresse » (Grand Larousse), « Eviter habilement un attaque » 
(Trésor de la Langue Française). In M.L. Audin, op. cit,, p. 161.
91 See P. Flores d’Arcais, «L’assurdo e la rivolta : Albert Camus filosofo del finito », art. cit, p. 208.
92 « Cet espoir forcé est chez tous d’essence religieuse » (MdS, 122). « La pensée mystique nous a familiarisé 
avec ces procédés » (MdS, 123).
93 «II n ’y a plus une seule idée qui explique tout, mais une infinité d’essences qui donnent un sens à une infinité 
d’objets. [...] le réalisme platonicien devient intuitif, mais c’est encore du réalisme. [...] ici la pensée se jette 
dans un polythéisme abstrait. » (MdS, 131) [My italics]
94 « Mais Jaspers va nous fournir, poussé jusqu’à la caricature, un exemple de cette attitude. [...] On le laisse 
impuissant à réaliser la transcendant, incapable de sonder la profondeur de l’expérience et conscient de cet 
univers bouleversé par l’échec. [...] Pourtant, sans justification, il le dit lui-même, il affirme d’un seul jet à la
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According to Camus, Shestov and Kierkegaard95 turn the feeling of absurdity into the 
ontological proof o f  a transcendent Being,96 and dissolve the notion of the absurd,97 by 
hypostatising it in the «griserie de l'irrationnel et la vocation de l’extase»: «Dès l’instant où  
[la] notion [de l’absurde] se transforme en tremplin d’éternité, elle n’est plus liée à la lucidité 
humaine» (MdS, 124).
As a notion, the absurd is “relative”, thus «[s]i absurde il y a, c’est dans l’univers de 
l ’homme» (Id.), that is, in that confrontation o f man’s elementary hopes and desires, his 
appetite for clarity, and the un-reasonable opacity of the world. It is in this confrontation that 
man creates the absurd universe (MdS, 121), in the sense that the absurd is this confrontation 
(MdS, 124).
Vivre, c’est faire vivre l’absurde. Le faire vivre, c’est avant tout le regarder. Au contraire d’Eurydice, 
l’absurde ne meurt que lorsqu’on s’en détourne. L’une des seules positions philosophiques cohérentes, c’est ainsi 
la révolte. Elle est un confrontement perpétuel de l’homme et de sa propre obscurité. Elle est l’exigence d’une 
impossible transparence. Elle remet le monde en question à chacune de ses secondes. (MdS, 138)
I argue that the movement o f  revolt,98 9evoqued in the MdS as an act of défi and protest 
against the absurd walls that de-limit and de-fine existence, refusing all meta-physical hope, 
nonetheless recovers a meaning -  thus, refuting total nihilism - in a way that can be thought, 
with Jean-Luc Nancy, in the following terms:
Et pourtant, on n ’a pas tort non plus, bien au contraire, de protester qu 'il fau t bien qu’il y ait quelque 
chose comme un sens du monde (ou comme du sens au monde) [...]. Cette protestation ne viendrait-elle — et elle 
vient, nécessairement, elle est déjà là [...] — que de ce qu’on appelle un « sentiment », cela même nous reconduit 
au sens dans la plus grande généralité sémantique du sentir." C’est-à-dire, à nouveau, du rapport à ou de Yêtre- 
à-quelque chose, cette chose ne pouvant donc être qu 'autre chose. Ainsi, « être au monde », si cela a lieu (mais
fois le transcendant, l’être de l’expérience et le sens supra-humain de la vie en écrivant : « L’échec ne montre-t-il 
pas, au-delà de toute explication et de toute interprétation possible, non le néant mais l’être de la 
transcendance ». Cet être qui, soudain et par un acte aveugle de la confiance humaine, explique tout, il le définit 
comme « l’unité inconcevable du général et du particulier». Ainsi l’absurde devient dieu (dans le sens le plus 
large de ce mot) et cette impuissance à comprendre, l’être qui illumine tout » (MdS, 122).
95 «[Kierkegaard] fait de l’absurde le critère de l’autre monde alors qu’il est seulement un résidu de l’expérience 
de ce monde. « Dans son échec, dit Kierkegaard, le croyant trouve son triomphe ». » (MdS, 126).
96 « Cela passe, dit-on, la mesure humaine, il faut donc que cela soit surhumain. Mais ce « donc » est de trop. Il 
n’y a point ici de certitude logique. Il n’y a point non plus de probabilité expérimentale. Tout ce que je puis dire, 
c ’est qu’en effet cela passe ma mesure. Si je  n’en tire pas une négation, du moins je  ne veux rien fonder sur 
l’incompréhensible. Je veux savoir si je puis vivre avec ce que je sais et avec cela seulement.» (MdS, 127).
97 «Nous savons qu’il [l’absurde] ne vaut que dans un équilibre, qu’il est avant tout dans la comparaison et non 
point dans les termes de cette comparaison. Mais Chestov justement fait porter tout le poids sur l’un des termes 
et détruit l’équilibre. [...] Tout est sacrifié ici à l’irrationnel et l’exigence de clarté étant escamotée, l’absurde 
disparaît avec un des termes de sa comparaison.» (MdS, 124-5).
98« De même que le danger fournit à l’homme l’irremplaçable occasion de la saisir, de même la révolte 
métaphysique étend la conscience tout le long de l’expérience. Elle est cette présence constante de l’homme à 
lui-même. Elle n’est pas aspiration, elle est sans espoir. Cette révolte n’est que l’assurance d’un destin écrasant, 
moins la résignation qui devrait l’accompagner. » (MdS, 138).
99 The echoes o f Camus’s fourth LAA are here apparent : « Je continue à croire que ce monde n’a pas de sens 
supérieur. Mais je  sais que quelque chose en lui a du sens et c’est l’homme, parce qu'il est le seul être à exiger 
d'en avoir. » (E, 241). [My italics]
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cela a lieu) est pris dans le sens bien avant toute signification. Cela fait sens, cela demande ou propose sens en 
deçà ou au-delà de toute signification. Si nous sommes au monde, s’il y a de l’être-au-monde en général, c’est-à- 
dire s’il y a du monde, il y a du sens. Le il y  a fait sens par lui-même et comme tel. [...] Ainsi, monde n’est plus 
seulement corrélatif de sens, il est structuré comme sens, et réciproquement, sens est structure comme monde. 
En définitive, « le sens du monde » est une expression tautologique.
Toute la question, désormais, est de savoir si cette tautologie se réduit à la répétition, sous deux 
signifiants d’un même manque de signification (c’est le nihilisme), ou bien si elle énonce cette différence du 
même par laquelle le sens ferait monde et le monde ferait sens, mais tout autrement que par le renvoi à une 
signification.1”
Borrowing Nancy’s terminology, I suggest that Camus’ understanding of the absurd 
exceeds the reference to (the sheer loss of) signification, to which the problem of nihilism is 
traditionally reduced: while incorporating the modem experience of a loss or absence o f  a 
transcendent meaning (retreat o f  the world) -  identified in the historically situated sentiment 
de l'absurdité {modern nihilism) -  the metaphors of the absurd, always and already, touch 
upon le sens in the acceptation of «sensu»! sentir {aisthesis). Thus, by taking place in/as 
aesthetic judgement {“révolte de la chair”), the absurd is always and already disclosing a 
meaning.
As Camus points out in a letter to Pierre Bonnel in March 1943:
L’effort de la pensée absurde (et gratuite), c’est l’expulsion de tous les jugements de valeur au profit des 
jugements de fait. Or, nous savons, vous et moi, qu’il y a des jugements de valeur inévitables. Même par-delà le 
bien et le mal, il y a des actes qui paraissent bons ou mauvais et surtout il y a des spectacles qui nous paraissent 
beaux ou laids. [...] L’absurde, apparemment, pousse à vivre sans jugements de valeur et vivre, c'est toujours, de 
façon  plus ou moins élémentaire, juger. (E, 1423) [My italics]
It is interesting to observe that, in the Carnets in September 1937, revolt is associated 
w ith an anti-metaphysical, anti-foundational attitude -  a “no” to everything that transcends 
the irreducible contradictoriness of a finite condition {«Non et révolte devant tout ce qui n’est 
pas les larmes et le soleil», CI, 77) - which is intimately related to a passionate “yes” to life, 
which has the form of the aisthe tic “confrontation” of the lucid man to his finitude.10 01 
This relation is confirmed in another note in the Carnets, taken from Kierkegaard’s Rien 
Philosophiques:
100 J.-L. Nancy, Le Sens du monde, op. cit, p. 18. [My italics]
101 In a note in the Carnets dated 15 September 1937, Camus situates revolt in the lucid awareness of what we 
have defined above as the aisthetic present: «Cette présence de moi-même à moi-même, mon effort est de la 
mener jusqu’au bout, de la maintenir devant tous les visages de ma vie [...]. Ne pas céder : tout est là. Ne pas 
consentir, ne pas trahir. Toute ma violence m’y aide et le point où elle me porte mon amour m’y rejoint et, avec 
lui, la furieuse passion de vivre qui fait le sens de mes journées. [...] Vie au visage de larmes et de soleil, vie 
sans le sel et la pierre chaude, vie comme je l’aime et je l’entends, il me semble qu’à la caresser, toutes mes 
forces de désespoir et d ’amour se conjugueront Aujourd’hui n’est pas comme un halte entre oui et non. Mais il 
est oui et il est non. Non et révolte devant tout ce qui n’est pas les larmes et le soleil. Oui à ma vie [ ...]»  (CI, 76- 
77).
J J
Le langage a raison dans le mot passion d’insister sur la souffrance de l’âme ; alors que l’emploi du m o t 
passion nous fait penser plutôt à l’impétuosité convulsive qui nous étonne, et oublier ainsi qu’il s’agit d ’une 
souffrance (orgueil -  défi).
Id  L’acteur (de vie) parfait c ’est celui qui « est agi » - et qui le sait, - la passion passive. (CI, 83) [M y
italics]
In the MdS, the lucid or absurd man’s aisthetic conscience entails an act o f deft, o r 
tension by which the absurd is maintained, not as a “reality” to be looked upon -  an objective  
fracture (Sub-stans) between man and the world - but as the aisthetic touching-upon-the-limit, 
which constitutes the finiteness o f existence.
By linking revolt to the aisthetic judgement o f the absurd man, the question o f  
meaning is reformulated within an aesthetic, i.e., anti-foundational, horizon, disclosing, 
within the realm o f  praxis, a way out o f the nihilistic tabula rasa o f transcendent values:102
Cette révolte donne son prix à la vie. Étendue sur toute la longueur d’une existence, elle lui restitue sa 
grandeur. Pour un homme sans œillères, il n’est pas de plus beau spectacle que celui de l’intelligence aux prises 
avec une réalité qui le dépasse. Le spectacle de l'orgueil humain est inégalable. [...] L’homme absurde ne peut 
que tout épuiser, et s'épuiser. L’absurde est sa tension la plus extrême, celle qu’il maintient constamment d ’un 
effort solitaire, car il sait que, dans cette conscience et dans cette révolte au jour le jour, il témoigne de sa seule 
vérité qui est le défi. (MdS, 139) [My italics]
The praxis in question, illustrated by the lucid «acteur de vie», is defined within the 
limits o f a finite, anti- or post-metaphysical thought, as passion passive, 103 The lucid 
awareness of “being acted” (passivity) should not be confused with a profession o f  
heteronomy, which subjects the absurd man to a superior necessity:104
[...] je  n’ai rien à faire avec le problème de la liberté métaphysique. Savoir si l’homme est libre ne 
m ’intéresse pas. Je ne puis éprouver que ma propre liberté. Sur elle, je  ne puis avoir de notions générales, mais 
quelques aperçus clairs. Le problème de la « liberté en soi » n’a pas de sens. Car il est lié d’une tout autre façon 
à celui de Dieu. Savoir si l’homme est libre commande qu’on sache q ’il peut avoir un maître. [...] la notion 
même qui rend possible le problème de la liberté lui retire en même temps tout son sens. Car devant Dieu, il y  a 
moins un problème de la liberté qu’un problème du mal. je ne puis pas me perdre dans l’exaltation ou la 
simple définition d’une notion qui m’échappe et perd son sens à partir du moment où elle déborde le cadre de 
mon expérience individuelle. Je ne puis comprendre ce que peut être une liberté qui me serait donnée par un être 
supérieur. J ’ai perdu le sens de la hiérarchie. Je ne puis avoir de la liberté que la conception du prisonnier ou 
de l'individu moderne au sein de l ’État. La seule que je connaisse, c ’est la liberté d’esprit et d’action. Or si 
l’absurde annihile toutes mes chances de liberté étemelle, il me rend et exalte au contraire ma liberté d’action. 
(MdS, 139-140) [My italics]
102 MdS, 136-137.
103 Passivity acquires its full meaning in the sense o f  the “sterility” o f  the finite (absurd) thought: «La seule 
pensée qui ne soit pas mensongère est donc une pensée sterile» (MdS, 151). I suggest that we read this passage 
with Nancy’s L ’expérience de la liberté, Galilée, Paris, 1988, pp, 22-23.
IM Which is strongly excluded in the opening lines of the chapter on «Absurd Freedom» (MdS, 136).
Death makes the absurd perfectly visible (Cl, 141) in the irreparable finitude o f existence. A 
note in the Carnets in August 1938 allows us to link Camus’ reflection on freedom to 
Nietzsche’s aesthetic transvaluation of moral values:105 106
La seule liberté possible est une liberté à l’égard de la m ort L’homme vraiment libre est celui qui, 
acceptant la mort comme telle, en accepte du même coup les conséquences -  c’est-à-dire le renversement de 
toutes les valeurs traditionnelles de la vie. Le <r Tout est permis » d'Ivan Karamazov est la seule expression 
d ’une liberté cohérente. Mais il faut aller au fond de la formule. (CI, 118-119) [My italics]
The freedom o f  the prisoner sentenced to death coincides with the lucid reduction to 
the aisthetic present, to the “here-and-now” of ex-istence which erases all transcendent 
illusion -  «Avant de rencontrer l’absurde, l’homme quotidien vit avec des buts, un souci 
d’avenir ou de justification (à l’égard de qui ou de quoi, ce n ’est pas la question). Il évalue ses 
chances, il compte sur le plus tard, [...]. Il croit encore que quelque chose dans sa vie peut se 
diriger. [...] Cette idée que «je suis », ma façon d'agir comme si tout a un sens (même si à 
l’occasion, je disais que rien n’en a), tout cela se trouve démenti d ’une façon vertigineuse par 
l’absurdité d’une mort possible » (MdS, 140).li>6
In the MdS, the absurd awareness that “I am acted” {passive) acquires its full meaning 
in the light of a rejection o f teleological thinking - the delusory idea that I can direct (my) life, 
actively acting it toward an aim - whose acting as i f  is shattered by the “mathematical” 
evidence (Cl, 141) and irrevocability o f death. Passivity, in this sense, coincides with the re­
opening of man’s availability oflto action (MdS, 140).107
Fettered by the absurd “chains” o f  finiteness (MdS, 113), the only reasonable 
freedom,108 for a lucid thought, is the «divine disponibilité du condamné à mort [...], cet 
incroyable désintéressement à l’égard de tout, sauf de la flamme pure de la vie » - « l’homme 
absurde se sent dégagé de tout ce qui n’est pas cette attention passionnée qui cristallise en 
lui » (MdS, 142).
L’homme absurde entrevoit ainsi un univers brûlant et glacé, transparent et limité, où rien n’est possible 
mais tout est donné, passé lequel c’est l’effondrement et le néant II peut alors décider d’accepter de vivre dans 
un tel univers et d’en tirer ses forces, son refus d’espérer et le témoignage obstiné d’une vie sans consolation. 
(MdS, 142).
105 On the same page is the note on lucid death from Nietzsche’s Crépuscule des Idoles.
106 My italics.
107 In September 1939, that is, in the immediate aftermath of the declaration of the Second World War, Camus 
wrote in his Carnets: «Il y a une fatalité unique qui est la mort et en dehors de quoi il n’y a plus de fatalité. Dans 
l’espace de temps qui va de la naissance à la mort, rien n’est fixé: on peut tout changer et même arrêter la guerre 
et même maintenir la paix, si on le veut assez, beaucoup et longtemps » (CI, 171).
108 «[...] la seule liberté raisonnable: celle qu’un cœur humain peut éprouver et vivre » (MdS, 142).
35
This « passionate attentiveness » o f  the lucid man toward the finitude of his condition, 
illustrated in the image o f generalized death sentence, is what characterizes revolt as passion  
passive, within which all action is inevitably recognized as «useless»: «Il n’y a qu’une action 
utile, celle qui referait l’homme et la terre. Je ne referais jamais les hommes» (MdS, 166).
The figure o f the conqueror in the MdS embodies the metaphysical revolt o f the lu c id  
man against his finitude, whose freedom is (in) his restlessly repeated being-at-the-limit.109
Human action is useless because it is finite -  everything is not possible, because, 
although man’s hubristic attempts at mastering and changing nature may seem to b e  
stretchable ad infinitum , the latter inexorably clash with the finitude of existence: hum an 
action cannot re-make men because it cannot eliminate death and evil. The conqueror’s action 
is passive, that is, it takes place within the anti-metaphysical and anti-foundational limits o f  
aisthesis: la chair is his only (finite) evidence (Id.).
It is in the conqueror’s identity o f  finite thought of the finite and passive or useless 
action,110 that, I suggest, we find the key to Camus’ later political writings and, in particular, 
to his critique o f ideologies.111 12The concept o f creation, as formulated in the pages o f the 
MdS, is essential, in my view, to grasp Camus’ understanding o f  action, and plays a pivotal 
part in the development o f the author’s ethical and political reflections between 1943 and 
1957.
It is significant that the conqueror - together with the actor and the artist, one o f  
Camus’ three illustrations of the absurd man -  figures in Nietzsche’s La Volonté de  
Puissance. In the MdS, the conqueror and the artist (créateur) are defined as «esprits 
parents» (MdS, 192), which share a common (absurd) awareness of the uselessness o f  
creation -  «Ainsi je  demande à la création absurde ce que j ’exigeais de la pensée, la révolte, le 
liberté et la diversité. Elle manifestera ensuite sa profonde inutilité » (Id.). According to 
Camus,
109 «[...] en face de la contradiction essentielle, je  soutiens mon humain contradiction. J'installe ma lucidité au 
milieu de ce qui la nie. J ’exalte l’homme devant ce qui l’écrase et ma liberté, ma révolte et ma passion se 
rejoignent alors dans cette tension, cette clairvoyance et cette répétition démesurée » (MdS, 166).
110 «Non, dit le conquérant, ne croyez pas que, pour aimer l’action, il m’a fallu désapprendre à penser. Je puis 
parfaitement au contraire définir ce que je  crois. Car je  le crois avec force et je  le vois d’une vue certaine et 
claire » (MdS, 164).
111 «Un cœur si tendu se dérobe à l’étemel et toutes les Églises, divines ou politiques, prétendent à l’étemel. Le 
bonheur et le courage, le salaire ou la justice, sont pour elles des fins secondaires. C’est une doctrine qu’elles 
apportent et il faut y souscrire. Mais je  n ’ai rien à faire des idées ou de l’étemel. Les vérités qui sont à ma 
mesure, la main peut les toucher. Je ne puis me séparer d’elles. Voilà pourquoi vous ne pouvez rien fonder sur 
moi : rien ne dure du conquérant et pas même ses doctrines » (MdS, 167).
112 «Les degrés de la force créatrice: 1. L’acteur faisant de soi une certaine figure [...], 2. le poète, le sculpteur, le 
peintre ; 3. le maître, - Empédocle ; 4. le conquérant ; 5. le législateur (le philosophe) [...]»  (VPII, § 657, fr. 
1883-1887).
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[p]our tous ces personnages, leur œuvre les définit au moins autant qu’elle en est définie. Le comédien 
nous l’a appris : il n’y a pas de frontière entre le paraître et l’être. [...] Sur le chemin de cette liberté, il est encore 
un progrès à faire. Le dernier effort est de savoir se libérer aussi de leurs entreprises : arriver à admettre que 
l’œuvre même, qu’elle soit conquête, amour ou création, peut ne pas être ; consommer ainsi l’inutilité profonde 
de toute vie individuelle. Cela même leur donne plus d’aisance dans la réalisation de cette œuvre, comme 
d’apercevoir l’absurdité de la vie les autorisait à s’y plonger avec tous les excès. (MdS, 192). [My italics]
Freed from the necessity o f the work o f  art as product, the objective correlate o f 
teleological thinking, creation is identified in the MdS with a form o f discipline or askesis.n3 
In the light o f Camus’ pages on freedom, absurd creation is not, properly speaking, a poiesis 
in that its useless action does not make anything. In the life-span o f an individual there is 
nothing given or pre-determined, except the unique fatality of death that de-limits the material 
(finite) “space” o f (infinite) possibilities.13 14 What is “pro-duced” is exclusively the agent 
(acteur de vie) -  in this sense absurd creation is a kind o f praxis: «Créer, c’est ainsi donner 
une forme à son destin» (E, 192).115
À ce point, le problème est inversé. Il s'agissait précédemment de savoir si la vie devait avoir un sens 
pour être vécue. Il apparaît ici cm contraire qu’elle sera d’autant mieux vécue qu ’elle n'aura pas de sens. Vivre 
une expérience, un destin, c ’est l’accepter pleinement. Or on ne vivra pas ce destin, le sachant absurde, si on ne 
fait pas tout pour maintenir devant soi cet absurde mis à jour par la conscience. Nier l’un des termes de 
l’opposition dont il vit, c ’est lui échapper. Abolir la révolte consciente, c’est éluder le problème. (MdS, 13S) 
[My italics]116
What emerges is a co-implication, mediated through aisthesis, of meaning and value : 
« La croyance au sens de la vie suppose toujours une échelle de valeurs, un choix, nos 
préférences » (MdS, 142-143). The lucid awareness of what Camus metaphorically describes 
as the absurd walls o f the finite, which bring about the tabula rasa o f (transcendent) value, 
«la croyance à l’absurde revient à remplacer la qualité des experiences par la quantité» (MdS,
113 «Dans cet effort quotidien où l’intelligence et la passion se mêlent et se transportent, l’homme absurde 
découvre une discipline qui fera l’essentiel de ses forces. L’application qu’il y faut, l’entêtement et la 
clairvoyance rejoignent ainsi l’attitude conquérante. » (MdS, 192). [My italics]
114 Nancy uses the terrn chora to define «non pas lieu indéterminé, mais possibilité de lieux, ou plutôt pure 
raatière-à-lieux » (J.-L. Nancy, L ’expérience de la liberté, op. cit, p. 112).
1151 suggest that we understand the discipline of the absurd création in the sense of what Nancy calls praxis as 
“schématisation”: «C’est ainsi que l’existence est réellement au monde. Ce qui est “à faire” ne se situe pas sur le 
registre d’une poiesis, comme une œuvre dont le schème serait donné, mais sur le registre de la praxis, qui ne 
« produit » que son propre agent ou son propre acteur, et qui ressemblerait donc plutôt à l’action d’une 
schématisation [...]» (J.-L. Nancy, L ’expérience de la liberté, op. cit., p. 39). This interprétation is confirmed by 
my analysis of the pages on revoit and art in HR (see Chapter 2.4).
116 We can say, with Nancy, that in the MdS, «[...] le motif du sens [est] désormais placé sous cette exigence : 
penser sa finitude, ne pas la combler ni l’apaiser, et pas non plus selon le mouvement insidieux d’une théologie 
ou d ’une ontologie négatives, où l’insensé finit, à l’infini, par boucler le sens même. Mais penser l’inaccessibilité 
du sens comme l’accès même au sens, et de nouveau, en toute rigueur, cet accès n’ayant pas lieu, n’accédant pas 
à quelque inaccessible, mais ayant lieu, in-accédant à lui-même, à ce suspens, à cette fin, sur cette limite où 
simultanément il se défait et se conclut, sans médiation de l’un à l’autre geste. Une pensée finie est une pensée 
qui reste sur cette im-médiation.» (J.-L. Nancy, Le Sens du monde, op. cit., p. 29). Paolo Flores d’Arcais uses the 
expression « ethics of the finite » to describe this normative dimension in Camus’ analysis o f the absurd (in 
« L ’assurdo e la rivolta : Albert Camus filosofo del finito », art. cit, p. 209).
37
iiliÜ iiJÜ Ü iilîli:;
143), « quality » designate here a number o f experiences organized toward an end, producing 
a  meaningful life.
Thus, the ethics o f  quantity defines the attitude of the absurd man, illustrated by Don 
Juan - as opposed to the quality-oriented attitude o f the saint (MdS, 154) -  as grounded in the 
anti-metaphysical refusal of Foundation,117 which reduces “sens ” (end1 meaning) to a man­
made means for ordering and unifying the dispersed chaos o f  becoming:118 «Là où la lucidité 
règne, l’échelle des valeurs devient inutile» (MdS, 144).
Si je me persuade que cette vie n’a d’autre face que celle de l’absurde, si j ’éprouve que tout son 
équilibre tient à cette perpétuelle opposition entre ma révolte consciente et l’obscurité où elle se débat, si 
j ’admets que ma liberté n’a de sens que par rapport à son destin limité, alors je dois dire que ce qui compte n’est 
pas de vivre le mieux mais de vivre le plus. [...] Une fois pour toutes, les jugements de valeur sont écartés ici au 
profit des jugements de fait. [...] J ’ai seulement à tirer les conclusions de ce que je  puis voir [...]119 120(MdS, 143) 
[My italics]
Now, according to Camus, it is the absurd «et sa vie contradictoire» (MdS, 144) which 
re-open the possibility for a new meaning: a longer experience, that is, a greater amount o f 
experience, is what changes the table of values within the framework of a modem life- 
condition - «Il nous faut imaginer cet aventurier du quotidien qui par simple quantité des 
expériences battrait tous les records (j’emploie à dessein ce terme sportif) et gagnerait ainsi 
sa propre morale. [...] Battre tous les records, c’est d’abord et uniquement être en face du 
monde le plus souvent possible» (MdS, 144), that is, to maintain the absurd in/as the aisthetic 
present - «Le présent et la succession des présents devant une âme sans cesse consciente, 
c ’est l 'idéal de l ’homme absurde» (MdS, 145).
117 The play-actor, as the second illustration o f the absurd man, embodies Nietzsche’s word: “Ce qui importe 
[...] ce n’est pas la vie étemelle, mais l’étemelle vivacité” (MdS, 162). The manuscript of the chapter attests that 
Camus took this sentence from Nietzsche’s Opinions et Sentences mêlées (Aph. 408), see E, 1445, n. 1 to p. 162.
1,8 « L’homme absurde multiplie [...] ce qu’il ne peut pas unifier » (MdS, 155).
119 « [ . ..]  ma règle ici est de m ’airanger de l’évidence immédiate » (MdS, 143).
120 «[•••] les conditions de la vie moderne imposent à la majorité des hommes la même quantité d’expériences et 
partant la même expérience profonde. [...] Je vois alors que le caractère propre d’une morale commune réside 
moins dans l’importance idéale des principes qui l ’animent que dans la norme d’une expérience qu’il est possible 
de calibrer. En forçant un peu les choses, les Grecs avaient la morale de leurs loisirs comme nous avons celle de 
nos journées de huit heures. » (E, 143). A note in the Carnets in October 1941 sheds further light on Camus’ use 
o f the terni “morale commune” as norm of conduct: «Contradiction dans le monde moderne. A’ Athènes, le 
peuple ne pouvait vraiment exercer son pouvoir que parce qu’il y consacrait la plus grande partie de son temps, 
et des esclaves, tout le jour, faisaient les travaux qui restaient à faire. A’ partir du moment où l’esclavage est 
supprimé, on met tout le monde au travail. Et c’est à cette époque où la prolétarisation de l’Européen est le plus 
avancée que l’idéal de souveraineté populaire se fait plus fort : cela est impossible » (CI, 247-248). This aspect, 
also pointed out by Nietzsche in his aphorism on compulsory and free work in Human, ail too human, 1,439, 
plays a pivotai rôle in Hannah Arendt’s analysis o f the political in the Human Condition.
121 The figure of the adventurer as the embodiment of the absurd thought recurs in the Carnets (July 1937): 
«L’aventurier. A le sentiment net qu’il n’y a plus rien à faire en art Rien de grand ou nouveau n’est possible 
[...]. Il ne reste que l’action. Mais qui porte une grande âme n 'entrera dans cette action qu ’avec désespoir » (CI, 
58)
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Camus does not seem to be afraid of «faire comme tant de ces hommes dont je  parlais 
plus haut, choisir la forme de vie qui nous apporte le plus possible de cette matière humaine, 
introduire par là une échelle de valeurs que d’un autre côté on prétend rejeter [ . . .]»  (MdS,
144). The nihilistic, i.e., anti-foundational and anti-metaphysical, perspective opened up by 
the evidence of the absurd is here preserved in the idea that, within the finite limits of the 
human condition, lucidity, as a form of sensory/sensual (aisthetic) awareness (« être
conscients »), transfigures the table of values and makes it useless: «Sentir sa vie, sa révolte,
122sa liberté, et le plus possible, c’est vivre et le plus possible» (Id.).
Car l’erreur est de penser que cette quantité d’expériences dépend des circonstances de notre vie quand 
elle ne dépend que de nous.m  (MdS, 144)
[... ] Par le seul jeu de la conscience, je transform e en règle de vie  ce qui était invitation à la mort -  et je 
refuse le suicide. (MdS, 145-146) [My italics]
It is significant that Camus quotes Nietzsche in order to elucidate the meaning of this 
« transformation », or transvaluation o f the nihilistic evidence into a new norm o f conduct, 
morality thus being the result of a persistent and persévérant action in «the same direction», 
which brings about a value -  something for which life is “made” worth living:
Quand Nietzsche écrit: « Il apparaît clairement que la chose principale au ciel et sur la terre est d 'obéir  
longtemps et dans une même direction : à la longue il en résulte quelque chose p o u r quo i il va ille la  peine de 
vivre su r cette terre comme par exemple la vertu, Part, la musique, la danse, la raison, l’esprit, quelque chose qui 
transfigure, quelque chose de raffiné, de fou ou de divin », il illustre la règle d’une m orale de grande allure. 
Mais il m ontre aussi le  chem in de l'hom m e absurde. O béir à  la  flam m e , c ’est à la fois ce qu’il y a de plus facile 
et de plus difficile. Il est bon cependant que l’homme, en se mesurant à la difficulté, se juge quelquefois. Il est le 
seul à pouvoir le faire. (MdS, 146) [My italics]
From the antropomorphicfaesthetic perspective o f  modem  nihilism, Camus relates the 
transfiguration of the absurd evidence of the meaninglessness and valuelessness o f the world 
into a norm or rule (“règle de combat”, MdS, 173), to the concept o f création. He, thus, 
résumés the Nietzschean m otif o f the unbearableness o f absurd - «L’art et rien que l ’art, dit 
Nietzsche, nous avons l’art pour ne point mourir de la vérité» (MdS, 173):12 324
122 It is in this perspective that we fully grasp the meaning o f Camus’ note on the idea of the nihil or nothingness 
(néant), which is approached from the psychological viewpoint: «Dans l’expérience psychologique du néant, 
c’est à la considération de ce qui arrivera dans deux mille ans que notre propre néant prend véritablement son 
sens. Sous un de ses aspects, le  néant est fa it exactem ent de la  somme des vies à ven ir qui ne seron t p a s les 
nôtres » (MdS, 145, note 1). [My italics]
123 « Disons que le seul obstacle, le seul « manque à gagner » est constitué par la mort prématurée. [...] La folie 
et la mort, ce sont ses [de l’homme absurde] irrémédiables. L’homme ne choisit pas. L’absurde et le surcroît de 
vie qu’il comporte ne dépendent donc pas de la  volonté de l'hom m e, mais de son contraire qui est la mort » 
(MdS, 144-145).
124 The motif of “obedience” also recurs in the C arnets (January-February 1942): «À opposer « Le grand danger 
est de se laisser accaparer par une idée fixe » (Gide) et 1’ « obéissance » nietzschéenne.» (Cil, 14).
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Toutes ces vies maintenues dans l’air avare de l’absurde ne sauraient se soutenir sans quelque pensée 
profonde et constante qui les anime de sa force. Ici même ce ne peut être qu’un singulier sentiment de fidélité. 
[...] Il y a ainsi un b o nheur m étaphysique à soutenir l’absurdité du inonde. La conquête ou le jeu, l’amour 
innombrable, la révolte absurde, ce sont des hommages que l’homme rend à sa dignité dans une campagne où il 
est d’avance vaincu.
Il s ’agit seulement d ’être fidèle à la règ le  du combat [...] la jo ie  absurde par excellence, c ’est la 
création  [...]. (MdS, 173) [My italics]
The absurd is developed around the opposition between two metaphoric poles, nuit/aveugle, 
designating the finiteness o f a limited thought, as well as the nihilistic tabula rasa o f meaning 
and value, and flamme/lumière/ïucidité. Through the emphasis on «obéir à la flamme», which 
explicitly refers to the absurd, constantly designated in the essay through the metaphoric 
constellation o f vision (thus, associated to light/lucidity¡clairvoyance), Camus overturns the 
negative understanding o f  obscurity/blindness, associated with the nihilistic loss o f  meaning, 
as the necessary starting point of «honest» thinking:
[...] il faut que l’esprit rencontre la nuit”, répondent les mystiques et les existentiels. Certes, mais non 
pas cette nuit qui naît sous les yeux fermés et par la seule volonté de l’homme -  nuit sombre et close que l’esprit 
suscite pour s’y perdre. S’il doit rencontrer une nuit, que ce soit plutôt celle du désespoir qui reste lucide, nuit 
polaire, veille de l’esprit d ’où se lèvera peut-être cette clarté blanche et intacte qui dessine chaque objet dans la 
lumière de l’intelligence. À ce degré, l’équivalence rencontre la compréhension passionnée. (MdS, 146)
It is interesting to observe a correspondence between the metaphor o f the absurd, «nuit 
polaire»,125 and the Nietzschean image of the «traveller o f  the artic pôle» in the Genealogy o f  
Mordis (III, 26), who represents the nihilistic culmination of the ascetic idéal. The latter
125 As M.L.Audin points out, in the metaphor of the “polar night”, the geographical element (polaire) amplifies 
the harshness and endlessness of a condition of darkness (nuit), which bears in itself the birth/rebirth o f an 
endless day/light, traceable in le g rand  M id i (in Marie-Louise Audin, P our une sém iotique du M ythe de S isyphe, 
op. cit., p. 460). This idea is confirmed by Audin’s reading of the metaphor o f the desert: Camus’ desert, as the 
Biblical one, expresses a transitory stage, a pathway leading the absurd man to the safe shores o f the Island (He) 
( Idib., p. 438-440). As Roger Quillot points out, the image of the isle «chère a Nietzsche (le  G a i Savoir, aph. 
372; A in si p a r ia it Zarathustra, “Les Iles bienheureuses”), est au centre de l’oeuvre de Camus. Voir la Préface 
qu’il a donnée en 1959 à la réédition du livre de Jean Grenier, Les lie s» (E, p. 1447 n. 174). The metaphor of the 
desert recurrently used by Camus to describe the absurd experience of a world rendered to its primeval 
strangeness and meaninglessness (E, 116), in. association to the notions o f illusion and “m ensonge " (E, 113), can 
already be found in a fragment dated 1885 in the French edition of Nietzsche’s L a  Volonté de P uissance: « Nous 
savons que la disparition d ’une illusion ne crée pas tout de suite une vérité, mais un nouveau fra g m en t 
d'ignorance, un élargissement de notre ‘espace vide’, un accroissement de notre ‘d é se r f » (VPII, « Le problème 
de la modernité », §118). Furthermore, the link with the G enealogy o f  M orals seems to be suggested also by a 
note in Camus’s C arnets (15 December 1942): «Le beau , d it N ietzsche après Stendhal, est une prom esse de 
bonheur. M ais s 'i l  n ’est p a s  le  bonheur m êm e, que p e u t- il prom ettre  ?» (Cil, 60). This quotation echoes the 
G énéalogie d e  la  m orale, III, § 6 where Nietzsche writes: « Est beau -  dit Kant -  ce qui provoque un plaisir 
désintéressé. ‘Désintéressé’ : comparez avec cette définition cette autre, d’un véritable ‘spectateur’ et d’un artiste 
-  Stendhal, qui appelle quelque part la beauté une promesse de bonheur.En tout cas, ici est récusé et rayé le seul 
aspect du fait esthétique que Kant mette en relief : le désintéressement.». Kant’s error, according to Nietzsche, 
consisted o f approaching the aesthetical problem from the « spectator »’s viewpoint instead of the artist’s (the 
creator’s) experience, an idea with which the young Camus seemed to be already familiar in 1931. This is all the 
more significant if  we consider that part III o f  the G enea logy  provides the link between the ‘aestheticism’ o f the 
C répuscule des ¡doles (which Camus read between ’38 and ’39), and the question o f nihilism in the posthumous 
fragments, as man’s will to nothingness.
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coincides with a harsh and resolute sight directed beyond, in a deserted landscape where life is 
speechless (le mutisme o f a world devoid o f reasons) and only the « “À quoi bon? ” uEn 
vain! ” “Nada!"» resound. It is precisely the «ascetic ideal» that closes the argument o f the 
MdS, the philosophical essay conceived by its author as a “passionate definition” o f modem 
nihilism.
In the chapter on La création sans lendemain, Camus insists on the relationship 
between the attitude o f  the absurd creator and the negative thought {pensée negative) 
described in the first part o f the MdS, as a finite, anti-foundational and anti-metaphysical 
thought o f the finite.126 Now, the absurd work of art cannot be confused with the sheer 
attempt to escape or to find a comfortable way out of the unbearable view of the absurd 
“truth” (MdS, 174)
Exposing the nihilistic renouncement o f all attempts to «surajouter au décrit un sens 
plus profond qu’elle [la pensée lucide] sait illégitime», the absurd work o f art cannot provide 
an end, a meaning or consolation to the absurd life (MdS, 176):
L’œuvre absurde illustre le renoncement de la pensée à ses prestiges et sa résignation à n’être plus que 
Tintelligence qui met en œuvre les apparences et couvre d'images ce qui n'a pas de raison. Si le monde était 
clair, Part ne serait pas. (MdS, 177)
In a note in the Carnets in November *42, Camus corrects this sentence, disavowing 
the implicit substantialist perspective in favour o f the “modest” perspective of a finite thought 
of the finite:
Je n’aurais pas dû écrire : si le monde était clair, l’art ne serait pas -  mais si le monde me paraissait 
avoir un sens je  n’écrirais pas.127 (Cil, 54)
In the MdS, the artist, or the creator, is defined as the most absurd o f the lucid 
characters (MdS, 170), in that he is aware o f  the limits of human thought -  the question is no 
longer to explain but to feel {éprouver) and describe. It is in the aisthetic present, opened up 
by the discovery o f the absurd,128 that the lucid creation acquires its full meaning as the
126 «L’existence tout entière, pour un homme détourné de l’étemel, n’est qu’un mime démesuré sous le masque 
de l’absurde. La création c’est le grand mime. Ces hommes [absurdes] savent d’abord, et puis tout leur effort est 
de parcourir, d’agrandir et d ’enrichir Pile sans avenir qu’ils viennent d ’aborder. Mais il faut d ’abord savoir» 
(MdS, 174).
127 « Il y a des cas où il faut être personnel, par modestie. [...] C’est une vérité brillante, sans fondement » (Cil,
5 4 -5 5 ).
121 « Car la découverte absurde coïncide avec un temps d’arrêt où s’élaborent et se légitiment les passions 
futures » (MdS, 174).
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attempt to“transfigure” the nihilistic « mort d’une experience» into the repetition and 
multiplication of aisthesis.129
The artistic transfiguration o f a meaningless world, despoiled of the categories o f  
human reason, does not attempt, however, to negate the absurd evidence from which it starts, 
and from which it gains its own “derisory” meaning (MdS, 179). On the one hand, the work 
o f art attests the «renoncement de 1’intelligence à raisonner le concret», or the metaphysical 
échec o f a “humiliated” reason, and the consequent aisthetic «triomphe du charnel» (MdS, 
176), as the visible près-ence o f the finiteness o f the human condition;130 on the other hand, 
the absurd work o f art is in itself the fu tile  protest against this condition (MdS, 192).131
The objectiveness o f the work o f  art is dissolved in the aisthetic awareness o f  the 
absurd -  which does not mean that its sensory dimension is denied,132 bur rather that from the 
“useless”, le ., nihilistic, anti-foundational perspective (¿‘gratuite") o f a finite thought reduced 
to la chair, work (“oeuvre”) as such, generally designating all human enterprise, makes sense 
exclusively in the light o f the constant effort, which constitutes the «attitude créatrice», as 
«l’une des celles qui peuvent compléter l’existence absurde» (MdS, 189).
What allows us to complete the absurd existence is, in Camus’ view, the w ill to 
maintain the conscience in which, and through which, the absurd exposes itself -  the will not 
to elude the absurd evidence o f  the finite:
L'effort de dom ination  est ici considérable. Mais l’intelligence humaine peut suffire à bien plus. Elle 
démontrera seulement V aspect vo lon ta ire de la  créa tion . J'ai fait ressortit ailleurs que la volonté humaine 
n'avait d'autre fin que de maintenir la conscience. Mais cela ne saurait aller sans discipline. De toutes les 
écoles de la patiente et de la lucidité, la création est la plus efficace. (MdS, 190). [My italics]
In the concluding pages o f his essay Camus draws the elements of an ascesis, made 
visible in the absurd creation «without tomorrow» {sans lendemain), which is entirely 
grounded on the constant effort to maintain the awareness («<conscience surhumaine», MdS, 
190) o f  its uselessness («Travailler et créer «pour rien» [...]» - MdS, 189) and finiteness («il
129 « Le cœur apprend ainsi que cette émotion qui nous transporte devant les visages du monde ne nous vient pas 
de sa profondeur mais de leur diversité. L'explication est vaine, mais la sensation reste, et, avec elle, les appels 
incessants d’un univers inépuisable en quantité. On comprend ici la place de l’œuvre d’art»  ( MdS, 174).
130 «[.♦•] la suite [des] œuvres [de l’homme absurde] n’est qu’une collection d’échecs. Mais si ces échecs 
gardent tous la même résonance, le créateur a su répéter l’image de sa propre condition, faire retentir le secret 
stérile dont il est détenteur » (MdS, 190).
131 He writes in his C arnets in November 1943: «Pour que l’œuvre soit défi, il faut qu’elle soit terminée (d’où la 
nécessité du « sans lendemain »). Elle est le  con tra ire de la  création divine. Elle est terminée, bien limitée, 
claire, p é trie  de V exigence hum aine. L’unité est dans nos mains ». (Cil, 113). « [...] la création humaine, faite à 
partir du monde, est toujours pour finir tourné contre le monde. [...] C’est Part et l’artiste qui refont le monde, 
mais toujours avec une arrière-pensée de pro testa tion . » (Cil, 116). [My italics]
132 « La pensée abstraite rejoint enfin son support de chair. » (MdS, 178). I
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n’est pas de vraie creation sans secret» - MdS, 190), and freed from the reifying dimension o f 
the work of art and its logic o f achievement -  as sheer performance (MdS, 192):
[La création] est aussi le bouleversant témoignage de la seule dignité de l’homme : la révolte tenace 
contre sa condition, la persévérance dans un effort tenu pour stérile. Elle demande un effort quotidien, la  m aîtrise  
de soi, Vappréciation exacte des lim ites du  vrai, la  m esure et la fo rce . Elle constitue une ascèse. Tout ce la  
« p o u r rien  », pour répéter et piétiner. [...] la grande oeuvre d’art a moins d’importance en elle-même que dans 
l'épreuve  qu’elle exige d’un homme et l’occasion qu’elle lui fournit de surmonter ses fantômes et d’approcher 
d’un peu plus près sa réalité nue. (MdS, 191) [My italics]
In March 1942 Camus notes in his Carnets:
Parvenu à l’absurde, s’essayant à vivre en conséquence, un homme s’aperçoit toujours que la 
conscience est la chose du monde la plus difficile à maintenir. Les circonstances presque toujours s’y opposent. 
Il s’agit de vivre la lucidité dans un monde où la dispersion est la régie.
Il s’aperçoit ainsi que le vrai problème, même sans D ieu, est le problème de l’unité psychologique ( le 
travail de l’absurde ne pose réellement que le problème de l’unité métaphysique du monde et de l’esprit) et la 
paix intérieure. Il s’aperçoit ainsi que celle-ci n’est pas possible sans une discipline difficile à concilier avec le 
monde. Le problèm e est là. Il faut justement la concilier avec le monde. Ce qu’il s’agit de réaliser c’est la règ le  
dans le siècle . [...] (Cil, 19-20) [My italics]
It is significant that in the Appendice to MdS on "L ’espoir et i 'absurde dans l 'œuvre
de Franz Kafka”, first published in the review Arbalète in 1943, Camus would praise
Nietzsche as «le seul artiste à avoir tiré les conséquences extrêmes d’une esthétique de
l’Absurde, puisque son ultime message réside dans une lucidité stérile et conquérante et une
1négation obstinée de toute consolation surnaturelle » (MdS, 210).
It is precisely in the pages on the absurd création that we measure the terms o f Camus’ 
confrontation with Nietzsche. Camus defines thinking as the will to create or to (de-)limit 
(our) world (MdS, 177): starting from the absurd expérience o f the divorce between man and 
his condition, it is the attempt to find «un terrain d’entente selon sa nostalgie, un univers 
corseté de raisons ou éclairé d’analogies qui permette de résoudre le divorce insupportable. 
Le philosophe, même s’il est Kant, est créateur» (MdS, 177).13 34
Stemming from man’s quest for imûfy,135 création plunges us to the heart of the problem 
o f Nihilism, as exposed by Nietzsche in his posthumous fragments:
Développement de l’absurde:
1) si le souci fondamental est le besoin d’unité ;
2) si le monde (ou Dieu) n’y peuvent satisfaire.
C’est à l’homme de se fa b riq u er  une unité, soit en se détournant du monde, soit à l’intérieur du monde. 
Ainsi se trouvent restituées une morale et une ascèse qui restent à préciser. (Cil, 57)136
133 My italics. E, 210.
134 Camus is repeating here the (Nïetzschean) îdea that «toute pensée est antropomorphique» (MdS, 110).
135 In a note in August ’42: «Nostalgie de la vie des autres. C’est que, vue de l’extérieur, elle forme un tout.
Tandis que la nôtre, vue de l’intérieur, paraît dispersée. Nous courons encore après une illusion d’unité » (Cil, 
39-40).
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Ascesis can be understood, in a post-metaphysical sense, as a kind of intra-mundane self- 
discipline: what I suggest is that, in the nihilistic tabula rasa o f meaning and value, disclosed 
by the absurd experience, another kind o f morality, namely an aesthetic morality in the 
Nietzschean sense, emerges in Camus’ work, as is made visible in the concept of style de vie.
137
In order to elucidate the relationship between creation and (aesthetic) morality, it is 
useful to focus our attention on Camus’ interpretation o f Nietzsche’s Over-Man. In a note in 
the Carnets in August 1942, Camus wrote:
Littérature. Se méfier de ce mot. Ne pas le prononcer trop vite. Si l’on ôtait la littérature chez les grands 
écrivains on ôterait ce qui probablement leur est plus personnel. Littérature = nostalgie. L ’homme supérieur de 
Nietzsche, l’abîme de Dostoïevski, l’acte gratuit de Gide, etc., etc. (Cil, 35) [My italics]
Again in March 1943: «Nietzsche connaît aussi la nostalgie. Mais il ne veut rien demander au 
ciel. Sa solution : ce qu’on ne peut demander à Dieu, on le demande à l’homme : c ’est le 
surhomme» (Cil, 87).
Camus appraises Nietzsche’s Over-Man in the light o f his own aesthetic reflection on 
the absurd creation, which is itself inscribed within the nihilistic overcoming o f  Metaphysics, 
as the de-valuation o f superior values, exposed in Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments. W hat 
he seems to suggest is that the Over-Man is literature, in the sense of the expression o f  
Nietzsche’s desire for unity (nostalgie). Thus, it is exclusively within the (finite) limits o f  the 
absurd work o f art that it should be understood, against the Nazi (misappropriation.
In Camus’ view, it is in the Over-Man, - as the solution to the philosopher’s 
ontological nostalgia, which takes over the place left vacant by God as the highest value - that 
the tragic paradox o f the absurd, and o f m odem  nihilism, is exposed. As he had already 
observed about Dostoyevsky’s work in the MdS, what defines the modem  character is the 
interrogation on the meaning o f  life, and what distinguishes the modern sensibility from the 
classic, ancient, one is the metaphysical concern o f  the former, as distinguished from the 
moral concern of the other (MdS, 182). The question is spelt out in  its most extreme form in 
Dostoyevsky’s novels: «L’existence est mensongère ou elle est étemelle» (Id.). 137
,j6 November-December 1942. (My italîcs).
137 «Sans lendemain. “Qu’est-ce que je médite de plus grand que moi et que j ’éprouve sans pouvoir le définir? 
Une sorte de marche difficile vers une sainteté de la négation -  un héroïsme sans Dieu -  l’homme pur enfin. 
Toutes les vertus humaines, y compris la solitude à l’égard de Dieu.
Qu’est ce qui fait la supériorité d'exemple (seule) du christianisme ? Le Christ et ses saints -  la recherche d’un 
style de vie. Cette oeuvre comptera autant de formes que d’étapes sur le chemin d’une perfection sans 
récompense. L’Étranger est le point zéro. Id  Le Mythe, [i.e. MdS] [...] » (March 1942, Cil, 31). See also Cil, 
28.
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In his fragment on the de-valuation of cosmological values, Nietzsche posed the quest 
for meaning as the fundamental condition for the possibility o f nihilism,138 which culminates, 
in its third and last phase, in the negation o f the metaphysical world, of the true, supra- 
sensory and therefore eternal, world of the Platonic-Christian metaphysics, as fiction  («nous 
avons mesuré la valeur du monde d’après des categories qui ne s’appliquent qu’à un monde 
purement fictif », VPII, 55) or lie («le caractère de l’existence n’est pas d’être «vraie», mais 
d ’être fausse ...», Id).
The question o f lie (mensonge) as metaphysical problem recurs in another fragment in 
the French edition o f La Volonté de Puissance :
Journal du nih iliste. -  Terreur d’avoir découvert la « fausseté » de tout 
Le vide ; plus de pensée ; les fortes passions tournant autour d’objets sans va leur ; être le spectateur de ces 
absurdes mouvements pour et contre [...]. La force plus énergique ne sait plus à quoi elle sert. Tout est là, mais il 
n’y a plus de fins. L’athéisme, ou manque d’idéal.
Phase de la négation passionnée en paroles et en actes ; ainsi se soulage le besoin accumulé d’affirmation, 
d’adoration...
Phase du mépris même envers la négation...même envers le doute...même envers l’ironie...même envers le 
mépris...
C atastrophe : le m ensonge n e  sera it-il pas une chose divine  ? La valeur de toute chose ne consisterait-elle pas à 
être fa u sse  ?.. .Ne devrait-on pas croire en Dieu, non parce qu’il est vrai, m ais parce qu  ’il est fa u x  ? Le désespoir 
ne serait-il pas simplement la suite d’une foi dans la divin ité de la vérité 7 Qui sait si le mensonge justement et la 
fa lsifica tio n , l’introduction artificielle d’un sens, ne seraient pas une valeur, un sens, une fin ?...
XI 1887-III 1888 (VPII, § 107,52-53)
What emerges in this fragment is precisely the question of the “place” o f the highest 
values: nihilism is the active extraction o f all (supra-sensory and bestowing meaning upon the 
sphere o f appearances) values from this world. The meta-physical “place”, or the true eternal 
world in which the values had been projected (second form  of nihilism), therefore remains 
empty - «La sphère où nous avions placé nos valeurs reste hors de notre atteinte -  de ce fait, 
l’autre sphère, celle où nous vivons, n’a nullement gagné en valeur» (VPII, § 106, 52 ).139
Now, the “catastrophe” of nihilistic thought lies precisely in the overturning of the 
value o f truth into its opposite, or rather, in the hypostatisation o f the negation of all 
traditional metaphysical values (the awareness o f «le mensonge [...] et la falsification, 
l’introduction artificielle d’un sens»): falsehood becomes the new highest (divine) value, 
meaning and end o f the world, and the transcendent sphere («la foi dans la divinité de la 
vérité»), thus, remains intact.
138 VPII, § 111, 54. Cfr., M. Heidegger, Il N ichilism o Europeo, op. cit, p. 92.
b9 As Heidegger observes, Nietzsche’s transvaluation o f values, as a new position  o f values beyond “com plete” 
Nihilism, cannot take place by simply re-placing the old values by filling the space left vacant by the nihilistic 
destruction of traditional idols.
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This question is immediately related to the problem of the self-divinisation o f man, as  
the logical consequence o f the «metaphysical crime» o f nihilism, which is addressed by  
Camus in his commentary on Dostoievski’s Possédés in the MdS:
«Si Dieu n’existe pas, je  suis dieu ». Devenir dieu, c’est seulement être libre sur cette terre, ne pas serv ir  
un être immortel. C’est surtout, bien entendu, tirer toutes les conséquences de cette douloureuse indépendance. 
Si Dieu existe, tout dépend de lui et nous ne pouvons rien contre sa volonté. S’il n’existe pas, tout dépend de 
nous. Pour Kirilov comme pour Nietzsche, tuer Dieu, c’est devenir dieu soi-même -  c’est réaliser dès cette terre 
la vie étemelle dont parle l’Évangile. (MdS, 184) [My italics]
In the MdS, Kirilov represents the extreme outcome of the nihilistic death of God -  o r 
o f the logical suicide or superior suicide (MdS, 183): «Si Dieu n* existe pas, Kirilov doit [ . . .]  
se tuer pour être dieu. Cette logique est absurde, mais c ’est ce qu’il faut» (Id..). Kirilov kills 
himself for a  superior idea - «Il veut se tuer pour devenir dieu » (Id..) : «du surhomme il n ’a  
que la logique et Vidée fixe , de l’homme tout le registre » (MdS, 184).140
I suggest that we interpret Camus’ 1941 version o f  the tragedy Caligula in the light o f  
the question, brought forth in the MdS, o f  the relationship between absurd, creation and 
freedom. It is significant that in the preface to the 1958 American edition of his four tragedies 
('Caligula, La Malentendu, L'État de Siège, Les Justes), written between 1938 and 1949, 
Camus defined Caligula precisely as «l’histoire d ’un suicide supérieur» (T, 1730).141
The Nietzschean parentage o f  the first version of the play, which is heavily indebted to 
the reading o f Nietzsche’s Origine de la tragédie, is highlighted by James Arnold,142 
according to whom between 1937 and 1938 «Camus avait mené de front deux explorations 
artistiques du sens de la mort» - the tragedy Caligula, and an unfinished novel, La M ort 
Heureuse — and that «[il] a fini par condamner à  l’oubli l’exploration narrative, où d ’ailleurs 
les meilleures pages sont lyriques, en faveur de l ’exploration théâtrale qui, en 1938, relevait 
encore du théâtre lyrique».143 According to Arnold,
140 My italics
141 My italics.
142 «Car toute la pièce [Caligula], de 1938 à 1941, évoluait dans l’ombre de la mort, non pas d'une mort -  
Drusilla étant le signe absent de la moitié perdue d’une unité ontologique idéale -  mais la mort conçue comme le 
phénomène définitif qui donne son sens à la vie. En ceci le premier Caligula révélera des affinités avec les plus 
belles pages méditatives de Malraux dans La Condition Humaine. L’érotisme du premier Caligula n’est pas non 
plus sans rapports avec le Malraux qui s’intérrogeait, au début des années trente, sur la mort et la vie par le biais 
de la sexualité. [...]», A. James Arnold, « Pourquoi une edition critique de Caligula », Albert Camus 1980, op. 
cit., p. 181.
,4j Ivi, p. 182. As Arnold confirms, «Caligula et Le M ythe de Sisyphe se font écho en plusieurs endroits, en 
1941» (CAC4, 160), especially concerning the divinisation o f Caligula and Kirilov. A rapprochement of 
Nietzsche and Dostoyevsky is confirmed by Camus’ 1933 notes, which attest his reading o f Shestov’s La
Philosophie de la tragédie (see CAC4,130).
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L’état d ’esprit “juvénile” dont Camus fait prevue dans le Caligula de 1938 est aussi, et au premier chef, 
une tentative artistique de suggérer la possibilité de réintégrer les contradictions de la vie humaine par delà la 
mort, afin de retrouver une plénitude de vie que l’on suppose aussi en déça de la naissance. Il est évident qu’une 
tragédie qui se propose de traiter, de donner à voir et à sentir, cette conception de la vie et de la mort, devra  
s  'éloigner beacoup de ce  q u 'il est convenu d 'a p p eler les réalités de la vie socia le. Cette tragédie-là, par contre, 
exploitera, jusqu’à l’exaspération des nerfs, la part d’ombre de la vie humaine, celle qui n’est pas et, peut-être, ne 
sera  ja m a is socia lisée .144
I argue that Caligula explores one aspect, namely, the absolute logic or the super­
human «idée fixe»  o f  modem thinking exposed to the experience of the absurd, or to modern 
nihilism, which cannot be socialised for it inevitably spells doom and destroys the world in 
which it enters. It is significant that Camus resumed this «tragédie de 1*intelligence» (T, 1730) 
in the question «si la poésie doit être meurtrière ou non» (CAC4, 52) :145 Caligula is defined 
as «un empereur artiste» (CAC4, 21), who transforms his philosophy in corpses («pour la 
première fois dans l’histoire, la poésie agit», CAC4,44).
Caligula’s philosophy is the (<absurdist) absolutization of the disclosing moment o f the 
absurd, brought about by death as the limit par excellence, and aisthetically experienced 
through the touch/slap o f the cold and bloodless corpse.146 Caligula embodies the absurd 
«liberté [...]du condamné à mort» (CAC4, 31), initiated to the «vérité de ce monde qui est de 
n ’en point avoir» (CAC4, 75) : in a world rendered to its primitive meaninglessness and in­
humanity, Caligula chooses the systematic (“logical”) exercise o f a boundless power and 
limitless freedom to change a finite existence of suffering and death, through the realization 
o f the impossible (CAC4, 84).
What is important to point out for our purposes is that in the 1941 version, the 
question of power and that of freedom coincide: as poet and master (Emperor), I argue, 
Caligula illustrates, in my view, one possibility of the «aestheticizing» creative force, which 
we have traced in Nietzsche’s fragments. «Monstre pour avoir trop aimé» (CAC4, 23), 
Caligula is not an idealist, he experiences despair through physical torment (CAC4, 32) as/in 
sensual excess:147 Grenier would criticize this early version for its «côtés faibles 
(romantiques)» (CAC4, 124) -  it is significant that Camus would take over the adjective 
«romantique» in HR to address the absolutization of the absurd sensibility, illustrated in the 
MdS, toward a murderous fabrication o f corpses.
144 A. James Arnold, « Pourquoi une edition critique de C aligula », op. ciL, p. 183. My italics.
145 My italics. In Cherea’s words: «Caligula vivant, je  suis tout entier livré à l’arbitraire et à l’absurde, c’est-à- 
dire à la poésie» (CAC4,44).
146 This image is developed for the first time in an untitled one-page manuscript («Voilà, elle est morte...») 
datable around 1933.
147 According to Camus’ friend and professor o f philosophy, Jean Grenier, «ce que [Camus] admirait avant tout 
chez [Nietzsche], c’était la lutte continuelle contre la douleur physique» (CAC4, 132). On the relation between 
the young Camus’ concern with the aesthetic justification of suffering and his appropriation of Nietzsche’s 
aesthetics of tragedy, see Arnold’s essay in CAC4, 126-ff.
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What I would like to point out is the relationship between the absurd evidence 
(modern nihilism) and the exercise o f omnipotence, which will be the object o f further 
examination in Chapter 3, anticipating the idea -  exposed by Arendt in OR -  that Absolute 
Evil and Absolute Good (embodied in the tragedy respectively by Caligula and Scipion - 
CAC4, 68) do not belong in this world, that they are destructive of the human intercourse and 
plurality (CAC4,29).
The tragedy develops one dimension o f the sensibilité absurde illustrated in the M dS, 
and rooted in what the author defines as modem nihilism: I, however, suggest that it is 
possible to trace another dimension in Camus’ raisonnement absurde, which opens the way 
for, and in a way provides the elements for, the author’s ethical reflection between 1941 and 
1945.148
In a fragment dated 1884, Nietzsche formulates the relationship between nihilism and 
creation - «C’est nous qui avons crée un monde pourvu d’une valeur ! Cela connu, nous 
reconnaissons aussi que le respect de la vérité est la conséquence d’une illusion, et qu’il faut 
estimer plus haut la force plastique, simplificatrice, constructive, inventive. « Tout est faux ! 
Tout est permis ! [...]» (VPII, §108, 53):
La morale est dès maintenant anéantie : constater ce fait ! Ce qui reste, c’est : « Je veux ».
Hiérarchie nouvelle. Contre l’égalité.
Au lieu du juge et du répresseur, le créateur.
Notre situation favorable : c’est nous qui moissonnons.
Mon extrême responsabilité : mon orgueil !
[.»] (VPII, § 16, p. 19)
Stavroguine’s absurd judgement: “Tout est permisl” (MdS, 185), in the chapter on 
Dostoyevsky’s Kirilov in the MdS, echoes the final pages on the absurd creator («un monde 
demeure dont l’homme est le seul maître», MdS, 192): in a world without God, everything is 
in our hands - «[i]l n ’y a pas de mystère dans la creation humaine. La volonté fait ce miracle» 
(MdS, 190).149
148 According to Arnold, it is only after the armistice in 1940 that Camus «a pu, su et dû reprendre Caligula en y 
insérant ses préoccupations éthiques de plus en plus marquées qui n 'existaient pas au moment de la première 
version» (A. James Arnold, « Pourquoi une edition critique de Caligula », op. cit., p. 185), and which mark the 
shift from «le texte lyrique au texte dramatique» (Id.). It is significant that the aesthetic principle governing 
Camus’ concept of tragedy underwent an important change around 1941: «Le Caligula de 1938 est lyrique et 
onirique. Les principes qui organisent les rapports entre ses parties -  l’extraordinaire symétrie entre Scipion et 
Caligula, par exemple, ou bien la lutte métaphysique, 1 'agon, qui détermine le sort tragique du héros et qui se 
communique viscéralement, pour ainsi dire -  ont été oblitérés par la substitution d’une esthétique étrangère à 
celle qui présidait à la composition de la version originale.» (Ivi, p. 183). We could hypothesize a parallel 




For the French author, the Nietzschean “je  veux” coincides with the effort (will as 
self-discipline) to maintain the lucid awareness of the absurd. It is in this sense that I suggest 
we interpret Camus’s letter to Ponge: «Si je n’avais pas une peur bleu des magnifiques 
généralisations à la Nietzsche, je vous dirais: « Le sentiment de l ’absurde, c’est le monde en 
train de mourir. La volonté de l ’absurde, c ’est le monde nouveau » (E, 1667).
What I suggest is that creation highlights, in the coincidence of the finite thought (of 
the finite) and the useless action o f the absurd man - be him conqueror, artist, or Don Juan -150 
a normativeness inherent in the act o f ex-isting.151
We can say, with Nancy,152 that freedom from all (transcendent) law opens the way, in 
Camus’ reflection on the absurd, to a concept of freedom of existence as law - law describing 
a limit which is not imposed to life from outside or above, but is existence as the finite être-à 
o f man and world.
The absurd thought «éclaire ce désert et le domine. Elle connaît ses servitudes et les 
illustre. Elle mourra en même temps que ce corps. Mais le savoir, voilà sa liberté » (MdS, 
167). The conqueror, in this sense, embodies the convergence o f  this groundless law, this un­
founded aisthetic foundation, and creation:
Les conquérants parlent quelquefois de vaincre et surmonter. Mais c’est toujours « je  surmonter» qu’ils 
entendent Vous savez bien ce que cela veut dire. Tout homme c’est senti l’égal d’un dieu à certains moments. 
[...] Cela vient de ce que, dans un éclair, il a senti Pétonnantegrandeur de l’esprit humain. Les conquérants sont 
seulement ceux d’entre les hommes qui sentent assez leur force pour être sûrs de vivre constamment à ces 
hauteurs et dans la pleine conscience de cette grandeur. [...] [Les conquérants] ne quittent jamais le creuset 
humain, plongeant au plus brûlant dans l’âme des révolutions.
Ils y trouvent la créature mutilée, mais ils y rencontrent aussi les seules valeurs qu'ils aiment et qu’ils admirent, 
l’homme et son silence. C ’est à la fois leur dénuement et leur richesse. 11 n’y a qu’un luxe pour eux et c’est celui 
des relations humaines. (MdS, 167) [My italics]
The Nietzschean echoes in the conqueror’s «self-overcoming» - which in the MdS is 
identified with the “arithmetic” capacity o f the absurd thought to maintain itself le p lus  (E, 
167), and to stretch the aisthetic present the most by repeating it -  re-pose the question o f  the 
“transvaluation of values” within the nihilistic limits of the finite (E, 166), as a question o f 
praxis: « Même humiliée, la chair est ma seule certitude. Je ne puis vivre que d’elle. La
150 «Don Juan sait et n’espère pas. II fait penser à ces artistes qui connaissent leur limites, ne les excèdent jamais 
et, dans cet intervalle précaire où leur esprit s’installe, ont toute la merveilleuse aisance des maîtres. Et c’est bien 
là le génie : l'intelligence qui connaît ses frontières » (E, 152). [My highlighting)
151A s  Paolo Flores d’Arcais points out, « [u]n’esisten2a  priva di necessità in un mondo privo di scopi, è 
un’esistenza per necessità giudicante. Cosa possa essere il senso del mondo e della propria esistenza viene 
scelto, momento per momento. Poiché non è dato, non può accadere altrimenti. Venire al mondo equivale a far 
nascere un dover essere. “Respirare è giudicare”. Laddove non si dà giustificazione, deve inevitabilmente darsi 
giudizio. [...] L’esser-ci è allora fatalmente normativo [...]» (P. Flores d’Arcais, “L’assurdo e la rivolta” , art. 
cit., p. 209).
152 J.-L. Nancy, L 'expérience de la liberté, op. cit., pp. 37-38.
créature est ma patrie. Voilà pourquoi j ’ai choisi cet effort absurde et sans portée. V oilà 
pourquoi je suis du côté de la lutte.» (MdS, 166). lu the manuscript version o f the MdS the  
term « lutte » is replaced by the term « révolte »:153 I argue that the pages on the conqueror 
represent the textual link between the argument on the absurd in the MdS and the 1945 
Remarque sur la révolte, which is the cornerstone o f Camus’ criticism of Existential 
philosophy and o f his political reflection between 1944 and '47.
In his Remarque sur la révolte, Camus wrote: « [...] l’homme peut-il, à lui seul et sans 
le secours de l’étemel, créer ses propres valeurs ?» (E, 1696). «Dans l’ordre de l’expérience 
humaine, la révolte a le même sens que le cogito dans l’ordre de la pensée. Elle est la 
première vérité et elle crée la première valeur » (E, 1686-87). Creation, in this sense, cannot 
be understood as the realization, or the bringing into presence, o f some essence, a pre­
existent idea or “plan”, in the Platonic acceptation of poiesis. There is nothing that precedes 
that experiri, and revolt constitutes the founding act of human experience, in the finite sense 
o f an effort that pushes itself to the limit (MdS, 136), and maintains itself in that being-at and 
touching-upon it, which de-fines the human condition:
Le monde est toujours fermé. Nous sommes toujours dans le cercle [...]. [...] à la limite on pourrait 
entrevoir un absolu d 'évidence  qui ne serait ni dans 1’ irréductibilité de l’homme ni dans la situation contre 
laquelle il est en lutte, mais dans le rapport que l’un et l’autre soutiennent entre eux, et qui est à proprement 
parler la condition hum aine. C ’est le r e la tif absolu. La révolte permet au moins d’affirmer que la condition 
humaine est, ce qui n’est pas si évident qu’il le paraît (E, 1695-6). [My italics]
Revolt «founds» the human condition, in the only sense consistent with a finite  
thought o f the finite, which is that o f the lucid act o f touching-upon-the-limit.154 The aisthetic 
judgement is the /¿arw-giving act o f  the absurd man, protesting against his finitude, which 
founds ex-istence, in the sense of an opening-up (sur-prise) o f its being ex-posed to the limits: 
it is in this sense that «/ 'homme et son silence» are the only values that are recognized and 
praised by the conqueror (MdS, 167).
133 See Quillot’s Notes et Variantes to MdS, note 3 to page 166 (E, 1446).
154 Nancy offers an understanding foundation, which I take as appropriate to describe Camus’s notion of 
création: «Le modèle de la fondation n’est-il pas la fondation antique de la ville, par le tracé de sa limite ? [ .. .]  
Ce n’est pas la fondation au sens architectonique du creusement et de l’établissement d’une assise sur laquelle 
pourra tenir un édifice. Pour pouvoir opérer une fondation architectonique, ilfaut d’abord avoir fondé au sens 
topographique et cadastral [...] qui est de délimiter l ’espace de la fondation. Cette délimitation, par elle-même, 
n’est rien, elle est néant d’opération productiver. Elle ne fait rien, en ce sens (et elle n’est pas p o iesis), et il n ’y  a  
rien, rien de donné ni de préétabli ( pas même l’idée d ’un plan de la cité ou de l’édifice), [...] là  où  la fondation a 
lieu. Celle-ci est plutôt ce rien  lui-même, cette insaisissable chorâ, portés à l’intensité incandescente d’une 
décision. Ici, maintenant, où il n’y a rien, ici et maintenant qui est n’importe où et n’importe quand, est décidé de 
l’existence, par exemple d’une cité. Ce n’est pas produire cette cité, mais c’est cela sans quoi il n ’y aurait ni plan 
ni opération pour la produire. Cela trace une limite en se portant sur cette limite, qui ne doit son existence qu’à 
ce geste fondateur.» (J.-L. Nancy, L 'expérience de la  liberté , op. cit., pp. 112-113).
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I suggest that the figure o f  Caligula, in the 1941 version o f the tragedy, situates itself 
in the reverse of this aisthetic awareness: the image of the looking-glass, around which 
Camus organizes the Emperor’s absolute creation, marks the withdrawal from the aisthetic 
touching-upon, and the simplifying force o f terror which erases the plural com-pearance. Men 
are reduced to an (abstract) public of guilty victimes in the inexorable face o f their 
Judge/executioner (CAC4, 36). Caligula’s hands stretching toward the cold surface of the 
mirror in the closing lines o f his absurd monologue (CAC4, 119) summarise in an image the 
negation of Oedipus’ tragic «tout est bien» (MdS, 197), for whom «le seul lien qui le rattache 
au monde, c’est la main fraîche d ’une jeune fille» (Id.).
Now, what I suggest is that creation o f  values can be understood in/as the de-limiting 
of a material/sensory (aisthetic) “space” in which the meaning o f  existence is overturned 
(trans-valuation) into existence as meaning:
Comment ne pas comprendre que, dans cet univers vulnérable, tout ce qui est humain et n'est que cela 
prend un sens plu brûlant ?Visages tendus, fraternité menacée, amitié si forte et si pudique des hommes entre 
eux, ce sont les vraies richesses puisqu'elles sont périssables. C’est au milieu d’elles que l’esprit sent le mieux 
ses pouvoirs et ses limites. (MdS, 167) [My italics]
In the concluding pages o f the essay on the absurd, Camus devotes particular attention 
to the mythological figure of Sisyphus, revisited as «travailleur inutile des enfers» (MdS, 
195). Condemned to roll a stone endlessly to the top of an infernal mountain, Sisyphus pays 
the price of his “earthly” passions:155 in this sense, « [il] enseigne la fidélité supérieure qui nie 
les dieux et soulève les rochers» (MdS, 198). His superior fidelity is the Nietzschean fidelity 
to the earth (the finite), in the light o f  which the absurd hero is exclusively creator:
S’il y a un destin personnel, il n ’y a point de destinée supérieure ou du moins il n’en est qu’une dont il juge 
qu’elle est fatale et méprisable. Pour le reste, il se sait le maître de ses jours. À cet instant subtil où l’homme se 
retourne sur sa vie, Sisyphe, revenant sur son rocher, contemple cette suite d’actions sans lien qui devient son 
destin, créé par lui, uni sous le regard de sa mémoire et bientôt scellé par sa mort. Ainsi, persuadé de l’origine 
tout humaine de tout ce qui est humain, aveugle qui désire voir et qui sait que la nuit n’a pas de fin, il est 
toujours en marche. (MdS, 198) [My italics]
Creation, again, coincides with a poiesis-praxis, in which the act o f shape donation (MdS, 
192) is understood as a form of self-discipline, such that «Vexercice de vivre ne saurait aller 
sans la conscience de son caractère insensé» (MdS, 180).
155 «Son mépris des dieux, sa haine de la mort et sa passion pour la vie, lui ont valu ce supplice indicible où tout 
l’être s ’emploie à ne rien achever » (MdS, 196).
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In the absurd confrontation with its finite condition (le rocher), Sisyphus illustrates the 
Pascalian grandeur o f the lucid man,156 devoid o f the comfort o f  faith -  he represents the 
tragic dimension o f finitude:
Si ce mythe est tragique, c’est que son héros est conscient Où serait en effet sa peine, si à chaque pas 
l ’espoir de réussir le soutenait ? L’ouvrier aujourd’hui travaille, tous les jours de sa vie, aux mêmes tâches et ce 
destin n’est pas moins absurde. Mais il n’est tragique qu’aux rares moments où il devient conscient. Sisyphe, 
prolétaire des dieux, impuissant et révolté, connaît toute l’étendue de sa misérable condition : c’est à elle qu’il 
pense pendant sa descente. La clairvoyance qui devait faire son tourment consomme du même coup sa victoire. 
(MdS, 196)
The notion o f tragic is worth analysing in detail, as it will prove essential in Camus’ 
later writings. From the comparative analysis o f the MdS with the Carnets, a constant 
correspondence emerges between the tragic and what we have defined as absurd or aisthetic 
conscience.
In a  note, dated June 1937, Camus writes: «Combat tragique du monde souffrant. 
Futilité du problème de l’immortalité. Ce qui nous intéresse, c’est notre destinée, oui. Mais 
non pas « après », « avant ». » (CI, 51). The association o f the tragic with conflict anticipates 
the pages on the useless struggle o f the absurd hero (MdS, 166,198) against a finite condition 
o f suffering and death. Identified with the refusal o f a transcendent principle or meaning that 
would justify existence, Camus defines the tragic as contradictory (Cl, 51). The textual 
reference to the notion o f the absurd as «contradictory in existence», in the later Remarque 
sur la révolte (E, 1696), is confirmed by Camus himself in another note o f the Carnets in Mai 
’37, where he insists on the relationship between tragic and the liminal experience o f game 
(jeu), as being a useless or absurd effort:
Aux confines -  Et par-dessus: le jeu. Je nie, suis lâche et faible, j ’agis comme si j ’affinnais, comme si 
j ’étais fort et courageux. Question de volonté55 pousser l’absurdité jusqu’au bout= je  suis capable de...
D’où prendre le jeu au tragique, dans son effort ; au comique dans le résultat (indifférent plutôt). [...] 
Epurer le jeu par la conquête de soi-m êm e -  la sachant absurde.
Conciliation du sage hindou et du héros occidental. [...] (CI, 39).
The echoes o f  Nietzsche’s remarks on game (jeu) are pointed out by A. James 
Arnold.157 I suggest that it s possible to detect a correspondence between Nietzsche’s
156 «[...] il est supérieur à son destin. Il est plus fort que son rocher.» (MdS, 196)
157 According to Arnold, in chapter 10 (“Pourquoi je suis si malin”) of E cce H om o  « “le jeu” a été marqué d’un 
trait de crayon dans la phrase: « Je  ne connais p a s d 'a u tre  m anière, dans les rapports avec les grandes tâches, 
que le jeu . » (p. 70) Toute la fin de la page suivante, sur Yam or fa t i  est mise entre crochets » (in A. James 
Arnold, “Camus lecteur de Nietzsche”, art. cit., p. 96) - « [...] je  révolte par ma seule existence tout ce qui a du 
sang mauvais dans les veines... Ma formule pour désigner la grandeur dans l’homme, c’est Yam or fa t i :  que 
personne ne veuille rien autrement, ni en avant, ni en arrière, ni dans les siècles des siècles. Ne pas seulement 
supporter la nécessité, encore moins se la dissimuler -  tout idéalisme est manière de mentir devant la nécessité -, 
mais l’aimer... » (F. Nietzsche, E cce Homo, Paris, Flammarion, p. 90). In Amold’s view, «Il est fort possible
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definition of the tragic philosopher in Ecce homo and the figure o f the lucid thinker in the 
MdS (E, 191).
It is significant that Camus insisted on the notion o f honnêteté (MdS, 113) to describe 
the finite method of the absurd thought,158 as opposed to the intellectual dishonest escape out 
o f the evidence of finitude in the comfortable “constructions” (maisons d'idées) o f 
metaphysical thought (MdS, 137), o f which the «idée fixe» of the Over-Man is the extreme 
(inconsistent) expression.
In the philosophical essay,Sisyphus is tragic because he is aware (conscient) o f the 
absurd, and chooses to acknowledge the weight of tears and blood o f his finite condition -  
tragedy cannot be separated from the aisthetic or absurd conscience, as the figure o f Oedipus 
beautifully illustrates:
Ainsi, Œdipe obéit d’abord au destin sans le savoir. À partir du moment où il sait, sa  tragédie  
com m ence. Mais dans le même instant, aveugle et désespéré, il reconnaît que le seul lien qui le rattache au 
monde, c’est la main fraîche d’une jeune fille. Une parole démesurée retentit alors : « Malgré tant d’épreuves, 
mon âge avancé et la grandeur de mon âme me font juger que tout est bien. » L’Œdipe de Sophocle, comme le 
Kirilov de Dostoïevski, donne ainsi la formule de la victoire absurde. La sagesse antique rejoint l’héroïsme 
moderne.159
On ne découvre pas l’absurde sans être tenté d’écrire quelque manuel du bonheur. [...] Mais il n’y a 
qu’un monde. Le bonheur et l’absurde sont deux fils de la même terre. Il sont inséparables. [...] « Je juge que 
tout est bien », dit Œdipe, et cette parole est sacrée. Elle retentit dans l’univers farouche et limité de l’homme. 
Elle enseigne que tout n’est pas, n'a pas été épuisé. Elle chasse de ce monde un dieu qui y était entré avec 
l’insatisfaction et le goût des douleurs inutiles. Elle fait du destin un affaire d’homme, qui doit être réglée entre 
les hommes. (MdS, 197)
In a note in the Carnets in August 1938 Camus wrote :
Accroître le bonheur d’une vie d’homme, c’est étendre le tragique de son témoignage. L’œuvre d’art (si 
elle est un témoignage) vraiment tragique doit être celle de l’homme heureux. Parce que cette œuvre d’art sera 
tout entière soufflée par la mort. (CI, 120)
The relation tragic-happiness-death (absurd) is pivotai in order to grasp the meaning of 
the concluding lines o f the MdS. Since the lyrical essays Camus had associated happiness 
with the lucid awareness o f the finite -  la mort consciente (CI, 119),160 or what we hâve 
defined as aisthetic conscience. In Le desert (Noces) he wrote:
que cet aspect du jeu soit en rapport avec l’Acte II de C aligula  (version A) : « Jeu de Caligula », et avec le sous- 
titre de la pièce primitive : « Caligula ou le Joueur » (Ivi, p. 96).
158 Two short notes from Henri Albert’s translation of Je Crépuscule des Idoles in the Carnets in August 1938 
confirm Camus’ interest in the Nietzschean notion of tragic and its relation to a isthetic  conscience (death) (CI, 
119). Moreover, in September 1939: «"La volonté de système est un manque de loyauté" (C répuscule des 
Ido les). " L ’artiste tragique n’est pas un pessimiste. Il dit oui à tout ce qui est problématique et terrible" 
(C répuscule des Idoles) » (CI, 174).
159 See also CI, 39.
160 The note on happiness in the C arnets follows Camus’ notes from Nietzsche’s C répuscule des Ido les (CI, 119) 
and from Humain, trop kum ain: «Nietzsche. « Que désirons-nous donc à l’aspect de la beauté? C’est d’être
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Mais qu’est-ce que le bonheur sinon le simple accord entre un être et l’existence qu’il mène ? Et quel 
accord plus légitime peut unir l’homme à sa vie sinon la double conscience de son désir de durée et son destin de 
mort ? On y apprend du moins à ne compter sur rien et à considérer le présent comme la seule vérité qui nous 
soit donnée par « surcroît ». (E, 85)
In Camus’ lyrical writings, the sensual «beauté insupportable» o f nature (E, 85) 
initiâtes the author to the bitter awareness o f his finitude, happiness résides in the aisthetic 
présent o f the chair consciente, as the ultimate accord o f a (finite) being with his condition 
(ex-istence) - 161 «singulier instant où la spiritualité répudie la morale, où le bonheur naît de 
l ’absence d ’espoir, où l ’esprit trouve sa raison profonde dans le corps» (E, 87).* 162 163
Tout ce qui exalte la vie, accroît en même temps son absurdité. Dans l’été d’Algérie, j ’apprends qu  ’une  
seule chose e s t p lu s tragique que la  sou ffrance e t c 'e s t la  v ie  d ’un hom m e heureux. Mais ce peut être aussi bien 
le chemin d’une plus grande vie, puisque cela conduit à ne p a s tricher. (E, 75) [My italics]
Happiness is associated with the lucid refusal to cheat: Camus’ terminology in the 
1938-9 lyrical essays betrays a close intellectual “parentage” with Nietzsche’s work - Ecce 
homo, but also Twilight o f  the Idols and Human, All too Human, which he read between 
August ’38 and September ’39.
In Ecce homo, Nietzsche identifies morality with the «mensonge millénaire» of 
metaphysical, religious and philosophical, thought, as the «[...] volonté de ne pas voir, à tout 
prix, comment en somme la réalité est fa ite», which devaluates the sensory worldly
appearances in the belief in a « true world », transcendent and supra-sensory.
The relationship between mensonge and the optimistic bonheur mesquin o f the 
« good » (moral) men,164 which deprives existence o f its grandeur, bears some interesting 
affinities with Camus’ own thought in the juvenile essays and notes. In particular, the 
identification, through the figure o f Zarathustra, o f the tragic philosopher with the honest
beaux. Nous nous figurons que beaucoup de bonheur y est attaché, mais c ’est une erreur» (Humain, trop  
hum ain) » (CI, 119-120).
l6> The definition o f happiness as an accord  between a being and his existence, and between man and his finite 
condition does not contradict the metaphoric definition o f  the absurd as “divorce”, nor should it be confused with 
a form o f “resignation” or “acceptation” o f absurdity: the aisthetic conscience, in which the absurd is 
maintained, coincides with the lucid “fidelity” to the finite, in the sense of Sisyphus’ will to acknowledge his 
condition. “Accord”, in this sense, means the refusal to “escape” the finite (rejection of hope and faith in another 
life), which coincides with the metaphysical revolt o f the absurd man.
162 My italics.
163 My italics. F. Nietzsche, E cce hom o, Paris, Mercure de France, 1909, p. 166 ; Paris, Flammarion, 1992, p.
154
164The notion o f happiness in Camus’ writings cannot be confused with the petty happiness o f Zarathustra’s 
« last men »: «[...] il n’a pas été dit que le bonheur soit à toute force inséparable de l’optimisme. II est lié à 
l’amour -  ce qui n’est pas la même chose. Et je  sais des heures et des lieux où le bonheur peut paraître si am er 
qu’on lui préfère sa promesse. Mais c’est qu’en ces heures ou en ces lieux, je n’avais pas assez de coeur à aimer, 
c’est-à-dire à ne pas renoncer. Ce qu’il faut dire ici, c’est cette entrée de l ’hom m e dans les fê te s  de la terre et de 
la beauté. Car à cette minute, comme le néophyte ses derniers voiles, il abandonne devant son dieu la petite 
monnaie de sa personnalité. Oui, il y  a un bonheur p lu s  haut où le  bonheur p a ra ît fu tile . » (E, 86) [My 
highlighting]
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yes-saying spirit -  the tragic sentiment being «l’émotion affirmative par excellence» - 165 and 
with the immoralist, who proceeds to the tabula rasa of Christian decadent values in view o f a 
transvaluation of all values, finds some recurrent echoes, throughout Camus’ early writings, 
in the relationship between «jeu»,166 «valeurs héroïques»/«courage» (CI, 23) and 
«immoralisme».167
In a short text, probably the draft o f a preface to his manuscript Le Courage, dated 
1934, immoralism is associated with the lucid awareness o f the «tragique qui obsède 
l’homme » (CAC 2, 299) and the heroic will « de n'en refuser » : «Entre cet envers et cet 
endroit du monde et de moi-même, je  me refuse à choisir» (Ibidem). Immoralism and lucidity 
are closely interwoven in Camus' work with the recurring motive o f «dédoublement», which 
plays a pivotal part in the definition of the artist in the author’s philosophical and political 
thought.168
To conclude, the intertextual analysis o f Camus’ writings seems to confirm the need to 
re-interpret the the «pensée limitée, mortelle et révoltée» o f  the MdS beyond the Existentialist 
labelling. The definition o f tragic thought,169 in the sense of an aporetic and ironic (finite) 
thought o f  the finite , which abandons all discourse on Foundation, and embraces an 
aisthetic/aesthetizing perspective,170 *in the Nietzschean acceptation explored above, is more 
resonant with, and offers, in my opinion, a deeper and more complex insight into the French 
writer’s philosophical and political reflection.
Now, in the 1942 philosophical essay Sisyphus’ «joie silencieuse» resides in the lucid 
contemplation {conscience) of his absurd torment, «[qui] fa it taire toutes les idoles» - 
«L’homme absurde dit oui et son effort n’aura plus de cesse » (MdS, 197-8). Like Œdipus, in 
the moment of clairvoyance Sisyphus judges that «tout est bien» - «[c]et univers désormais 
sans maître ne lui paraît ni stérile ni futile. [...] La lutte elle-même vers les sommets suffît à
16î F. Nietzsche, Ecce hom o, Paris, Mercure de France, 1909, p. 122 ; or Paris, Flammarion, 1992, p. 124.
166 «La mort qui donne au jeu et à l’héroïsme son vrai sens» (CI, 29).
167 « Et les voilà qui meuglent : je  suis im m oroliste. Traduction : j ’ai besoin de me donner une morale. Avoue-le 
donc, imbécile. Moi aussi. » (CI, 41).
168 «Intellectuel? Oui. Et ne jamais renier. Intellectuel* celui qui se dédouble. Ça me plaît Je suis content d’être 
les deux. « Si ça peut s’unir ? » Question pratique. Il faut s’y mettre. « Je méprise l’intelligence » signifie en 
réalité : « je  ne peux supporter mes doutes ». Je  p réfère tenir les yeux ouverts.»  (CI, 41). [My italics]
169 It traces an interesting correspondence between the absurd  thought o f the MdS and what Clément Rosset and 
Sergio Givone analyse and define respectively as trag ic philosophy and tragic thought, in C. Rosset, La log ique  
du p ire . Éléments p our une ph ilosophie tragique, Paris, PUF, 1993 and S. Givone, D isincanto del m ondo e 
pensiero  tragico, Roma-Bari, Il Saggiatore, 1988.
170 Sergio Givone uses the expression « prospettiva estetizzante » (in S. Givone, D isincanto del m ondo e
pensiero  tragico, op. ciL, p. 32.
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remplir un cœur d ’homme. Il fa u t imaginer Sisyphe heureux» (MdS, 198).m  Sisyphus’ 
happiness is tragic in that it stems from the absurd revolt, groundlessly founded on the 
aisthetic fidelity to the earth, the passionate “yes” to the wonder o f the finite. (
I suggest that we interpret the Nietzscheanism of the MdS, and especially o f the 
tragedy Caligula, which around 1937-38 explored the relationship between power and absurd 
freedom in its “superhuman” mise en œuvre, in the light of Camus’ political engagement at 
the beginning of World War II.
According to Abbou and Lévi-Valensi,172 Camus published a series o f articles under 
various pseudonyms in the journal Soir-Républicain between October and December 1939. In 
an article, dated 6th o f  November 1939 and signed Néron, the young author intentionally 
draws on a  Nietzschean terminology, developed around the theme “Sous les éclairages de la 
guerre”, the article is entitled Considérations inactuelles -  its “untimeliness” resting on the 
author’s passionate defence of independence «[qui] /  ’oppose aux maîtres et a ta  esclaves de 
l’heure».173
Among the various characters/spokesmen o f Camus’s political position in Soir 
Républicain -  from Zaks, who signs two articles reporting R. Capitant’s interpretation o f  the 
doctrine o f  National Socialism,174 to Irénée, who imagines a federal solution to the war, 
proposing the abdication o f national sovereignties («instruments juridiques des 
impérialismes»)175 to an international law and the creation of a new order,176 to Jean Mersault, 
whose commentaries on international politics point to a u société des peuples " beyond the 
idea o f nation, and the imperialistic interests («antagonismes égoïstes») related to it,177 178and, 
finally, to Liber and Marco, who similarly insist on the new order o f a «politique de plebiscite 
et de fédéralisme» - themes that will recur in the later articles of Combat -m  Néron voices, in 
its most radical form, Camus’s (Nietzschean) untimely free spirit, demolishing all prejudices 
(«en particulier ceux qui conduisent tout droit à la mort»),179 and heroically affirming himself 
against a generalized process o f “domestication” in 20th century politics, constructed around 
the master-slave dialectic.
l7! My italics. 
m  CAC3,pp. 15-28.
173 CAC3, p. 637.
174 « La doctrine du national-socialisme » (6 octobre 1939) ; « La doctrine du national-socialisme. Croisade ? » 
(11 octobre 1939) ; Ivi, pp. 633-636.
175 (11 November 1939) Ivi, p. 640.
176 Ivi, p. 640.
177 «Pas de croisade» (13 décembre 1939), « Notre revue de presse indépendante. La société des peuples » (15 
décembre 1939), Ivi, pp. 641- 642,648-649.
178 « La recherche du possible» (30 décembre 1939), in CAC3, p. 651.
179 CAC3, p, 637.
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I suggest that the employ of a Nietzschean terminology in Camus* analyses o f  the 
contemporary political situation in the articles for Soir Républicain expresses an early 
perception on the part o f the young author o f the need to draw on an “alternative” (non­
political, in the sense o f what was conceived as political in the French tradition around 1940) 
source in order to formulate and define his own personal political thought.
This will be explored in more detail in Chapter 2, which will focus on the continuity 
between the earlier “untimely” political position and the «considerations volontairement 
inactuelles» o f the later articles for Combat™  as formulating an alternative approach to the 
political, as distinguished from both the Liberal and Marxist tradition of political thought.
I suggest that the question o f nihilism is the fil rouge between the tragic thought o f the 
MdS and the political reflection from 1944 onward: I agree with James Arnold that, besides 
the striking terminological continuity with the article in Soir Républicain, the role and 
understanding o f Nietzsche’s thought undergoes an important evolution in Camus’ writings 
between 1938-39 and 1944-47. Arnold situates this crucial break around 1941-43. What I 
intend to explore is the shift in Camus’ understanding of nihilism around 1941-43 as playing 
an important part in the development of the author’s political reflection during the war and the 
Resistance.
1.4. D EFIN IN G  GOOD N IH IL IS M .
In his letter to Ponge in January 1943, Camus wrote:
Si je n’avais pas une peur bleu des magnifiques généralisations à la Nietzsche, je vous dirais: « Le 
sentiment de l’absurde, c’est le monde qui est en train de mourir. L a volonté de l ’absurde, c ’est le m onde 
nouveau . » M ettons que cette form ule contienne tren te pour cent de vérité, e t ce serait assez pour exalter 
beaucoup d ’esprits. M ais aurons-nous la fo rce  q u ’ilfa u t ? (E, 1667) [My italics]
Camus’ concern, I suggest, must be understood against the backdrop o f his four 
Lettres à un ami allemand, written in Paris between July 1943 and July 1944 for the declared 
purpose «d’éclairer un peu le combat aveugle» (E, 219) o f the men o f  the French Resistance. 
The «blindness» of the struggle against the Nazi occupant conveys the tragic effort o f what 
Camus repeatedly describes as a (political) action which is not guided and legitimized by any 
principle or universal value. The question addressed in the letter to Ponge and in LAA asks 
whether a m il to the absurd, which would justify the refusal of the destructive power policy 180
180 «Démocratie et modestie», C om bat, 30 avril 1947, in Camus à Combat, op. cit., p. 663-665.
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of Nazism, and allow the «building» a new  world out o f the tabula rasa of modem nihilism, is 
conceivable.
In this sense , the four texts o f LAA expose the relationship between the absurd 
premises o f meaninglessness and valuelessness {modern nihilism) and the Nazi “deification” 
of falsehood {mensonge) and the will to destruction:
Vous n’avez jamais cru au sens de ce monde et vous en avez tiré l’idée que tout était équivalent et que 
le bien et le mal se définissaient selon que l’on v o u la it. Vous avez supposé qu’en l’absence de toute morale 
humaine ou divine les seuls valeurs étaient celles qui rég issa ien t le  m onde an im al, c’est-à-dire la  v io len ce  e t la  
ruse . Vous en avez conclu que l’homme n ’était rien et qu’on pouvait tuer son âme, que dans la plus insensée des 
histoires la tâche d’un individu ne pouvait être que l’aventure de la pu issance, et sa morale, le réalisme des 
conquêtes. (LAA, 240) [My italics!
Nazism embodies the “catastrophe” o f  modern nihilism: from the (finite) evidence o f  
the absence o f a meaning and values in se  o f  existence, these nihilists conclude with the total 
absence o f meaning and value. The absurd is hypostatised, falsehood takes up the “place” o f  
truth, everything is equivalent, and power and conquest are celebrated as the essence and end 
o f being. The will to the absurd thus coincides with the systematic {logical) self-deification o f  
man, who replaces the vacant place o f the (dead) God, through the exercise of a limitless 
will to destruction (LAA, 240) The echo o f  Nietzsche’s fragments on incomplete nihilism and 
the intermediate phase o f nihilism in the Will to Power, is apparent, in my view, in the 
relationship brought forth by Camus between an extreme form o f nihilism and the self-
1 ft?destructive instinct o f the will to nothingness.
Camus was well acquainted with the problem of the relationship between nihilism and 
the will to destruction through Jean Grenier, Professor o f  Philosophy in Algiers, and later 
dose friend o f Camus. Grenier had published two essays on «Le Nihilisme Européen et les 
Appels de l *Orient» under the pseudonym o f  Jean Caves in the French review Philosophies in 182
181 « Parce que vous étiez las de lutter contre le ciel, vous vous êtes reposés dans cette épuisante aventure où 
votre tâche est de mutiler les âmes et de détruire la terre. Pour tout dire, vous avez choisi l’injustice, vous vous 
êtes mis avec les dieux. » (LAA, 240-241)
182 «On n’abandonne pas une position extrême pour une position moyenne, mais pour une autre extrême, inverse 
.] C’est la forme outrancière du nihilisme: le Néant (“l’absurde”) étemel!
[...] Rien n’a de valeur dans la vie que le degré de la puissance -  si l’on admet que la vie elle-même est volonté 
de puissance. La morale a préservé du nihilisme les d ésh érités  en attribuant à tout homme une valeur infinie, une 
valeur métaphysique [...]. A  supposer qu e la  croyance à  ce tte  m orale disparût, les déshérités, privés de leur 
consolation, disparaîtraient.
Cette disparition se présente sous l’aspect d ’une d estru c tio n , d’une sélection instinctive de la fo rc e  destructive  
[...] Le nihilisme, signe que les déshérités ont perdu toute consolation: q u ’ils détruisent pour q u ’on les 
d étru ise; [...] qu’ils se placent sur le terrain du principe opposé Telle est la forme européenne du 
bouddhisme, de la négation active après que l’existence a perdu son « sens ». » (VPII, § 8, pp. 13-15). [My 
italics]
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1924.183 Grenier identifies nihilism with the Spenglerian «despair o f civilization», and with 
the Nietzschean «volonté du néant»:1** the European spirit is “nihilistic” in the sense o f a 
negative, negating spirit, which rejects all traditional standards, and culminates in a 
celebration o f the élan vital through violence («C’est que l’Occidental, “homme de 
puissance” (Gewaltmensch) périt pour se trop abandoner à la fogue des instincts»).185 186
The comparative analysis o f the 1941 note on Absurd and Hitlerism/Power (CI, 225) 
with the1942 and 1943 preface, notes and letters, where Camus resorts to the notion of 
Nihilism in order to address the argument o f the MdS, suggests that around that date the 
writer was re-thinking the work o f Nietzsche in the light of the problem of a relationship 
between nihilism and Nazism. It is plausible that he would resort, in particular, to the 
posthumous notes, published under the heading of La Volonté de Puissance, in order to 
elucidate the relationship between the modem loss of Foundation, the decline of the Western 
tradition, and politics.
There are reasons to believe that Camus was (re)approaching Nietzsche against the 
backdrop of (and as a reply to) the French philosophico-political debate of the Thirties and 
early Forties concerning the relationship between nihilism and Hitlerism. In 1939, the 
Editions Gallimard had published the French translation of Hermann Rauschning’s Die 
Revolution des Nihilismus:m  this German exile, who had been in Hitler's entourage in the 
early phases o f Nazi government, develops a thesis which bears many affinities with the 
argument of Camus’s LAA.
Rauschning offers an interpretation o f National Socialism as a movement o f «sheer 
destruction» and «utter nihilism» (RD, xii), the latter being identified not only with the
1831 owe the reference to this important source to Professor Toby Garfitt, a scholar o f the work and thought of 
Jean Grenier and Albert Camus.
1,4 « A m o r Fati. Qu’une civilisation doute d’elle-même, voilà qui est grave, qu’elle se veuille détruire, voilà qui 
est désespéré. Ce doute, cette volonté que pressentait Nietzsche, nous la voulons montrer présente à touts les 
Européens d’aujourd’hui et qui pensent. Et d’abord aux Allemands. Il a paru, après la guerre, en Allemagne un 
livre d ’Oswald Spengler: L a  ruine de l ’O ccident, qui vient d’atteindre, malgré ses 1200 pages in-8, sa 47* 
édition, qui donne naissance, depuis cinq ans, à une quantité d’articles, de livres d’exégèse ou de critique, qui 
enfin a  été couronné en 1919, par le comité du N ietzsche-Archiv. Un pareil succès avec un pareil titre prouve 
quelque chose. Le mieux, pour connaître la pensée de l’Allemagne contemporaine, est donc d’analyser ce qu’elle 
tient unanimement, sinon pour un chef-d’œuvre, du moins pour un monument très important II semble en la 
lisant, qu’on assiste, dépouillé de toutes somptuosités wagnériennes, au vrai Crépuscule des Dieux» (Jean 
Caves, « Le Nihilisme Européen et les Appels de l’Orient », Philosophies, n. 1, 15 mars 1924,51-52). « [...] [la 
civilisation de l’Occident] travaille à se ruiner pour avancer l’heure de sa mort [...] Nietzsche l’a bien analysée, 
cette Schadenfreude tournée contre soi : « Cette tendance d ’aller à sa  p erte  se présente comme la volonté de se 
perdre [...] la volonté de destruction comme volonté d’un instinct plus profond encore, l’instinct de l’auto- 
destruction, la volonté du néant». » (Jean Caves, art cit., 55-57).
185 Jean Caves, art. cit., 61.
186 Hermann Rauschning, La révolution du nihilism e, traduit de l’allemand par Paul Ravoux et Marcel Stora, 
Paris, NRF Gallimard, 1939.
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negation o f all traditional moral and spiritual values, but also primarily with the dissolution o f  
all rational principles, with an anti-theoretical rejection o f all doctrine, unleashing the  
«instincts les plus bas de I ’hum anitéà  la brutalité, à la violence, à la haine, à la vengeance, 
à l ’envie...au banditisme, au mensonge. » (RD, 65), and culminating in the exaltation o f  a
1 fi?
boundless policy o f violence and absolute dominion (RD, 60-1).
In his 1940 lecture on Nietzsche’s European Nihilism , Heidegger focused on Nihilism, 
in the sense of a process of de-valuation and transvaluation o f values, as the extreme 
development of modern metaphysical thinking. In the light of Nietzsche’s concluding section 
o f fragment n. 12 on the decline o f cosmological values,187 88 Heidegger identifies values w ith 
particular viewpoints on the conditions fo r  the preservation and strengthening, which refer to 
complex forms of duration o f life within becoming, or centres o f  dominion -  what Nietzsche 
defines as will to power. I89 It is in the light o f this definition that Heidegger interprets 
Nietzsche’s distinction o f different forms o f  Nihilism: in the posthumous notes, incomplete 
nihilism - «Le nihilisme incomplet, ses formes: nous y vivons en plein. Les tentatives 
d ’échapper au nihilisme, sans renverser les anciennes valeurs, produisent l’effet contraire,
187 A very similar thesis had already been formulated by Emmanuel Lévinas in his article Q uelques réflexions  
su r la ph ilosophie de l ’H itlérism e, published in the revue E sprit in 1934. Although he never uses the term 
‘Nihilism’, Lévinas roots Hitlerism in an extreme form o f  scepticism, identified with a complacent absence o f  
belief and commitment to any truth. In this sense, Nazi “philosophy” is seen as marking the collapse o f Western 
civilization, by celebrating the “awakening o f elemental feelings” and the annihilation of the spiritual values o f  
the Judeo-Christian tradition. According to Lévinas, Hitlerism embodies the dissolution of the Platonic-Christian 
duality Body/Mind (corresponding to the one Senses/Ideas), identifying the Self with physical existence, and 
therefore “chaining” the latter to the fatality o f biological laws -  a thesis that finds an echo in the notion o f  
«biological Caesarism» in Camus’s HR. The Krieck-Heidegger political querelle  on Nihilism and its relation to 
National Socialism also dates between 1934 and 1936. In 1934, in the Nazi review Volk im W erden, of which he 
was the director, Ernst Krieck, professor o f Philosophy and rector of the University o f Frankfurt, later successor 
o f Heinrich Rickert in Heidelberg, attacked Heidegger’s doctrine in Sein  und  Z eit, denouncing its rootedness in a 
m etaphysical nihilism . It is shortly after this event that Heidegger comes to combine his interest in Nietzsche’s 
work, and in particular in the W ill to  P ow er, with his reflection on nihilism. In his lecture on Schelling  in 
Summer 1936, Heidegger praises Nietzsche for experiencing and elaborating a “great knowledge” of Nihilism, 
and for starting a counter-movement foreboding authentic historical decisions: in a passage of the manuscript 
version of the lecture, expunged in the 1971 edition, the philosopher emphasised the relationship between 
Nietzsche’s thought on Nihilism and the Nazi-Fascist movements, by pointing to Mussolini and Hitler as the 
(only) two men in Europe to start, in different ways, such counter-movements within the political configuration 
of the nation, under the profound influence of Nietzsche, but without directly affirming the authentic  
m etaphysical fram ew ork  o f Nietzsche’s thought (see Franco Volpi, Introduction to the Italian edition of M. 
Heidegger, I l  N ichilism o E uropeo , op. cit., pp. 15-19; and also Mazzino Montinari, “L a Volonté de Puissance ” 
n ’existe p a s , Editions d’Eclat, Paris, 1996).
188 « [...] le résultat de certaines perspectives d’utilité bien définies, destinées à maintenir et à fortifier certaines 
form es de dom ination  humaine et projetées à tort dans l’essence des choses. C’est encore une fois la naïveté  
hyperbolique de l’homme qui se prend pour le sens et la mesure des choses. » (VPII, § 111, p. 55-56). Cfr. F. 
Nietzsche, Le N ihilism e E uropéen , Paris, Editions Kimé, p. 38 (fir. n. 12).
189 M. Heidegger, I l N ich ilism o  Europeo , op. cit., p. 116.
60
rendent le problème plus aigu» (VPII, § 7, p. 12) — is opposed to the transvaluating complete 
nihilism, which is preceded and prepared by an intermediate phase o f extreme nihilism:190
Qu’est-ce qu’une croyance? Comment naît-elle ? Toute croyance consiste à tenir pour vrai.
La forme extrême du nihilisme consisterait à dire: Toute croyance, toute opinion est fausse, parce qu’il 
n’y a pas de « monde vrai ». Il n’y a donc qu’une apparence perspectivîste dont l’origine est en nous (dans la 
mesure où nous avons besoin d’un monde rétréci, abrégé, simplifié) - La mesure de notre force, c’est ce que nous 
pouvons reconnaître de phénoménisme, de mensonge nécessaire, sans en mourir.
Dans cette mesure, le nihilisme était la négation d’un « monde vrai », de l’Être, pourrait être la pensée 
d'un Dieu. (VPII, § 627,229-230)191
In Heidegger’s reading, it is in this extreme form, that nihilism is ambiguous, allowing 
two distinct variants: a  passive nihilism («[...] comme déclin et regression de la puissance de 
l’esprit»), and an active nihilism («[...] comme signe de la force accrue de l’esprit»),192 the 
latter being identified with the recognition o f  the will to power as the foundation (sub-iectum) 
of the possibility of truth.193 Heidegger emphasises the supreme strength of the active-ecstatic 
form o f nihilism as a God-like way o f  thinking, which does not admit anything as a measure 
for all things beside and above itself, and which overcomes sheer aspiration to Nothingness 
through an active «force violente et destructive» (VPII, §277, 110),194 creating the space for a 
new position o f values.195
In his commentary on European Nihilism, Heidegger defines Nietzsche’s 
“antropomorphism” as the explicit enunciation of what was thought and postulated very early 
in the history o f metaphysics as the principle o f all thinking, namely, the unconditional role o f 
man as dominator and ultimate principle of all interpretations o f the world - 196 the 
unconditioned subjectivity. From this perspective, he identifies active nihilism with the God­
like perspective, one that recognizes no other principle and measure above and beside the 
Subject-man.
Tracing in Nietzsche’s will to power the ultimate unconditioned foundation (as 
subiectum), Heidegger defines nihilism as the extreme outcome of modern metaphysics,197 
which, he argues, has its foundation in Descartes’ reflections on method. The Cartesian
190 M. Heidegger, op. cit., p. 108. «P ostu la t de cette hypothèse: l’idée qu’il n’y a pas de vérité; qu’il n’y a pas de 
nature absolue des choses, de “chose en soi”. C e n 'est là  que du nihilism e, et du p lu s  extrême. Il place la valeur 
des choses justement dans ce fait qu’il n’y a aucune réalité qui corresponde ou qui ait jamais correspondu à ces 
valeurs, mais qu’elles sont au contraire un symptôme de force chez le créateur d e  valeurs, une simplification 
utile à  la  vie  » (VPII, § 112, p. 56).
191 F. Nietzsche, Le N ihilism e E uropéen, op. cit., p. 39 (fr. n. 15). My italîcs.
192 Ivi, p. 42 (fr. 22). VPII, § 276,109.
195 M. Heidegger, i l  N ichilism o Europeo , op. cit, p. 108.
194 F. Nietzsche, Le N ihilism e Européen, op. cit, p. 42 (fr. 23).
195 M. Heidegger, ¡1 N ichilism o Europeo , op. cit, p. 109.
196 Ivi, p. 154.
197 Ivi, pp. 168- ff.
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“method”, as the pro-ceding against being, which secures it as an object for a subject, 
discloses new forms o f dominion, unknown to the Greek world, under the unlimited 
sovereignty o f subjectivity.198
Now, Nietzsche’s metaphysics as “anthropomorphism”, as the configuration of the 
world in the image o f  man, poses the negation of truth in the sense o f error/falsehood as the 
only essence o f truth: thus conceived, Nietzsche provides the subject (as will to power) with 
the unconditional disposal o f truth/falsehood. Thus, as Heidegger emphasises,199 the 
subjectivity is not merely freed from  all limits, but it itself decides and disposes o f all 
limitation.
It is significant that ten years later, in his essay on Nietzsche et le nihilisme, published 
in Les Temps Modernes in August 1950 and later included in the philosophical essay 
L ’Homme révolté, Camus should draw a similar parallel between Nietzsche’s nihilism and 
Descartes’ method, but with a diametrically different meaning:
Au lieu du doute méthodique, il [Nietzsche] a pratiqué la  négation m éthodique, la destruction appliquée 
de tout ce qui masque encore le nihilisme à luî-même, des idoles qui camouflent la mort de Dieu. « Pour élever 
un sanctuaire nouveau, il faut abattre un sanctuaire, telle est la loi. » Celui qui veut être créateur dans le bien et 
dans le mal, selon lui, doit d ’abord être destructeur et briser les valeurs. [...] Il a écrit, à sa manière, le D iscours 
de la  m éthode de son temps, sans la liberté et l’exactitude de ce XVIIe siècle français qu’il admirait tant, mais 
avec la folle lucidité qui caractérise le XXe [sic] siècle, siècle du génie, selon lui. Cette méthode de révolte, il 
nous revient de l’examiner. (HR, 476)
Camus traces the “lucid folly” of the 20th century precisely in the unconditional or 
“absolute” negation brought about by modern nihilism, and prepared by Nietzsche’s method 
o f  revolt, or the methodical negation, which coincides with the tabula rasa of all transcendent 
principle and value. Camus, like Heidegger, shows himself to be aware, in the 1951 essay on 
revolt and in his notes around 1943-45, that the absence o f  limit is the problem of modern 
nihilism. In an interview to Les Nouvelles Littéraires in May 1951, Camus observed that
[qjuand j ’analisais le sentiment de l’Absurde, dans le  M ythe de S isyphe , j ’étais à la recherche d’une 
méthode et non d’une doctrine. Je pratiquais le doute m éthodique. Je cherchais à faire cette « table rase » à partir 
de laquelle on peut commencer à construire.
Si on pose que rien n ’a de sens, alors il faut conclure à l’absurdité du monde. Mais rien n’a-t-il de sens ? 
Je n’ai jamais pensé qu’on puisse rester sur cette position. Déjà, quand j ’écrivais le  M ythe, je songeais à l’essai 
sur la révolte [...]. (E, 1342-3) 200 [My italics]
198 Ivi, pp. 205-207.
199 Ivi, p. 241.
200 In the same year he déclarés: «je me place dans le nihilisme et c’est là que je cherche des valeurs 
constructives, parce que de ces valeurs-là, je peux être sû r  [...] je  ne veux pas la fin de notre civilisation, je veux 
au contraire affirmer des valeurs qui assureront la reconstruction. Si je pars du nihilisme, c’est pour trouver des 
valeurs sures » (F. Rauhut, “Du nihilisme à la mesure...”, op. cit., pp. 17-ff.)
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Furthermore, insisting on the provisional character of the absurd negation he wrote: 
«son vrai caractère [...] est d’être un passage vécu, un point de départ, l'équivalent en 
existence, du doute méthodique de Descartes » (HR, 417).201 What is interesting to point out 
is that in the 1945 Remarque sur la révolte Camus maintains that «[d]ans Fordre de 
l’expérience humaine, la révolte a le même sens que le cogito dans l’ordre de la pensée. Elle 
est la première vérité et elle crée la première valeur » (E, 1686-87) -  stretching the analogy, in 
a note, to the point of declaring that «le cogito est révolte » (Id).202 2034
The emphasis on value and truth seems to expose Camus’s argument (and its 
“Cartesian” terminology) to the Heideggerian critique o f the modem metaphysics of 
subjectivity, touching upon the problem of man as the unconditioned, and therefore unlimited, 
sub-iectum who posits («creates») values, introducing and extracting them from the world. 
But I argue that the raisonnement absurde o f the MdS does not allow us to draw such 
conclusions: if the absurd experience dismantles the concept of Subject as a “jeux stérile” 
(MdS, 111), or illusory construction, in the line o f Nietzsche’s critique o f meta-physical idols, 
Camus’ notion o f “la chair consciente ” cannot be confused with the Heideggerian notion of 
“body” in the German philosopher’s critique o f Being as Representativeness.
According to Heidegger, while Descartes’ man is subject in the sense of the 
representing Ego, for Nietzsche, man is subject in the sense of the unconditioned subjectivity 
of the body, as passions and instincts — as will to power. 203 It follows, in Heidegger’s view, 
that active nihilism lies precisely in the recognition of this subjectivity o f  the body (as will to 
power) as the only foundation and origin of values: Nietzsche’s metaphysics, according to the 
German philosopher, is centred around animalitas, the essence of subjectivity disclosing itself 
as brutalitas and bestialitas.204 This, I argue, is where Camus joins, and immediately parts 
ways with Heidegger: the problem of modem  nihilism lies for both in the un-conditionality o f 
man as subject and master o f a God-less creation, that is, in a (metaphysical) condition o f 
absence o f  limit.
Now, the question o f limit, inscribed, as I have attempted to show, in the aisthetic 
experience of the absurd, as an essentially cognitive/ontological question, acquires a primary 
political concern in Camus’ reflection after 1941. This would explain why, in his letter to
201 My italics.
203 The cogito is revolt precisely in that it erases all reference to a transcendent Being or Value. Certainty and 
values are posed in the hands o f  man. But it is in disclosing the God-like unconditionality o f man as only m aster 
that revolt opens the way to absolute nihilism, the object o f Camus’s analysis in the 1951 essay.
203 M. Heidegger, II N ichilism o Europeo, op. cit., p. 230.
204 Ivi, p. 243. From this perspective, nihilism (extrem e-active-ecstatic) is the accomplishment of the m odern 
pre-eminence and dom inion of the unconditioned subject.
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Ponge in *43, Camus would claim his right to think in the margins o f  modem nihilism, outside 
and against a form o f nihilism diffused in his time. «Je l’ai dit dans ma prière d ’insérer: “ Il 
s’agit de savoir si l’on peut définir un bon n i h i l i s m e Il me semble que vous [Ponge] du 
moins avez démontré qu’on le pouvait» (H, 1666).205 As though regretfully avowing the 
unsuccessfulness of his own attempt, Camus’ words confirm that the MdS was conceived by 
its author as an altogether personal effort o f  mise en œuvre in this direction:
Si j ’en juge par vos notes, la définition serait celle-ci : « Le bon nihilisme est celui qui conduit au relatif et à 
l ’humain ». C ’est là que je  vous rejoins, malgré mon goût de l’ontologie, car, sur ce point précis de notre 
destin historique, j ’ai assez le goût de l’homme et de son bonheur pour éviter toutes les contradictions. (E, 
1666).
What I argue is that the « relative » and the « human », as opposed to the « Absolute » and 
« God-like », are inscribed in the raisonnement absurde o f the MdS, and more precisely, in 
the metaphoric constellation employed by Camus to define the absurd. According to the 
author, the feeling o f the absurd, or o f absurdity, as Camus seems to interchange the two 
formulas, is a  passion «qui règle mes rapports avec la vie» (MdS, 113) - «savoir si l’on peut 
vivre avec ses passions, savoir si l’on peut accepter leur loi profonde qui est de brûler le cœur 
que dans le même temps elles exaltent» (Id.).
Furthermore, the absurd is metaphorically described as depending both upon man and 
upon the world -  in this sense, I suggest, it is relative par excellence: it is the only link 
between the two, which «les scelle l’un à l’autre comme la haine seule peut river les êtres» 
(MdS, 113). The sensory dimension (aisthesis), confirmed by the reference to hatred as a 
passionate face-to-face or con-frontation, is the dominant feature in Camus’ characterisation 
o f the absurd/absurdity as a contradiction: it is in this peculiar (aisthetic) être-à, that «toute la 
conséquence d ’une vie peut en naître » (MdS, 118).
L’irrationnel, la nostalgie humaine et l’absurde qui surgit de leu r tête-à -tête , voilà les trois personnages 
du dram e qui doit nécessairement finir avec to u te  la  lo g iq u e  don t une existence e s t capable. (MdS, 118)
Dans cet univers indéchiffrable et limité, le d estin  de Vhom m e p ren d  désorm ais son sens. (MdS, 113) 
[My italics]
The close textual analysis of the MdS brings forth the implications o f  the theatrical metaphor, 
as related to, and conveying a specific aisthetic acceptation o f time,206 which illustrates the 
absurd as ex-ceeding sheer meaninglessness (o f the world) and valuelessness.
205 My italics.
206 MdS, 158. «Quoi d’étonnant à trouver une gloire périssable bâtie sur les plus éphémères des créations? 
L’acteur a trois heures pour être Iago ou Alceste, Phèdre ou Gloucester. Dans ce court passage, il les fait naitre et 
mourir sur cinquante mètres carrés de planches. Jamais l’absurde n’a été si bien et si longtemps illustré. Ces vies 
merveilleuses, ces destins uniques et complets qui croissent et qui s’achèvent entre des murs et pour quelques
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Now, while, according to Heidegger, Nietzsche roots appraising in the will-to- 
power,207 Camus situates appraising in the very act o f living, that is, in existing.208 According 
to him,
Refuser toute sign ifica tion  au m onde revient à  supprim er tout fugem en t de valeur. M ais vivre, et par 
exemple se nourrir, est en so i un jugem ent de valeur. On choisit de durer dès l’instant qu’on ne se laisse pas 
mourir, et l’on reconnaît alors une valeur, au moins relative, à la vie. (E, 865) [My italics]
The act of living, of existing, which for Camus is always and already some kind of 
judgement -  aesthetic (in Nietzsche’s acceptation of the term, that is anti-foundational, as 
opposed to moral), and aisthetic, Le., unfoundedly founded on aisthesis - cannot be reduced 
to sheer bestiality (animalitas), nor to the nakedness of bodily functions and drives, ex-istence 
(the absurd) being precisely what distinguishes, in Camus’s argument, man from animal, as 
the owe-with-the-world 209 210
I argue that, while apparently re-stating the subject-object opposition o f modem 
metaphysics, Camus’ absurd is (in) the being4n~front~of-iht-wox\à o f a subjectivity (the lucid 
will to «être en face du monde le plus souvent possible», MdS, 144), which roots that con- 
fronîation in the sensory toucher-à of man-to-world and o f world-to-man, that is, m the 
aisthetic present of la chair consciente. In this sense, the absurd of the MdS eventually marks 
the irreparable break down o f the un-conditioned Ego.
As I have attempted to show, the limit is inscribed in ex-istence as the absurd 
touching-upon-the-borders which exposes the finitude of man’s condition: this is where 
Camus situates the urelative” and “human”, which are the distinguishing features of good 
nihilism.
The fact that, between 1942 and 1944, Camus identifies good nihilism with a «good» 
use o f  the anti-Foundational, “aestheticizing”, conclusions brought forth by the evidence o f 
absurdity, emerges in the 1944 article “Sur une philosophie de Vexpression ” de Brice Parain,
heures, quel raccourci souhaiter qui soit plus révélateur ? [ .. .]  Si jamais la morale de la quantité pouvait trouver 
un aliment, c’est bien sur cette scène singulière » (MdS, 159). It is significant that Camus would chose four 
characters belonging to ancient and modem tragedy to illustrate the m étier absurde o f the actor.
207 M. Heidegger, l l  N ichilism o E uropeo, op. cit., p. 288.
208 See his letter to Bonnel in March 1943 (E, 1423).
209 «Si j ’étais arbre parmi les arbres, chat parmi les animaux, cette vie aurait un sens ou plutôt ce problème n’en 
aurait point car je  ferais partie de ce monde. Je serais ce monde auquel je  m’oppose maintenant par toute ma 
conscience et par toute mon xigence de familiarité. » (MdS, 136).
210 M an’s nostalgie, or need for unity and meaning, exposes man to the world precisely in the sense that the 
world is fe l t  on the sensory limit or boundary, upon which man inevitably touches in his stretching out for 
reasons. As he points out in his letter to Bonnel: «[...] l’absurde n’aurait pas de sens hors de la nostalgie. Mais je 
me refuse seulement à croire que dans l’ordre métaphysique le besoin d’un principe nécessite l’existence de ce 
principe» (E, 1424).
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and is confirmed by a  note in the Carnets (September 1944), which brings forth the continuity 
between Camus’ interrogation on language, the question o f nihilism and its relationship with 
totalitarianism:211
Il n’y a pas d’autre objection à l'a ttitu d e  to ta lita ire  que l’objection religieuse ou morale. S i le m onde 
n 'a p a s  de sens, ils ont raison. J e  n  'accepte p a s  qu ’ils a ien t ra iso n  D onc...
C ’est à nous de créer  Dieu. Ce n’est pas lui le créateur. Voilà toute l’histoire du Christianisme. Car nous 
n’avons qu’une façon de créer Dieu, qui est de le devenir. (Cil, 127) [My italics]
If  the world has no reason and value, they, i.e., the Nazis, are right to resort to power 
and violence, to the instinctual drives (E, 240), or to bestiality,212 *as the logical outcome o f the 
total negation o f  all meta-physically grounded sense and value.
What Camus voices here is the dilemma that the “Nietzschean” generation o f the 
early decades o f  the 20 century faced with the break down o f the Western Tradition (modem  
nihilism), in which it was incapable o f  rationally refuting the nihilistic argument at the core 
o f the Nazi «totalitarian attitude», or o f  appealing to any religious/ moral to justify an active 
rejection of its murderous policy.
Et à la vérité, m oi q u i croya is p en ser com m e vous, je  ne voyais guère d’argument à vous opposer, sinon 
un go û t vio lent de la justice qui, pour finir, me paraissait aussi peu raisonné que la plus soudaine des passions. 
(LAA, 240) [My italics]
Declaring in the fourth Lettre in July 1944 that different conclusions could be drawn from a 
common absurd experience o f  de-valuation o f superior values, Camus suggests the possibility 
o f a bad use o f the nihilistic premises inherent in the raisonnement absurde. This in 
confirmed in the article on Parain, published the same year, where the author shows himself 
to be fully aware of the pitfalls in Nietzsche’s thought,214 which he summarises in the notion 
o f «métaphysique du mensonge» (E, 1679).
211 It is significant that Camus’ early notes on Parain’s philosophy of language in the Carnets, taken over two 
years later in the article for the review P oésie 44, should have been written in the same period as the draft o f  a 
preface to the MdS (between March and August 1942): «Brice Parain. Essai sur le logos platonicien. Étudie le 
logos comme langage. Revient à doter Platon d ’une philosophie de l’expression. Retrace effort de Platon à la 
recherche d’un réalisme raisonnable. Quel est le « tragique » du problème ? S i n o tre  langage n 'a  p a s de sens, 
rien  n 'a  de sens. Si les sophistes ont raison, le monde est insensé. La solution de Platon n’est pas psychologique, 
elle est cosmologique. Quelle est l’originalité de la position de Parain : il considère le problème du langage 
comme métaphysique et non pas social et psychologique (...].» (Cil, 34-35).
212 «Vous [les Nazis] avez supposé qu’en l’absence de toute morale humaine ou divine les seules valeurs étaient 
celles qui régissaient le m onde an im a l, c’est-à-dire la violence et la ruse » (LAA, 240).
2,J «Nous avons longtemps cru ensemble que ce monde n’avait pas de raison supérieure et que nous étions 
frustrés. Je le crois encore d’une certaine manière. Mais j ’en ai tiré d’autres conclusions que celles dont vous me 
parliez alors et que, depuis tant d’années, vous essayez de faire entrer dans l’Histoire » (LAA, 239-240).
214 A quotation from Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments, which can be found in both the editions o f La Volonté 
de pu issance  and in the Œ uvres P osthum es, suggests that by 1944 Camus was already acquainted with these two 
works by the German philosopher: «Aux tentatives the justification, on a substitué l’étude des règles de 
l’expression. C’est une évolution parallèle à celle qui a fini par remplacer, dans notre siècle, la métaphysique par
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Anticipating Gianni Vattimo, according to whom «once the real world has been 
recognized as possessing the structure of a fable, the fable could then be said to acquire the 
ancient metaphysical dignity (the “glory”) o f  the real world»,215 the liquidation o f the True 
eternal principles o f  traditional Metaphysics as fable  or lie is seen by Camus as leaving the 
transcendent “space” o f the onios on vacant: «la foi dans la divinité de la vérité» is turned 
upside down, through the glorification o f its opposite (mensonge), but remains nevertheless 
intact. The absurdity o f this world is, thus, turned into an ^¿-solute : 216 «Nietzsche acceptait 
le mensonge de l’existence et y voyait le principe de toute vie et de tout progrès» (E, 1679).
It is in the bad logic of this incomplete or inconsequent form of nihilism that we 
recognize the elements o f the totalitarian attitude, defined in the LAA the same year:
Parce que vous [les Nazis] avez fait de votre désespoir une ivresse, parce que vous vous en êtes délivré 
en ¡ ’érigeant en principe, vous avez accepté de détruire les œuvres de l’homme et de lutter contre lui pour 
achever sa misère essentielle. [...] Parce que vous étiez las de lutter contre le ciel, vous vous êtes reposés dans 
cette épuisante aventure où votre tâche est de mutiler les âmes et de détruire la terre. Pout tout dire, vous avez 
choici l’injustice, vous vous êtes m is avec les dieux. Votre logique n 'éta it q u ’apparente. (LAA, 240-241) [My 
italics]
The inconsequent logic of the totalitarian attitude, resumed in the Nazi ideology and 
power policy - stemming from a common principle or “commencement” (E, 240), in other 
words, from modern nihilism, as experienced by the front generation - is described by Camus
as a loss o f  lucidity.
Culminating in self-divinisation, loss of lucidity can easily be identified as the extreme 
outcome of the God-like perspective of an unconditioned and unlimited subjectivity.217 It is 
possible to trace a convergence, in Camus’ pages, o f this incomplete-nihilism and the logic of 
domination of power policy, structured around the conceptual constellation of destructionI
le culte de l’action, l’effort de la connaissance par la petite sagesse du pragmatisme. «La connaissance e t le  
devenir s ’excluent », d it N ietzsche. Il faut donc, si l’on veut vivre dans le devenir, abandonner tout espoir de 
connaissance » (E, 1675).
215 Gianni Vattimo, «An apology for Nihilism», in G. Vattimo, The E nd o f  M odernity. N ihilism  and  
H erm eneutics in Post-m odern C utlure, Polity Press, 1988, p. 25.
216 Historicism is, in this sense, only apparently rejecting nihilism - as he points out in his 1949 conference “Le 
temps des meurtriers”: «tout le réalisme politique et moral qui guidait et guide encore les destinées du monde 
obéit, souvent sans le savoir, et avec 100 ans de retard, à une philosophie de l’Histoire née en Allemagne, selon 
laquelle l’humanité entière se dirige selon des voies rationnelles vers un Univers définitif. On a remplacé le 
nihilisme par un rationalisme sans nuances [...] [et] s’il est vrai que l’Histoire obéit à une logique souveraine 
[...] alors tout ce qui sert cette marche inévitable est bon et les accomplissements de l’Histoire sont les vérités 
définitives » (in F. Bartfeld, A lbert Camus voyageur et conférencier, op. cit., p. 58).
217 The référencé to the Over-Man as the product of the self-divinisation o f man is apparent in the first LAA 
(July 1943): «Nous luttons pour cette nuance qui sépare le sacrifice de la mystique, l’énergie de la violence, la 
force de la cruauté, pour cette plus faible nuance encore qui sépare le faux du vrai et l’homme que nous espérons 
des dieux lâches que vous révérez » (E, 224). The continuity with the Parain article is confirmed on a textual 
Ievel by an immédiate echo : « II n’est pas sûr que notre époque ait m anqué de dieux. On lui en a propose 
beaucoup, et le plus souvent bêtes ou  lâches.» (E, 1671).
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«achèvement». This is essential in order to grasp the meaning o f  Camus’ personal position 
vis-à-vis the traditional concept of the political, and especially o f the political role o f creation.
Now, what is important to point out is that, by identifying the inconsequent logic o f 
the Nazis’ nihilistic reasoning with a loss o f  lucidity (metaphorically designated as 
aveuglement), Camus seems to suggests that the lucid thought, illustrated in the MdS as a 
possible (though not the only) outcome of the nihilistic tabula rasa o f traditional values, as an 
honest thought, namely, one that is consistent with its absurd premises, may be identified with 
the good nihilism, o f which the MdS was conceived as an attempt o f  mise en oeuvre.
Moreover, it suggests that Camus conceived o f good  nihilism as coinciding with the 
Nietzschean active or complete nihilism. This is confirmed by the fact that, almost eight years 
after the publication o f the essay on the absurd, in his article on Nietzsche et le nihilisme, 
published in Les Temps Modernes in August 1950 and later included in L 'homme révolté,218 
Camus hinted a posteriori at a philosophical parentage between the absurd argument o f  the 
MdS and Nietzsche’s notes on active nihilism.
The terminological correspondences between Camus’ commentary of Nietzsche’s La 
Volonté de puissance and the pages on absurd freedom and the lucid tabula rasa o f 
metaphysical ‘illusions ’ in the MdS suggest that the French writer conceived the aisthetic or 
tragic thought o f the 1942 essay, as the «mise au point» o f  a  good nihilism, to be inheriting 
(and completing) the positive legacy o f the German philosopher, that of a certain use -  
clinical, methodical, provisional or strategic (HR, 475) - o f  the anti-foundational premises 
brought forth by his “conscious” nihilism (Id..):
M dS { m 2 ) :
«En dehors de cette unique fatalité de la mort, tout, 
joie ou bonheur, est liberté. Un monde demeure dont 
l'hom m e est le  seu l m aître. Ce qui le liait, c’était 
l'illu sion  d’un autre monde » (MdS, 192)
«Je peux tout réfuter dans ce monde qui m’entoure,
N ietzsche et le  n ih ilism e  (1950):
« La vraie morale, pour Nietzsche, ne se sépare pas de 
la lu cid ité  » (HR, 477)
« Le nihilisme, qu’il se manifeste dans la religion ou 
dans la prédication socialiste, est l’aboutissement 
logique de nos va leurs d ites supérieures. L’esprit libre 
détruira ces valeurs, dénonçant les illusions sur 
lesquelles elles reposent, le marchandage qu’elles 
supposent, et le crime qu’elles commettent en 
empêchant l'in te llig en ce  lucide d’accomplir sa 
mission : transformer le nihilisme passif en nihilisme 
actif. » (HR, 479)« Dans ce monde débarrassé de Dieu 
et des idoles morales, l’homme est maintenant 
solitaire et sans m aître. » (Id.)
« Si le  destin  n  'est p a s  orienté p a r une valeur 
supérieure , s i le  hasard  est roi, voici la marche dans 
les ténèbres, l'a ffreu se  lib erté  de l'aveug le. [...] Cette
2,8 HR, 475- 489.
68
me heurte et me transporte, sauf ce chaos, ce hazard 
roi et cette divine équivalence qui naît de P anarchie. 
Je ne sais pas si ce monde a un sens qui le dépasse. 
Mais je sais que je ne connais pas ce sens [...] » 
(MdS, 136).___________________________________
impasse où Nietzsche pousse méthodiquement son 
nihilisme,219 *on peut dire qu’il s’y rue avec une sorte 
de joie affreuse. Son but avoué est de rendre à 
l’homme de son temps la situation intenable. » (HR, 
480-481 ) (My italics)___________________________
Lucidity is the term used in the MdS to address the aisthetic finite thought o f the finite, 
as opposed to the suicidal logic of absolute negation (MdS, 138). That the former coincides 
with a particular use o f the nihilistic evidence o f  the loss or retreat o f the world is confirmed 
in the MdS by the association o f lucidity with ascesis, or self-mastering, as illustrated in the 
chapter on “La liberté absurde ” and in the figure o f the absurd creator.
Thus, the question o f  good  nihilism coincides with the question o f the finite “method” 
(in the Greek acceptation o f  meta-hodos, hodos -  “way”) traced in MdS, identified, precisely, 
with «la route aride et desséchée de Y effort lucide»™  through which
[touts] les problèmes reprennent leur tranchant. L’évidence abstraite se retire devant le lyrisme des 
formes et de couleurs. Les conflits spirituels s’incarnent et retrouvent l’abri misérable et magnifique du cœur de 
l’homme. Aucun n 'est résolu, Mais tous sont transfigurés. Va-t-on mourir, échapper par le saut, reconstruire une 
maison d’idées et de formes à sa mesure ? Va-t-on au contraire soutenir le pari déchirant et merveilleux de 
l’absurde ? Faisons à cet égard un dernier effort et tirons toutes nos conséquences. Le corps, la tendresse, la 
création, l ’action, la noblesse humaine, reprendront alors leur place dans ce monde insensé. L ’homme y  
retrouvera enfin le vin de l ’absurde et le pain de l ’indifférence dont il nourrit sa grandeur. (MdS, 137)221 2[My 
italics]
In analogous terms, and mirroring the movement o f “la pensée humiliée”, it is in the work of 
the great “romanciers philosophes ”, 222 which embodies the échec o f tragic thought against 
the hubristic God-like view o f extreme or absolute nihilism, that «[la] pensée abstraite rejoint 
enfin son support de chair» (MdS, 178):
219 In an interview in mai 1951 Camus declared : « Quand j ’analysais le sentiment de l’Absurde dans le Mythe de 
Sisyphe, j ’étais à la recherche d ’une méthode et non d’une doctrine. Je pratiquais le doute méthodique. Je 
cherchais à faire cette ’table rase’ à partir de laquelle on peut commencer à construire. Si l’on pose que rien n’a 
de sens, alors il faut conclure à l’absurdité du monde. Mais rien n’a-t-il de sens ? Je n’ai jamais pensé qu’on 
puisse rester sur cette position.» (E, 1343).
~20 «Elle [la route aride de l’effort lucide] débouche maintenant dans la vie quotidienne. Elle retrouve le monde 
de I’ « on » anonyme, mais l’homme y rentre désormais avec sa révolte et sa clairvoyance. Il a désappris 
d’espérer. Cet enfer du présent, c’est enfin son royaume. » (E, 137).
221 The echoes of Camus’s review of the novel Le Pain et le Vin, by the Italian anti-fascist writer Ignazio Silone, 
in Alger républicain (23rd Mai 1939) would confinn the aisthetic dimension inhérent in the metaphoric 
constellation of the absurd, as well as its latent political implications: «Retrouver le chemin de ces gestes et de 
cette vérité, et d’une philosophie abstraite de la révolution revenir au pain et au vin de la simplicité, c’est 
l’itinéraire d’Ignazio Silone et la leçon de ce roman. Et ce n’est pas sa moindre grandeur que de nous inciter, 
nous aussi, à retrouver, à travers les haines de l’heure, le visage d’un peuple fier et humain qui demeure notre 
seul espoir de paix » (E, 1399).
222 Camus cites among many Balzac, Sade, Melville, Stendhal, Dostyevsky, Proust, Malraux, and Kafka. « Mais 
justement le choix qu’ils ont fait d’écrire en images plutôt qu’en raisonnements est révélateur d’une certaine 
pensée qui leur est commune, persuadée de l’inutilité de tout principe d’explication et convaincue du message 
enseignant de l’apparence sensible. » (MdS, 178).
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Incapable de sublimer le réel, la pensée s’arrête à le mimer. Le roman dont il est question est 
l'instrument de cette connaissance à la fo is relative et inépuisable, si semblable à celle de l'amour. De l’amour, 
la création romanesque a l ’émerveillement initial et la rumination féconde. (MdS, 179). [My italics]
What emerges in the pages o f  the MdS is an opposition between abstract/suicide and 
a/s/Aejw/lucidity. The latter cannot be separated from self-discipline, as the condition for the 
re-opening o f the possibility of meaning out o f the logical impasse o f the anti-foundational 
nihil.213
Tout, dès qu’on creuse, aboutit à un problème métaphysique. Ainsi, de quelque paît que l’homme 
se tourne, il se trouve isolé sur le réel comme sur une île entourée d’une mer fracassante de possibles et 
d’interrogations. On peut conclure de là que le monde a un sens. Car il n’en aurait pas, s’il était, brutalement 
Les mondes heureux n’ont pas de raisons. Il est donc ridicule de dire : « La métaphysique est-elle possible ? ». 
La métaphysique est. (Cil, 96). [My italics]
It is clear from this note, probably dated between February and May 1943, that, in 
Camus’s acceptation o f  the term, metaphysics cannot be confused with a Platonic-Christian 
«reasonable realism»: it is precisely because man is surrounded by the absurd walls (the 
image o f the island evoking the finiteness  o f  human condition and the échec o f  all 
foundationalism), that the world has a  meaning. A world without man would have no reason 
and no meaning, it would simply be. Metaphysics, therefore, in this specific acceptation, 
coincides with er-istence as the mutual exposedness o f man-to-the-world and the world-to­
man. namely, the absurd n4 It is precisely in this sense that we should understand Camus’ 
«souci métaphysique» (E, 1666), summarising his personal position vis-à-vis of modem 
nihilism.
Good nihilism is a form of thinking which develops in the margins of modem 
nihilism, as a result o f  its anti-foundational tabula rasa, but which cannot be reduced to a 
philosophy o f  absurdity, in the sense o f  a thought o f utter meaninglessness (of the world). 
Instead, it is identified with an honest, 225 “metaphysically” concerned (in the sense exposed 2345
223 In July 1943 he wrote: «Nous avions beaucoup à dominer et peut-être pour commencer la perpétuelle 
tentation où nous sommes de vous ressembler. Car il y a toujours en nous quelque chose qui se laisse aller à 
l’instinct, au mépris de l’intelligence, au culte de l’efficacité.» (LAA, 222).
224I use the term ex-istence to refer to the finite être-à as the absurd exposedness to the lîmits, that is, in an anti- 
foundational sense. It is in this sense that we must read the following note in the Carnets (September 1943): 
«Puisque le mot existence recouvre quelque chose, qui est notre nostalgie, mais puisqu’en même temps il ne peut 
s’empêcher de s ’étendre à l’affirmation d’une réalité supérieure, nous ne le garderons que sous une forme 
convertie -  nous dirons philosophie inexistentielle, ce qui ne comporte pas une négation mais prétend seulement 
rendre compte d’un état de « l’homme privé de... » La philosophie inexistentielle sera la philosophie de l'exil » 
(CU, 106). [My italics]
225 « [...] je  ne prétends pas à penser nouvellement, mais à penser honnêtement. » (E, 1666).
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above), tragic thought o f  the finite. In the closing lines of his raisonnement absurde Camus 
wrote:
Mais il est mauvais de s’arrêter, difficile de se contenter d’une seule manière de voir, de se priver de la 
contradiction, la plus subtile peut-être de toutes les forces spirituelles. Ce qui précède [i.e. the absurd argument] 
définît seulement une façon de penser. Maintenant, il s 'agit de vivre. (MdS, 146) [My highlighting]
The «way of thinking» outlined in the MdS is precisely that absurd method which emerges 
from the tragic awareness o f  the oniologidaisthetic limit, and is made visible by the artist’s 
absurd effort and self-discipline.
The 1942-43 Carnets attest the continuity between the tragic or aisthetic thought o f 
the MdS and Camus’ reflection on revolt, from the Remarque to HR:
Essai sur la révolte. La nostalgie des “commencements”. IcL le thème du relatif -  mais le relatif avec 
passion. Ex : déchiré entre le monde qui ne suffit pas et Dieu qu’il n’a pas, l’esprit absurde choisit avec passion 
le monde. Id  : partagé entre le relatif et l’absolu, il saute avec ardeur dans le relatif. (Cil, 62-63) [My italics]
Camus clearly grafts the notion of revolt in the tragic passion passive, which dwells in the 
finite and liminal dimension of the relative -  a dimension recovered, as Camus writes to 
Ponge in January 1943, by and through good nihilism (E, 1666).
The notion o f the “relative” recurs on another occasion the same year: in his letter to 
Pierre Bonnel, Camus declares his belief in the possibility «de lier à une philosophie absurde 
une pensée politique soucieuse de perfectionnement humain et plaçant son optimisme dans le 
relatif» (E, 1423)226
Now, the aisthetic component in the transition from the absurd to revolt is brought 
forth by Camus’s insistent reference to the three intertwined terms bonheur -  beauté -  amour 
in the 1943-44 Carnets:
Essai sur la Révolte. Après avoir fait partir de l’angoisse la philosophie : la faire sortir du bonheur.
Id  Régénérer l’amour dans le monde absurde, c’est an fait régénérer le plus brûlant et le plus périssable 
des sentiments humains (Platon : « Si nous étions des dieux, nous ne connaîtrions pas l’amour »). [...] Mais cet 
amour est en dehors de l’étemel. C’est le plus humain des sentiments avec ce que le mot comprend à la fois de 
limitation et d’exaltation. C’est en cela que l'homme ne se réalise que dans Vamour parce qu’il y  trouve sous 
une form e fulgurante l ’image de sa condition sans avenir [_].(CII, 75) [My italics]
Tragic happiness closes the raisonnement absurde o f the MdS on the famous lines, «Il faut 
imaginer Sisyphe heureux» (MdS, 198). It is significant that, between November 1942 and
226 This idea is further developed in a note, probably dated end 1943 : «La plus grande économie qu’on puisse 
réaliser dans l’ordre de la pensée c’est d’accepter la non-intelligibilité du monde -  et de s’occuper de l’homme» 
(Cil, 113).
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January' 1943, Camus should re-question the work of Nietzsche precisely through the notion 
o f bonheur: «Le beau, dit Nietzsche, après Stendhal, est une promesse de bonheur. Mais s ’il 
n *est pas le bonheur même, que peut4l promettre?» (Cil, 60).
Beauty, in the tragic perspective of the lucid  artist, coincides with happiness -  not in 
the sense o f some kind o f “ideal” (promised, thus not sensually present) object of 
disinterested contemplation, but rather as sensory (passionate) touching-upon-the limit which 
dt-fines the human finite condition.227
Camus describes the lucid or absurd thinker who, although acknowledging a 
philosophy o f  evidence («qui répugne à l’esprit et au cœur mais qui s ’impose», Cil, 82), 
knows a philosophy o f preference, as «penseur heureux»:
Ainsi ma philosophie d’évidence, c’est l’absurde. Mais cela ne m’empêche pas d’avoir (ou plus 
exactement de connaître) une philosophie de préférence : Ex : un juste équilibre entre l’esprit et le monde, 
harmonie, plénitude, etc...Le penseur heureux est celui gu i suit sa pente -  le penseur exilé celui qui s’y refuse -  
par vérité — avec regret mais détermination... Peut-on pousser aussi loin cette séparation entre le penseur et son 
système ? N ’est pas en fait revenir à un réalisme détourné : la vérité extérieure à l’homme -  contraignante. Peut- 
être, mais ce serait alors un réalisme non satisfaisant. Non pas une solution à priori. (Cil, 83) [My italics]
The contradiction between the evidence of the absurd, evoked in the MdS, and the inclination 
o f the penseur heureux -  between the thinker and his set o f (absurd) “truths”- is the key term 
o f  Camus’ definition o f the tragic finite thought o f  the finite.228
The philosophy o f preference introduces a protest, which creates a tension between the 
nihilistic evidence (absurd) and the thinker’s tragic knowledge: "bonheur” and
“connaissance pure ", thus, coincide, and in the 1943 notebooks (CII, 87) they are opposed to 
the absurdist attitude o f the exiled thinker (CII, 83), who hypostatizing the contradiction in 
existence o f the absurd,229 attempts to deduce a  stringent logicality from his initial illogic, i.e., 
contradictory, evidence.
The tragic bonheur is opposed to the satisfaction or «complaisance dans la douleur», 
which, in the same pages o f  his notebooks, Camus links to the Nietzschean notion o f Eternal
227 A note in the Carnets, dated between March and August 1942, brings to our attention a relationship between 
beauty and freedom, which is o f  interest for the understanding o f Camus’ political writings in the following 
months: «Les pays qui abritent la beauté sont les plus difficiles à défendre — tant on vaudrait les épargner. Ainsi 
les peoples artistes devraient être les victimes désignées des peuples ingrates -  si l’amour de la liberté ne primait 
pas l’amour de la beauté au cœur des hommes. C’est une sagesse instinctive -  la  liberté étant la source de la 
beauté» (Cil, 22). In another note, in 1944, Camus confessed : « Je ne peux pas vivre hors de la beauté. C’est ce 
qui me rend faible devant certains êtres » (Cil, 94).
228 He notes in his Carnets in 1943: «Imaginons un penseur qui dit: « Voilà, je  sais que cela est vrai. Mais 
finalement les conséquences m’en répugnent et je  recule. La vérité est inacceptable même pour celui qui la 
trouve. » On aura ainsi le penseur absurde et son perpétuel malaise» (Cil, 82).
229 « Absurde. Si l’on se tue, l’absurde est nié. Si l’on ne se tue pas l’absurde révèle à l’usage un principe de 
satisfaction qui le nie lui-même. Cela ne veut pas dire que l’absurde n’est pas. Cela veut dire que l’absurde est 
réellement sans logique. C’est pourquoi on ne peut réellement pas en vivre » (Cil, 109).
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Return (Cil, 104), and which, he suggests, identifies the absurdist attitude of the modem 
European, le., nihilistic, thought - «L’Européen qui fait du courage une volupté: il s’admire. 
Répugnant. Le vrai courage est passif : il est indifférence à la mort. Un idéal : la connaissance 
pure et le bonheur» (Cil, 87). Bonheur, amour, beauté must be interpreted as three
interrelated dimensions o f the aisthetic experience, described in the MdS. It is from this 
perspective that .the notes on sexuality, scattered in the 42-43 cahiers, acquire a specific 
meaning and relevance, and provide a link between the 1942 philosophical essay and the 
moral and political reflection between 1943-44.
It is significant that, as early as November 1942, Camus explicitly relates his reflection 
on sexuality to the absurd and the nihilistic tabula rasa of meaning and value: «La sexualité 
débridée conduit à une philosophie de la non-signification du monde. La chasteté lui rend au 
contraire son sens (au monde) » (Cil, 55). Camus demonstrates the use o f the term chastity 
both with a strong aisthetic or sensory dimension, and with a clear aesthetic value, drawing 
upon the Nietzschean motif o f the artist’s ascetic self-discipline towards the realization o f the 
work o f art.230 132 23
Chastity is related to the artist’s conduct as distinguished from, and transcending, the 
pure toucher-h of sensual love into a relative, finite, (aisthetic) meaning, that is «created» not 
through a violent suppression (ressentiment), but through the self-mastering (askesis) o f the 
artist’s limitless and measureless passions and imagination. In contrast, de Sade’s 
systematic eroticism illustrates «une des directions de la pensée absurde» (Cil, 111), which 
introduces a stringent logicality in the initial aisthetic experience, betraying it.
Martha’s bonheur des pierres, formulated in a note for the tragedy Le Malentendu in 
the 1942 Carnets, illustrates, in my view, the logical “systematization” o f the aisthetic couple 
bonheur-amour, which dissolves the absurd (finite) experience o f the sensory/sensual being- 
exposed-to-the-limit into the abstract, God-like, anti -aisthetic and anti-tragic, self-centredness 
o f a self-sufficient monad: «La sœur. -  Priez Dieu qu’il vous rende comme une pierre. C’est 
ça le vrai bonheur et c ’est cela qu’il a choisi pour lui-même. Il est sourd, je  vous dis, et muet 
comme un granit. Faites-vous semblable à lui pour ne connaître plus du monde que l’eau qui
230 My italics.
231 My italics. «Une seule façon de ne pas se laisser “posséder” par l’absurde, c ’est de ne pas retirer d’avantages. 
Pas de dispersion sexuelle sans chasteté, etc. IcL introduire thème de l’oscillation. [...] » (Cil, 82).
232 «La sexualité ne mène à rien. Elle n'est pas immorale mais elle est improductive. On peut s’y livrer pour te 
temps où l ’on ne désire pas produire. Mais seule la chasteté est liée à un progrès personnel. 11 y a un temps où la 
sexualité est une victoire -  quand on la dégage des impératifs moraux. Mais elle devient ensuite une défaite -  et 
la seule victoire est conquise sur elle à son tour : c’est la chasteté » (Cil, 51).
233 Cil, 77-78.
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ruisselle et le soleil qui réchauffe. Rejoignez la pierre pendant qu’il en est temps [...]» (Cil, 
64-65).
Abstraction defines the absurdist attitude as opposed to the tragic attitude, 234 *236which 
Camus characterises in altogether different terms in a note for his Essay on Revolt in 1943: 
«Essai sur la Révolte: une des directions de l’esprit absurde c’est la pauvreté et le 
dénuement.» (Cil, 82). As Eduard Morot-Sir points out, pauvreté and dénuement work 
primarily as aesthetic principles, which describe the author’s painful effort toward the self­
mastering o f his passions and imagination. Pauvreté and dénuement seal the aisthetic 
moment, described in the lyrical essays and in the MdS, with the aesthetic effort o f the artist. 
It is in the light o f the opposition between aisthesislart and abstraction that, in Camus’s 
articles and notes around 1943 and 44, the artist’s reflections acquire a strong moral and 
political connotation.
In the Carnets between November 1943 and September 1944, the Plague resumes the 
opposition between a tragic finite thought o f  the finite, exposed and limited by the aisthetic 
present brought forth by the experience o f the absurd, and the absurdist attitude, denoted 
throughout the notebooks by the appeal to abstraction , as a limitless withdrawal from the 
sensory ex-posedness-to-the-limit, which erases the unique singularity o f the particular that is 
met in the sensory toucher-à.
He writes in a note: «Id  Dans la peste on ne vit plus par le corps, on se décharné» 
(CII, 119). The plague is the (dis-embodying) embodiment of war’s permanent “state of 
siege” : a brief note on the 11 o f  November 1942 testifies to Camus* impression at the news 
o f the landing o f the Allies in North Africa: «Comme des rats!» (CII, 53). I suggest that the 
author’s reflection on w ar and the political question o f the «irruption o f  History» is mediated, 
precisely, by the tragic dimension o f aisthesis.
As he wrote in a  note dated December 1942,237 through the metaphor o f the plague 
Camus expresses «l’étouffement dont nous avons souffert et l’atmosphère de menace et d ’exil 
dans laquelle nous avons vécu. Je veux du même coup étendre cette interprétation à la notion 
d’existence en général. La peste donnera l’image de ceux qui dans cette guerre ont eu la part 
de la réflexion, du silence -  et celle de la souffrance morale» (T, 1959). In order to clarify the
234 In another note in September 1944 : «Ceux qui aiment toutes les femmes sont ceux qui sont en route vers 
! abstraction. Ils dépassent ce monde, quoiqu’il y paraisse. Car ils se détournent du particulier, du cas singulier. 
L’homme qui fuirait toute idée et toute abstraction, le vrai désespéré, est l’homme d’une seule femme. Par 
entêtement dans ce visage singulier qui ne peut satisfaire à tout» (Cil, 126)
233 E. Morot-Sir, “Logique de la limite, esthétique de la pauvreté: théorie et pratique de l’essai”, in Albert Camus 
1980, op. cit., pp. 192-208.
236 My italics.
237 Later transcribed in CII, 66-ff.
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meaning assigned in 1942 to the term «souffrance morale», and the peculiar role played by 
the notion of reflection in the development o f his political thought around 1942-43, it is 
essential that we take a closer look at his definition of the plague:
la peste est la plus concrete de toutes les forces [...]. [...] elle ouvre les yeux, [...] elle force à 
penser. Elle est à ce compte comme tous les maux de ce monde et comme le monde lui-même. [...] Quelque 
grandeur que les individus en tirent, à considérer la misère de nos frères, il faut être un fou, un criminel ou un 
lâche pour consentir à la peste, et en face d’elle le seul mot d’ordre d’un homme est la révolte. (T, 1957)
Moralité de la peste : elle n’a servi à rien ni a personne. Il n’y a que ceux que la mort a touchés en eux- 
mêmes ou dans leur proches qui sont instruits. Mais la vérité qu’ils ont conquise ne concerne qu’eux-mêmes. 
Elle est sans avenir. (T, 1956).
The truth, ex-posed by the plague, is the absurd evidence which erases the teleological ("sans 
avenir ") and utilitarian categories of (modem) thought, opening up the ex-posedness of ex­
istence.
The continuity with the terminology o f the play Caligula -  the Emperor embodying 
the tragic man awoken to the evidence that men die and are not happy, who chooses to turn 
himself into the Plague in order to teach the absurd “truth” to all his subjects - and with the 
MdS is apparent: «Quel est l’idéal de Thomme en proie à la peste? -  Je vais bien vous faire 
rire: c’est l'honnêteté» (T, 1958).233
What characterises the plague as illness, in its first movement, is the destruction of 
aisthesis, the withdrawal from that being-at-the-limit, which ex-poses and ex-plodes the 
monadic individuality in the sensory/sensual toucher~à. This withdrawal is summarised in the 
notion o f separation.238 39 240
Les séparés. IdL Tout au bout du temps de la peste, ils n’imaginaient plus cette intimité qui avait été la 
leur et comment avait pu vivre près d’eux un être sur lequel, à tout moment, il pouvaient porter la main. (CII, 
91).*°
In another note he writes:
Peste. On ne peut pas jouir du cri des oiseaux dans la fraîcheur du soir -  du monde tel qu 7î est. Car il 
est recouvert maintenant d’une couche épaisse d’histoire que son langage doit traverser pour nous atteindre. Il en 
est déformé. Rien de lui n ’est senti pour lui-même parce qu’à chaque moment du monde s’attache toute une série 
d’images de mort ou de désespoir. Il n’y a plus de matin sans agonies, plus de soir sans prisons et plus de midi 
sans carnages épouvantables. (CII, 118) [My italics]
238 «[...] Un des thèmes possibles : lutte de la médicine et de la religion ; les puissances du relatif (et quel relatif) 
contre celles de l’absolu. C’est le relatif qui triomphe ou plus exactement qui ne perd pas» (T, 1957).
239 As the notebooks attest, by the end of 1942 tuberculosis forced the author to undergo the experience of 
separation and withdrawal from the intimacy of the beloved ones : «La maladie est un couvent qui a sa règle, son 
ascèse, ses silences et ses inspirations» (CII, 57).
240 My italics. «Peste. Les séparés: Journal de la Séparation? « Le sentiment de la séparation fiit général et il est 
possible d’en donner une idée d’après les conversations, les confidences et les nouvelles qui paraissent dans les 
journaux. » Id  Les séparés. Cette heure du soir, qui pour les croyants est celle de l’examen de conscience -  cette 
heure est dure pour le prisonnier -  elle est celle de / *amour frustré  » (CII, 90-91 ).
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In a text published in 1943, “Les exilés dans la peste”, he describes the condition o f 
imprisonment (T, 1963) o f  those under the siege o f the deadly epidemic: «[...] tous enfin se 
virent éloignés sans recours, empêchés de rejoindre ou de communiquer. [...] Cette invasion 
brutale de la maladie avait pour premier effet de supprimer les sentiments individuels, ou du 
moins, d’obliger les gens à agir comme s’ils n ’en avaient pas» (T, I960).241
The overcoming o f  the initial stage o f  withdrawal is, however, already attested in a 
note dated 15th January 1943: «La maladie est une croix, mais peut-être aussi un garde-fou. 
L’idéal cependant serait de lui prendre sa force et d’en refuser les faiblesses. Qu’elle soit la 
retraite qui rend plus fort au moment voulu. Et s ’il faut payer en monnaie de souffrance et de 
renoncement, payons » (Cil, 73).242 Souffrance/douleur, experienced under the absurd 
condition o f the plague/illness/separation, coincide with the (re-)opening up of what we have 
previously defined as the aisthetic present, which already provided the link between the 
plague/absurd and revolt in the MdS.243
Camus distinguishes the « prisoners », exiled by the plague, who are still capable o f 
“reflection”, imagination and memory, from those who, lacking all capacity of imagination, 
succumb to the illness (CII, 68). In a note between March and May 1943, we read: «Peste: 
très important. “C’est parce qu’ils vous ont foutu le ravitaillement et la douleur des 
séparations qu’ils vous ont eus sans révolte» (C il, 97).244
Intimately intertwined with love, happiness, suffering, pain, and sensory pleasure, 
revolt belongs to, and is only possible under the condition of, aisthesis. The exiled condition 
is described by the tragic oscillation between the sensory dimension, actualised through 
imagination, and a reality with mortifies the sensory ex-posedness (toucher-à) o f man:245 that
24,My italics. «Les télégrammes restèrent alors la seule ressource. Des êtres qui liaient l’intelligence, le cœur et 
la chair, en furent réduits à chercher les signes de cette communion ancienne dans le majuscules d’une dépêche 
de dix mots. Et comme, en fait, les formules qu’on peut utiliser dans un télégramme sont vite épuisées, de 
longues vies communes et des passions douloureuses se résumèrent rapidement dans un échange périodique de 
formules toutes faites [...]» (T, 1960-1).
242 My italics. In a note in the Carnets (winter 1942) he writes: «Vivre avec ses passions c’est aussi vivre avec
ses souffrances, - ce qui en est le contrepoids, le correctif, l’équilibre et le paiement, Lorsqu’un homme a appris 
-  et non pas sur le papier -  à rester seul dans l’intimité de sa souffrance, à surmonter son désir de fuir, l’illusion 
que d’autres peuvent « partager », il lui reste peu de chose à apprendre » (Cil, 57). And further on : « Toute 
pensée se juge à ce qu’elle sait tirer de la souffrance. Malgré ma répugnance, la souffrance est un fait » (Cil, 94) 
43 « [...]£ 'Etranger décrit la nudité de l’homme en face de l’absurde. La Peste, l ’équivalence profonde des 
points de vue individuels en face du même absurde. C’est un progrès qui se précisera dans d’autres œuvres. 
Mais, de plus, La Peste démontre que l’absurde n 'apprend rien. C’est le progrès définitif.» (Cil, 36)
244 My italics.
245 « Ils [les séparés] éprouvaient aussi la souffrance profonde de tous les prisonniers et de tous les exilés qui est 
de vivre avec une mémoire qui ne sert à rien. Ce passé même auquel ils réfléchissaient sans cesse n’avait que le 
goût du regret. [...] Ces aller-retour, ces oscillations entre des joies imaginaires e les réalités de l'absence, 
c'était en vérité l ’exil. Et chacun d’eux apprenait presque à neuf qu’il relevait d'une patrie aux couleurs de 
l ’amour et de la liberté, hors de laquelle il perdait son nom d ’homme ». (T, 1964) [My highlighting]
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same exposedness and oscillation, which define the absurd in the MdS.246 Furthermore, revolt 
is only possible in concurrence with «la pensée en general, c ’est-à-dire [...] Vimagination 
précise»,247 or what he addresses elsewhere, in clear Kantian terms, as reflection 248
According to a note in 1943 (CII, 81), the tragic thought that emerges and informs the 
MdS is the premise and condition to philosophizing -  as the point zero, the methodical tabula 
rasa, the pars destruens — after which and through which philosophizing not only is possible, 
but becomes necessary. The notion o f revolt, thus inseparable from the absurd aisthesis -  or, 
rather, from the absurd thought as rooted in the aisthetic present -  is crucial in order to (re­
define philosophy beyond nihilism. As he declared in an interview in 1945:249
Accepter l’absurdité [i.e. meaninglessness and senselessness] de tout ce qui nous entoure est une étape, 
une expérience nécessaire : ce ne doit pas devenir une impasse. Elle suscite une révolte qui peut devenir féconde. 
Une analyse de la notion de révolte pourrait aider à découvrir des notions capables de redonner à l’existence un 
sens relatif, quoique toujours menacé. (E, 1425)
I argue that the absurd evidence does not become an impasse, but brings revolt into 
being only in so far as the capacity for thinking is preserved, namely, the capacity for the 
opening up of the aisthetic present and its re-petition by the faculty of imagination.
The aisthetic present is the cornerstone of Camus’ main objection to Sartre’s 
existentialist philosophy -  and of philosophy tout court as generally identified with the 
Hegelo-Marxian conception of philosophizing — in the Carnets in 1943: «Etre et Néant (p. 
135-136). Étrange erreur sur nos vies parce que nous essayons d ’éprouver nos vies de 
l ’extérieur» (Cil, 119). It is in this sense that, I suggest, we must read his well-known 
declaration in an interview to Servir in December 1945:
[...] Je ne suis pas un philosophe. Je ne crois pas assez à la raison pour croire à un système. Ce qui 
m’intéresse, c’est de savoir comment il faut se conduire. Et plus précisément comment on peut se conduire 
quand on ne croit ni en Dieu ni en la raison. (E, 1427).
Earlier that year in a note in the Carnets (October 1945), he wrote :
246 It is significant that, in 1943, Camus was thinking o f introducing the theme of oscillation in his essay on 
revolt (CII, 82).
247 My italics. He notes in 1943: «Ce qui distingue le plus l’homme de la bête, c’est l’imagination. De là que 
notre sexualité ne puisse être vraiment naturelle, c ’est-à-dire aveugle » (Cil, 94).
248 Such “precise imagination”, which is seen to produce the absurd world, by applying a modern principle to 
human conduct (morality) and aesthetics (CII, 81), not only coincides with the « triomphe du charnel » 
described in the MdS as the mark o f a tragic finite thought o f the finite, but, I suggest, in the « modem principle» 
evoked in the Carnets is precisely that «modern nihilism», which the 1942 essay was supposed to convey in 
metaphors or images. The reference to Scheler’s book on the man of ressentiment in the Carnets in the early 
months o f 1943 (CII, 81) seems to confirm the continuity between Camus’ reflection on nihilism, the tragic 
thought developed in the MdS, and the emergence of the notion of revolt.
249 “Non, je  ne suis pas existentialiste”, extraits d’interview à Les Nouvelles littéraires (15 Novembre 1945) in E, 
1424-27.
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Pourquoi suis-je un artiste et non un philosophe? C’est parce que je  pense selon les mots et non selon 
les idées. (Cil, 146). [My italics]
In the concluding section o f « La création absurde » in MdS, Camus explicitly 
declared that « les idées sont le contraire de la pensée », that is, o f  the tragic « pensée limitée, 
mortelle et révoltée » (MdS, 191) disclosed by the absurd experience, which constitutes the 
lucid «philosophies ironiques qui font les oeuvres passionnées » (Id ) . Art is conceived as the 
« site » of the aisthetic experience o f the absurd toucher-à,250 which ex-presses the liminal ex­
posedness, in the foundationless «being-left-alone», of human existence.251
To « think in words », as opposed to thinking in abstract concepts, is the artist’s tragic 
thought o f the finite. Now, in his Diplôme on Métaphysique chrétienne et néoplatonisme in 
1936 Camus attempts a  definition o f the «point de vue d'artiste » as contained, in his view, in 
Plotin’s way o f philosophizing:252
[...] aussi bien qu’une pensée religieuse, la philosophie de Plotin est un point de vue d ’artiste. Si les 
choses s ’expliquent c ’est que les choses sont belles. Mais cette extrême émotion qui saisit l’artiste devant la 
beauté du monde, Plotin la transporte dans le monde intelligible» (E, 1271).
[...] Mais si, de la description, Plotin passe à l’explication, il a recours à des images. (E, 1276)
[...] Dans le 9e traité de la «JV Ennéade», Plotin démontre l’imité fondamentale des âmes et leur 
liaison à la force qui anime le monde. A vrai dire, il en donne surtout une image. [...] La solution de Plotin est 
comme toujours moins une raison qu’un sentiment dont il tente de donner l’équivalent dans une image [...]. (E, 
1280) [My italics]
The aesthetic « explanation » through the recourse to images thus constitutes, in Camus’s own 
words, the artist’s perspective, which is the condition o f a peculiar kind of thinking and 
philosophizing. It is significant that, in January 1936, Camus noted in his Carnets'. «On ne 
pense que par images. Si tu vera être philosophe, écris des romans.» (CI, 23).253
In the notebooks o f the early Forties, we detect a clear continuity, if not a 
straightforward identity, between the artist’s «discipline nécessaire à  l’œuvre» (Cil, 77) — the
250 « Toute pensée qui renonce à l’unité exalte la diversité. Et la diversité est le lieu de l ’art. La seule pensée qui 
libère l’esprit est celle qui le laisse seul, certain de ses lim ites et de sa fin prochaine. » (MdS, 191).
251 From the perspective o f the absurd aesthetics, the lucid novelist embodies the aisthetic thought: «[...] 
L’essentiel est qu’ils triomphent dans le concret et que ce soit leur grandeur. Ce triomphe tout charnel leur a été 
préparé par une pensée où les pouvoirs abstraits ont été humiliés. Quand ils le sont tout a fait, la chair du même 
coup fait resplendir la création de tout son éclat absurde » (E, 191). «À un certain point où la pensée revient sur 
elle-même, ils [les penseurs lucides] dressent les images de leur œuvres comme les symboles évidents d’une 
pensée limitée, mortelle et révoltée » (ld.).
2 «[...] la synthèse plotinienne fournit à la pensée chrétienne, non pas une doctrine (selon certains auteurs) mais 
une méthode et une façon de voir les choses» (E, 1269).
25jMy italics. « [... ]justement le choix [que les romanciers philosophes] ont fa it d ’écrire en images plutôt q u ’en 
raisonnements est révélateur d’une certaine pensée qui leur est commune, persuadée de l’inutilité de tout 
principe d’explication et convaincue du message enseignant de l’apparence sensible. » (MdS, 178).
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aesthetic “ascèse” or self-mastering - and what Camus understands as the exercise o f thought 
(Id.), as the aisthetic awareness preserved and repeated by imagination.254
Art ex-poses and ex-presses, through the artist’s creation, the “loss of the world” 
experienced by the finite thought of the finite:
Du naturel en art Absolu il est impossible. Parce que le réel est impossible (mauvais goût, vulgarité, 
inadéquation à l’exigence profonde de l’homme). C’est pour cela que la création humaine, faite à partir du 
monde, est toujours pour finir tournée contre le monde. [...] C’est Part et Partiste qui refont le monde, mais 
toujours avec une arrière-pensée de protestation. (CH, 115-116) [My italics]
The intertextual analysis o f the MdS excludes that the lucid artist’s re-making o f the world 
may be understood as some kind of architectonic founding or fabrication (poiesis) o f a 
material/matter according to a pre-established idea or project in the author’s mind. As we 
have previously shown, in the 1942 essay, Camus employs a narrow acceptation o f  creation 
in the sense of an aisthetic or finite thought (MdS, 177) of the world. 255 256
The artist’s creation is comprised by Camus under the Nietzschean notion o f 
«rumination» and the pre-philosophic notion o f wonder (MdS, 179), and contains revolt, 
identified with an aisthetic deliberation (protest) as its constitutive moment. As Gay-Crosier
• 256points out,
[...] [djésireux de surmonter par la parole ou l’écriture l’absence d’un centre fixe entre les termes de la 
contradiction qui le harcèle, le locuteur ou l’écrivant, rebelle au désordre naturel, se voit forcé de corriger celui- 
ci par l'ordre artificiel mais insuffisant de sa grammaire. Son discours, qui a pour ambition de centrer et de fixer 
le sens produit par un réseau de noms et prédicats, ne parvient qu’à fixer [...] l’absence de sens et est incapable 
de fournir un sens permanent. L’acte prédicatif plus que la simple nominalisation constitue une intervention 
discriminatrice, une différentiation, bref un jugement par excellence. L’acte prédicatif prend alors l’allure d’une 
révolte qualificative qui s’évertue à vêtir d’une chair concrète palpable l’ossature de la nominalisation souvent 
abstraite. De là l’importance de la métaphore dans le discours philosophique camusien. En tant que modalité de 
la révolte -  celle qui se dirige contre le manque de sens concret -  l’intention prédicative doit se résigner au 
même insuccès que celui par lequel se solde toute rébellion [...].
Volonté discriminatrice en action, la révolte discursive, de par sa répétition et son énergie, assure la 
révision périodique des jugements qu’elle apporte, instaurant, ce faisant, le discours critique, c’est-à-dire la 
distance vis-à-vis de son objet et d’elle-même. À la scission intellectuelle de Vobjet et du sujet la révolte 
substitue une opposition vécue, donc assumée, mais non une synthèse des contraires. Elle réunit singulièrement 
la séparation intellectuelle et la proximité vécue. Ainsi la négation affirmative qu’elle pratique est-elle à la fois
254 « Dans toute souffrance, émotion, passion, il y a un stade où elle appartient à l’homme même dans ce qu’il a 
de plus individuel et de plus inexprimable et un stade où elle appartient à l’art. Mais dans son premier moment 
l’art ne peut jamais rien en faire. L’art est la distance que le temps donne à la souffrance. C’est la transcendance 
de l'homme par rapport à lui-même, » (Cil, 110). (My italics). This idea is essential, in my view, to grasp the 
meaning of the link between art and revolt that Camus establishes in the MdS and throughout his notebooks 
(1943-44).
255 Between Autumn 1943 and 1944 Camus devotes a series of notes to the question o f «la  creation corrigée» 
and the work of art -  «Mon oeuvre. Terminer suite d’œuvres sur livre sur le monde crée : « La création 
corrigée ». » (Cil, 117). «Si l’œuvre, produit de la révolte, résume l’ensemble des aspirations de l’homme, elle 
est forcément idéaliste (?)» (CII, 117). [My italics]
256 Raymond Gay-Crosier, « La révolte génératrice et régénératrice », in Albert Camus : œuvre fermée, œuvre 
ouverte ? Actes du Colloque du Centre Culturel International de Cerisy-la-Salle, Cahiers Albert Camus 5, Paris, 
Gallimard, 1985, pp. 123-125.
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une tentative de rapprochement par la distance et de distanciation par le rapprochement. C’est ce genre de 
proximité distancée, donc critique, que Camus propose d ’adopter face à l ’histoire [...]. [My italics]
In the notion o f « distanced proximity », which, in Gay-Crosier’s words, defines the artist’s 
discoursive revolt, it is not difficult to recognize those elements which we have seen to 
characterise the aisthetic present as the absurd ex-perience o f être-à.
The liminality, inexorably inscribed in language, is what repeatedly emerges in the 
1944 article «Sur une philosophie de î  'expression» de Brice Parain. It is this very liminality, 
which provides the key to the overcoming o f  a nihilistic-absurdist «philosophie de la non- 
signification» (E, 1678):
[Parain] affirme sans doute que, si le langage n ’a pas de sens, rien ne peut en avoir et que tout est 
possible. Mais ses livres montrent en même temps que les mots ont juste assez de sens pour nous refuser cette 
ultime certitude que tout est néant. [...] Ni oui ni non, le langage est seulement une machine à fabriquer du 
doute. Et comme dans tout problème qui engage l’être, dès que nous avançons un peu loin, là où notre condition 
se joue, nous rencontrons la n u it Un « non » brutal serait au moins positif. Mais ce n ’est pas cela. Ce langage si 
incertain (...) ne dorme pas l ’être, mais il le laisse soupçonner. Chaque mot dépasse l’objet qu’il prétend 
désigner et appartient au genre. Mais s’il indique le genre, il n’est pas le genre tout entier [...). Dans le mot, il y  a 
quelque chose de plus, mais ce quelque chose de plus n ’est pas encore assez. (E, 1678)
[...] [Parain] entrevoit seulement q u ’il y  a dans le langage une puissance qui nous déborde : « On lui 
demande de formuler ce que l’homme a de plus intimement individuel. Il n ’y est pas propre. Sa destination est de 
formuler ce que l’homme a de plus strictement impersonnel, de plus strictement pareil aux autres. » C’est à cette 
banalité supérieure que peut-être il faut se tenir [...] Car le langage passe l’individu et sa terrible inefficacité est 
le signe de sa transcendance. (E, 1679) [My italics]
The liminality o f  language is inseparable from its« inefficacy », which declares the loss or 
retreat o f the original, “re-velatory” word, founding the intimate Being o f  the community: 257
L’histoire de la philosophie, pour Parain, est, au fond, l’histoire des échecs de la pensée devant le 
problème du langage. L’homme n’est pas arrivé à trouver ses mots. Et peut-être est-il possible d’imaginer 
l ’aventure métaphysique comme une quête, à la fo is obstinée et stérile, du maître-mot qui éclairerait tout, le 
« Sésame » suffisant, l’équivalent de « Aum », la syllabe sacrée des Hindous. À cet égard, les recherches de 
Parain montrent que des premiers Grecs à la dialectique moderne, la réflexion sur le langage a évolué dans le 
sens d’une démission. (E, 1674-5) [My italics]
The transcendence o f language is a fin ite  transcendence, as the being-driven-to-the- 
limit which dissolves the presence o f Being into the aisthetic près-ence, as an endless 
toucher-à, the revolted «distanced proximity»,258 which exposes the absurd or tragic 
awareness o f the impossibility of hypostasis. In this sense, language marks, in the very 
moment it seems to embrace it, the failure o f the architectural paradigm of artistic creation:
237 See Jean-Luc Nancy, La communauté désœuvrée, Christian Bourgois Éditeur, 1999, pp. 122-123.
“ V p p .  157-ff.
80
hence, Camus’ insistence on the absurd work o f art as défi to God as Supreme Architect, and 
to the world as divine creation.
As he writes in 1944, «[ce] qui caractérise notre siècle, ce n’est peut-être pas tant 
d’avoir à reconstruire le monde que d’avoir à le repenser. Cela revient à lui donner un 
langage » (E, 1680).259 60 *It is significant that, for Camus, the interrogation on the problem of 
language -  as developed by various authors, such as Jean Paulhan, Francis Ponge, and Parain 
himself -  «ne s’agit pas chez eux d’un exercice byzantin sur des motifs de grammaire, mais 
d’une interrogation profonde qui ne se sépare pas de la souffrance des hommes» (E, 1681).
The social and political implications of an interrogation on language had already been 
brought forth by the Surrealists. But in the Forties, and mainly through the work of the above 
mentioned authors, an important change had taken place:
Au lieu de tirer de l’incertitude du monde ou du langage toutes les libertés, une démence calculée, 
l’inspiration automatique, on s’efforce à la discipline intérieure. Du désespoir on ne tire plus l’anarchie, mais la 
domination de soi. La tendance n ’est plus de nier la raison du langage et de lâcher la bride à ses désordres. Elle 
est de lui reconnaître des pouvoirs relatifs de revenir,pur l ’absurde ou le miracle, à sa tradition. Autrement dit, 
et ce passage de pensée est capital pour l’époque, d’une philosophie du mensonge et de la non-signification, au 
moins apparente, du monde, on ne tire plus l’apologie de l’instinct, mais un parti pris de l ’intelligence. Il s’agit 
seulement d’une intelligence raisonnable revenue au concret et soucieuse d ’honnêteté. C’est un nouveau 
classicisme -  et qui témoigne pour les deux valeurs qui sont aujourd’hui le plus attaquées, je veux dire 
l’intelligence et la France. (E, 1681) [My italics]
This text constitutes an invaluable trait-d’union between the « aesthetic » reflection of the 
MdS and the 1943-44 political writings. Camus employs the terminology of the MdS -  
**honnêteté, “domination de so i”, “discipline thus confirming the continuity between his
reflection on language and the pages on the raisonnement absurde - 1’ «intelligence 
raisonnable revenue au concret et soucieuse d ’honnêteté» coinciding, I argue, with the 
aisthetic or tragic thought o f the finite.
In my view, the key to the later criticisms concerning the “conservatism ” of Camus’s 
philosophical and political thought lies precisely in the meaning o f that «return to the 
tradition», hinted in the 1944 article, as the only valuable alternative to nihilism. As he
259 Scattered notes on « la création corrigée », later taken over and developed in HR, can be found in the Carnets 
between 1943 and 1944 : « Pour ma « création contre Dieu ». C’est un critique catholique (Stanislas Fumet) qui 
dit que l’art, quel que soit son but, fait toujours une coupable concurrence à Dieu. [...] Encore Péguy : « Il y a 
même une poésie qui tire son éclat de l’absence de Dieu, qui ne spécule sur aucun salut, qui ne s’en remet à rien 
d’autre qu’à elle-même, effort humain, récompensé dès la terre, à remplir le vide des espaces. » 11 n’y a pas de 
milieu entre la littérature apologétique et la littérature de concurrence » (Cil, 108-9).
260 In this sens,e Camus’ conception of art reflects, and must be inscribed in, an aesthetics of failure -  what 
Eduard Morot-Sir defined as esthétique de la pauvreté (see E. Morot-Sir, “Logique de la limite, esthétique de la 
pauvreté: théorie et pratique de l’essai”, in Albert Camus 1980, op. cit., pp. 192-208.
My italics.
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suggests in this text, tradition can be recovered either via miracle, i.e., the religious solution 
(which Camus ultimately rejects); or via the absurd, i.e.y the aisthetic awareness, as the un­
founded foundation o f that act of deliberation that constitutes the «parti pris de i ’intelligence» 
(E, 1681).
As the absurd creation is bom of «l'émerveillement initiai» (MdS, 179),262 disclosed 
in the aisthetic experience o f the absurd, the new classicism propound in the 1944 article, 
which resumes Camus’ aesthetics o f finitude {esthétique de la pauvreté),263 binds the lucid 
thinker to
ces vertus qui font l’honneur de l’homme et qui sont honnêteté et pauvreté. Ce qu’on peut apprendre de 
l’expérience qui nous est is proposée [i.e. the absurd expérience], c’est à tourner le dos aux attitudes et aux 
discours, pour porter avec scrupule le poids de notre vie quotidienne. «M aintiens l'homme dans son 
application, dit L’Essai sur la misère humaine, c'est par elle qu'il devient immense et c'est la seule immensité 
qu 'il transmet. ». Oui, nous avons à retrouver notre banalité. (E, 1681-2) 264[My italics]
As Pierre-Louis Rey points out,265 « [l]es préoccupations esthétiques de Camus 
n ’éclairent pas seulement les débats politiques ou moraux auxquels il fut mêlé : on a souvent 
le sentiment qu’elles les justifient»: an « aesthetic » justification, /.e., anti-metaphysical and 
anti-foundational, which, I argue, offers the key to an aisthetic understanding of the political 
developed in the 1943-44 articles and notebooks. Camus notes in his Carnets in 1944:
Je ne crois pas aux actions désespérées. Je ne crois qu’aux actions fondées. Mais je  crois qu’il faut peut 
de choses pour fonder une action. (Cil, 127)
The aisthetic judgement o f revolt) brings about the Foundation-less foundation {arche) 
o f political action, beyond nihilistic despair and the break down of tradition. 266
262 On the relationship between stupor and «interrupted myth», see Jean-Luc Nancy, La communauté désœuvrée, 
PP- 137-ff-
b* He writes in the Carnets (Mai 1943): «La confiance dans les mots, c’est le classicisme -  mais pour garder sa 
confiance il n’en use que prudemment. Le surréalisme qui s’en défie en abuse. Retournons au classicisme, par 
modestie. » (CH, 101)
264 Camus’s conception of art, as the finite “pnxhwf’ o f the aisthetic “distanced proxim itÿ\ that is, of 
discoursive revoit, can therefore be understood, with Nancy, as «une poiesis qui soit, en elle-même, une praxis. 
Ce qui est fondé existe en tant que c’est, par libre decision, sort de l’en-soi, de la nuit de l’abstraction et de 
l’épaisseur de l’immanence, mais n’en est pas sorti au sens de quelque chose qui en aurait été extrait: ce n’en est 
encore sorti qu’au sens de la libre decision, qui en fait en même temps l’incision inaugurale à la surface de l’en- 
soi -  et celui-ci se retire. C’est l’expérience même, parce que cela ne recueille ni ne produit rien : cela décide 
d’une limite [...]. L’expérience de fonder est sur la limite. Ce qui est fondé existe [...] selon le mode de 
l’existence de la limite, c’est-à-dire selon le mode de ce franchissement de soi (franchissement et 
affranchissement, gestes de libération) qui fait la structure propre de la limite. La fondation est l’expérience de la 
transcendance finie [ ...]»  (J.-L. Nancy, L ’expérience de la liberté, op. cit., pp. 113-114).
265 Pierre-Louis Rey, Camus une morale de la beauté, SEDES, Paris, 2000, p. 16.
266 In a note between Novembre 1943 and September 44: «Poser la question du monde absurde, c’est demander 
“Allons-nous accepter le désespoir, sans rien fa ire?  Je suppose que personne d ’honnête ne peut répondre oui »
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What I will argue in the following chapter, through the comparative analysis o f the 
articles and editorials for Combat, is that the aisthetic moment comes to define a certain 
“aesthetic” conception o f  politics and political action -  one which cannot, however, be 
reduced to what is generally addressed as the “aestheticizatiori* o f  the political, which 
designates the Nazi project o f Politics as Total Art, and culminates in the totalitarian 
Immanent community.
(CII, 116). «.Essai sur Révolte: « Tous les révoltés agissent pourtant comme s'ils croyaient à l’achèvement de
l ’histoire. La contradiction est... ». » (Cil, 123). My italics.
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Chapter 2. At  the origin of the political.
In the present chapter, I will focus on the continuity between the MdS and the political 
articles written by Camus for the journal Combat during the Resistance and in the aftermath 
o f the War, elucidating whether and in what sense the judgment o f revolt, rooted in the 
aisthetic or tragic finite thought o f  the finite (defined in Chapter 1), as bringing about a good 
(use of) nihilism within a post-metaphysical horizon, provides the moral guidelines for 
political conduct in the totalitarian impasse. What I intend to show is that Camus’ political 
programme o f re-introducing the language o f  morality within politics, generally read in the 
light of the French tradition o f the moralistes, discloses the possibility o f «aesthetically» re­
thinking the political, outside and against the organicistic/ «immanent» concept of the 
(political) community.
His political writings are read together and next to Arendt’s reflection on morality, 
thinking and judging, in order to grasp the political relevance o f  creation and language in 
tracing the source for a moral norm o f  conduct within the political acting-together-at-the- 
limit, brought forth by the aisthetic or tragic thought o f  the MdS.
2.1. a  C o m b a t  a g a in s t  n ih il is m  ( 1944-49).
The 1944 texts highlight a pivotal concern, on Camus’ part, for the question of language as an 
eminently political question. The continuity between the fourth Lettre à un ami allemand, the 
article “Sur une philosophie de l'expression” de Brice Parain and the editorial «La 
démocratie à faire» in the journal Combat (2nd September 1944) on this theme is apparent:
II n’est pas sûr que notre époque ait manqué de dieux. On lui en a proposé beaucoup, et le plus souvent 
bêtes ou lâches. Il semble bien, au contraire, qu ’elle manque d ’un dictionnaire. C’est une chose, du moins, qui 
paraît évidente à ceux qui espèrent pour ce monde, où tous les mots sont prostitués, une justice claire et une 
liberté sans équivoque. Mais la question que vient de poser Brice Parain est justement de savoir si un tel 
dictionnaire est possible et, surtout, s’il peut se concevoir en dehors d ’un dieu qui lui donne ses significations. 
(E, 1671-2) [My italics]
The question o f nihilism is evoked under the twofold, historically delimited, 
phenomenon o f  the de-valuation o f  superior values (death o f God), and the loss of meaning 
(signification) that it entails, and o f the construction o f a myriad o f  «dieux bêtes ou lâches» - 
o f what he will address in HR as the «sacré dégradé» o f totalitarian regimes - in the ab-solute
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and transcendent space left vacant by the (Christian) God of the tradition (incomplete 
nihilism).
It is within the nihilistic horizon, in a world organized on the systematic prostitution o f 
words, that the reconstitution o f a dictionary goes together with, and is inseparable from, the 
attempt to re-think the political beyond the horrors of totalitarian regimes -  «nous ne 
concevons pas de politique sans langage clair», he writes in Combat (CAC8, p. 166).1 In the 
editorial «L’intelligence et le caractère» (29th August 1944), Camus wrote:
C’est le temps de la morale, c’est-à-dire celui où le langage devient net et où il est possible de le tenir à 
la face mêmes des réalistes. (CAC8, p. 156) [My italics]
It is in the light o f his concern for language, as an eminently political concern, that 
Camus’s engagement as rédacteur en chef and editorialist in the journal of the Resistance 
Combat between August 1944 and June 1947,2 acquires its full meaning. In the article «Le 
journalisme critique» (8th September 1944), Camus insists on the invaluable role of what he 
defines as critical journalism in giving «au pays le langage qui le fera écoutera (CAC8,182):
À des temps nouveaux, il faut, sinon des mots nouveaux, du moins des dispositions nouvelles de mots. 
Ces arrangements, il n’y a que le cœur pour les dicter, et le respect que donne le véritable amour. (CAC8,182)
Considered as one o f the greatest and most authoritative voices o f the «mystique de la 
Résistance»,3 Camus* contribution to Combat exceeds, in my view, the topoi o f the French 
Resistant thought:4 I suggest that the 1944-46 articles provide an essential key to the 
understanding o f Camus’ concept o f the political, by re-thinking the author’s concern for 
language within the sphere of aisthesis, as posing in the line of the finite method o f the finite,
1 Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi confirms that «Les Lettres à un ami allemand éclairent admirablement le sens qu’il 
faut donner à l’engagement de Camus, et à sa participation à Combat clandestin » (in Cahiers Albert Camus 8. 
Camus à Combat édition établie, présentée et annotée par J. Lévi-Valensi, Gallimard, Paris, 2002, p. 35).
2 Bom in December 1941 out o f the fusion o f François Menthon, Pierre-Henri Teigen, René Capitant, Alfred and 
Paul Coste-Floret’s Resistant movement Liberté with Henri Frenay, Bertie Albrecht, Jacqueline and Jean-Guy 
Bernard’s journal Vérités (CAC8, 21-22), Combat was published with the programmatic intention of providing 
«informations précises puisées aux meilleures sources [...] de Brest à Nice et de Dunkerque à Bayonne» in order 
to fight «contre l ’anesthésie du peuple française, and to be accessible to the largest number so that «à la défaite 
des armes succède la victoire de l 'esprit » (see CAC8, 23-24). It is highly probable that Camus came into contact 
with the movement of Combat during his frequent travels to Saint-Etienne, where he received medical treatment 
for tuberculosis, and to Lyon, where he repeatedly met Pascal Pia and René Reynaud, who were among the first 
active militants of this clandestine movement, and Francis Ponge, actively participating in Résistance 
communiste. Camus’s letter to Ponge is dated 27* January 1943 (E, 1662-1668): a fake identity card in the name 
o f Albert Mathé, dated 20* May 1943, proves that only a few months later Camus was engaged with the 
Resistance. The first Lettre à un ami allemand written in July ’43, attests «d’un état d’esprit de révolte, de 
colère, de combattant, même -  ou plutôt surtout -  si ce combattant déteste la guerre et la violence » (CAC8, 34).
3 Jean-François Sirinelli, Dictionnaire de la vie politique française au XX  siècle, PUF, 1995, p. 128.
4 See, in particular, Henri Michel et Boris Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Les idée politiques et sociales de la Résistance 
(Documents clandestins — 1940-1944), PUF, Paris, 1954.
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brought forth by the textual analysis o f the MdS, the question o f the morality of human 
(political) action.
It is important to point out that, throughout the articles and editorials o f Combat, 
Camus uses the terms politics/political with a strong negative acceptation, which generally 
refers to the political practice codified in France under the Third Republic, which he 
summarises under the term of «realism», as a  strict teleological reasoning applied to public 
conduct. In « L’intelligence et le caractère », Camus defines such reasoning as
un effet de l'intelligence seule. Cette faculté aperçoit très bien la relativité de toutes choses. Sa 
conclusion normale quand elle examine un événement historique est que cela passera, qu’il n’est donc pas de 
raisons de se gêner. Et passant de la révolution à Pétain, on peut effectuer un pas de plus et faire des offres 
d ’emploi à ceux-là que Vichy justement a tenté de déshonorer. [...JC’est que l ’intelligence seule ne suffit pas à 
apercevoir cette évidence. Il faut aussi du caractère [ ...]  » (CAC8,155)
That Camus identifies the pair « intelligence et caractère » with an aisthetic or lucid 
thought is confirmed, a few lines later, by the association o f  political realism with 
aveuglement and mensonge, the latter being identified with the systematic abuse and 
« prostitution » o f language for the purpose o f  political propaganda and historical efficacy.
The author opposes the realism o f  (traditional) politics — identified with the utilitarian 
reasoning o f  the French bourgeois ruling class, which justifies all means (and, hence, the 
collaboration with a  regime founded on violence and murder) for the realization of its political 
ends, and which was de-legitimized by «la honte» of 1940 - with a morality defined around 
the aisthetic terms o f  «sacrifice», «grandeur», «souffrance».5
In the editorial «Morale et politique» (4th September 1944) Camus declares the 
intention o f «supprimer la politique pour la remplacer par la morale. C’est ce que nous 
appelons une révolution» (CAC8,171).
I suggest that the political project embraced by the équipe of Combat under the 
heading o f «De la Résistance à la Révolution» (21st August 1944) must be understood in the 
sense of a «trans-valuation»,6 in the immediate aftermath o f the Liberation o f the political by 
means o f allowing morality into the sphere o f  human action.
5 «La fin d ’un monde » (61*1 September 1944) condemns the political manoeuvres o f the “moribund” bourgeois 
ruling class («le rôle directeur de la bourgeoisie est terminé en 1940 », CAC8, 172) : «Nous savons maintenant 
que les vies françaises sont irremplaçables. Mais il faut que cette classe comprenne, qu’elle nous laisse enfin 
[...] après avoir tant manqué de courage et de générosité, elle ne se prive pas de cette intelligence élémentaire 
qui lui permettrait encore d’être le témoin d’une grandeur dont elle n’a pas su être ouvrière.» (CAC8, 173). [My 
italics]
6 Camus himself would Write to Francis Ponge in 1943 :« [ . . . ]  je pense quelquefois à une immense révision des 
valeurs, totale et clairvoyante -  et je sais bien que je n’aurai ni le talent ni la force de mener cela à bien. Mais 
cela du moins peut être l’œuvre de plusieurs esprits et c’est une tâche qui doit vous séduire. Vous pouvez
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This is a project that stems from the nihilistic tabula rasa of Foundation, and aims at 
overcoming nihilism by bringing the latter to its extreme consequences, against all 
incomplete-nihilistic «retour a Varsenal des vielles solutions»:
Nous croyons que la vérité de ce siècle ne peut s'atteindre qu’en allant jusqu 'au bout de son propre 
drame. S i l 'époque a souffert de nihilisme, ce n ’est pas en ignorant le nihilisme que nous obtiendrons ta morale 
dont nous avons besoin. Non, tout ne se résume pas dans la négation ou l’absurdité. Nous le savons. Mais il faut 
d’abord poser la négation et l’absurdité puisque ce sont elles que notre génération a rencontrées et que ce sont 
elles dont nous avons a nous arranger.7 (CAC8,310){My italicsj
It is precisely in the connection o f a pessimistic thought, or what he defines as «une 
philosophie de la négation», and a positive «morale de la liberté et du courage» (CAC8, 
310),8 that Camus writes :
il s’agit de savoir [...] si l'homme, sans le secours de l'éternel ou de la pensée rationaliste, peut créer À 
lui seul ses propres valeurs. Cette entreprise nous dépasse tous infiniment. [...] la France et l’Europe ont 
aujourd’hui a créer une nouvelle civilisation ou à périr. (CAC8,308) [My italicsj
This idea, confirmed one year later in an interview to Servir (20th December 1945),9 
places Camus’ political reflection at the margins of the theologico-political paradigm * 
resumed, on the one hand, by traditional (religious) political thought and, on the other, by 19th 
century Historicist ideologies. Now, according to Camus
[...] les civilisations ne se font pas à coups de règle sur les doigts. Elles se font par la confrontation des 
idées, par le sang de l'esprit, par la douleur et le courage. (Id.)
The metaphor « sang de l'esprit » immediately refers to, and repeats, the aisthetic association 
contained in the absurd metaphor of «la chair consciente»: what I suggest is that the morality
évidemment alléguer que Sisyphe est paresseux. Mais quoi, ce sont les paresseux qui remuent le monde. Les 
autres n ’ont pas le temps » (E, 1668). He associates the moral and political transvaluation to clairvoyance, which 
is the distinctive feature o f Sisyphus, in the concluding chapter of the 1942 essay devoted to this mythological 
figure («Si ce mythe est tragique, c’est que son héros [Sisyphe] est conscient [...J La clairvoyance qui devait 
faire son tourment consommé du même coup sa victoire», MdS, 196). This text confirms the continuity o f his 
political reflection with the tragic thought developed in the MdS.
7 A. Camus, «Le pessimisme et le courage» (3rd Novembre 1944).
8 Camus argues here against the thesis, widely accepted in the French press around ’44-’45, of a causal 
relationship between the philosophies of negation and the «plus laches servitudes», according to the reasoning 
that a «philosophie pessimiste est par essence une philosophie découragée et,pour ceux qui ne croient pas que le 
monde est bon, ils sont donc voués à accepter de servir la tyrannie». One of the examples he quotes is Gaston 
Rabeau’s article «Nazisme pas mort?» published in the Christian-Democratic journal L'Aube on the 21** 
October 1944. According to Rabeau: «.C’est notre Université qui a fait connaître Nietzsche, et Nietzsche est une 
des premières sources du nazisme. [...] Il y a eu ensuite ta doctrine du néant et du désespoir. Cette philosophie 
du néant et du désespoir devant l’absurdité du monde et l'inutilité de l’existence est celle de Martin Heidegger. 
Elle a été tout récemment implantée en France avec beaucoup d’originalité et de profondeur par M. Sartre (...) 
Mais toute une littérature, romans et théâtre, répand, depuis plusieurs années, des doctrines nihilistes [...,] 
J'espère que les auteurs célèbres auxquels je  fais allusion ne continueront pas a accomplir leur œuvre de mort » 
(CAC8, p. 307, note 2).
9 E, 1427.
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propounded by Camus in the 1944 articles should not be confused with the “traditional” table 
o f moral, i.e., transcendent, values (against which he had declared his vocation of immoraliste 
since the early ‘30’s), but should, instead, be identified precisely with a finite «morale de la 
chair», unfoundedly founded on aisthesis. 10
In the article «De la Résistance à la Révolution», written by Camus during the riots 
that culminated three days after in the Liberation of Paris,11 and published in the first non- 
clandestine edition o f Combat (21st August 1944),12 134the writer summarises the political line of 
the journal in the following terms:
Il a fallu cinq années de lutte obstinée et silencieuse pour qu’un journal, né de l’esprit de résistance, 
publié sans interruption à travers tous les dangers de la clandestinité, puisse paraître enfin au grand jour dans un 
Paris libéré de sa honte. [...] Ces années n’ont pas été inutiles. Les Français qui y sont entrés par le simple 
réflexe d’un honneur humilié en sortent avec une science supérieure qui leur fait mettre désormais au-dessus de 
tout l'intelligence, le courage et la vérité du cœur humain. Et ils savent que ces exigences d ’apparence si 
générale leur créent des obligations quotidiennes sur le plan moral et politique. Pour tout dire, n ’ayant qu ’une 
fo i en 1940, ils ont une politique, au sens noble du terme, en 1944. Ayant commencé par la résistance, ils veulent 
finir par la Révolution/4
The « politique au sens noble du terme » is defined around the terms o f intelligence, 
courage, vérité du cœur: all terms, as we have shown, belonging to the aisthetic constellation 
o f  the finite or tragic thought illustrated in the MdS, which, I argue, explicitly breaks with the 
utilitarian, teleological reasoning underpinning 20th century political realism.
We fail to grasp the meaning and the implications o f  Camus’ contribution to the post­
war political debate if  we do not seriously question the centrality accorded to the problem of 
morality and the creation o f values in the articles and notes o f the Forties. In the article «Us
10 « il vient des temps où la morale rentrer dans la politique -  he writes on the 29th August 1944 - parce que 
des hommes, tout d’un coup, se sont mis à payer cette politique avec leur sang, parce que des Français l’ont faite 
au moyen de tortures et d’assassinats d’un côté, de sacrifices et de grandeurs secrètes de l’autre. » (CAC8, 155). 
This idea is further developed in the editorial o f the 29* o f September 1944: «Le monde que nous espérons a 
déjà été payé trop cher. S 'il y  fa u t encore le sang et la  douleur des hommes, il faudra bien donner ce sang et 
souffrir cette douleur. Mais pas un Européen ne saurait y  penser avec légèreté. Et dans tous les cas, ce n’est pas 
dans ce pays où nous venons de vivre toute l'étendue et toute l'absurdité de la misère humaine qu’on trouvera 
des hommes pour l’accepter dans la gaîté du cœur. [...] Les Français n’avaient pas tous reconnus en 1939 que la 
guerre avait un sens. Ils savent maintenant qu’elle en a un. Elle a même pris pour eux un sens supérieur 
puisqu’ils n’ont plus seulement à détruire un ennemi, mais aussi à vaincre l’idée que quatre années de trahison 
officielle ont donnée de la France à l’extérieur. [...] Nous nous sommes mis dans la position difficile d’un peuple 
qui doit à nouveau faire preuve d’une noblesse et d’une grandeur autrefois reconnues sans effort. Que nous 
ayons à le faire avec la vie des meilleurs d'entre nous, c ’est l'affreuse tragédie de notre nouvelle histoire » 
(CAC8, 216-217). The «higher» meaning o f war coincides with the aisthetic and finite sens of la chair 
souffrante, expressed by the images of blood and pain. It is important to observe that Camus identifies France 
not so much with the Nation-State, conceived as an abstraction and a legal construction, but with the “living” 
people, of those who have paid with their lives and suffering the Nazi Occupation and the war.
See Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi, “Un journal dans l’histoire”, in Cahiers Albert Camus 8. Camus à « Combat». 
Éditoriaux et articles d ’Albert Camus 1944-47, Gallimard, Paris, 2002, p. 42. Abbreviated as CAC8.
,2Camus contributed to the clandestine Combat between March and July 1944 (n. 55-58).
13 CAC8,44.
14 C A C 8,141-2.
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ne passeront pas» (23rd August 1944), Camus explicitly relates the condition of the Plague -  
illustrated by those who have lost their capacity for memory and imagination, or those who 
are incapable of aisthetic thinking - to nihilism: «Aux quelques rares Français qui, mutilés 
dans leur mémoire et leur imagination, oublieux de l ’honneur et insoucieux de la honte, assis 
dans leur confort personnel, pourraient demander : « À quoi bon ?» il faut, ici, répondre » 
(CAC8,147).
The echo o f Nietzsche’s posthumous note on nihilism is not fortuitous: Camus’s re­
reading and re-evaluation o f the philosopher’s work dates precisely around 1943-44.*5 He 
wrote around that date:
Révolte. Chap. I. La monde existe. Ce qui est immoral, c ’est le Christianisme. Définition d'une morale 
contre le rationalisme intellectuel et rirrationalisme divin. [...] (Cil, 125) [My highlighting]
In the absurd horizon, some kind of morality can and must, therefore, be recovered 
beyond the nihilistic tabula rasa - 16 that is, an aesthetic morality (in the Nietzschean sense), 
unfoundedly founded on the aisthetic experience, which is brought forth in the finite ex-
17posedness o f la chair souffrante in/as that déchirement, which is the mark of lucidity.
The continuity between the good nihilism o f the raisonnement absurde and the 
political writings is highlighted by two articles in Combat, « Le sang de la liberté » (24th 
August 1944) and «L a nuit de la vérité» (25th August 1944), where Camus describes the 
«effort commun» of the French Resistance {Combat, 142) in terms that echo the chapter on 
the absurd Conquest in the MdS:
« Une fois de plus, la justice doit s’acheter avec le 
sang des hommes.
Nous connaissons trop ce combat, nous y sommes trop 
mêlés par la chair et par le cœur pour accepter sans 
amertume cette terrible condition. » [...]. (CAC8,149)
«Unis dans la même souffrance pendant 
quatre ans, nous le sommes encore dans la même 
ivresse, nous avons gagné notre solidarité. Et nous 
reconnaissons avec étonnement dans cette nuit
«[...] le chemin de la lutte me fait rencontrer la chair. 
Même humiliée, la chair est ma seule certitude. Je ne 
puis vivre que d ’elle. » (MdS, 166)
« Comment ne pas comprendre que, dans cet univers 
vulnérable, tout ce qui est humain et n’est que cela 
prend un sens plus brûlant ? Visages tendus, fraternité 
menacée, amitié si forte et si pudique des hommes 
entre eux, ce sont les vraies richesses parce qu’elles
15 Cil, 78-79. Nietzsche’s name recurs in Camus’s notes on morality in the Carnets: «On ne peut être capable 
d’engagement sur tous les plans. Du moins peut-on choisir de vivre sur le plan où l’engagement est possible. 
Vivre ce qu’on a d’honorable et cela seulement Dans certains cas cela peut conduire à se détourner des êtres 
même (et surtout) pour un cœur qui a la passion des êtres. En tout cas cela fait du déchirement. Mais qu’est-ce 
que cela prouve ? Cela prouve que celui qui aborde sérieusement le problème moral doit finir dans les extrêmes. 
Qu’on soit pour (Pascal) ou contre (Nietzsche), il suffit qu’on le soit sérieusement et l’on voit que le problème 
moral n’est que sang, folie et cris». (Cil, 125).
M Cf., his letterto Barthes in 1955 (T, 1973).
17 See MdS, 165.
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bouleversante que pendant quatre ans nous n’avons 
jamais été seuls. Nous avons vécus les années de la 
fraternité. » (CAC8, 152)
«[...]  On ne peut toujours vivre de meurtres 
et de violence. Le bonheur, la juste tendresse, auront 
leur temps. Mais cette paix ne nous trouvera pas 
oublieux. Et pour certains d’entre nous, le visage de 
nos frères défigurés par les balles, la grande fraternité 
virile de ces années ne nous quitteront jamais. [...] 
Rien n’est donné aux hommes et le peu qu’ils peuvent 
conquérir se paye en morts injustes. Mais la grandeur 
de l’homme n’est pas là. Elle est dans la décision 
d ’être plus fort que sa condition. Et si sa condition est 
injuste, il n’y a qu’une façon de la surmonter qui est 
d ’être juste lui-même. (C A C 8,153)
[My italics]
sont périssables. C’est au milieu d’elles que l’esprit 
sent le mieux ses pouvoirs et ses limites. » (MdS, 167)
« La grandeur a changé de camp. Elle est dans la 
protestation et le sacrifice sans avenir. [...] C’est une 
revendication de l’homme contre son destin. [...] Les 
conquérants parlent quelque fois de vaincre et 
surmonter. Mais c’est toujours « se surmonter » qu’ils 
entendent Vous savez bien ce que cela veut dire. Tout 
homme s’est senti l’égal d ’un dieu à certains 
moments. C’est ainsi du moins qu’on le dit. Mais cela 
vient de ce que, dans un éclair, il a senti l’étonnante 
grandeur de l ’esprit humain. Les conquérants sont 
seulement ceux d ’entre les hommes qui sentent assez 
leur force pour être surs de vivre constamment à ces 
hauteurs et dans la pleine conscience de cette 
grandeur. » (MdS, 166-7)
« [...] Notre destin est en face de nous et c’est lui que 
nous provoquons. Moins par orgueil que par 
conscience de notre condition sans portée. Nous aussi, 
nous avons parfois pitié de nous-mêmes. C’est la seule 
compassion qui nous semble acceptable : un sentiment 
que peut-être vous ne comprenez guère et qui vous 
semble peu viril. Pourtant ce sont les plus audacieux 
d’entre nous qui l’éprouvent. Mais nous appelons 
virils les lucides et nous ne voulons pas d'une force  
qui se sépare de la clairvoyance. » (MdS, 168). [My 
italics]_________________
Protest and sacrifice are precisely the terms through which Camus drafts his Essai sur Révolte
l O
around ’44: the heroic «decision d’être plus fort que sa condition» can be easily identified 
with that deliberative act (praxis) disclosed by the aisthetic judgement of revolt, which 
jnfoundedly founds the new values o f what he addresses as an aw/f-political and anti-realistic 
apolitique de l ’honneur» ,* 19
N ous é tions entrés d an s  cette guerre avec l ’idée q u e  cela  é ta it absurde, m ais q u ’on ne pouvait pas faire au trem en t
'Jous pouvons dire ainsi que n o u s  y som m es entrés pour l ’honneur. (C A C 8 ,185) [M y  ita lic s ]
Now, honour is one of the terms that recur in the editorial o f the 17th o f September 
944, which Camus devotes to the German situation. According to the author, the German 
people are immersed in a  profound «sommeil de l ’esprit», which explains why «[il] continue à
‘ «L ‘homme peut-il à lui seul créer ses propres valeurs? C ’est tout le problème. Vous êtes pertinent ? Mais je  
’ai jamais dit que l ’homme n ’était pas raisonnable. Ce que je  veux, c’est le priver de son prolongement illusoire 
i  de faire reconnaître qu’avec cette privation il est enfin clair et cohérent. Id  Sacrifice qui conduit à valeur.[...] 
onsidérer l’héroïsme et le courage comme des valeurs secondaires -  après avoir fa it preuve de courage. » (Cil, 
23-4).
«Le temps de la justice» (22nd August 44) (CAC8,146).
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se taire derrière ses frontières entamées, massif, obstiné, muet sur les crimes qu’on a commis 
en son nom, résigné aux terribles blessures qui tombent sur ses villes» (CA C8,195) :20
[...] ce peuple suit sa vocation profonde, celle d’un pays qui n 'a pas voulu penser et qui pendant des 
années n ’a pas eu d ’autre souci que d ’éviter les charges de la pensée. L’unité qui commence avec Bismarck 
n’était pas la fusion harmonieuse et féconde d’individus différents. Cette unité était d’abord une unanimité. Et 
jamais, comme sous Hitler, cette unité n’a été si totale. Elle était l'unité indistincte et amorphe d'un peuple 
content d'avoir la paix. Oui, ce peuple a fa it la guerre parce qu'il voulait la paix de l ’esprit. Et la paix de 
l ’esprit consistait pour lui à laisser à d'autres le soin de penser pour lui. Ce peuple n’aime pas la liberté, 
puisqu’il hait la critique. C’est pour cela qu’il n’aime pas les révolutions qui affranchissent l’homme et qu’il n’a 
jamais fait que des révolutions légales, qui renforçaient à la fois l’État et la nation. Et ce régime hitlérien qui lui 
enlevait le bonheur et la dignité, l'honneur et la vie personnelle, il l’a accepté parce que, pour finir, il y trouvait 
ce sommeil de l’esprit dont il avait toujours rêvé. (CAC8, 195-196) [My italics)
This text is o f particular interest for a series of reasons : firstly, it associates the realisation o f 
the totalitarian, “immanent”, community under the regime of Hitlerism with thoughtlessness; 
and secondly, by relating the (in)capacity for thinking with the notion of freedom, it 
highlights the complexity o f Camus’ understanding of revolution.
In analysing the German case, Camus distinguishes a legal revolution, reinforcing the 
state and the nation, from a material revolution — rooted in a revolt, which stems from 
(material) despair and not from  constructive reflection (CAC8, 196), thus closing itself back 
upon «cette épaisseur, cette inertie qui le livreront [the German people] aux vainqueurs du 
moment» (Id.) - 21 from «les revolutions gui affranchissent l ’homme» (Id.). Freedom is 
inseparable from the capacity of thinking, as the condition for a political unity («fusion 
harmonieuse et féconde d’individus différents») which cannot be confused with the totalistic 
and totalitarian «unanimité inconsciente» (CAC8, 195).
In the editorial o f  the 20th o f September, the political relevance of language is once 
again spelt out: the silence of the German people is identified with the silence of its Führer, 
who dispensed the German people from the capacity for speaking and the exercise o f  words 
(CAC8, 199), which is the mark of thoughtlessness,22
20 «Cette énorme masse garde son silence comme si le monde entier et son propre destin lui étaient devenus 
étrangers. Tous les observateurs alliés et neutres sont d’accord : le peuple allemand continue de dormir dans le 
crépuscule de ses dieux » (C A C 8,195). [My italics]
21 As Abbou {joints out, «Camus n’a jamais réduit la libération de l’homme au seul domaine matériel, pas plus 
d’ailleurs qui ne l’a exclu. Et l’on commettrait une erreur grossière en supposant que le journaliste relègue les 
données matérielles et historiques de la libération de l’homme à un plan secondaire » (A. Abbou, « Nature et 
place d ’une théorie de la libération de l’homme dans la pensée d’Albert Camus », in Camus et la politique, op. 
cit., p. 119.
22 «[...] ce silence est éloquent. Il s’identifie à celui de toute l’Allemagne, il est celui d ’un homme qui, lui aussi, 
a renoncé à penser. Hitler, sans doute, n’était pas un penseur. Mais c’était un homme à qui les mots tenaient lieu 
d’idées. Ses méditations, elles étaient hurlées à pleins poumons devant cent mille Allemands. Et se taire pour lui, 
c’est ne plus être. » (CAC8,200).
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Camus traces the totalitarian immanent unity o f the German nation under the Führer to 
thoughtlessness, which he designates as a hatred o f  consciousness, and which is nothing other 
than the loss o f  lucidity (<aveuglement) of the LAA.23 In the political articles, thoughtlessness 
thus coincides with the rejection of the aisthetic thought o f the 1942 essay. This is confirmed 
in the same editorial, where the exercise of words is related to righteousness, the latter being 
reduced under Hitlerism to sheer exercise of force:
L’Allemagne a accepté d’avoir raison ou tort avec Hitler. Et la raison de Hitler n’était faite que de sa 
force. L 'Allemagne a accepté d'avoir raison ou tort avec la force. La conviction profonde de ce peuple était que 
Hitler serait toujours plus fort que son destin. Mais aucun homme jam ais ne peut être plus fo rt que son destin, 
sinon dans le silence de son cœur ou par les pouvoirs de l'amour. Seulement, c ’était là le genre de force qui le 
faisait rire. (CAC8,200)
The continuity with the aisthetic finite thought o f  the finite, in the chapter on the 
absurd conquest, is further highlighted in Camus’ association o f the immanent/totalizing logic 
o f Hitlerism to modem individualist thought:
[ce] peuple qui a tant détesté l’individu, a pris de l’individualisme la part la plus basse, celle qui met un 
homme au-dessus des autres au mépris de toute conscience. (Id.)
Camus thus roots the Nazi «immanent» community in an extreme appropriation of modem 
individualism, which, by rejecting the aisthetic dimension, which is the mark o f lucidity or 
consciousness, as the condition for thinking plurality (CAC8, 195), is turned into an abstract 
reductio ad unum, that culminates - in the nihilistic, a-moral and God-less, equation of 
righteousness to force - in collective suicide.24
The fact that, in the aftermath o f the Liberation o f  France from the Nazi occupant, 
Camus was primarily concerned with the necessity of re-thinking the political community 
towards a radical “transvaluation” o f the latter in the sense o f  an aisthetic finite thought o f the 
finite, is apparent in the editorial of the 19th September 1944.
In the report o f the first public meeting o f the Mouvement national de Libération («Des 
hommes qui ne parlaient au nom d’aucun parti, qui ne s’adressaient à aucune clientèle 
existant déjà avant la guerre [...], C A C 8,197), the term «révolution» plays a pivotal role :
23 In the éditorial o f the 15* September 1944, Camus wrote: «[...] si Hitler avait réussi, l’Histoire eût reconnu en 
lui un grand homme. Quelques-uns d’entre nous, sans doute, l’eussent encore nié au nom même de la grandeur 
dont nous aurions jugé qu’elle avait été pour toujours avilie dans un régime où le nom d’homme avait perdu son 
sens. Mais l’Allemagne entière et le monde eussent oublié la médiocrité irrémédiable de cette âme livrée aux 
idée fixes , les crimes que jusqu’à lui on pensait être sans nom, mais qui prendront maintenant le sien, le malheur 
enfin qu’il traînait autour de lui et qu’il a étendu comme une nuit sur tant de pays désespérés » (CA C8,189).
24 CAC8,201. In another éditorial (29* September 1944) Camus wrote: «[...] nous avons l’idée que l’Allemagne 
hitlérienne est décidée à finir dans le plus tragique et le plus théâtral des suicides [ . ..]»  (CAC8,216).
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De quelle révolution s’agit-il ? Celle dont on parlait dimanche à Pleyel ne ressemble à aucune de celles 
qui nous étaient déjà proposées avant la guerre et par des partis très différents. C’est pour cela qu’elle semble 
vague à certains esprits. On a l'habitude de faire correspondre aux mots les images tes plus familières. La 
révolution, pour beaucoup, c ’est 1789 et 1917. Le reste est trop fatiguant à penser. Il n ’est même pas sûr que 
les mouvements représentés à la réunion d’hier aient eux-mêmes une idée tout à fait précise de cette révolution. 
Mais ils parlaient au nom d’une force intérieure qui les dépasse, qui les a portés pendant quatre ans et qui, dans 
certaines conditions, pourrait prendre demain sa vraie forme. (CAC8,197)
Revoit is the force that has guided the Résistance for four years - «[c]’est-à-dire le refus 
entier, obstiné, presque aveugle au début, d’un ordre qui voulait mettre les homes à genoux. 
La révolte, c ’est d ’abord le cœur » (CAC8, 198). It is in the very moment «où [la révolte] 
passe dans l’esprit, où le sentiment devient idée, où l’élan spontané se termine en action 
concertée» (CAC8, 198) that « l’informe pensée qui jaillit aujourd’hui au bout de ces quatre 
ans de nuit [...] porte le germe [...] de toutes les renaissances » (C A C 8,198-9).
Not only does Camus oppose this « shapeless thought » to the «paresse de l ’esprit», 
which he sees at the root o f ail Historicistic reasoning, but it is also in this revoit that we must 
find, in his view, «la théorie originale et précise» of a new révolution (C A C 8,198) -  a kind o f 
“theory” which is consistent with the imite method of the MdS:
Nous ne croyons pas ici aux révolutions définitives. Tout effort humain est relatif. L’injuste loi de 
l’histoire est qu’il faut à l’homme d’immense sacrifices pour des résultats souvent dérisoires. Mais si mince que 
soit le progrès de l’homme vers sa propre vérité, nous pensons qu’il justifie toujours ces sacrifices. Nous croyons 
justement aux révolutions relatives. (CAC8,198)
As he wrote to Ponge in January 1943 :
En m atière politique du moins, la notion du relatif ne m 'est pas étrangère, croyez-le. Je regrette d’avoir laissé en 
Algérie le seul écrit politique que j ’aie commis et qui (coïncidence supplémentaire) faisait état de ce que 
j ’appelais « la révolution pessimiste » ou « la révolution sans métaphysique ». Vous auriez été surpris de voir 
que j ’ai rencontré, vous ignorant, exactement les mêmes formules que vous. [...] [d]ans la méditation où le 
temps nous plonge, la seule chose que nous puissions faire, c ’est de prendre conscience. Nous avons pour cela 
besoin les uns des autres. A cet égard, je  crois que votre expérience, cette chasse insistante de ¡’expression, qui 
aboutit à un humanisme intolérant (au bon sens) et à un relativisme passionné, est irremplaçable [...] (E, 1667) 
[My hîghlighting]
The continuity between his politica! articles around 1944 and the chapter on the absurd 
conquest in the MdS is, once more, made visible in an éditorial, published in Combat on the 
4* November 1944, and later included in the chapter “Morale et politique” of his collection of 
political writings Actuelles, where the «pessimist révolution», or the révolution without 
metaphysics, acquires its full meaning in the light of Camus’ «passion désintéressée au 
bonheur impossible des hommes» (CAC8,312):
Nous savons, en effet, que le salut des hommes est peut-être impossible, mais nous disions que ce n’est 
pas une raison pour cesser de le tenter et nous disons surtout qu’il n ’est pas permis de le dire impossible avant 
d’avoir fait une bonne fois ce qu’il fallait pour démontrer qu’il ne l’était pas. Aujourd’hui, l’occasion nous en est 
donnée. (CAC8,312-313)
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The echoes o f the gooif-nihilistic «faire comme si» o f the absurd conqueror in the MdS are 
apparent.25 Now, Camus opposes the modest political thought o f an «intelligence raisonnable 
revenue au concret» (H, 1681), i.e., the aisthetic or finite («soucieuse d'honnêteté», Id.) 
thought o f the finite to the idealistic political systems and ideologies - the polemical target of 
the article being principally Communism - which justify all means toward the realization of 
an ultimate and definitive salut or bonheur o f  men.
Intellectual and moral honesty is, in contrast, the condition for that clairvoyance (CAC8,224), 
which -  in apparent continuity with the terminology of the 1942 essay - Camus poses as the 
method of a  new  political praxis.
As he writes in the editorial o f  the 27th September, devoted to the trial o f Louis 
Renault, and touching upon the charges of «indignité nationale», concerning the confiscation 
o f the properties of French industrialists that collaborated with the Vichy regime,26 the year 
1940 marks, in the history o f France, the break-down of the moral and political guideposts of 
the tradition.27
This idea is further developed in the editorial o f the 7th October, included in the 
chapter “Morale et politique” in Actuelles, where Camus rejects the Communist re- 
appropriation o f the traditional means of political action, in particular, o f violence and 
manipulation o f language (lying and propaganda), identified with political realism (<«7 s 'agit 
de savoir si tous les moyens sont bons», CAC8, 312), in order to realize a higher end, that is 
legitimized through a coherent Philosophy o f History:
[...] nous ne croyons pas au réalisme politique. Notre méthode est différente.
Nos camarades communistes peuvent comprendre que des hommes qui n’étaient pas en possession d’une 
doctrine aussi ferme que la leur aient eu beaucoup à réfléchir pendant ces quatre années. [...] Parmi tant d’idées 
bouleversées, tant de purs visages sacrifiés, au milieu des décombres, ils ont senti le besoin d’une doctrine et 
d ’une vie nouvelles. Pour eux, c'est tout un monde qui est mort en juin 1940. (CAC8,239). [My italics]
It is not difficult to recognize in the new doctrine o f the revolted men of the Resistance the 
finite aisthetic thought o f  the finite, which, in the nihilistic horizon o f the tabula rasa o f the 
tradition, poses the conditions for re-thinking political action beyond the reduction, during the 
Nazi occupation and the Vichy regime, o f the political to a «legal fiction»  (CAC8, 210).
25 The absurd thought of the limits o f human action in the charter on Conquest in the MdS constitutes, I argue, 
the premise and condition to grasp the meaning o f Camus’ political engagement. The echoes o f the absurd or 
nihilistic wisdom of the conqueror in Camus’ notion o f pessim ist revolution are apparent (MdS, 166).
26 Editorial, 28th September (CAC8,212-ff.)
27 «[en] 1940 a commencé, en France, une époque où les hommes ont été appelés à se juger un par un, dans la 
solitude, hors de tout appui traditionnel.» (CAC8,212) (My italics).
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What emerges in the editorials between September and October *44, is a dissociation 
of judgement and (written) law, the latter authorizing the terrorist practices under the Nazi- 
Fascist regime in France: written law is opposed to the «loi des cœurs»,2i that is, to the 
Resistance fighters’ revolt as some other kind o f law, de-limiting men’s conduct in the sense, 
analysed above, o f an internal self-mastering (askesis),28 9 the political urgence in the aftermath 
of the Liberation thus being the institution o f what Camus calls the «tribunaux d ’honneur» 
(CAC8, 211), which would allow us to «juger au nom d ’une vérité qui n ’a pas encore pris 
form e de loi» (Id.) - that is, in the name of a «law o f  honour» or moral justice.30 *
The fact that the «truth», opposed by Camus to a murderous law, which allows 
violence and torture, and destroys communication, is nothing but the finite, anti-metaphysical, 
truth o f aisthesis, is made apparent in the exchange o f articles with François Mauriac 
concerning the question o f justice. In the editorial of the 25th October 1944, touching upon the 
problem of the trials against collaborators o f the Vichy regime, the author develops an 
argument, which, I suggest, anticipates the tone and conclusions o f Hannah Arenedt’s report 
of Eichmann’s trial in *66:
Nous n’avons pas le goût du meurtre. Et la personne humaine figure tout ce que nous respectons au 
monde. Notre premier mouvement devant cette condamnation [the death sentence o f G. Suarez] est donc la 
répugnance. Il nous serait facile de penser que notre affaire n 'est pas de détruire des hommes, mais qu’elle est 
seulement de faire quelque chose pour le bien de ce pays. Mais en vérité, nous avons appris depuis 1939 que 
nous trahirions ainsi le bien même de ce pays. La France porte en elle, comme un corps étranger, une minorité 
d’hommes qui ont fait hier son malheur et qui continueront de le faire. Ce sont les hommes de la trahison et de 
l’injustice.
C'est leur existence même qui pose le problème de la justice puisqu 'ils form ent une part vivante de ce 
pays et que la question est de les détruire.
[...] que M. Mauriac considère le conflit où se trouvent des hommes qui ignorent la sentence divine et 
qui gardent, cependant, le goût de l’homme et l’espoir de sa grandeur. [...] nous avons choisi d'assumer la 
ju stice humaine avec ses terribles imperfections, soucieux seulement de la corriger par une honnêteté 
désespérément maintenue.
Nous n’avons jamais demandé une répression aveugle et convulsive. Nous détestons l’arbitraire et la 
sottise criminelle, [...] nous souhaitons pour cela une justice prompte et limitée dans le temps, la répression
28 «Pendant quatre ans, ce n’est pas au nom de la loi écrite que nous avons jugé, c ’est au nom de la loi des cœurs. 
Quant aux textes de lois, ils ne servaient qu’au bourreau » (CAC8,211).
29In the editorial on the question of National indignity (28th September 1944), Camus opposes the 
collaborationist industrials (« des hommes que l’argent a détournés de toute conscience », CAC8, 213) to «[...] 
des hommes de liberté et de justice [qui] se trouvent ligotés par leur principes eux-mêmes et seraient empêchés 
d’agir s’ils ne décidaient pas, une fois pour toutes, de faire de leur conscience la nouvelle loi dont ils ont besoin » 
(CAC8, 214). In the editorial o f the 29th October 1944, he adds : « Le goût de l’honneur ne va pas sans une 
terrible exigence envers soi-même et envers les autres. Cela est fatiguant, bien sûr. Et un certain nombre de 
Français étaient fatigués d’avance en 1940 » (CAC8,295).
30 «C’est la fiction de légalité que Vichy a créée qui nous force à substituer la justice morale à la justice de droit 
[...]»  (CAC8,302).
Jl The polemic, concerning the problem of the press and the épuration, originated from the death sentence o f the 
journalist Georges Suarez, member of the Parti Populaire français and director of the collaborationist 
A ujourd’hui, accused of giving intelligence to the enemy and of treason, and executed on the 9th November 1944 
(see CAC8,288, n. 1).
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immédiate des crimes les plus évidents, et ensuite, puisqu’on ne peut rien faire sans la médiocrité, l'oubli 
raisonné des erreurs que tant de Français ont tout de même commises. (CAC8,288-289) [My italics]
Honesty is associated with a clairvoyant respect, not of sheer life, nor o f Man as an 
abstract entity, but o f the <<personne humaine», conceived aesthetically}1 Camus traces the 
conditions for a social and political re-naissance, o f a new “beginning” (<commencement), 
firstly, in the exclusion from the « living » community (of the living) of those, who, for their 
lack of thought and imagination, have made themselves responsible for malheur and injustice, 
Le., for the suffering and death o f their fellow-men; and secondly, in a “reasonable 
forgetfulness” that would re-open the conditions for reconstruction.
What emerges from Camus’ articles around 1944 is the understanding and re­
definition of the political community in terms that echo the reflection o f Georges Bataille and 
o f the Collège de Sociologie around that same date:32 3 by opposing the ‘active’ principle of 
power, associated with dominion and violence (realism), to the ‘passive’ principle o f revolt, as 
aisthetic judgement (the clairvoyant «passion passive» o f the Carnets), Camus re-comprises 
the political community beyond the totalizing and totalitarian «community toward action» 
realised by Hitlerism - as the active realization (fabrication) o f the mono-cephalous 
community, the product o f  an abstracting and simplifying reductio ad  m um  -  in the sense of 
what could be defined as a «community toward existence»}4 the latter being identified by 
Camus with the aisthetic judgement o f revolt, which is the opposite o f abstraction.35
It is significant, in this sense, that Georges Bataille expressed his enthusiastic approval 
for Camus’s Remarque sur la révolte, published in the review L ’Existence in 1945. As 
Bataille’s notion of «communication» - which, in the 1945 work On Nietzsche,36 is rooted in 
the moment o f risk taking o f the individuals’ separate existence (shattering the «full and intact 
individual»), as the liminal experience o f the being suspended in the beyond oneself at the
32 The aisthetic dimension o f  the notion of person in Camus’s political articles of this period is apparent in the 
editorial of the 27th October 1944, devoted to the memory of René Leynaud, and later included, not without 
reason, in the chapter “l a  Chair” in the collection Actuelles: «Car des hommes comme Leynaud étaient entrés 
dans la lutte [de la Résistance], convaincus qu’aucun être ne pouvait parler avant de payer de sa personne» 
(CAC8, 292). The continuity with the (nihilistic) finite thought of the finite developed in the MdS is further 
confirmed in the editorial o f  the 25th October 1944: «Ce langage est-il si horrible que le pense M. Mauriac? 
Certes, ce n’est pas celui de la grâce. Mais c’est le langage d’une génération d’hommes élevés dans le spectacle 
de l’injustice, étrangère à Dieu, amoureuse de l'homme et résolue à le servir contre un destin si souvent 
déraisonnable. C’est le langage de cœurs décidés à prendre en charge tous leur devoirs, à vivre avec la tragédie 
de leur siècle et à servir la grandeur de l’homme au milieu d’un monde de sottise et de crimes. » (CAC8, 289- 
290).
33 Georges Bataille collaborated to Combat with an article on «Nietzsche est-il fasciste?» (20th of October 1944)
34 Roberto Esposito, Communitas, op. cit., p. 304.
35 CAC8,475.
36 Bataille dedicated a copy o f  Sur Nietzsche to Camus : «à Albert Camus,...la morale pourrait-elle être poussée 
trop loin ? Avec l’amitié de Georges Bataille » (see F. Favre, « Quand Camus lisait Nietzsche », in Albert Camus 
20, op. cit., p. 204).
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limit o f  nothingness - Camus’ notion of revolt designates a liminal experience «d’un “tout” 
encore assez obscure et d’un “rie«” qui signifie exactement la possibilité de sacrifice de 
l’homme à ce tout» (E, 1683):
Le révolté veut être tout, c’est-à-dire cette valeur dont il a soudain pris conscience et dont il veut 
qu’elle soit dans sa personne reconnue et acceptée -  ou rien, c’est-à-dire être déchu par la force qui le domine. À 
la limite il acceptera de mourir. Il met en balance la mort et ce qu’il appellera par exemple sa liberté. [...] la 
révolte, contrairement à une opinion courante, et bien qu’elle naisse dans ce que l’homme a de plus strictement 
individuel, met en cotise la notion même d ’individu. Car si l’individu, dans les cas extrêmes, accepte de mourir et 
meurt dans le mouvement de sa révolte, il montre par là qu 'il se sacrifie an bénéfice d'une vérité qui dépasse sa 
destinée individuelle, qui va plus loin de son existence personnelle. [...] La part que le révolté défend, il a le 
sentiment qu ’elle lui est commune avec tous les hommes. C’est de là qu’elle tire sa soudaine transcendance. 
C’est pour toutes les existences en même temps que le fonctionnaire se dresse lorsqu’il juge que, par un tel ordre, 
quelque chose en lui est nié qui ne lui appartient pas seulement, mais qui est un lieu commun où tous les 
hommes, même celui qui l’insulte et l’opprime, ont une solidarité toute prête. Il y a une complicité qui unit à la 
victime le bourreau. (E, 1683-84) [My italics]
The value “created” (E, 1687) by the judgement of the revolted man does not coincide 
with the individual, but is inherently plural («Il faut tous les hommes pour la composer», E, 
1685), in that it is founded on the aisthetic experience of a toucher-à - «C’est dans la révolte 
que Vhomme se dépasse dans autrui, et, de ce point de vue, la solidarité humaine est 
métaphysique» (Id.) -  which exceeds reduction to empathy: anticipating certain passages o f
Hannah Arendt’s lectures on Kant, Camus qualifies revolt in the (Kantian) terms of
* 10disinterested judgement.
It is significant that Camus posed disinterestedness as one o f the key elements o f his 
political programme in the editorial o f the 21st of October 1944:
[...] notre foi est qu’aucune tâche humaine n’est impossible à l’homme. Il nous faut seulement et 
précisément des hommes. Des hommes, c’est-à-dire des cœurs avertis à la fois de l ’audace et de la prudence, des 
âmes sensibles et des volontés fermes, des esprits capables en même temps de désintéressement et 
d ’engagement. Et si l’on devait nous dire que cela encore est inhumain, alors nous répondrions que c’est une 
raison pour le tenter et pour redonner ainsi à ce pays le dernier espoir de sa grandeur. (CAC8,276) [My italics]
The terni also recurs in the editorial o f the 24* o f November 1944, conceming the diffusion 
o f the Socialist doctrine among larger fractions of the French public opinion, where Camus 
reveáis his política! convictions:
La justice sociale peut très bien se faire sans une philosophie ingénieuse. Elle demande quelques vérités 
de bon sens et ces choses simples qui sont la clairvoyance, l’énergie et le désintéressement.
[...] les doctrines ne sont pas efficaces par leur nouveauté, mais seulement par l’énergie qu’elle véhiculent et par 
leur esprit de sacrifice des hommes qui les servent (CAC8,351) 3789
37 G. Bataille, On Nietzsche, The Athlone Press, London, 1992, p. 19.
38 E, 1684-5 (See my analysis in Chapter 4).
39 «On se révolte aussi contre soi-même et ce mouvement où l’homme se dresse contre l’homme lui-même [...] 
montre au moins le caractère profondément désintéressé de toute révolte » (E, 1684) (My italics).
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By taking his distance from the Socialist doctrines of the Third Republic (CAC8, 
352),40 Camus propounds
un autre socialisme, qui est décidé à payer. Il refuse également le mensonge et la faiblesse. Il ne pose 
pas la question futile du progrès, mais il est persuadé que le sort de l’homme est toujours entre les mains de 
l ’homme.
il ne croit pas aux doctrines absolues et infaillibles, mais à l'amélioration obstinée, chaotique mais 
inlassable, de la condition humaine. La justice pour lui vaut bien une révolution. [...] celle-ci lui est plus 
difficile qu’à d’autres, parce qu’il n’a pas le mépris de l’homme [...]. (CAC8, 352) [My italics]
In the editorial of the 23rd of November 1944, Camus distinguishes two forms of Socialism 
among the political thoughts, which struggled to express themselves in the immediate 
aftermath o f  the Liberation, and during the war: «un socialisme marxiste de forme 
traditionnelle, représenté par les anciens partis, et un socialisme libéral, mal formulé quoique 
généreux, qui se traduit dans les mouvements et les personnalités issus de la résistance» 
(CAC8,348-9).41
This latter form o f “Libertarian” Socialism appealed to a «tradition collectiviste 
française qui a toujours laissé sa place à la liberté de la personne et qui n ’a rien emprunté au 
matérialisme philosophique» (CAC8, 349). It is precisely the rejection of the strong and 
coherent Philosophy o f History, inscribed in the philosophical materialism o f the Marxist 
version o f the Socialist doctrine, which prevented the «socialisme résistant» (Id.) from 
converging into the ancient organization(s) o f the political tradition.
It is in this sense that I suggest we must understand Camus* appeal to the law of 
honour -42 inseparable from revolt,43 and belonging, together with honesty, generosity and 
courage, to the constellation o f the aisthetic finite thought o f the finite - as summarising an
40 «Il y a une certaine forme de cette doctrine [socialiste] que nous détestons peut-être plus encore que les 
politiques de tyrannie. C’est celle qui se repose dans l’optimisme, qui s’autorise de l’amour de l’humanité pour 
se dispenser de servir les hommes, du progrès inévitable pour esquiver les questions de salaires, et de la paix 
universelle pour éviter les sacrifices nécessaires. Ce socialisme-là est fait surtout du sacrifice des autres. Il n’a 
jamais engagé celui qui le professait. En un mot, ce socialisme a peur de tout et de la révolution » (CAC8, 351).
41 My italics.
42 The law of honour is related to the question of justice and épuration: « [...] il fallait aller jusqu’au bout de 
notre contradiction et accepter résolument de paraître injustes pour servir réellement la justice. [...] Il s’agissait 
de créer la loi dont nous avons besoin, de la form uler en termes clairs et irréprochables. Il s’agissait enfin, pour 
compenser sa rétroactivité, de lui assigner dans le temps une limite précise, passée laquelle elle ne serait plus 
valable. Il était possible alors d’aller vite parce qu’il devenait possible de parler clair. Le Gouvernement ne 
pouvait pas arrêter tous les coupables en quelques semaines. Il pouvait en quelques semaines créer sa loi 
d ’honneur qu’on aurait appliquée pendant six mois ou un an et qui aurait débarrassé la France d’une honte qui 
dure encore» (CAC8,432).
43 In the éditorial of the 29* October 1944, Camus relates honour to revoit, as the “no-saying” force («la capacité 
de dire non») o f the men o f Résistance, which will be providing those same men with the yes-saying strength 
(«fermeté») and positive virtues for political reconstruction (CAC8,296).
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open, limited, political programme, consistent with its open and limited (good-nihilistic) 
“doctrine” :44 45
[La méthode que nous essayons d'appliquer aujourd'hui] ne prétend pas à refaire toute la politique d'un 
pays. Elle veut essayer de provoquer dans la vie politique de ce même pays une expérience très limitée qui 
consisterait, par une simple critique objective, à introduire le langage de la morale dans l ’exercice de la 
politique. Cela revient à dire oui et non en même temps et à le dire avec le même sérieux et la même objectivité. 
(CAC8,239-240) [My italics]
It is significant that, one year later, in Remarque sur la révolte, Camus defined revolt 
precisely as this very same act of «[dire] à la fois oui et non» (E, 1682), namely, with a 
refusal which is not a resignation, but lies in
ce sentiment du révolté que l’autre “exagère", “qu’il n’a pas de raisons pour", enfin “qu’il outrepasse 
son droit”, la frontière, pour finir, fondant le droit. La révolte ne va pas sans le sentiment d’avoir soi-même en 
quelque façon et quelque part raison. [...] [Le révolté] affirme qu’il y a en lui quelque chose qui vaut qu'on y 
prenne garde. (E, 1682) [My italics]
In « Le sang de la liberté » (24th August 44), the « immenses raisons » of the Resistance 
fighters lay precisely in the despairing experience of four years of war, to which men have 
been «mêlés par la chair et par le cœur». The aisthetic dimension o f such experience, 
emphasized by these recurring metaphors, explicitly provides the answer to the nihilistic «À 
quoi bon?», 45 as well as to the Nazi argument in LAA: «La Résistance a aujourd’hui - 
Camus wrote on the 28th o f November 1944 - l’expérience du courage et du sacrifice» 
(CAC8, 359), and as such it is a «force de rénovation qui a conçu l’idée d’une France juste , 
en meme temps qu’elle forgeait une France libre» (CAC8,367).46
The «lutte indicible» for freedom, in the feverish hours that preceded the 25th of 
August, is thus described by Camus as the «terrible enfantement» o f a revolution (CAC8, 
150) » but the metaphor, o f Marxian memory, o f  20th century political realism is exploded:
Le Paris qui se bat ce soir veut commander demain. Non pour le pouvoir, mais pour la justice, non pour 
la politique, mais pour la morale, non pour la domination de leur pays, mais pour sa grandeur » (Id.) [My 
italics]
In the material dénuement o f France and Europe, in the aftermath of the Nazi occupation and 
o f war, Camus traces the conditions for a new, unprecedented, freedom o f  action, which finds
44 To use of the term “political theory’’ with reference to Camus’ reflection would be, as Abbou puts it, «une 
provocation [...]. Camus s’était toujours défié des théories et des systèmes, il aurait, en une matière si grave, 
congédié la question en remarquant qu’il avait récusé d’emblée les deux sources du dérèglement de la pensée 
révolutionnaire : la raison et la logique » (A. Abbou, « Nature et place d'une théorie de la libération de 




the (aîsthetic) premises for a political renovation - what he insistently addresses as 
«révolution par la loi» - 47 in the experience o f the Resistance:
[...] une dernière chance nous était donnée. Nous pensons vraiment qu’elle est la dernière. La ruse, la 
violence, le sacrifice aveugle des hommes, il y a des siècles que ces moyens ont fait leurs preuves. Ces preuves 
sont amères. Il n 'y a plus gu 'une chose à tenter, qui est la voie moyenne et simple d'une honnêteté sans illusions, 
de la sage loyauté et l ’obstination à renforcer seulement la dignité humaine. (CAC8,313) [My italics]
It is significant that, beside his repeated denunciation o f the stupidity and senility o f the 
French Administration in the critical phases o f the war, Camus paid particular attention to the 
cupidity of the economic oligarchies, and qualify the latter in terms of «aveuglement» and 
insufficient imagination (CAC8, 383-4), thus immediately associating it with the anti- 
aisthetic, nihilistic thought o f Hitlerism.
In his editorial o f the 9th o f February 1945, he explicitly pointed out that «la liberation 
n ’était pas la liberté, que le combat contre I 'ennemi nazi se confondait pour nous avec la lutte 
contre les puissances de l ’argent» (CAC8,443).48 It is to this latter problem that, I argue, we 
must relate the moral question. In the editorial o f the 27th o f June 1945, later included in the 
chapter “Morale et politique” o i Actuelles > Camus would insist that
cette époque ne prétend pas donner de leçon de moralité à celle qui Fa précédée. Mais elle a le droit, 
acquis au milieu de terribles convulsions, de rejeter purement et simplement la morale qui l'a  menée à la 
catastrophe. Car ce n’est pas sans doute les idées politiques de M. Herriot et de ses collègues radicaux qui nous 
ont perdus. Mais la morale sans obligation ni sanction qui était la leur, la France des boutiquiers, de bureaux de 
tabac et de banquets législatifs dont ils nous ont gratifiés, a fa it plus pour énerver les âmes et détendre les 
énergies que des perversions plus spectaculaires. Dans tout les cas, ce n’est pas cette morale qui donne à M. 
Herriot le droit de condamner les Français de 1945. Ce peuple est à la recherche d ’une morale, voilà ce qui est 
vrai. Il est encore dans le provisoire. (CAC8, 553-554) [My italics]
Denouncing the political morality o f  the economic «fausses élites», who were responsible, in 
Camus’ view, for the identification o f  the exercise o f politics with the «vertus moyennes» of 
utter mediocrity in the pre-war years (CAC8, 554), the author summarises the «arrachements 
et [..•] douleur» of the war, and of the Nazi occupation, in terms o f  a  «conflit moral étendu à 
une nation entière» (C AC8, 554).49
Camus opposed to the private interests o f the political and economic élites o f the Third 
Republic and the Vichy regime («dont nous avons enregistré la démission») which in the 
aftermath of the Liberation controlled a disquieting revival o f «des politiques obstinément
47 CAC8,386.
48 In another editorial (9th March 1945): «Il y a deux manières d’attenter à la liberté: par la force policière ou par 
la force économique. Cette dernière peut s’exercer soit directement -  d’une manière matérielle -  soit 
indirectement, en orientant la pensée, en l’abêtissant, en l’infléchissant par la presse dans le sens d’intérêts 
particuliers.» (CAC8,453).
49 My italics.
nationalistes» - the programme, promoted by the équipe of Combat, o f a popular democracy 
«dont réconomie serait juste  et le principe politique, libéral» (CAC8,443), organized around 
the collectivisation o f production,50 and the creation of a political and economic federation.51
Camus devoted an editorial (26th of December 1944) to the concept of democracy, in 
the wake o f the declaration of Pope Pio XII,52 in which he rejects the latter’s (moderate) 
understanding o f democracy «au sens large [...][qui] peut comprendre aussi bien la 
république que la monarchie. [Qui] se défie de la masse [...] [et] admet aussi les inégalités de 
la condition sociale, sauf à les tempérer par l’esprit de fraternité » (CAC8, 410). « Il y a une 
modération de Vesprit qui doit aider à l’intelligence des choses sociales, et même au bonheur 
des hommes », which is not conservative (CAC8, 410-11) and is identified with the self- 
discipline of the « revolted » thought, which coincides with the aisthetic parti pris o f men’s 
(tragic) happiness. Camus associates this kind o f moderation with an understanding of the 
political, which has its formulation in the Charter o f the Resistance (CAC8, 450), and would 
be fully expressed, in the author’s view, by an international democracy, opposed to the 
acceptance and promotion o f Imperialistic power politics (CAC8,446).
What emerges in the articles for Combat is the presence o f  two distinct/opposed 
paradigms of the political: one characterised by the notions o f power, dominion and conquest 
-  associated with the term «aveuglement», designating the lack of imagination or abstraction 
which governs its political actors -  and the other, identified with the experience of the 
Resistance, founded on revolt - what we have addressed in terms of ¿rizerie  judgment.
This reading is confirmed by Roger Dadoun’s analysis of an an-archic foundation in 
Camus’ work.53 By tracing in the convergence o f revolt and «bonheur», the foundation of an- 
archê, as the twofold suppression of anteriority and authority - 54 both terms embodying an
50 «Depuis six mois, nous réclamons une économie de guerre et de reconstruction qui marque une rupture avec le 
passé, des socialisations (et d’abord celle du crédit) qui mettent la production au service de la collectivité [...]»> 
(CAC8,443).
51 «Depuis six mois, conscients de la contradiction où s’étrangle un monde pris entre une économie désormais 
internationale et des politiques obstinément nationalistes, nous réclamons une fédération économique mondiale, 
où les matières premières, les débouchés commerciaux et la monnaie seront internationalisés et prépareront ainsi 
la fédération politique qui empêchera les peuples de s’égorger tous les vingt ans » (CAC8,443).
52«La vrai démocratie -  according to Pio XII -, qu’elle soit de forme républicaine aussi bien que de forme 
royaliste, assure aux peuples la liberté à laquelle ils aspirent, alors que dans l’État autoritaire gouverné par des 
mains politiques, personne n’a le droit de vivre honorablement sa vie propre » (CAC8, 408, note 2). Camus 
praises the «termes clairs» and the «langage net» in which the highest spiritual authority of his tirae would 
finally condemn the Nazi-Fascist dictatorships (CAC8, 409) : « Disons-le clairement, nous aurions voulu que le 
Pape prît parti, au cœur même d ces années honteuses, et dénonçât ce qui était à dénoncer. II est dur de penser 
que l’Église a laissé ce soin à d’autres, plus obscurs, qui n’avaient pas son autorité [...]» (CAC8,409-410).
5 Roger Dadoun, “Albert Camus: Fondations d’anarchie”, in Camus e t la  po litique, op. cit., p. 263.
54 Ivi, p. 262,
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order «ou personne n 'est jamais reconnu»,55 namely, the axiti-aisthetic sphere of abstraction 
and dominion, which destroys the pres-ence o f la presence sensible - 56 Camus' emphasis on 
the aisthetic moment in the articles o f Com bat highlights an (unfounded) origin/foundation 
(arche) other o f the political, and an alternative paradigm o f  political action.
I argue that the aisthetic judgment o f  revolt unfoundedly founds the (new) political 
community, as a community «for ex-istence». This thesis is confirmed by the individuation, in 
the articles between 1944-46, o f two recurrent, and clearly marked, terminological 
constellations, employed by Camus when dealing with political problems:
Puissance Générosité
Domination/ conquête) (-^ Impérialismes ) Honnêteté
Aveuglement (-> manque d’imagination) Clairvoyance (•> âmes sensibles = capables
Abstraction (“> Terreur-^ Réalisme) d’imagination)
Dieux lâches Grandeur
Courage/audace
It is significant that Camus assimilated the Resistance «combat» against the Nazi 
occupant with the post-Liberation political struggle to dismantle the monopoly of power of 
the industrial and financial élites, as the expressions o f one identical political paradigm.
This seems to be confirmed by an article, dated 23rd May 1945 -  the last of a series of 
six articles devoted to the Algerian Crisis in the wake o f  the massacres of Sétif and Guelma -  
where Camus denounces the French and European unwillingness to solve the Colonial 
question:
Aujourd’hui, les hommes libres de cette Europe ont la victoire, ils ont arrêté un moment le terrible cours 
de cette décadence. Ils veulent maintenant renverser rHistoire. Et ils le peuvent assurément, s’ils y mettent le 
prix du sacrifice. Mais il ne feront cette révolution que s’ils la font totalement. Ils ne sauveront l’Europe de ses 
démons et de ses dieux lâches que s’ils libèrent tous les hommes qui dépendent de l’Europe.
[...] je demande seulement aux Français qui savent aujourd’hui ce qu’est la haine : « Voulez-vous 
sérieusement être haïs par des millions d’hommes [i.e. the eight million of Arabo-Berberian people living in 
Algeria] comme vous avez haï des milliers d’autres hommes [i.e. the Nazi occupant] ? Si oui, laissez faire les 
choses en Afrique du Nord. Si non, accueillez ces hommes auprès de vous et fait-en vos égaux, par les moyens 
qui conviendront. »
55 Ivi, p. 260.
56 Dadoun associates the an-archic suppression o f anteriority and authority with nihilism: «Lorsqu’on a mis les 
primo-géniteurs à la trappe et le pouvoir supreme à l’égout, d’où probablement il a surgi, on a l’impression qu’il 
ne resterait que le néant, et que cette double fondation (suppression de l ’antériorité et suppression de l’autorité) 
accule l’anarchisme au nihilisme [...]» (in Roger Dadoun, “Albert Camus: Fondations d’anarchie”, art. cit-, p. 
262).
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[.*•] peut-être est-il temps d’envisager l’époque où les gouvernants gouverneront selon la raison, c’est- 
à-dire, aujourd’hui, selon i ’audace et la générosité. (CAC8, 532) [My italics]
Generosity cannot be separated from the (tragic) notion of happiness, and from the aisthetic 
or lucid thought, which emerges in the lyrical essays and in the MdS, In the novel La Peste, 
Camus would explicitly talk o f «l’exigence généreuse du bonheur» (T, 1329), the meaning of 
which, I suggest, can be fully grasped in the light of the openness and plurality which 
constitute the sensory toucher-à - o f the «horizontal transcendency» brought about in the 
tragic bonheur o f the revolted man.
The urge to bring the aisthetic judgement o f revolt at the core, as archê, of the political 
is further highlighted in the editorial o f the 8th of August 1945,57 where Camus comments, in 
terms unparalleled in the French press at that date, on the news of the atomic bomb attack on 
Hiroshima on the 6th of August:58
Nous nous résumerons en une phrase: la civilisation mécanique vient de parvenir à son dernier degré de 
sauvagerie. Il va falloir choisir, dans un avenir plus ou moins proche, entre le suicide collectif ou l’utilisation 
intelligente des conquêtes scientifiques.
En attendant, il est permis de penser qu’il y a quelque indécence à célébrer ainsi une découverte, qui se 
met d’abord au service de la plus formidable rage de destruction dont l’homme ait fait preuve depuis des siècles.
Que dans un monde livré à tous les déchirements de la violence, incapable d'aucun contrôle, indiffèrent 
à la justice et au simple bonheur des hommes, la science se consacre au meurtre organisé, personne sans doute, à 
moins d’idéalisme impénitent, ne songera à s’en étonner. (CAC8,569-570). [My italics]
An-archê thus characterises the scientific, abstract, thought, whose in-difference to bonheur 
and justice is the mark o f a loss/lack of imagination and aisthetic con-tact, which goes 
together with an incapacity for moderation, as discipline or «ascèse», and culminates in 
collective suicide.
I take the reference to the Nazi nihilistic/blind logic toward collective suicide to be 
intentional, hinting at a continuity, confirmed in the 1951-52 writings, between the power 
politics o f Hitlerism and the power politics o f the Western so-called dem ocratic world.
The urge to contain, and finally replace, the imperialist drives o f the free democratic 
states, that were, thus, prolonging «les politiques de tyrannie » (CAC8, 351), by the 
constitution o f a «popular» and «international» democracy -  «une veritable société 
internationale, où les grandes puissances n ’auront pas de droits supérieurs aux petites et aux 
moyennes nations, où la guerre, fléau devenu définitive par le seul effet de Fintelligence
57 Camus will include this editorial in the chapter “Morale et politique” in Actuelles.
58 As Jacqueline Lévi-Valensi points out, among the «formidable concert que la radio, les journaux et les agences 
d’information viennent de déclencher au sujet de la bombe atomique», which consisted essentially of scientific 
articles on the atom and the fabrication of the bomb, even Mauriac’s article “La bombe” in Le Figaro on the 10th 
o f August, insisting on the «angoisse universelle», the «génie de la destruction» and «amour de la mort poussé 
au paroxysme», «est loin d’avoir la vigueur de celui de Camus» (CAC8,569, notes 2 and 3).
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humaine, ne dépendra plus des appétits ou des doctrines de tel ou tel État » (CAC8, 571) -  
seems to rest on the belief that «une politique d’entente européenne qui réduise au maximum 
les rivalités nationales » (CAC8,370) would, and will, reflect the economic interdépendance 
and the solidarity o f  the European countries in the aftermath o f the Liberation.59
Camus retired from Combat between September and November 1945, only returning 
one year later with a series o f eight articles under the heading N i Victimes Ni Bourreaux, 
published between the 19th and the 30th o f  November 1946.60
Earlier that year, the author o f  the short essay <cRemarque sur la révolte» held a 
conference at Columbia University under the title «La Crise de l'homme», which was 
developed a  few months later in the article «Nous autres meurtriers».61
It is in «Nous autres meurtriers» that the reference to the «appetites and doctrines», 
responsible, in the author’s view, for having turned war into a definitive plague (CAC8 571), 
is further elucidated:
Les mots d’espoir sont le courage, la parole claire et l'am itié. Qu’un seul homme puisse envisager 
aujourd’hui une nouvelle guerre sans le tremblement de l'indignation et la guerre devient possible. Qu’un seul 
homme puisse justifier les principes qui conduisent à la guerre et à la terreur et il y aura guerre et terreur. Il faut 
donc bien que nous disions clairement que nous vivons dans la terreur parce que nous vivons selon ta puissance 
et que nous ne sortirons de la terreur que lorsque nous aurons remplacé les valeurs de puissance par les valeurs 
d ’exemple. Il y a terreur parce que les gens croient ou bien que rien n ’ a de sens, ou bien que seule la réussite 
historique en a. Il y a terreur parce que les valeurs humaines ont été remplacées par les valeurs du mépris et de 
l’efficacité, la volonté de liberté par la  volonté de domination. On n’a plus raison parce qu’on a la justice et la 
générosité avec soi. On a raison parce qu’on réussit. Et plus on réussit, plus on a raison. À la limite, c’est la 
justification du meurtre.62 [My italics]
This text confirms and enfiches the two constellations o f the political, analysed earlier on, by 
summarising them in the opposition (of Nietzschean memory) between volonté de domination 
and volonté de liberté. The fact that these two constellations correspond, in Camus’s view, to
59 «Nous ne sommes pas sur la voie de cette société internationale, parce que notre temps est, en effet, celui des 
impérialismes. Il y a [...] un impérialisme américain comme il y a des impérialismes russe et anglais. Nous ne 
poussons pas l ’ingénuité jusqu’à penser que ces impérialismes peuvent être négligés [...]. Le mieux nous paraît 
être de plaider sans relâche pour cette démocratie internationale où personne ne serait lésé et où toutes les 
nations se sentiraient solidaires. C’est en cela que nous pensons servir la paix [...]. Et l’on peut voir que [...] 
cette manière de servir la paix peut être aussi la meilleure façon de servir la France et de lui garder son 
honneur » (CAC8,573-574).
60 In September 1945 he noted in his Carnets: «Nous sommes dans un monde où il fait choisir d’être victime ou 
bourreau -  et rien d’autre. Ce choix n’est pas facile » (CAC8, 607). For the reasons of Camus’ retirement from, 
and later return to, Combat, see Albert Camus-Pascal Pia, Correspondance 1939-1947, Paris, Fayard/Gallimard, 
2000, p. 144; and J. Lévi-Valensi Ed., Camus à Combat, op. cit., pp. 606- 607.
61 The article was published in the review Franchise, in the third number (November-December 1946) devoted 
to “Temps des assassins”, which collected a number of articles by Albert Einstein, Emmanuel Mounier, Aldous 
Huxley, Teilhard de Chardin, Brice Parain, Jean-Paul Sartre and Camus himself. It is significant that the various 
contributions around this theme were presented in the form of a tragedy in five acts, “Nous autres meurtriers” 
figuring in the first Act (in F. Bartfeld, Albert Camus voyageur et conférencier, Archives Albert Camus, n. 7, 
Paris, Lettres Modernes, 1995, p. 46).
62 F. Bartfeld, Albert Camus voyageur et conférencier, op. cit., p. 48.
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the opposition of valeurs de puissance! valeurs d'exemple is all the more significant, in that 
they place themselves, and must be read against the backdrop of the nihilistic belief that «rien 
n’ a de sens, ou bien que seule la réussite historique en a», which he questions under the 
formula o f «crise de l'homme».
Chiaromonte, who, as a refugee from Italy, had met Camus in Algeria in 1941 before 
flying to the United States,63 and who received the writer and friend in New York in 1946, 
provides us with a detailed transcription of the conference paper, published in the review 
Twice a Year under the title o f  «Human Crisis»:64
Siamo nati all’inizio della prima guerra mondiale. Adolescenti, avemmo la crisi del 1929; a vent’anni, 
Hitler. Poi ci furono la guerra d'Etiopia, quella di Spagna, Monaco. Questi furono i fondamenti della nostra 
educazione. Quindi vennero la seconda guerra mondiale, la disfatta, Hitler nelle nostre città e nelle nostre case. 
Nati e formati in tale modo, in che cosa credevamo? In nulla. Nulla, tranne la negazione ostinata in cui ci 
chiudemmo, costretti, fin da principio. I l m ondo in cui eravam o chiam ati a d  esistere era un mondo assurdo, e un 
altro in  cu i potessim o rifug iarci non esisteva: quello della  cultura era un mondo bello, certo, ma non era reale. 
E allora, quando ci trovammo dinanzi al terrore hitleriano, da quali valori potemmo trarre conforto, per opporli a 
quella negazione? Da nessuno. Se il problema fosse stato quello del fallimento di un’ideologia politica, o di un 
sistema di governo, sarebbe stato abbastanza semplice. Ma quel che accadeva veniva dal fondo stesso deH’uomo 
e della società: su questo non c’era da sbagliarsi, ne avevamo conferma ogni giorno, e p iù  ancora nel 
com portam ento dei m ediocri che in quello dei crim inali. A guardare i fatti, gli uomini meritavano quel che stava 
loro capitando: il loro modo di vita valeva veramente troppo poco, e la violenza della negazione hitleriana, in sé 
e per sé, era logica. Ma era insopportabile, e l’abbiamo combattuta.65 [My italics]
The «human crisis» is related to thè question o f nihilism, thè latter being characterised by thè 
historical awareness o f thè absurdity o f thè world, or thè loss of a transcendent Foundation,
63 In the United States Chiaromonte came in contact with Mary McCarthy e Dwight MacDonald: his 
collaboration to Partisan R eview  is significant throughout the Forties and Fifties.
64 The manuscript of the conference is missing. The contents of the intervention can nonetheless be reconstructed 
through Chiaromonte’s notes (in N. Chiaromonte, A lbert Camus, in “Tempo Presente”, gennaio 1960, in N.C., II  
tarlo  della  coscienza, Bologna, Mulino 1992, 217-222). Chiaromonte is among the first to draw the attention to 
the question of nihilism as a pivotal element in the ethical and political reflection of the French author. 
Remembering Albert Camus in an essay, published in “Tempo Presente” in January 1960, Nicola Chiaromonte, 
wrote (see my article S. Novello, “N ichilism o<, totalitarism o e tragedia nel Caligola di A lbert Camus”, in 
P arenklisis. Rassegna annuale d i cultura della  Editrice Clinam en, 2003/1, pp. 87- 103).
65 «We were bom at the beginning o f the First World War. As adolescents we had the crisis of 1929; at twenty, 
Hitler, Then came the Ethiopian War, the Civil war in Spain, and Munich. These were the foundations of our 
education. Next came the Second World War, the defeat, and Hitler in our homes and cities. Bom and bred in 
such a world, what did we believe in? Nothing. Nothing except the obstinate negation in which we were forced 
to close ourselves from the beginning. The world in which we were called to exist was an absurd world, and 
there were no other in which we could take refugef..] when we found ourselves face to face with Hitler’s terror, 
in what values could we take comfort, what values could we oppose to negation? None. If that problem had been 
the bankruptcy of a political ideology or a system of government, it would have been simple enough. But what 
happened came from the very root of man and society...the violence o f the Hitlerian negation was in itself 
logical. But it was unbearable, and we fought it.
[ . . . ]  the poison which impregnated Hitlerism has not been eliminated; it is present in each of us. Whoever 
today speaks of human existence in terms of power, efficiency, and “historical tasks” spreads it. He is an actual 
and potential assassin. For if the problem o f man is reduced to any kind of “historical task”, he is nothing but a 
raw material of history', and one can do anything one pleases with him... We opposed terror because it forces us 
to choose between murdering and being murdered; and it makes communication impossible. This is why wg; i ^  
reject any ideology that claims control over all of human life.» (Ibidem) [ My highlighting] ^
entailing the loss o f (higher) values by means o f which to justify the resistance against the 
power politics and terrorist regime o f Hitlerism.
But in Camus* understanding, the question o f  nihilism and terror (la «crise de 
l’homme») clearly exceeds the problem o f  the break-down o f  traditional moral values, and 
touches more crucially, in terms that anticipate Hannah Arendt’s analysis in the OT (explored 
in Chapter 3),66 upon the «mediocre» conduct, than upon what is, the properly speaking, 
criminal conduct.67 *69
As he writes in the 1946 article «Nous autres meurtriers»:
[...] la terreur et la fatalité sont faites pour moitié au moins de l'inertie et de la fatigue des individus en 
face des principes stupides ou des actions mauvaises dont on continue d’empoisonner le monde. La tentation la 
plus forte de l'homme est celle de l’inertie. [...) il est plus facile de faire son travail quotidien et d’attendre dans 
une paix aveugle que la mort vienne un jour, les gens croient qu’ils ont assez fait pour le bien de l’homme en ne 
tuant personne directement.6* [My italics]
In the 1949 conference «Le Temps des meurtriers», the problem of nihilism brings in 
the problem of judgem ent. When describing the generation between the two World Wars, 
Camus insists that
[cjette génération a donc vécu dans le nihilisme. Bien entendu, cela non plus n’était pas nouveau. 
D 'autres générations, d'autre pays ont vécu à d'autres périodes de l'histoire cette expérience. Mais, ce qu’il y a 
de nouveau, c’est que ces mêmes hommes, étrangers à toutes valeurs, ont eu à régler leur position personnelle 
par rapport au meurtre et à la terreur. [...] Ils n’aimaient ni la guerre ni la violence. Ils ont dû accepter la guerre 
et exercer la violence. Ils n’avaient de haine que pour la haine. Il leur a fallu apprendre cette difficile science. 
Pour se battre, il faut croire à quelque chose. Ces hommes-là, apparemment, ne croyaient à rien. Ils pouvaient 
donc ne pas se battre. Mais si l’on ne se bat pas, on adopte alors les valeurs de l’ennemi, même si ce sont des 
valeurs méprisables, puisqu’on les laisse triompher.
Nous savions instinctivement que nous ne pouvions pas céder aux bêtes qui s’élevaient aux quatre coins de 
l’Europe. Mais nous ne savions pas justifier cette obligation où nous étions. Ceci était la maladie de l'Europe 
qu’on peut encore définir ainsi : il n’ a pas si longtemps, c’étaient les mauvaises actions qui demandaient à être 
justifiées, et aujourd’hui, ce sont les bonnes. Et elles n’étaient pas faciles à justifier, puisque les plus conscients 
d’entre nous apercevaient qu’ils n’avaient encore dans la pensée aucun principe qui pût leur permettre de 
s’opposer à la teneur et de désavouer le meurtre. Car s i on ne croit à rien [ ...]  s i rien n ’a de sens et s i nous ne 
pouvons affirmer aucune valeur, alors tout est permis et rien n 'a d'importance. Alors, il n ’y  a ni bien ni mal, et 
Hitler, par exemple, n 'a ni tort ni raison. [...]
Et lorsque nous pensons que rien n’a de sens, il faut conclure que celui qui a raison, c’est celui qui 
réussit. La seule règle est de se montrer le plus efficace, c ’est-à-dire le plus fort. Le monde n’est plus partagé 
entre les justes et les injustes, mais entre les maîtres et les esclaves 69 [My italics]
66 Camus’ article «The Human Crisis» figures among the bibliographical sources of the OT since the first 
edition. The French writer’s reflection is taken up, and further developed, in the Conference in Sa5 Paulo in 
1949, where he describes the perspective of the Front generation faced to nihilism in terms very close to the ones 
emplyed by Hannah Arendt in the III part on Totalitarianism.
67 In the editorial o f the 27th o f  June 1945 in Combat, Camus explicitly refers to the «élites de la médiocrité»
and to the «vertus moyennes» o f the «morale sans obligation ni sanction» of the bourgeoisie in the French Third 
Republic («la France de boutiquiers, de bureaux de tabac et de banquets législatifs») (CAC8,554).
69 F. Bartfeld, Albert Camus voyageur et conférencier, op. cit., p. 47.
69 Ivi, p. 56-57.
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Now, according to Camus, «la volonté d’efficacité, c’est la volonté de domination», and the 
will to dominion over something or somebody coincides with the desire for its/his sterility, 
silence and death -  that is, with «le mal d'abstraction».70 71
This idea is first formulated by Camus in the Carnets between Septemer 1944 and the early 
months of 1945:
Démonstration. Que / ’abstraction est le m ai Elle fait les guerres, les tortures, la violence, etc. 
Problème : comment la vue abstraite se maintient en face du mal charnel -  l’idéologie face à la torture infligée 
au nom de cette idéologie. (Cil, 133) [My italics]
The conceptual couple torture (terror)/ abstraction is contraposed in the notebooks to the 
couple communication/  complicité, the latter being possible exclusively within the finite 
sphere o f the aisthetic touching-upon:
Communication. Entrave pour l’homme parce qu’il ne peut dépasser le cercle des êtres qu’il connaît. 
Au-delà, il en fait une abstraction. L’homme doit vivre dans le cercle de la chair. (Cil, 135) [My italics]
Camus* diagnosis at the turn of 1944-45 is that «[finalement la politique aboutit aux partis 
qui desservent la communication (complicité)» (Cil, 134), namely, to (traditional) forms of 
power politics, founded on the will to dominion (master-slave/friend-enemy relationship), and 
organised around the systematic use o f violence and murder, which destroy the aisthetic con­
tact («cercle de la chair»): «Le monde -  he wrote in the article «Les Embarras de la violence» 
- n ’est plus pour nous qu’une épure. Et dans les cadres de cette épure, s’ordonnent les 
symboles qui consacrent la domination de l ’homme sur l ’homme. Les tickets remplaçant le 
pain, des vies entières renfermées dans une fiche de police [...]. Et à force de papiers et de 
fonctionnaires, on crée un monde où la chaleur humain disparaît, où aucun homme ne peut en
71toucher un autre, si ce n ’est pas à travers le dédale de ce qu’on appelle les formalités ».
In «Le Temps des meurtriers», Camus relates the nihilistic principle of efficacy to the 
(negative) constellation o f the politics of dominion, as constitutive of, and founding the 
philosophical justification for, the master/slave or «victimes/bourreaux» relationship (see 
diagram).
70 Ivi, p. 59-60.




Son langage: polémique et insulte.
«Le XXe siècle est, chez nous, le siècle de la polémique et de 
l'insulte. Elle tient, entre les nations et les individus la place que 
tenait traditionnellement le dialogue réfléchi. Des milliers de voix, 
jour et nuit, poursuivant chacune de son côté un tum ultueux 
m onologue, déversent sur les peuples un torrent de paroles 
mystificatrices.» ( F. Bartfeld, op. cit., p. 60)
Mécanisme de la polémique:
«consiste à considérer l'adversaire en ennem i, à le simplifier par 
conséquent et à refuser de le voir. Celui que j'insulte, je  ne connais 
p a s îa  couleur d e  son regard. Grâce à la polémique, nous ne vivons 




A) le maître/le bourreau
«il y a des hommes qu'on ne persuade pas. Il était et il est 
impossible à une victime des camps de concentration d'expliquer à 
ceux qui l ’aw ilissent qu’ils ne doivent pas le faire. C 'est que ces 
derniers ne représentent plus des hom m es, m ais une idée portée à  la  
tem pérature de la  p lu s inflexible volonté. Celui qui veut dominer 
est sourd. En face de lui, il faut se battre ou mourir. C’est 
pourquoi les homme d’aujourd’hui vivent dans la terreur.»
B) I'esclave/Ia victime:
« Quoi d’étonnant à ce que ces silhouettes désormais sourdes et 
aveugles, terrorisées, nourries de tickets, et dont la vie entière se 
résume dans une fiche de police, puissent être ensuite traitées 
comme des abstractions anonymes. Il est intéressant de constater 
que les régimes qui sont issus des idéologies dont je parle sont 
précisément ceux qui, par système, procèdent au déracinement 
des populations, les promenant à la surface de l’Europe, comme 
des symboles exsangues qui ne prennent une vie dérisoire que 
dans les chiffres des statistiques. Depuis que ces belles 
philosophies sont entrées dans l’histoire, d’énormes masses 
d’hommes, dont chacun pourtant avait autrefois une manière de 
serrer la  main, son t définitivem ent ensevelis sous les deux initiales 
des personnes déplacées qu’un monde très logique a inventées pour 
elles.»
The «régimes qui sont issus des idéologies» o f (historical) efficacy, to which Camus 
refers in his 1949 conference, as realizing a systematic politics o f  déracinement - o f what 
Hannah Arendt analysed around the same years in terms o f rootlessness or statelessness, or 
the mass production o f refugees — are Nazism on the one hand, and the Communist regime 
as the murderous mise en œuvre o f  Historicism on the other.72 3
In Camus’ argument, Materialist Historicism only apparently overcomes the nihilistic 
reasoning «rien n ’d de sens», introducing - «toujoitrs en rejetant les principes d'explication 
supérieurs», and by fully assuming the «longue aventure de l'esprit moderne» which started 
with Nietzsche’s announce of God’s death (Le., o f modem nihilism) -  the value o f History:74
Mais, pensant cela, ils arrivaient au même résultat que s’ils avaient pensé que rien n’avait de sens. Car 
si l’Histoire a un sens c’est un sens total ou ce n’est rien. Ces hommes pensaient et agissaient comme si 
l’Historie obéissait à une d ia lectique so u vera in e  et comme si nous nous dirigions tous ensemble vers un but 
définitif. Ils pensaient et agissaient suivant le principe de Hegel : « L’homme est fait pour l’Histoire et non 
l’Histoire pour l’homme ». En vérité, tout réalisme politique et moral qui guidait et guide encore les destinées du 
monde obéit, souvent sans le savoir, et avec 100 ans de retard, à une philosophie de l’Histoire née en Allemagne, 
selon laquelle l’humanité entière se dirige selon des voies rationnelles vers un Univers définitif. On a remplacé le 
nihilisme par un rationalisme sans nuances et dans les deux cas, les résultats son les mêmes.75 [My italics]
Thus, the «logique souveraine» o f  20th century Historicist ideology does not escape, but 
instead coincides with, the bad logic o f  incomplete nihilism, identified in the LAA with 
Hitlerism.
What emerges in Camus’ political writings as early as ’46-’49, is the rejection o f the 
bio-political reduction o f  human life to «naked life», symbolized by the figure of the refugee, 
as sheer abstraction (the «vie dérisoire» resumed in the «chiffres des statistiques»), as the
72 LAA, 222.
73 The link between politics of dominion, nihilism and Historical efficacy reflects the intellectual debate in 
France at the time. As Tony Judt points out, since the early Thirties in France «Kojeve’s reading of Hegel placed 
an overwhelming emphasis upon the master-slave relationship, in which each comes to know himself a situation 
only to be overcome by action, by a struggle for truth (that is, self-recognition),which necessarily entailed the 
destruction o f the authority and claims o f the oppressor. This was not an option for the slave (or the master [...] 
-  “History”, and more particularly the violence that Kojeve claimed was its very essence, would bring the slave 
face to face with his situated condition. The practical lesson of such a heady doctrine amounted to this: whatever 
happened in human history, and especially those events that seem most terrible and total, has the ineluctable 
result of furthering the unfolding of the master-slave dialectic that is the meaning o f that history. [...] there was 
no basis in Kojfeve’s teaching for the rejection o f any historical act or epoch, however prim a fa c ie  meaningless 
and obscene. Like Carl Schmitt, he opened up the possibility for rendering anything respectable, even Nazism, 
whose very success might be construed as the verdict o f history» (Tony Judt, P ast Im perfect, University of 
California Press, pp. 76-77).
74 F. Bartfeld, op. cit., p. 59.
75 Ivi, p. 58.
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Æproduct of an incapacity for (aisthetic) thought and judgement,76 7which he traces at the root o f 
both ideologies (Material Historicism and Hitlerism):
On ne pense pas mal parce qu’on est un meurtrier, mais on est vn  m eurtrier parce q u ’on pense m al J 1 
[My italics]
It is here, I argue, that we measure the continuity between the 1944-49 political 
writings and the absurd thought developed in the MdS. In the article «Vers le dialogue», 
which concludes on the 30th o f November 1946 the series o f N i Victories N i Bourreaux, Camus 
would explicitly refer to the aisthetic finite thought of the finite as the only viable alternative 
to the Historicist «logique souveraine»: «Ce qui nous broie aujourd’hui, c’est une logique 
historique que nous avons créée de toutes pièces et dont le nœuds finiront par nous étouffer. 
Et ce n’est pas le sentiment qui peut trancher les nœuds d’une logique qui déraisonne, mais 
seulement une raison qui raisonne dans les limites qu'elle se connaît » (CAC8, 640).
He notes in the Carnets by the end of 1946:
Relation de l’absurde à la révolte. Si la décision finale est de rejeter le suicide pour soutenir la 
confrontation, c’est reconnaître implicitement la vie comme seule valeur de fait, celle qui permet la 
confrontation, qui est la confrontation, « celle sans quoi rien ». D’où il ressort que pour obéir à cette valeur 
absolue, qui rejette le suicide rejette également le meurtre. Notre époque est celle qui, ayant poussé le nihilisme a 
ces conclusions extrêmes, a accepté le suicide. Cela se vérifie dans la facilité avec laquelle elle accepte le 
meurtre, ou que le meurtre soit justifié.
[...] les hommes de la terreur ont poussé les valeurs du suicide jusqu’à leur conséquence extrême qui est 
le meurtre légitime, c ’est-à-dire, le suicide collectif. Illustration : l’apocalypse nazie en 1945. (CH, 190-191)
It is in the light o f these texts that, I suggest, we interpret Camus* opposition, in two notes in 
the Carnets also dated October 1946, between «actions messianique», associated to the terms 
abstraction/terror/history, and what he calls the «actions réfléchies» (CII, 220). And it is the 
light o f Camus’ rejection o f the category o f historicity that the aisthetic moment o f the 
sensory/sensual touching-upon nature, in beauty, and touching-upon other individual beings, 
in love, acquires its full (/m-)political meaning,78 as constitutive o f Camus’ notion o f 
reflection.
76We should not forget that to  live, in Camus’s terminology, is to ju d g e , and that «life» is assured exclusively 
in/as sensory con-tact in the sense o f the aisthetic thought in MdS - «Il n’y a pas de vie sans dialogue [...]. II n’y 
a pas de vie non plus sans persuasion» (in F. Bartfeld, A lbert Camus voyageur e t conférencier, op. cit., p. 60).
77 In F. Bartfeld, op. cit, p. 53.
78 « Id  L’historicité laisse sans explication le phénomène de la beauté, c’est-à-dire les rapports avec le monde 
(sentiment de la nature) et les êtres en tant qu’individus (amour). [...]» (Cil, 174). «Jd Tout l’effort de la pensée 
allemande a été de substituer à la notion de nature humaine celle de situation humaine et donc d’histoire à Dieu 
et la tragédie moderne à l’équilibre ancien. L’existentialisme moderne pousse cet effort encore plus loin et 
introduit dans l’idée de situation (a même incertitude que dans celle de nature. Il ne reste plus rien qu’un 
mouvement. Mais comme les Grecs je crois à la nature. » (Id.).
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ILife is identified precisely with that confrontation  or con-tact, which is nothing but 
the aisthetic or absurd  thought aware of its limits (E, 134), and «l’avenir du monde [ne] peut 
se passer de nos forces d'indignation et d'amour» (CAC8, 640). He anticipated with 
extraordinary clearsightedness in «Vers le dialogue»:
Une grande expérience met en marche aujourd’hui toutes les nations du monde selon les lois de la 
puissance et de la domination. Je ne dirai pas qu’il faut empêcher ni laisser se poursuivre cette expérience. Elle 
n’a pas besoin que nous l’aidions et, pour le moment, elle se moque que nous la contrarions. L'expérience se 
poursuivra donc. Je poserai simplement cette question : qu’arrivera-t-il si l’expérience échoue, si la logique de 
l’histoire se dément sur laquelle tant d’esprits se reposent pourtant ? Qu’arrivera-t-il si, malgré deux ou trois 
guerres, malgré le sacrifice de plusieurs générations et de quelques valeurs, nos petits-fils, en supposant qu’ils 
existent, ne se retrouvent pas plus rapprochés de la société universelle ? Il arrivera que les survivants de cette 
expérience n’auront même plus la force d’être les témoins de leur propre agonie. Puisque donc l’expérience se 
poursuit et qu’il est inévitable qu’elle se poursuive encore, il n’est pas mauvais que des hommes se donnent pour 
tâche de préserver, au long de l’histoire apocalyptique qui nous attend, la réflexion modeste qui, sans prétendre 
tout résoudre, sera toujours prête à un moment quelconque, pour fixer un sens à la vie de tous les jours. 
L’essentiel est que ces hommes pèsent bien, et une fois pour toutes, le prix qu’il leur faudra payer. (CAC8, 642- 
643) [My italics]
As he notes in his Carnets (April 1948), the «pensée réfléchie» is precisely the opposite o f  a 
messianic thought (Cil, 244), the latter justifying «un monde où le meurtre est légitimé et où 
la vie humaine est considérée comme fu tile» (CAC8, 612): «la peur  — he writes in Combat on 
the 19th o f November 1946 -  n’est pas le climat de la ju ste  réflexion», fear belonging to the 
political constellation o f dominion/abstraction/messianism/terror.
It is in the legitimization o f  terror, founded on the idea o f  the futility o f life, that 
Camus would trace the primary political problem of the 20th century world politics (Ibid.), as 
the mark of a generalized will to abstraction and loss o f imagination, the 
acceptance/justification o f  violence and murder, as constitutive o f the political realm, being 
especially diffused among those people who
n ’avaient pas d ’imagination pour la mort des autres. C ’est un travers de notre siècle. De même qu’on 
s’y aime par téléphone et qu’on travaille non plus sur la matière mais sur la machine, on y tue et on y est tué 
aujourd’hui par procuration. La propreté y gagne, mais la connaissance y  perd. (CAC8,614).79 [My italics]
The inter-textual reading o f Camus’ writings between 1943 and 1946 seems to confirm our 
thesis that «reflection», in the author’s understanding, is only possible under the conditions of, 
and may therefore be traced back to, that aisthetic awareness or pensée lucide, which emerges 
in the MdS and runs through the political articles in Combat. /
If, as Camus wrote in the introduction to HR in terms that echoed the 1949 i
Conference, the «sentiment de Vabsurde, quand on prétend d ’abord en tirer une règle i
79 In a note in the Carnets in November 1945, Camus would Write: «Je ne suis pas fait pour la politique puisque 
je suis incapable de vouloir ou d’accepter la mort de l’adversaire» (CII, 154).
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d’action, rend le meurtre au moins indifférent et, par conséquent, possible» (HR, 415), it is in 
the «volonté de l’absurde» (E, 1667), I would argue in the light o f the letter to Ponge, namely, 
in the aisthetic or tragic thought of the revolted man, that we may search for a principle o f ju st 
action beyond the moral and political impasse o f nihilism - a principle which provides the 
conditions for a «pensée juste»  (CAC8,616), and which breaks the «victime/bourreaux» logic 
of the politics of dominion.
As he wrote in the 1949 Conference in Saô Paolo: «la révolte peut encore nous donner 
[...] une règle d*action qui diminue la douleur des hommes au lieu de l’accroître» :80
Dans ce monde privé de valeurs, dans ce désert du cœur où nous avions vécu, que signifiait en effet 
cette révolte ? Elle faisait de nous des hommes qui disaient Non. Mais nous étions en même temps des hommes 
qui disaient Oui Nous disions non à ce monde, à son absurdité essentielle, aux abstractions qui nous menaçaient, 
à la civilisation de mort qu'on nous préparait En disant non, nous affirmions que les choses avaient assez duré, 
qu’il y  avait une limite qu'on ne pouvait dépasser. [...]
Mais ce quelque chose [que nous affirmions] avait-il une valeur générale, dépassait-il l’opinion d’un 
individu, pouvait-il servir de règle de conduite ? La réponse a déjà été donné. Les hommes dont je parle 
acceptaient de mourir dans le mouvement de leur révolte. Et cette mort prouvait qu ’il se sacrifiaient au bénéfice 
d ’une vérité qui dépassait leur existence personnelle [...].,! Ce que nos révoltés défendaient contre un destin 
ennemi, c'était une valeur commune à tous. Quand les hommes étaient torturés avec application, quand des 
mères se voyaient obligées de condamner leurs enfants à mort, quand les justes étaient enterrés comme des 
pourceaux, ces révoltés jugeaient que quelque chose en eux était nié qui ne leur appartenait pas seulement, mais 
qui était un lieu commun où les hommes ont une solidarité toute prête. [My italics]
Now, the «value common to all» is created by the act of revolt in the sense, I argue, 
that it is brought forth in/as the «common space», which founds men’s solidarity and 
fraternity, in the liminal, aisthetic, «le cercle de la chair», which is inherently plural.
The impossibility for the victim to persuade his/her torturer/executioner not to commit 
the murderous act lies precisely, in Camus’s argument, in the fact that the latter has lost the 
aisthetic awareness (lucidity), which is primarily related to the withdrawal from sensory con- 
tact ( «On ne veut plus savoir qu’il a un rire éclatant.», Cil, 232), ideology working toward 
the abstraction o f men: «Chaque fois que l’on a décidé de considérer un homme comme 
ennemi, on le rend abstrait. On Y éloigne» (Id.).
This would explain why, in the Carnets in September 1949, Camus would 
(provocatively) plead in favour of man-to-man murder, as against the «destruction anonyme 
et froide, et abstraite» in contemporary societies (from the execution o f death sentences, in
*° F. Bartfeid, op. cit., p. 64.
11 The reference to the sacrifice o f revolted men, also recurring in the articles of Combat, is taken over in a note 
in the Carnets in 1948 (CII, 244), which provides the link to Camus’s reflection on tragedy. A note for the the 
tragedy Les Justes in the notebooks in 1947: «Piece Kaliayev: Impossible de tuer un home en chair, on tue 
1’autocrate. Pas le type qui s’est rasé le matin etc. etc.» (CII, 207).
82 F. Bartfeid, op. cit., pp. 64-65.
83 «la longue fratemité des hommes en lutte contre leur destín» (F. Bartfeid, op. cit., p. 67).
I l l
both the democratic and non-democratic world, to systematic state terror) as «une étape sur le 
chemin de la révolte» (CH, 275).
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2.2. The Functionary and the Rebel: Politics and Aesthetic Judgement.
It is significant that, in 1945, Camus chose the figure of the functionary to illustrate 
the «revolted» (révolté) man: «Un fonctionnaire qui a réçu des orders toute sa vie juge  
soudain inacceptable un nouveau commandement. Il se dresse et dit non.» (H, 1682).1
In the same year o f the Remarque sur la révolte, where the figure of the revolted 
functionary makes its first appearance, the Nuremberg trials seemed to offer its historical 
confutation. In the article «German Guilt»,2 34also published in 1945, Arendt posed the problem 
o f  «how to conduct ourselves and how to bear the trial of confronting a people among whom 
the boundaries dividing criminals from normal persons, the guilty from the innocent, has been 
so completely effaced that nobody will be able to tell in Germany whether in any case he is 
dealing with a secret hero or with a former mass murderer» (EU, 125).
It is precisely in discussing the inadequacy of traditional legal categories (Le., “war 
criminal”) to judge the modem political organization, staged under Himmler’s direction as a 
«vast machine o f administrative mass murder» in which «everyone is either an executioner, a 
victim, or an automaton, marching onward over the corpses o f his comrades» (EU, 126), that 
she comes to focus on «this new  type o f functionary» supplied and exploited by the 
unprecedented terror organization.
Not a fanatic, sadist or murderer, but a jobholder and a family man (EU, 129), this 
type o f  man, a purely modem product, «has driven the dichotomy o f private and public 
functions, of family and occupation, so far that he can no longer fin d  in his own person any 
connection between the two»'.
When his occupation forces him to murder people he does not regard himself as a murderer because he 
has not done it out o f inclination but in his professional capacity. Out o f sheer passion he would never do harm 
to a fly.
If we tell a member of this new occupational class which our time has produced that he is being held to 
account for what he did, he will fee l nothing except that he has been betrayed. But i f  in the shock o f the 
catastrophe he really becomes conscious that in fact he was not only a junctionary but also a murderer, then his 
way out w ill not be that o f rebellion, but suicide -  just as so many have already chosen the way of suicide in 
Germany, where it is plain that there has been one wave o f self-destruction after another. (EU, 130) /[M y  
italics]
1 My italics.
2 Republished in Essays in Understanding as «Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility» (EU, 121- 132).
3 In the report of his journey to Germany, published in Combat Magazine (30* o f  June- I** of July 1945) under 
the heading «Images de l’Allemagne occupée», Camus also used this image, used in 1946 for his famous series 
o f articles N i Victimes Ni Bourreaux: «[...] j ’y voyais l’image des déchirements de cette malheureuse Europe, 
partagée entre ses victimes et ses bourreaux [...]» (CAC8,560),
4 Arendt was further concerned with these «waves o f self-destruction» in another article in June 1945, «The Seeds 
of a Fascist International», which echoes Camus’s editorial of the 29* o f September 1944 (CAC8,2 16) about the 
«theatrical', suicidal urge» o f Nazism (EU, 145). According to Arendt the German «self-staged ruin [...] can be
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What the Nuremberg trials brought forth in this new figure o f the functionary, was the 
separation o f responsibility from guilt as the key-problem o f 20th century politics.5
The dissociation between co-responsibility in the crimes o f  Nazism and effective guilt 
in a stricter sense (EU, 126), which emerged in the post-war trials, is resumed by Camus in a 
short note in 1947: crime, in the author's view, can be personally imputed only in as far as its 
dimension of violation is acknowledged, «[a]utrement elle [la violence] est par ordre, elle est 
dans l ’ordre -  ou la loi ou la métaphysique. Elle n’est plus rupture. Elle elude la 
contradiction. Elle représente paradoxalement un saut dans le confort. On a rendu la violence 
confortable» (Cil, 214).6
A political order, in which crime is legalised, thus, loosing its character o f dis-order, as 
well as its imputability to trial, is precisely «[l’ordre] où personne n ’est jam ais reconnu» ,7 
that is, one that instaures the abstracting, God-like perspective, through the systematic 
dissolution o f aisthetic con-tact,8 which is precisely, in Camus' view, the mark o f the Nazi 
nihilistic «loss o f lucidity».
The starting point being the feeling  o f  the absurd, «[s]i l’on ne croit à rien, si rien n’a 
de sens et si nous ne pouvons affirmer aucune valeur, tout est possible et rien n’a 
d ’importance» - the po in t zero o f human action {absolute nihilism).
Three years later, in The Aftermath o f  Nazi Rule: Report from  Germany, Hannah 
Arendt traced in analogous terms a generalized «nihilistic relativity about facts» - assumed in 
1950 Germany (and Europe) to be «the essence o f democracy» (EU, 252) - and a «general 
lack o f emotion», as well as to a widespread «[ijndifference and the irritation that comes when
only partially explained by the long-pilloried nihilistic tendencies o f  Nazism»: anticipating her later argument, 
namely her thesis of a process of de-materialization o f power instaured by the totalitarian regime(s), Arendt 
would see in the complete destruction o f Germany, thouroughly and systematically brought about by the Nazis 
up to the last dramatic phases o f the war, the calculated effort to turn the outcome of the war «into a merely 
temporary defeat of the movement», by offering up Germany «as a sacrifice to the future of fascism» (EU, 145). 
«However correct it may be to regard the purely destructive tendency o f fascism  as one of the most active forces 
of the movement, it would be dangerously misleading to interpret these destructive impulses as culminating in a 
theatrical, suicidal urge directed against the movement as such. The Nazis may have planned to destroy Germany 
completely, they may have calculated on impoverishing the whole European continent by ruining German 
industry, they may hope to leave the Allies the burden and responsibility of governing ungovernable chaos, but 
certainly theur never wished to liquidate the fascist movement.» (Ibidem). [My italics]
5 «The number of those who are responsible and guilty will be relatively small. There are many who share 
responsibility without any visible proof o f guilt There are many more who have become guilty without being in 
the least responsible» (EU, 125).
6 My italics.
7 Roger Dadoun, an. cit., p. 260.
* He noted in the Carnets in 1947: «Paris-Alger. L’avion comme un des éléments de la négation et de 
l’abstraction modernes. Il n’y a plus de nature ; la gorge profonde, le vrai relief, le torrent infranchissable, tout 
disparaît. 11 reste une épure — un plan, IS homme prend en somme le regard de Dieu. Et il s ’aperçoit alors que 
Dieu ne peut avoir qu’une vue abstraite. Ce n’est pas une bonne affaire.» (Cil, 232). See also Cil, 206.
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indifference is challenged» (EU, 249), back to the legacy o f the Nazi regime, identifying in 
this «escape from  reality an escape from  responsibility» (EU, 250), the mark o f  a 
<pervasive public stupidity which cannot be trusted to judge correctly the most elementary 
events» (EU, 253).9
As she points out in At Table with Hitler, her review o f Henry Picker’s 1951 book 
Hitlers Tischgespräche, capacity for judgement coincides with «the fact that one not only has 
an opinion but also embraces that opinion»: nihilistic relativity is therefore the mark of an a- 
or anti-political irresponsibility, in the sense o f a withdrawal from the living community o f  
those who act and speak, and a refusal to judge.10
Now, Arendt relates stupidity, as the incapacity to judge, on the one side, to the 
incapability of thinking.11 12As she argued more than twenty years later, in her essay on 
Personal Responsibility under Dictatorship:
the only ones who d a red  judge by them selves, [...] were capable of doing so no t because they d isposed  
o f  a  better system o f  values or because the o ld  standards o f  right and  w rong w ere s till firm ly  p la n ted  in th eir  
m in d  and  conscience. On the contrary, all our experiences tell us that it was precisely the members o f 
respectable society [...] who were the first to yield. They simply exchanged one system of values against 
another. I therefore would suggest that the nonparticipants were those whose consciences did not function in this, 
as it were, autom atic way [...], they asked them selves to  w hat extent they w ould s till be able to  live  in  peace w ith  
them selves after having com m itted  certain deeds; and they decided that it would be better to do nothing [...] they 
refused to murder, not so much because they still held fast to the command “Thou shalt not kill”, but because 
they were unwilling to live together with a murderer -  themselves. The precondition  fo r  this kin d  o fju d g in g  is  
no t a highly developed in telligence or sophistication in  m oral matters, b u t rather the disposition to  live together 
exp lic itly  with oneself, to have intercourse w ith oneself, tha t is, to be engaged  in  th a t silen t dialogue betw een m e  
and  m y se lf w hich since Socra tes and Plato, w e usually ca ll thinking. T his kin d  o f  thinking  [ . . . ] «  no t technical 
an d  does not concern theoretical problem s. The divid ing line betw een those w ho w ant to think an d  therefore  
have to  judge by them selves, a n d  those w ho do no t, strikes across all social and cultural or educational 
differences. In this respect, the to ta l m oral collapse o f  respectable society  during the Hitler regime may teach us 
that under such circumstances those who cherish values and hold fast to moral norms and standards are not 
reliable: we now know that moral norms and standards can be changed overnight, and that all that then will be 
left is the mere habit of holding fast to something. M uch m ore reliab le w ill be th e  doubters an d  sceptics, not 
because scepticism  is good or doubting wholesome, bu t because they are used to  exam ine things a n d  to  m ake up  
th e ir own m inds.n  [My italics]
Thinking, as the silent dialogue between me and myself, «which is given in consciousness, 
[and] produces conscience as a by-product», 13 is connected to the activity of judging in the 
sense, pointed out by M. Passerin d’Entreves, in that it «dissolves the fixed habits o f  thought
9 My italics.
10 EU, 293.
11 See M. Passerin d’Entreves, “Arendt’s theory o f judgement”, in The C am bridge Companion to  H annah  
A rend t, CUP, 2000, pp. 248-249 (quoted as CCA).
12 H. Arendt, Responsibility a n d  Judgem ent, op. cit., pp. 44-45.
13 M. Passerin d’Entreves, “Arendt’s theory o f judgement”, op. cit., p. 249.
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and the accepted rules o f conduct, and thus prepares the way for the activity o f judging 
particulars without the aid of pre-established universels» - 14 as critical thought.
Quiescence in the sheer possession  o f  admitted norms and rules, as opposed to the 
thourough examination o f their content by the critical «wind o f  thought», is, in Arendt’s view, 
the source o f the banality o f evil under Hitler’s regime.15 In the editorial in Combat (17th 
September 1944), Camus described in analogous terms the irresponsible and comfortable 
«paix de I ’esprit» o f  (a part of) the German people, which consisted o f «à laisser à d’autres le 
soin de penser pour lui. Ce peuple n ’aime pas la liberté, puisqu’il hait la critique» (CAC8, 
195-196).
It is in the relationship between freedom and critical thought that, I suggest, we fully 
grasp the meaning o f  Camus’s « libertarian » political project. As he noted in his Carnets in 
July 1945:
Révolte. Finalement je choisis la liberté. Car même si la justice n’est pas réalisée, la liberté préserve le 
pouvoir de protestation contre l'injustice et sauve la communication. La justice dans un monde silencieux, la 
justice des muets détruit la complicité, nie la révolte et restitue le consentement, mais cette fois sous la forme la 
plus basse. C’est ici qu’on voit la primauté que reçoit peu à peu la valeur de liberté.
[...] La liberté c ’est pouvoir défendre ce que je ne pense pas, même dans un régime ou un monde que 
j ’approuve. C ’est p o u vo ir donner raison à  l'a d versa ire . (CII, 136-137) [My italics]
Freedom, which is defined by Camus as the capability to give reason, that is, to accept the 
point of view o f the opponent, implies critical thinking in the sense of a capacity for seeing 
the other’s point o f view .16
We should not forget that it is precisely by virtue o f such capacity for critical thinking 
that Camus was compelled to admit the irrefutability of the nihilistic argument of the Nazis in 
the LAA. In his notebooks in 1944, he explicitly used the adjective « totalitarian » to 
designate the systematic application o f the nihilistic tabula rasa  realised under the Nazi 
regime (CII, 127). As irrefutable as it may be, the logic o f  the nihilistic argument is 
unacceptable: under the conditions o f the Nazi regime, the act o f giving reason to the political 
opponent (the Nazi) coincided with the legitimation o f murder, with the acceptance (“yes- 
saving”) o f  the m urder o f innocent people and the destruction of the human living 
community. For this reason, the «totalitarian attitude» is characterised, in the 1944 notes, as a 
total negation o f freedom .
14 Ivi, p. 248.
15 Fabio Ciaramelli, « Le mal totalitaire et la phénoménologie de la condition humaine », in L 'hum aine condition  
politique. H annah A ren d t, sous la direction de Étienne Tassin, L’Harmattan, Paris, 2001, p. 181.
16 Two-sided thinking can be read together with Camus* insistence on «dédoublem ent» as the mark o f the critical 
or lucid thinker (Cl, 41 ).
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Now, the problem o f freedom, which in Camus’ 1945 note is inseparable from revolt, 
touches upon the question o f irresponsibility from the viewpoint of aisihetic thought, in the 
sense that it draws the attention to the «paix aveugle» of those who, if they chose not to 
commit the criminal acts in the first place, were nevertheless blind and deaf to the suffering o f 
tortured men, 17 choosing to withdraw from, and not to participate in, an order of legalized 
murder.
Arendt’s 1965-66 text Some Questions o f Moral Philosophy is, in this respect, 
elucidatory. When examining the problem of irresponsibility, she observ ed that
[...] the very few, who in the moral collapse of nazi Germany remained completely intact and free of all 
guilt [...] never doubted that crimes remained crimes even if legalized by the government, and that it was better 
not to participate in these crimes under any circumstances. In other words, they did not feet an obligation but 
acted according to something which was self-evident to them even though it was no longer self-evident to those 
around them. Hence their conscience, if that is what it was, had no obligatory character, it said, “This I can t do**, 
rather than, “This I ought not to do”.
The positive side of this “I can’t” is that it corresponds to the self-evidence of the moral proposition: it means: I 
can’t murder innocent people just as I can’t say, “two and two equal five”. You can always counter the “thou 
shalt” or the “you ought” by talking back: I  will not or cannot for whatever reasons. Morally the only reliable 
people when the chips are down are those who say ‘7 can V". The disadvantage of this complete adequacy of the 
alleged self-evidence or moral truth is that it must remain entirely negative. It has nothing whatsoever to do with 
action, it says no more than “I’d rather suffer than do”. Politically speaking -  that is, from the viewpoint o f the 
community or o f the world we live in -  it is irresponsible; its standard is the self and not the world, neither its 
improvement nor change. (RJ, 78-79) [My highlighting]
Critical thought, as the nay saying capacity for autonomous examination and exercise of 
doubt, is, in itself, purely negative - in this sense, I would say, «nihilistic». If we may argue, 
with Passerin d’Entrèves, that (critical) thinking prepares the way for the activity of 
judgement, 18 the former is nevertheless insufficient to step into action, for revolt to take 
place.
What provides, in both Camus and Arendt, a way out of the nihilistic impasse of in­
action «when the chips are down» is the capacity for imagination, as the most «concrete» 
faculty o f human thought, which is immediately linked to sensory experience as opposed to 
the abstracting and simplifying powers, and to the stringent logicality of the “totalitarian 
attitude”.
For both these authors, what failed in Hitler’s listeners, and allowed them to fall prey 
to the “philosophy” o f Hitlerism, was a general lack of practical imagination (EU, 295),
17 In « Nous autres meurtriers » Camus referred to «les gens [qui] croient qu’ils ont assez fait pour le bien de 
l’homme en ne tuant personne directement. Mais, en vérité, aucun homme ne peut mourir en paix s’il n’a pas fait 
tout ce qu’il faut pour que les autres vivent [...]. Et d’autres encore, qui n'ont pas envie de penser trop 
longtemps à la misère humaine, préfèrent parler d’une façon très générale et dire que cette crise de l’homme est 
de tous les temps.» (F. Bartfeld, op. cit, p. 47).
'* M. Passerin d’Entrèves, op. cit., pp. 248-249.
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which, according to Arendt, is inseparable from modem men’s inability to judge (EU, 292), 
and is the precondition to the totalitarian overturning o f  thinking into sheer giving/executing 
orders (EU, 294).
In her view, in the midst o f  the m odem  nihilistic feeling o f helpless nonsense, faced 
with the chaos o f discordant but equally sustainable opinions, Hitler «had discovered one fine 
day that if  you really hang onto any one o f  the current opinions and develop it with (as he was 
fond of saying) “ ice-cold” consistency, then everything would somehow fall back into place 
again. Hitler’s real superiority consisted in the fact that under any and all circumstances he 
had an opinion and that this opinion always fit perfectly into his over-all “philosophy”» (EU, 
293), with «a total disregard fo r  a ll reality and all experience» (EU, 294).
By contrast, in Camus’ Remarque, the revolted functionary «juge soudain 
inacceptable un nouveau commandement» under the impulse o f  a «répulsion à l’égard de 
l’intrus [...] [et] une adhésion entière et instantanée de l’homme à une certaine part de 
Vexpérience humaine» (E, 1682-3):
[...] la révolte amène seulement à dire qu’on ne voit pas qui, en dehors de l'être humain, est digne 
d’amour -  et de cet amour supérieur qui naît d ’une condition partagée. On n’élit pas dans un cas un idéal 
abstrait par pauvreté de cœur, dans une idée de revendication stérile, mais on choisit, au contraire, la part la plus 
concrète de l ’expérience pour la défendre contre ce qui l'opprime.» (E, 1686). [My italics]
The «yes-saying» dimension in the rebel’s judgement is rooted in the aisthetic 
awareness of «la part la plus concrète» o f  human experience, as opposed to the abstract ideal 
o f mankind, which Camus associates to the expression «pauvreté de cœur», as the incapacity 
for a sensory touching-upon (aisthesis). Revolt calls upon the capacity for imagination, 
already recurring in the 1944-45 editorials as the pre-condition for reflection.
Throughout the political articles o f  Combat, imagination is the condition for thinking a 
shared condition («condition partagée»), against the abstracting drives of modem nihilistic 
reasoning, at work in the Nazi power politics and under the Vichy regime, and still operating 
in the post-war restoration of traditional political practices.
Now, in her four lectures on Some Questions o f Moral Philosophy in 1965-66, Hannah 
Arendt draws on Kant’s Critique o f Judgement to deal with the moral and political issues 
raised by totalitarian horrors -  and, in particular, she draws on Kant’s analysis o f aesthetic 
judgem ents, as the only field in which «we judge without having general rules which are 
either demonstrably true or self-evident to go by» (RJ, 138).
The capability for judgement in the absence o f universal norms and standards -  as 
opposed to the stupidity or lack o f judgment, which both Camus and Arendt relate to
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contemporary «logical crimes» - is revisited against the backdrop o f the 20th century’s «total 
collapse o f moral and religious standards» (RJ, 138), or of what we have addressed as modern 
nihilism. It is related to so-called immoralism,19 and to imagination ,  as the the conditio sine 
qua non of common sense - 20 in Kant’s tinderstanding this is not «a sense common to all o f 
us, but strictly that sense which fits  us into a community with others, makes us members o f it 
and enables us to communicate things given by our five private senses» (RJ, 139).
Common sense, by virtue o f its imaginative capacity, can have present in itse lf all those who actually 
are absent. It can think, as Kant says, in the place o f everybody else, so that when somebody makes the 
judgment, this is beautiful, he does not mean merely to say this pleases me (as if, for instance, chicken soup may 
please me but may not be pleasant to others), but he claims assent from others because in judging he has already 
taken them into account and hence hopes that his jugments will carry a certain general, though perhaps not 
universal, validity. The validity will reach as far as the community o f which my common sense makes me 
member Kant calls this an “enlarged mentality”, meaning that without such an agreement man is not fit for 
civilized intercourse. (RJ, 140) [My italics]
I suggest that, in Camus’s 1945 Remarque, what revolt, in its affirmative moment,21 
brings about is an aesthetic judgement in the Kantian sense:
[...] l’affirmation de la révolte s’étend à quelque chose qui transcende l’individu,22qui le tire de sa 
solitude supposée, et qui fonde une valeur. On se bornera, pour le moment, à identifier cette valeur avec ce qui, 
en l’homme, demeure irréductible. [...] S’il [l’individu révolté] préfère la chance de la mort à la négation de 
cette part de l’homme qu’il défend, c’est qu’il estime cette dernière plus générale que lui-même. La part que le 
révolté défend, il a le sentiment qu’elle lui est commune avec tous les hommes. C’est de là qu’elle tire sa 
soudaine transcendance. C’est pour toutes les existences en même temps que le fonctionnaire se dresse lorsqu’il 
juge que, par tel ordre, quelque chose en lui est nié qui ne lut appartient pas seulement, mais qui est un lieu 
commun où tous les hommes, même celui qui Vinsulte et l'opprime, ont une solidarité toute prête. (E, 1683-4) 
[My italics]
As «in Kant’s words, “[e]goism can be opposed only by plurality, which is a frame o f 
mind in which the self, instead of being enwrapped in itself as if  it were the whole world, 
regards itself as citizen o f the world”» (RJ, 142-3), the value defended in/by revolt cannot be 
identified, in Camus’ view, with the individual in itself, but «[il] fa u t tous les hommes pour la 
composer» (E, 1685).
19 According to Arendt, «[,..] the few who managed not to be sucked into the whirlwind were by no means the 
“moralists”, people who had always upheld rules of right conduct, but on the contrary very often those who had 
been convinced, even before the debacle, of the objective non-validity o f these standards per se» (RJ, 138-139).
20 In her 1965-66 series o f lectures, Arendt defines imagination («or representation -  there is a difference 
between the two which I can neglect here», RJ, 139) as «my ability to have an image in my mind of something 
that is not present» (Idem).
21 «(...] le fonctionnaire révolté dit a la fois oui et non» (E, 1682).
22 «Il s’agit bien entendu, dans toute cette remarque, d’une transcendance qu’on pourrait appeler horizontale, par 
opposition à la transcendance verticale qui est celle de Dieu ou des Essences platoniciennes » (E, 1683, note *).




As in Arendt’s understanding o f the Kantian «enlarged mentality», according to which 
«my judgment of a particular instance does not merely depend upon my perception but upon 
my representing to myself something which I do not perceive» (RJ, 140), such that «my 
judgment is no longer subjective either, in the sense that I arrive at my conclusions by taking 
only myself into account» (RJ, 141), Camus’ revolt does not arise «seulement et forcément 
chez l’opprimé, mais [...] elle peut naître aussi au spectacle de l’oppression. Il y  a dans ce cas 
identification à l ’autre individu. E n e  s ’agit pas d'identification psychologique, subterfuge par 
lequel l’individu sentirait en imagination que c ’est à lui que l’offense se dresse (car il arrive 
au contraire qu’on ne supporte pas de voir infligées à d’autres des offenses que nous-mêmes 
avons subies sans révolte). E  y  a seulem ent identification de destinées et prise de parti » (E, 
1684-5).24 256
If we identify the « psychological subterfuge » with what Arendt calls “empathy”, as 
distinguished from the « enlarged mentality » in the proper sense, I argue that Camus’ notion 
o f revolt may be defined as a particular kind o f  judgement, rooted in the imagination and in a 
common sense, which bears the characters o f  the Kantian aesthetic judgment, namely, 
desinterestedness and exemplary validity.
It is significant that, in enouncing as early as 1943-44 the conciliability of the 
pessimistic metaphysics, entailed by the absurd  or tragic philosophy of the MdS, with a 
«pensée politique soucieuse de perfectionnement humain et plaçant son optimisme dans le 
relatif» (E, 1423), Camus declared in Combat
[...] notre foi [...] qu’aucune tâche humaine n’est impossible à l’homme. II nous faut seulement et 
précisément des hommes. Des hommes, c'est-à-dire des cœurs avertis à la fois de l’audace et de la prudence, des 
âm es sensibles et des volontés ferm es, des esprits capables en même temps de désintéressem ent et d’engagement. 
(CAC8,276)
As he would write that same year, «[I]a justice sociale demande quelques vérités de bon sens 
et ces choses simples que sont la clairvoyance, Vènérgie et le désintéressement» (CAC8,
*)fk351), which, according to the author, is inseparable from a certain «esprit de sacrifice» 
(Id.).
24 My italics.
25 Camus writes in the 1945 R em arque’. «[...] le mouvement de révolte n’est pas dans son essence un 
mouvement d’égoisme. [...] on se révolte aussi contre soi-même et ce mouvement où l’homme se dresse contre 
l’homme lui-même [...] montre au moins le caractère profondément désintéressé de toute révolte. » (E, 1684).
26 As he wrote to Bonnel in 1943: «l’absurde a plus de rapports qu’on ne croit avec le bon sens» (E, 1423).
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The conciliability o f the absurd thought of the MdS with a certain kind o f political 
thought, which goes beyond the nihilistic tabula rasa of the universally valid norms o f moral 
conduct lies precisely on the fact that
[...] il y  a des jugements de valeur inévitables. Même par-delà le bien et le mal, il y  a des actes qui 
paraissent bons ou mauvais et surtout il y  a des spectacles qui nous paraissent beaux ou laids. On ne préfère pas 
Stendhal à Georges Ohnet seulement en vertu de quelques recettes artistiques, mais aussi parce que le problème 
de la beauté en général se pose à leur propos. L’absurde, apparemment, pousse à vivre sans jugements de valeur 
et vivre, c ’est toujours, de façon plus ou moins élémentaire, juger. (E, 1423) [My italics]
In the absence o f  an absolute and transcendent table o f moral values, Camus suggests 
that some kind o f moral judgements, in the sense of the capacity o f  discerning good deeds 
from evil ones, or right from wrong conduct, is not only possible, but is also inevitable as the 
aesthetic judgements, or the capacity o f discerning the beautiful from the ugly. Aesthetic and 
moral judgments, thus, share the same origin, one that is independent from the religious and 
metaphysical beliefs in a transcendent and universal set of absolute truths and values.
This association o f moral and aesthetic judgements is all the more significant if  we 
consider that, when focusing on the question o f judgement («the true arbiter between right 
and wrong, beautiful and ugly, true and untrue», RJ, 137) in her Some Questions o f  Moral 
Philosophy, Hannah Arendt observes that «curiously enough, Kant himself [...] approached 
this problem [i.e., how we tell right from wrong] with the question, how do we tell beautiful 
from  ugly?»21 (RJ, 137).
What we can draw from the comparative analysis o f Camus’ and Arendt’s writings is 
that both authors seem to come to the conclusion that «[i]f we consider morality in more than 
its negative aspect -  the refraining from doing wrong, which may mean the refraining from 
doing anything» (RJ, 142), which is the viewpoint o f critical thought, disclosing the nihilistic 
temptation to inaction and irresponsibility, «then we shall have to consider human conduct in 
terms which Kant thought appropriate only for aesthetic conduct, so to speak. And the reason 
why he discovered moral significance in this seemingly so different sphere o f human life was 
that only here did he consider men in the plural, as living in a community. It is therefore in 
this context that we meet the impartial arbiter o f  the will as liberum arbitrium. ‘‘Disinterested 
appreciation”, as you know, is Kant’s definition o f what we feel in the face of beauty» (Id.).
This would explain why, in the nihilistic tabula rasa o f moral values, both Camus and 
Arendt could appeal to an ultimately unjustifiable sense o f  justice  upon which to found 
unfoundedly action. As Camus wrote in LAA: 27
27 My italics.
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Et à la vérité, moi qui croyais penser comme vous [the Nazis], je ne voyais guère d’argument à vous 
opposer, sinon un goût violent de la justice qui, pour finir, me paraissait aussi peu raisonné que la plus soudaine 
des passions. (LAA, 240) 28 2930[My italics]
The inexplicable and sudden « taste for justice », which arose in the face of terror without the 
need for any moral, in other words, absolute and transcendent law, should, thus, be traced, in 
both Camus and Arendt, to the category o f  aesthetic or, in Kant’s terminology, reflective 
judgement. As M. Passerin d’Entrèves points out, paraphrasing Arendt’s lectures:
in Kant’s Critique o f  Judgment [...] we find a conception of judgment as the ability to deal with 
particulars in their particularity, that is, without subsuming them under a  pre-given universal, but actively 
searching the universal out o f the particular. Kant formulated this distinction as that between determinant and 
reflective judgments. For him judgment in general is the faculty of thinking the particular as contained under the 
universal. If the universal (the rule, principle, law) is given, then the judgment which subsumes the particular 
under it is determinant If, however, only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it, then the 
judgment is reflective. For Kant determinant judgments were cognitive, while reflective judgments were non- 
cognitive. Reflective judgm ent is seen as the capacity to ascend from  the particular to the universal without the 
mediation o f  determinate concepts given in advance; it is reasoning about particulars in their relation to the 
universal rather than reasoning about universal in their relation to the particular. In the case o f aesthetic 
judgment this means that I  can understand and apply the universal predicate o f beauty only through 
experiencing a particular object that exemplifies it. Thus, upon encountering a flower, a unique landscape, or a 
particular painting, I am able to say that it is an example o f beauty, that it possesses “exemplary validity .
In her 1971 lecture on Thinking and M oral Considerations, Arendt identifies the 
ability to tell right from wrong, beautiful from ugly, as the faculty of judging particulars 
which operates in the absence o f those «general rules which can be taught and learned until 
they grow into habits that can be replaced by other habits and rules» (RJ, 189). This faculty is 
the manifestation, in the world o f appearances, o f «the wind o f thought» (RJ, 189), as 
opposed to the sudden and automatic (ithoughtless) exchange o f one set o f habits and norms 
for another, detected at the roots o f the banal infinite evil o f the Nazi functionary (RJ, 188).31
28As Camus noted in his Carnets in 1948: « Pourquoi refuser la délation, la police, etc..., si nous ne sommes ni 
chrétiens ni marxistes. Nous n’ayons pas de valeurs pour ça. Jusqu’à ce que nous ayons retrouvé un fondement à 
ces valeurs, nous sommes condamnés à choisir le bien (quand nous le choisissons) de façon injustifiable [...]» 
(Cil, 266-267). In very similar ternis, Hannah Arendt would recall, almost twenty years later, in her essay 
«Personal Responsibility Under Dictatorship», following the much controversial publication of Eichmann in 
Jerusalem, the climat of her generation, faced with the break down of traditional moral categories: «We had to 
learn everything from scratch, in the raw, as it were -  that is, without the help of categories and general rules 
under which to subsume our experiences. [...] Thus, here we are, demanding and meting out punishment in 
accordance with our sense o f  justice, while, on the other hand, this same sense o f justice informs us that all our 
previous notions about punishment and its justifications have failed us» (RJ, 25-26).
29 Arendt writes in Some Questions o f Moral Philosophy: «Kant himself analyzed primarily aesthetic judgments, 
because it seemed to him that only in this field do we judge without having general rules which are either 
demonstrably true or self-evident to go by. If therefore I shall now use his results for the field of morality, I 
assume that the fie ld  o f human intercourse and conduct and the phenomena we confront in it are somehow o f the 
same nature.» (RJ, 138).
30 M. Passerin d’Entrèves, op. cit., pp. 250-251.
31 «The purging element in thinking, Socrates’ midwifery, that brings out the implications o f unexamined 
opinions and thereby destroys them -  values, doctrines, theories and even convictions -  is political by
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Now, in her analysis of judgement, Arendt draws our attention to two aspects: firstly, 
that a distinction must be made between thinking and judging, namely, that whilst the former 
deals with «invisibles, with representations of things that are absent», the latter «always 
concerns particulars and things close at hand» (RJ, 189); secondly, and in relation to this first 
condition, if matters o f  right and wrong are not decided like table matters, that is, by 
appealing to some universal standard, «there is indeed something to which common sense, 
when it rises to the level o f  judging, can and does hold us to, and this is the example. [...] We 
cannot hold on to anything general, but to some particular that has become an example» (RJ, 
143) -  «We judge and tell right from wrong by having present in our mind some incident and 
some person, absent in time or space, that have become examples» (RJ, 145).
We can draw a parallel between Arendt’s pages on thinking and judgment and Camus* 
reflection, from the MdS to the 1945 Remarque, and recognize in the «raisormement 
absurde», identified with the negative/destructive process (pars destruens), which dismantles 
the unquestioned metaphysical and moral principles and norms, the liberating activity o f  
thinking, which does not create values (RJ, 188), thus remaining, under normal conditions, a 
solitary affair, which is marginal in social and political matters.
This reading is confirmed by Arendt’s later analysis o f nihilism as related to the 
activity of thinking. In Thinking and M oral Considerations, she points out that:
[w]hat w e com m only ca ll nihilism — and  are tem pted to date historically, decry politically, and ascribe 
to  thinkers who allegedly dared  to  think udangerous thoughts” -  is actually a danger inherent in the thinking  
activity itself. There are no dangerous thoughts; thinking itself is dangerous, but nihilism is not its product 
Nihilism is but the other side of conventionalism; its creed consists of negations o f the current so-called  positive  
values to  which it rem ains bound. All critical examinations must go through a stage of at least hypothetically 
negating accepted opinions and “values" by finding out their implications and tacit assumptions, and in this 
sense nihilism may be seen as an everpresent danger o f thinking. But this danger does not arise out of the 
Socratic conviction that an unexarained life is not worth living but, on the contrary, out of the desire to find 
results which would make further thinking unnecessary. Thinking is equally dangerous to alt creeds and, by 
itself, does not bring forth any new creed. (RJ, 177-178) [My italics]
Thinking is not dangerous per se, it does not harbour a nihilistic, i.e.y destructive, drive 
within itse lf.32 instead Arendt uses the term “nihilism” here to designate the turning against 
itse lf o f thinking, which aims at extinguishing the thinking activity once and for all. In this 
acceptation, nihilism is associated with an extreme form o f conventionalism, which is the
implication. For this destruction has a liberating effect on another human faculty, the faculty of judgment, which 
one may call, with some justification, the most political o f man’s mental abilities. [...] judging, the by-product o f  
the liberating effect of thinking, realizes thinking, makes it manifest in the world of appearances [...J. The 
m anifestation  of the wind of thought [...] is the ability to tel! wright from wrong, beautiful from ugly. And this 
indeed may prevent catastrophes, at least for myself, in the rare moments when the chips are down» (RJ, 188- 
189).
53 This is the thesis exposed by Fabio Ciamarelli in « Le mal totalitaire », in L 'hum aine condition politique. 
H annah Arendt, Paris, L’Harmattan, 2001, p. 181.
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negation o f  thought. The echoes o f the Nietzschean notion o f incomplete nihilism, stemming 
from an anti-metaphysical and anti-foundational tabula rasa, which, inconsistently with the 
conditions o f  thinking itself, culminates in the restatement (in a reversed form) o f  the 
metaphysical idols it pretended to destroy, are apparent. We should not forget that both 
Arendt and Camus argued that, in taking up the burden o f nihilism against traditional 
metaphysics,33 Nietzsche himself failed to remain consistent to the exercise o f the methodical 
doubt that he propounded, which they assume as the mark o f thinking.
Consequently, the «adhesion forcenée qui couronne l’œuvre de Nietzsche» in the 
theory o f the will to power, and the positive affirmation o f  its new values,34 35falls back into an 
incomplete nihilism. The danger inherent in this inconsistent form o f nihilism is that «[s]uch 
negative results o f thinking will then be used as sleepily, with the same unthinking routine, as 
the old values; the moment they are applied to the realm o f human affairs, it is as though they
«% e
had never gone through the thinking process» (RJ, 177), thus playing an important part 
under the conditions o f  totalitarian domination.
Before dwelling upon the relationship between nihilism and totalitarianism, I would 
like to focus on Arendt*s and Camus’ appropriation of Nietzsche’s thought with reference to 
his philosophy of the will to power, and to the question o f thinking and judgement, in that 
they offer some important insights to elucidate their political reflection.
In the 1965-66 Some Questions o f M oral Philosophy, Arendt draws the attention to 
two unconnected and contradictory (RJ, 131) descriptions o f  the will, which in traditional and 
modem discussions o f  the problem were left in confusion, but which Nietzsche carefully 
distinguishes: namely, the commanding function o f the will and the will as arbiter (RJ, 136).
In the first acceptation, the will to power is understood in the light of the element of 
command, or, in a more traditional way, in the light o f the structures of dominion: «[...] in 
Nietzschean terms: “The will wants to be master of him self’ and learns that if  the mind 
commands itsself and not merely the body (where it is obeyed instantly, as Augustin told us), 
this means that ƒ make a slave o f m yself -  that I  drag, as it were, the master-slave 
relationship, whose essence is the denial o f freedom, into the intercourse and the relationship
33«[...] la destruction appliqué de tout ce qui masque encore le nihilisme á lui-méme, des idoles qui camouflent 
la mort de Dieu» (HR, 477).
34 «The quest for meaning, which relentlessly dissolves and examines anew all accepted doctrines and rules, can 
at every moment turn against itself, as it were, produce a reversal of the old values, and declare these as “new 
values”. This, to an extent, is what Nietzsche did when he reversed Platonism, forgetting that a reversed Plato is 
still Plato, or what Marx did when he turned Hegel upside down, producing a strictly Hegelian system o f history 
in the process.» (RJ, 177). See also HR, 486.
35 My italics.
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which Ï  establish between me and myself. Hence, the famous harborer o f freedom turns out to 
be the destroyer of all freedom.» (RJ, 133).36
In contrast, there is the Nietzschean explanation of the powerfulness of the willing act 
itself in terms o f surplus or overflow (“abundance”) of strength, «identified by Nietzsche with 
the creative impulse; it is the root o f all productivity. If this is true (and I think all data o f  
experience speak in favour o f this interpretation) we could explain why the will is seen as the 
source o f spontaneity that prompts into action -  whereas the understanding of the will as 
disclosing the ultimate impotence of man through its dialectical nature could only lead to a 
complete paralysis of all forces unless one relies on divine help as is done in all strictly 
Christian ethics» (RJ, 135).
The emphasis on this «extravagant generosity or “lavish will” that prompts men in 
wanting and loving to do good (Will to Power, no. 749)» (RJ, 135) brings forth, in Arendt’s 
view, a distinction between the cause of acting (for Nietzsche, the surplus of strength) and 
«the cause of acting in such or such a way, in this particular direction, with this or that aim in 
mind», which Nietzsche underestimated as «insignificant» compared to the superabundant 
force (Id.).
Now, it is among these under-estimated «secondary causes» that Arendt traces «the 
morally decisive question o f whether the will to do turns in the direction o f doing right or 
doing wrong» (Id.),37 38and it is from an anti-metaphysical perspective, which does away with 
the question of the (ultimate) cause of action -  be that the God o f  the tradition, or a 
divinised superabundant force - that she draws on Kant’s Critique o f  Judgement in order to 
answer this question.
In a similar way, in his 1950 essay Nietzsche et le nihilisme, later included in HR, 
Camus resumes Nietzsche’s thought in the notion of creation: «La transmutation des valeurs 
consiste seulement à remplacer la valeur du juge par celle du créateur; le respect et la 
passion de ce qui est. La divinité sans l ’immortalité définit la liberté du créateur » (HR, 483).
36 My italics.
37 My italics.
38 «Within the tradition, you find the whole question of free will usually discussed under the title of liberum  
arbitrium , free arbitration, so that in the discussion o f moral issues the emphasis has shifted entirely from  the 
cause o f action as such to the question o f what goals to seek and which decisions to make. In other words, the 
commanding function o f the will (which raised such difficulties in P aul’s and Augustine’s minds) disappeared 
into the background, and its judging function (that it could clearly and freely distinguish between right and 
wrong) came to the foreground [...] With Christianity [...] that which commands, appeared more and more 
exclusively as a voice from outside, be it the voice of God speaking directly to man or the voice o f the 
ecclesiastical authority And the question was more and more only whether or not man possessed an organ 
within himself that could distinguish between conflicting voices. This organ, according to the meaning o f  the 
Latin word liberum arbitrium, was characterised by the same disinterestedness which we demand for the judging 
function in legal proceedings [...]». (RJ, 136) [My italics]
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BBUUUll 1
The notion o f  creation is related to the methodical application of the tabula rasa of 
transcendent foundation (HR, 475), which constitutes nihilism in its original movement as 
metaphysical revolt.
Cette impasse où Nietzsche pousse méthodiquement son nihilisme, on peut dire qu’il s’y rue avec une 
sorte de joie affreuse. Son but avoué est de rendre à l’homme de son temps la situation intenable. Le seul espoir 
semble être pour lui de parvenir à l’extrémité de la contradiction. Si l’homme alors ne veut pas périr dans les 
nœuds qui l’étouffent, il lui faudra les trancher d’un coup, et créer ses propres valeurs. La mort de Dieu 
n’achève rien [...] « Quand on ne trouve pas la grandeur en Dieu, dit Nietzsche, on ne la trouve nulle part ; il 
faut la nier ou la créer. » La nier était la tâche du monde qui l’entourait et qu’il voyait courir au suicide. La créer 
fut la tâche surhumaine pour laquelle il voulut mourir. Il savait en effet que la création n ’est possible qu’à 
l'extrémité de la solitude et que l’homme ne se résoudrait à ce vertigineux effort que si. dans la plus extrême 
misère de l ’esprit, il lu i fa lla it consentir ce geste ou mourir, Nietzsche lui crie donc que la terre est sa seule 
vérité, à laquelle il faut être fidèle, sur laquelle il faut vivre et faire son salut. Mais il lui enseigne en même temps 
que vivre sur une terre sans loi est impossible parce que vivre suppose précisément une loi. (HR, 481)
It is significant that Camus would use here the terminology o f the 1944^5 editorials 
o f Combat and in particular, the emphasis on the relation between revolt as creation of 
values, and the possibility o f  greatness (grandeur) in the absence o f  a transcendent foundation 
o f moral values.
The replacement o f  the «valeurs du ju g e» by the values o f creation entails a shift from 
a perspective still centred, in Arendt’s terminology, on the ultimate cause of the will as 
command (God being the supreme Judge and authority) to a finite, anti-metaphysical, 
perspective centred on man’s personal effort to give a certain direction or form  to his life -  the
will as arbiter.
For Camus, to live in the anti-metaphysical horizon o f a finite thought of the finite, 
which does away with a transcendent law outside and above man («faithful to the earth»), still 
entails a law. Now, to live, according to the author, is to judge , and judging is inseparable 
from the solitary intercourse of me and myself, which is thinking, and takes place within the 
limits of a gooif-nihilistic aisthetic reasoning.
What I suggest is that the internal law, which operates in the absence o f transcendent 
moral norms and rules o f conduct, lies in the lucid man’s capacity for aesthetic judgment, that 
brings about a form o f  intra-worldly ascèse. 39
39 As he writes in the 1944 “Sur une philosophie de l ’expression” de Brice Parain: «Au lieu de tirer de 
l’incertitude du monde ou du langage toutes les libertés, une démence calculée, l’inspiration automatique, on 
s’efforce à la discipline intérieure. Du desespoir on ne tire plus l’anarchie, mais la domination de soi. [...] d’une 
philosophie du mensonge et de la non-signification, au moins apparente, du monde, on ne tire plus l’apologie de 
l’instinct, mais un parti pris d’intelligence. Il s’agit seulement d’une intelligence raisonnable revenue au concret 
et soucieuse d ’honnêteté. C’est un nouveau classicisme [...]» (E, 1681).(My italics). We can trace a parallel 
between Camus’s aisthetic thought «revenue au concret» and the Arendtian appeal to a thought which «always 
concerns particulars and things close at hand» (RJ, 189), that is, to judgment.
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It is in the light o f these remarks that I suggest we interpret Camus* proposal to replace 
the «valeurs d ’efficacité», or «valeurs de puissance» o f traditional politics, with the 
(aesthetic) «valeurs d ’example».40
2.3. THE ARTIST VIS-À-VIS OF NIHILISM: THE AESTHETICIZATIONOF THE POLITICAL.
It is significant that Camus introduced the value o f example together with the figure o f 
Socrates, as related to, and entailed by, what he calls the «value o f ignorance», namely, an 
aporetic thought aware that «la vie comporte une part d’ombre et une part de lumière, que 
Vhomme ne pouvait pas prétendre tout régler [...] qu’il a  des choses qu’on ne sait pas et que 
si l'on pretend tout savoir, alors on fin it par tout tuer».41
The idea that «[cjelui qui ne peut tout savoir, ne peut tout tuer» is further developed in 
HR as the immediate consequence o f a finite thought, which is consistent with the original 
movement of revolt as “yes-and-no. Now, in the 1949 Conference he wrote:
L’Europe ne guérira pas si nous ne refusons pas aux philosophies politiques le droit de tout régler. Il ne 
s’agit pas, en effet, de donner à ce monde un catéchisme politique et moral. Le grand malheur de notre temps est 
que justement la politique prétend nous mounir, en même temps, d’un catéchisme, d’une philosophie complète, 
et même quelquefois d’un art d’aimer. Or, le rôle de la politique est de faire le ménage et non pas de régler nos 
problèmes intérieurs. J’ignore, pour moi, s’il existe un absolu. Mais je sais qu’il n’est pas de l’ordre politique.
[...] Aucun homme au monde, aujourd'hui ni demain, ne peut jamais décider que sa vérité est assez 
bonne pour pouvoir l ’imposer aux autres. Car la conscience commune des hommes peut seule assumer cette 
ambition. Et il fait retrouver les valeurs dont vit cette conscience commune. Cela signifie que nous avons tous a 
créer en dehors des partis, par-dessus les frontières, et qui affirmeront par leur vies et leurs discours que ce 
monde doit cesser d’être celui des policiers, des soldats et de l’argent pour devenir celui de l’homme et de la 
femme, du travail fécond et du loisir réfléchi.42[ My italics]
AIready in the article «Le siècle de la peur» (19th November 1946), Camus would 
wam that «[n]ous étouffons parmi les gens qui croient avoir absolument raison, que ce soit 
dans leur machines ou dans leurs idées. Et pour tous ceux qui ne peuvent vivre que dans le 
dialogue et dans l’amitié des hommes, ce silence est la fin du monde » (CAC8, 611). The 
correspondence with Arendt’s Thoughts About Lessing, written thirteen years later, and 
included in the collection Men in Dark Times — probably the closest o f Arendt’s writings to 
the argument o f the tragic thought, beautifully developed by Camus in his discourse for the 
Nobel Prize in 1957 - is striking and elucidating in this respect.
40F. Bartfeld, op. cit., p. 70.
41 Ibidem. My italics.
42 F. Bartfeld, op. cit., p. 68-69.
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As Arendt points out in 1959, in the post-metaphysical horizon disclosed by 
modernity, «[n]owadays [...] it is rare to meet people who believe they possess the truth; 
instead, we are constantly confronted by those who are sure that they are right» (MDT, 28).43
The notion o f  rightness arises in, and belongs to, the scientific discourse, as opposed to 
the notion o f  truth, traditionally related to the metaphysical, religious and philosophical, 
discourse, which it succeded in replacing in 20th century thought.44 Now,
[i)n spite of the difference between the notions of possessing the truth and being right, these two points 
of view have one thing in common: those who take one or the other are generally not prepared to sacrifice their 
view to humanity or friendship in case a conflict should arise. (MDT, 28) (My italics).
In terms that echo Camus’ reflection, Arendt emphasizes a relation between what she 
detected in Lessing’s thought as «the theme o f “limited gods ”, o f the limitations o f human 
understanding, limitations which speculative reason can point out and thereby transcend», and 
friendship as making political demands, and having political importance in preserving the 
reference to the world and, therefore, to humanity (MDT, 24-25).45
Lessing, in her view, «was content to belong to the race o f “lim ited gods”, as he 
occasionally called m en; and he thought that human society was in no way harmed by those
43 My italics.
44 « The simple fact is that even men who are utterly incapable of judging the specifically scientific aspects of an 
argument are as fascinated by scientific rightness as men of the eighteenth century were by the question o f truth» 
(MDT, 28). As Arendt points out, «the “pillars o f the best-known truths’* [...], which at the time were shaken, 
today lie shattered; we need neither criticism nor wise men to shake them any more. We need only look around 
to see that we are standing in the midst o f a veritable rubble heap of such pillars. Now, in a certain sense, this 
could be an advantage, promoting a new kind o f thinking that needs no pillars and props, no standards and 
traditions to move freely without cnztches over unfamiliar terrain. But with the world as it is, it is difficult to 
enjoy this advantage. For long ago it became apparent that the pillars o f the truths have also been the pillars of 
the political order, and that die world (in contrast to the people who inhabit it and move freely about it) needs 
such pillars in order to guarantee continuity and permanence, without which it cannot offer mortal men the 
relatively secure, relatively imperishable home that they need.» (MDT, 10-11). As Arendt points out in Truth 
and Politics, «[t]he modes of thought and communication that deal with truth, if seen from the political 
perspective, are necessarily domineering, they don’t take into account other people’s opinions, and taking these 
into account is the hallmark o f all strictly political thinking» (TP, 556). My italics.
45 According to Arendt, «humanity is exemplified not in fraternity but in friendship » (MDT, 25): it is in «dark 
times» that humanity manifests itself in the form o f a brotherly attachment to other human beings (fraternity), 
especially among persecuted peoples and enslaved groups. The relationship between fraternity and pariahdom is 
generally accompanied «by so radical a loss of the world, so fearful atrophy o f all the organs with which we 
respond to it -  starting with the common sense with which we orient ourselves in a world common to ourselves 
and others and going on to the sense of beauty, or taste, with which we love the world -  that in extreme cases, in 
which pariahdom has persisted for centuries, we can speak of real worldlessness» (MDT, 13). It is significant 
that, in Arendt’s view, fraternity «has its natural place among the repressed and persecuted, the exploited and 
humiliated, whom the eighteenth century called the unfortunate, les malheureux, and the nineteenth century the 
wretched, les misérables» (MDT, 14), among whom it coincided with a moving so closely together «that the 
interspace which we have called the world (and which of course existed between them before the persecution, 
keeping them at a distance from one another) has simply disappeared. This produces a warmth o f human 
relationship which may strike those who have had some experience with such groups as an almost physical 
phenomenon» (MDT, 13) (My italics). This passage echoes Camus’ pages on the Russian «meurtriers délicats» 
in HR.
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“who take more trouble to make clouds than to scatter them”, while it incurred in "much 
harm from  those who wish to subject all men 's ways o f thinking to the yoke o f  their own 
This has very little to do with tolerance in the ordinary sense [...], but it has a great deal to do 
with the gift o f friendship, with openness to the world [...]» (MDT, 26).46
Here, Arendt refers to that independent thinking for oneself (Selbstdenken), which in 
Lessing’s understanding calls primarily for courage (MDT, 8) as the mark of a limited and 
modest mentality that «can never give rise to a  definite world view which, once adopted, is 
immune to further experiences in the world because its has hitched itself firmly to one 
possible perspective» (Id.). She relates the capacity for independent thinking to an openness 
to (self)-contradiction, which entails openness to the world:
The ferm enta  cognitionis which Lessing scattered into the world were not intended to communicate 
conclusions, but to stimulate others to independent thought, and this for no other purpose than to bring about a 
discourse between thinkers. Lessing's thought is not the (Platonic) silent dialogue between me and myself, but 
an an ticipa ted  dialogue w ith others (MDT, 10) [My italics]
The relationship between a modest thought aware o f  its limits and «humanity» calls 
upon the moral and political implications of thinking in times of crisis, the «dark times» when 
the chips are down. In «Karl Jaspers: a laudatio», humanity in the Roman acceptation o f  
humanitas, as well as in Kant’s and Jaspers’ understanding o f  Humanität, coincides with «the 
valid personality which, once acquired, never leaves man, even though all other gifts o f the 
body and mind may succumb to the destructiveness of time» (MDT, 73), which is never 
acquired in solitude, but is inseparable from the existence o f  a public space of appearance for 
a m an’s acts and deeds.
Thus, in Arendt’s view, if the purely subjective dimension o f the creative process - 
which goes into a work (artistic or intellectual) realizing it - does not concern the public, it is 
the «living act and voice», which accompanies such work, that allows the person to appear 
together with it (MDT, 73):
The personal element is beyond the control of the subject and is therefore the precise opposite of mere 
subjectivity. But it is that very subjectivity that is “objectively” much easier to grasp and much more readily at 
the disposal of the subject. (By self-control, for example, we mean simply that we are able to lay hold of this 
purely subjective element in ourselves in order to use it as we like.) (MDT, 73) [My italics]
This passage offers some important insights into the political implications o f Camus’s 
notion o f example as related, on the one hand, to the work o f the artist, and, on the other, to 
the Socratic value of ignorance, as related to critical thinking.
46 My italics.
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If we identify the artist’s self-mastering (domination de soi), as the condition for the 
creative process and the realisation o f the work o f art, with what Arendt defines as the 
subjective element o f the artist’s self-control, then, in the notion o f  example, the “private” and 
solitary dimension o f subjectivity, implicit in the creative effort, is transcendend by virtue of 
the artist’s living act and voice that accompanies his work, which is implicit in Camus’ 
appropriation o f Nietzsche’s notion o f creation in the light o f  the German philosopher’s 
perspectivism.
This latter position is exposed in Arendt’s Some Questions o f Moral Philosophy, 
where she describes Nietzsche as «the last philosopher [...] who took moral issues seriously 
and who therefore analyzed and thought through all former moral positions. He said as 
follows: “It is a dénaturation of morality to separate the act from the agent, to direct hatred or 
contempt against the ‘sin’ [the deed instead o f  the doer], to believe that an action could be 
good or evil in itself...[In every action] all depends upon who does it [...]. Actually, it is the 
self-relatedness of him who judges that interprets an action or rather its actor with respect 
to...resemblance or ‘non-affinity’ between the agent and the judge” (Will to Power, no. 292)» 
(RJ, 144-5). Thus, according to Arendt,
[c]aught up in our modem prejudices, we think that only the “objective work ", separate from  the 
person, belongs to the public, that the person behind it and his life are private matters, and that the feelings 
related to these “subjective” things stop being genuine and become sentimental as soon as they are exposed to 
the public eye. (MDT, 72) [My italics]
Not only do the articles and editorials o f  Combat from 1944-45, which are coherent 
with the finite aisthetic thought o f the MdS, testify to Camus’ unwillingness to separate the 
act from the agent, the doer from the deed, and o f  the necessity to judge the latter by taking 
the particular singularity o f the former into account, but the emphasis on the concrete 
dimension o f the agent/doer as he appears publicly  in words and deeds is also related by 
Hannah .Arendt to a finite or limited reasoning in terms o f that exemplary validity (RJ, 144- 
ff.), which Camus opposes to the abstracting powers o f the logic o f  achèvement. Thus, just as 
Socrates «gave an example and hence became an example for a certain way o f conduct and a 
certain way o f deciding between right and wrong» (RJ, 144), thus, in Camus’ reflection, the 
artists «par leur oeuvre et par leur exemple» prove «qu’il vaut mieux se tromper sans 
assassiner personne et en laissant parler les autres que d'avoir raison au milieu du silence et 
des charniers».*1 47
47 F. Bartfeld, op. cit., p. 72.
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Self-mastering ceases to be confined to the purely private and subjective dimension of 
artistic creation, which becomes a moral and political stance in times o f crisis, by virtue o f its 
relationship to that capacity for independent thinking and dialogue, o f which Socrates is, for 
both Arendt and Camus, the example.
It is the Greek daimon o f Socratic memory that, in Arendt’s eulogy of Karl Jaspers, is 
said to most closely resemble the moral, “public” dimension of personality, as distinguished 
from individuality (MDT, 72-73). And it is the concrete and practical (not pragmatic) activity 
o f thought, as opposed to contemplation, which, in her view, constitutes a man into somebody, 
a person or a personality (RJ, 105). The moral and political implications of this reasoning are 
visible in the post-war trials against Nazi criminals, which interpreted from the standpoint o f 
critical thinking, i.e., «where all objective standards -  truth, rewards and punishments in a 
hereafter, etc. -  yield precedence to the “subjective” criterion of the kind o f person I  wish to 
be and live together wfr/z»(RJ, 111),48 show that «the greatest evil perpetrated is the evil 
committed by nobodies, that is, by human beings who refuse to be persons» (Id.).
Now, by relating personality to humanity, and by defining the realm of humanitas as 
that which does not lie in the beyond and is not utopian, but is of the present and o f this world 
(MDT, 80), consistently with a post-metaphysical “limited” thought o f the finite, Arendt says 
that everyone can enter humanity out o f  his own origins (Id.).
In Karl Jaspers: Citizen o f  the World? the emphasis on the origin(s) is immediately 
related, on the one hand, to plurality, diversity and mutual limitations (MDT, 81) which, in 
Arendt’s view, are at the root of the political concepts,49 and, on the other, to the nightmare o f 
a «horridly shallow unity» o f mankind «based on the technical means o f communication and 
violence» (MDT, 87) under the conditions o f a world government and world empire, which 
would decree the end o f politics (Id.). The unity o f the world brought about by technological 
development in Europe is inseparable from what Arendt defined as the politically destructive 
notion of rightness proper to scientific reasoning, which lays bare its nihilistic implications:
No less manifest than the fact that technology united the world is the other fact that Europe exported to 
the four corners of the earth its processes o f  disintegration  -  which had started in the Western world with the 
decline o f the traditionally accepted metaphysical and religious beliefs and had accompanied the grandiose 
developm ent o f the natural sciences and the victory o f  the nation sta te over a ll o ther fo rm s o f governm ent. The
48 In this text Arendt uses the term « subjective » in a different sense from the Laudatio, that is, in the light of the 
«shift from the objective w hat somebody did to the subjective who of the agent» (RJ, 111).
49 « A citizen is by definition a citizen among citizens of a country among countries. His rights and duties must 
be defined and limited, not only by those o f his fellow citizens, but also by the boundaries of a territory. [...] 
Politics deals with men, nationals of many countries and heirs of many pasts ; its laws are positively established 
fences which hedge in, protect, and limit the space in which freedom is not a concept, but a living, political 
reality.» (MDT, 81-82).
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same forces which took centuries to undermine the ancient beliefs and political ways of life, and which have 
their place in the continuous development of the West alone, took only a few decades to break down, by working 
from without, beliefs and ways of life in all other parts of the world. [...] Technology, having provided the unity 
o f the world, can just as easily destroy it and the means of global communication were designed side by side 
with m eans o f  possib le g lo b a l destruction. (MDT, 82-83) [My italics]
In the loss o f  memory o f « the authentic origins o f  all human existence» (MDT, 87) 
Arendt traces the danger inherent in this new reality of mankind, organized through technical 
means o f communication and violence. In his introduction to Simon Weil’s L 'enracinement in 
June 1949, Camus traced in «le mot “enracinement” [...] un retour a la tradition. Non pas la 
tradition comme on I’entend dans certains milieux politiques et dans nos piteux manuels 
d’histoire, mais celle qui consiste a penser juste, a voir juste » (E, 1700).50
It should not be surprising, hence, that in Le temps des meurtriers, that same year, 
Camus related, on the backdrop o f the contemporary nihilistic refusal to judge , especially 
widespread among intelligent and sceptic people, the notion o f  rightness to the historical 
“law” of efficacy and power,51 opposing the master/slave relationship implicit in the latter 
against the category o f  just/unjust men.52
I would suggest that, in the notion o f  «penser ju ste», Camus continues a particular 
kind of thinking which moves beyond the nihilistic impasse, without entailing a backward 
movement that recovers the moral norms and values o f the tradition. «[W]hen the chips are 
down», the only valid alternative to a politics o f power/efficacy/achievement - related both by 
Arendt and Camus to technological development and logic (“scientific”) murder -  is a 
“limited” thought which goes back to, and remains aware of, the origins.
In this sense, power politics in its 20* century, most extreme (nihilistic) form is, for 
Camus as well as for Arendt, ¿w-archic in the sense o f an order «ou personne n ’est jamais 
reconnu>\ namely, one in which men lose their personal dimension and become abstract 
silhouettes. In a note in the Carnets in 1947, taking his distances from a conservative 
«return» to the tradition, and its (Christian) morality, Camus wrote: *312
50 Camus describes Simone Weil’s work as entirely devoted to justice (E, 1701), and exposing some (thought) 
provoking truths among the lies in «le temps de la puissance et au siècle de l’efficacité» (Id.).
31 «Et lorsque nous pensons que rien n’a de sens, il faut conclure que celui qui a raison, c’est celui qui réussit La 
seule règle est de se montrer plus efficace, c’est-à-dire, le plus fort. [ . ..]«  L’histoire officielle consiste à croire 
les meurtriers sur la parole », a dit Simone Weil. Et nous ne pouvons pas douter en vérité que l’Histoire telle que 
nous la concevons, aurait consacré Hitler et justifié la terreur et le meurtre, com m e nous tous les consacrons e t 
les ju stifio n s aux m om ents o ù  nous osons penser que rien  n  'a de sens. Ainsi de quelque côté qu’on se tourne, au 
cœur de la négation et du nihilism e, le meurtre -  et le meurtre scien tifique , le meurtre utile -  a sa place 
privilégiée. » (F. Bartfeld, op. cit., p. 57). [My italics]
32 «Le monde n’est plus partagé entre les justes et les injustes, mais entre les maîtres et les esclaves » (F. 
Bartfeld, op. cit., p. 57).
53 Roger Dadoun, « Albert Camus : fondations d’anarchie » in Camus e t la  po litique , op. cit., p. 260 .1 argue that 
the anti-traditionalistic appeal to the origin(s) (arche), in the works o f both Arendt and Camus, provides the
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Si, pour dépasser le nihilisme, il faut revenir au christianisme, on peut bien alors suivre le mouvement et 
dépasser le christianisme dans l’héllenisme. (CII, 233)
In another note Camus claimed to agree with the view of the poet and friend Réné 
Char, according to whom the Greeks’ tragic ex-perience was mediated by beauty: «si les 
Grecs ont formé l’idée du désespoir et de la tragédie, c’est toujours à travers la beauté et ce 
qu’elle a d’oppressant. [...]Pour les Grecs, la beauté est au départ. Pour un Européen, elle est 
un but, rarement atteint. Je ne suis pas moderne.» (CII, 240). The overcoming of nihilism in 
Hellenism would, thus, mean the rejection o f the “aestheticizing” perspective typical o f 
Western modem thought, which considers beauty as the goal of the creative process, and the 
final result of a skilful poiesis out o f an idea in the artist’s mind. In this sense, Camus is not 
modem: beauty is at the beginning, as that through the experience o f which a tragic view is 
acquired, by virtue o f a constant effort of self-mastering.
In his letter Les Pharisiens de la justice, published in the review Caliban in 1950, 
which took into account and replied to some objections to his play Le Justes, Camus opposed 
the terroristic “fia t justitia pereat mundus” («Tuons tout le monde au nom de la justice pour 
tous», E, 720), or what he calls «une justice morte», to the «justice vivante», which, he writes 
significantly enough, is not a comfort but «une brûlure, et un effort sur soi-même» (E, 721).
Among his notes for Les Justes in the Carnets in 1947 we find the following remark: 
«Le monde sera plus juste  dans la mesure où il sera plus chaste (G. Sorel)» (CII, 234), 
chastity evoking the Nietzschean notion of ascèse, taken up by Camus as the distinctive 
character of the artist’s revolt.54
What emerges in Camus’ writings between 1947 and 1951 is a relationship between 
justice and beauty, which is mediated by the figure of the artist. It is in the light of this 
relationship that I suggest we re-interpret the author’s moral and political reflection in the 
sense o f  the project o f  an aesthetic overcoming of nihilism, in which, as I will argue in 
Chapter 4 of this work, tragedy plays an important part.
This project should not be confused with what Hannah Arendt addresses, in her 
extensive analysis of Hermann Broch’s artistic and political work, as the idolization o f beauty *
elements for a reflection on the relation between nihilism, anarchism and the political, which is attuned with 
Roberto Esposito’s diagnosis of the nihilistic drives inherent in the Western immnuitarian paradigm of the 
political, immunitas coinciding with the an-archic removal o f the originary communitas.
*In Conference for the awarding of the Nobel Prize (14th December 1957), Camus would refer to the freedom 
o f art as « une discipline ascétique » (E, 1093), which forces the artist to live in the « risque extrême », between 
die two abysses o f absolute negation and unconditioned assent - « [...) peut-être touchons-nous ici la grandeur 
de l’art, dans cette perpétuelle tension entre la beauté et la douleur, l’amour des hommes et la folie de la création, 
la solitude insupportable et la foule harassante, le refus et le consentement » (E, 1092).
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of the «aestheticizing literary man» (MDT, 122): instead, it situates itself at the opposite of 
all absolutizing attempts to fill the “value vacuum” o f  the nihilistic “death of God” by a 
murderous appeal to the logical consistency o f man’s system or creation.
The comparative analysis of Arendt’s text on Hermann Broch and o f  Camus’ 
reflection on the artist, from 1947 onward, is illuminating in this respect. According to 
Arendt, Broch
saw the criminal element and the element o f  radical evil as personified in the figure o f the aestheticizing 
literary man (in which category, for instance, he placed Nero and even Hitler) [...] As he saw it, the real 
seductiveness o f evil, the quality of sedution in the figure of the devil, is primarily an aesthetic phenomenon. 
Aesthetic in the broadest sense; the businessmen whose credo is “Business is business” and the statesmen who 
hold with “War is war” are aestheticizing literati in the “value vacuum”. They are aesthetes insofar as they are 
enchanted by the consonance o f their own system, and they becomes murderers because they are prepared to 
sacrifice everything to this consonance, this "beautiful*’ consistency. (MDT, 122-3)
The relationship between radical evil and the literati’s aestheticism, emphasized by 
Broch in the notion o f «beautiful consistency», is also the object o f  Camus’ reflection in the 
two sections o f l’HR on metaphysical revolt devoted, respectively, to de Sade and to the 
Dandies.
2.3.1. B e t w e e n  D e  S a d e  a n d  t h e  D a n d ie s .
Reporting on the state o f the philosophico-political debate in France in the post-war years,55 
and, in particular, o f what she addresses as French Existentialism, under which she places 
«Malraux and Camus on the one side, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the other» (EU, 436), 
Arendt drastically re-dimensioned the former’s much declaimed parentage with German 
contemporary philosophers («Their dependence upon the work o f  [...] Jaspers and Heidegger, 
has been somewhat exaggerated», EU, 437), observing how the Marquis de Sade and 
Dostoevsky exercised a stronger call on the intelligenzia than Pascal, Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche - whose influence, she writes, is less marked in France (Id.): «But all are 
overshadowed by the influence o f  Hegel and Marx in France, as distinguished from 
Germany» (Id.). Thus, she adds, in Heideggerian terms, their «style and form of expression 
remain in the line o f the French moralistes and that the extreme subjectivism o f  Cartesian 
philosophy has found here its last and most radical expression» (EU, 437).
55 Concern with Politics... (EU, 436-437).
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The following pages refute Arendt’s analysis, by showing, precisely, that Camus’s 
political reflection stands outside the so-called French Existentialism. Imbued with Pascal, 
Kierkegaard and Nietzsche from the early 1930’s through his teacher and friend, the 
philosopher Jean Grenier, and an attentive reader of Jaspers during the second half o f the 
1940’s, whom he quotes in HR, Camus was extremely critical o f  the contemporary 
fascination with Hegel and Marx among French intellectuals.
Now, Camus devotes a section of l’HR to the figure and work o f the Marquis de Sade, 
of which he explores the ethical and political implications. De Sade is «exemplary» (HR, 447) 
of an absolutely negating thought, which develops out of the author’s captivity («On exalte en 
lui le philosophe auX fers [...]», HR, 447) into a «rêve de destruction universelle» (Id.).
De Sade is the perfect «homme de lettres» in the sense that his literary creation 
provided the «equivalent dérisoire» o f a satisfaction, which the order o f the world would deny 
him: imprisoned in the Bastille, the writer conceived his ideal society - «des châteaux à 
septuple enceinte, dont il est impossible de s ’évader, et où la société du désir et du crime 
fonctionne sans heurts, selon un règlement implacable» (HR, 453) — a fiction  through which 
he systematically attempted the impossible «attentat contre la création» (HR, 455), i.e., 
against nature itself.
By conceiving God as «une divinité criminelle qui écrase l ’homme et le nie», and 
recognizing in murder a divine attribute (HR, 448), de Sade negates man and his morality 
because God does so, and negates God in the name of nature, identified with the sexual «élan 
aveugle qui exige la possession totale des êtres, au prix de leur destruction» (HR, 449). The 
unleashing of the limitless and measureless energy of desire, according to the iron laws o f 
which nature needs crime (Id.), culminates in self-destruction: the only law in a Godless 
world governed by unbridled sexual desire is force, and its motor is the will to power (HR, 
452), the «licence de détruire suppose qu’on puisse être soi-même détruit» (Id.).
The identification o f freedom with «l’enfer de la nécessité» o f illimited desire entails 
total submission to evil, the absolute acceptance o f universal murder, which culminates in a 
«horrible ache» (HR, 451).56 But at the climax o f de Sade’s self-glorification as master and
56 De Sade embodies the man o f letters whose art is « perverted »from original movement of revoit, he is in thîs 
sense the anti-artist: «Posséder ce qu’on tue, s’accoupler avec la souffrance, voilà l’instant de la liberté totale 
vers lequel s’oriente toute l’organisation des châteaux. Mais dès l’instant où le crime sexuel supprime l’objet de 
volupté, il supprime la volonté qui n’existe qu’au moment précis de la suppression. Il faut alors se soumettre un 
autre objet et le tuer à nouveau, un autre encore, et après lui l’infinité de tous les objets possibles. On obtient 
ainsi ces momes accumulations de scènes érotiques et criminelles dont l’aspect figé, dans les romans de Sade, 
laisse paradoxalement au lecteur le souvenir d ’une hideuse chasteté » (HR, 454).
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God, through the fictional character of the Unique, the solitary and only survivor o f his ideal 
republic, the writer
n’a triomphé qu’en rêve et ces dizaines de volumes, bourrés d’atrocités et de philosophie, résument une 
ascèse malheureuse, une marche allucinante du non total au oui absolu, un constentement à la mort enfin, qui 
transfigure le meurtre de tout et de tous en suicide collectif. (HR, 456) [My italics]
It is significant that Camus used the same expression as the one employed around 
1945 to describe the nihilistic power policy o f  the Nazi regime, and it is not without reason 
that de Sade is addressed as the precursor o f  the modem architects o f the totalitarian «cité de 
la puissance et de la haine» (HR, 454).57
According to Camus, « [njotre temps s 'est borné à fondre curieusement [le] rêve de 
république universelle [de Sade] et sa technique d'avilissement. Finalement ce qu’il haïssait 
le plus, le meutre légal, a pris à son compte les découvertes qu’il voulait mettre au service du 
meurtre d’instinct » (HR, 457).58
One essential «discovery», which Camus detects at the core of de Sade’s ideal 
universal republic (HR, 449), is the understanding o f the equality o f  men as a mathematical 
notion, that is, in terms o f  «l’équivalence des objets que sont les hommes, l’abjecte égalité des 
victimes» (HR, 450). In the closed universe o f de Sade’s castles, governed by «hideuse 
chasteté», «la jouissance, la grande joie fleurie des corps consentants et complices» (HR, 454) 
is abolished through the systematic reduction o f man to an object of experience and sexual 
pleasure, which operates via a total abstraction o f the living human being into «une espèce de 
plante absolument materiélle» (HR, 453) -  «Il faut encore que les objets de jouissance 
n ’apparaissent jamais comme des personnes» (Id ).59
What Camus points out in the measureless effort o f the «homme de lettres» is, firstly, 
an almost religious horror of the dispersedness and haphazardness which constitute the finite 
human condition: what drives de Sade’s limitless imagination during the prison years is the 
aesthetic «exigence d ’unité, déçue par la Création, [qui] se satisfait à toute force dans un 
microcosme», a  fictional world created by the demiurgic artist «à la mesure exacte de la 
nouvelle loi», the law o f  crime logically deriving from unbridled desire (HR, 452).
This leads us to the question o f  the «most absolute coherence», recovered by 
1’ «homme de lettres» within his own system or creation: «si le crime et le désir ne sont pas la 
loi de tout l'univers, s ’ils ne régnent pas au moins sur un territoire défini, ils ne sont plus
37 «Deux siècles à  l’avance, sur une échelle réduite, Sade a exalté les sociétés totalitaires au nom de la liberté 
frénétique que la révolte en réalité ne réclame pas » (HR, 457).
58 My italics.
My italics. «Dans la république barbelée de Sade, il n’y a que des mécaniques et des mécaniciens» (HR, 453).
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principes d'unité, mais ferments de conflit» (HR, 452), which dissolve the aesthetic 
microcosm back into the dispersedness of divine Creation. This is where, I argue, the enjeu o f 
the political is brought forth.
As Georges Bataille highlighted in his notes on Sade between 1947 and *49, 
«l’essentiel de la révolte est qu’elle est toujours refus d’un interdit, ou plutôt son essence est 
un refus de tout interdit [...]. Le refus des interdit est le refus de la limite. [...] c’est la 
grandeur de Camus d’être seul à montrer ce qui rend compte de l’attitude contradictoire de 
Sade [...]. Il semble bien que il ait obéi à la loi que Camus devait définir- avec une 
rigueur qui confond l’esprit : son goût pour la révolution, son refus de la terreur, son attitude 
« chrétienne » si stupéfiante à l’égard de ses beaux-parents».60 In the light of revolt against 
law (qua law), de Sade’s rejection o f legal crime and the death sentence under the Terror is 
the logical consequence o f the writer’s identification of freedom with absolute licence and 
justice with «la divinité de toutes les passions» (HR, 450), which are incompatible with the 
cold and rational execution o f crime (HR, 451). According to Camus, «[on] trouve ici 
l’amorce d’une idée qui sera développée encore par Sade: celui qui tue doit payer de sa  
personne. Sade, on le voit, est plus moral que nos contemporains» (Id.).61 62
But, as Bataille rightly points out, de Sade ended up being «logique comme Von est
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pris au piège: la révolte en lui l’avait mené à l'égalité». What the French philosopher fails 
to appreciate in Camus’ analysis of de Sade’s work is precisely that, by accepting desire and 
crime exclusively as principles o f  unity, and not as fermentation of conflict, the 
“aestheticizing” effort o f  the literary man, bom out of revolt against (moral and divine) law , 
eventually falls back into the metaphysical affirmation of a new law {incomplete nihilism) out 
of sheer contempt for the fmitude o f ex-istence - and the new law, systematically applied in de 
Sade’s microcosm of crime, is interwoven with the notion o f power (HR, 452).
What characterises the law o f this new “aesthetic” system is the rejection of the 
aisthetic con-tact, which, in the MdS, is at the root o f the tragic finite thought of the 
finite.Thus, in spite of Hermann Broch’s contempt for the figure of the aestheticizing literary 
man - whose “closed system”, which provides a justification of crime in the foundationless 
horizon of the nihilistic “value vacuum”, is identified with radical evil (MDT, 123) -  his 
«man in his uttermost abstraction» bears striking affinities with de Sade’s objects of sexual
60 G. Bataille, Œuvres complètes, VII, Paris, Gallimard, 1976, p. 634.
61 My italics. It is significant that, around 1949, Bataille conceived a book on Camus’ moral and political 
thought, a part of which should have been devoted, in the author’s intention, to a comparative analysis o f de 
Sade and Camus, touching upon their common rejection of terror. See, also, the article « La morale du malheur: 
La Peste » in Critique (June-July 1947, n. 13-14.
62 Bataille, op. cit., p. 634. My italics.
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pleasure/murder: it is precisely in this abstracting logic, visible in both de Sade and Broch’s 
(diametrically opposed) writings, that we grasp the link between what Camus addresses as 
«total negation» -  resumed in de Sade’s notion of freedom as limitless destructiveness, 
culminating in total crime - and «absolute affirmation» -  embodied by Broch’s quest for an 
«earthly absolute», and redemption from death as radical evil (MDT, 149).
As the French author points out,
[le] succès de Sade à notre époque s’explique par un rêve qui lui est commun avec la sensibilité 
contemporaine : la revendication de la liberté totale, et la  déshum anisation opérée à fro id  p a r  l ’intelligence. La 
réduction de l ’hom m e en ob je t d ’expérience, le règ lem ent qui précise les rapports de la volonté de puissance et 
de l’homme objet, le cham p clos de cette m onstrueuse expérience, sont des leçons que les théoriciens de la 
puissance retrouveront, lorsqu’ils auront à organiser le temps des esclaves. (HR, 457) [My italics]
If de Sade’s work anticipates in fiction  the de-humanizing techniques operated in the 
totalitarian camps, and systematically employed by totalitarian terror, Camus’ reflection on 
Dandysm and Romantic Satanism brings to our attention another aspect, pointed out in 
Arendt’s text on Hermann Broch, namely, the relationship between the artistic creation o f an 
aesthetic unity and the justification o f crime («the real seductiveness of evil, the quality o f 
sedution in the figure o f  the devil, is primarily an aesthetic phenomenon», MDT, 122), and a 
certain «goût de l’apocalypse» (HR, 464), which the French author traces at the core o f  the 
20th century revolutionary experience.
The dandy represents, in Camus’ view, the most orginal figure o f the Romantic 
defiance o f moral and divine law: in the works o f Blake, Vigny, Lermontov, Baudelaire, 
Lacenaire, and Lassailly, dandysm is inseparable from Satanism, identified with the apology 
and exercise o f evil and murder as a  revolt against God’s violence and injustice -  «Le héros 
romantique s’estime donc contraint de commettre le mal, par nostalgie d’un bien impossible» 
(HR, 459). The dandy’s Luciferian obstination in (the imagination of) evil is rooted in the 
repetition o f  injustice and suffering (HR, 460-461) in order to secure meaning to (his) 
existence.
The romantic «métaphysique du pire» (HR, 461) is grounded on a solitary experience 
o f  suffering, which authorises all kinds of excess (HR, 460): it is not «une communion, moins 
encore une construction».63 The highest value in the romantic constellation being frenzy  
(frénésie), «la terrible exaltation d ’une action brève et dévorante» (Id.) finds its ultimate 
meaning in apocalypse: «La frénétique ivresse et, à la limite, le beau crime épuisent alors en
63 Ms Char, E, 1638, note to p. 460. My italics.
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une seconde tout le sens d’une vie» (Id.). The dandy’s aesthetic indulging in evil and murder 
(«Le mélodrame sanglant et le roman noir triomphent. », Id.),
délivre [...], et à moindres frais, ces appétits affreux de rame que d’autres satisferont dans les camps 
d’extermination. (HR, 460).
What is interesting to point out is that at the roots o f this attitude, Camus traces the 
notion of fatality, which is precisely the exclusion o f  value judgements, replaced by the « [...] 
“C ’est ainsF qui excuse tout, sauf le Créateur, responsible unique de ce scandaleux état de 
fait» (HR, 458), which justifies the Romande hero’s confusion of good and evil.
Fatalism, in the author’s view, goes together with the Romantic ideal end o f man’s 
(self)-deification:
Un baroque romantique [...] prétend que le but de toute vie intellectuelle est de devenir Dieu. Ce 
romantique, au vrai, est un  p eu  en avance sur son tem ps. Le but n’était alors que d’égaler Dieu, et de se 
maintenir à son niveau. On ne le détruit pas, mais, par un effort incessant, on lui refuse toute soumission. Le 
dandysme est une fo rm e dégradée de l ’ascèse. (HR, 461). [My italics]
The dandy’s murderous effort to parallel divine injustice with human injustice (HR, 
459) cannot be confused with the tragic ascèse o f Camus’ artist: in the haphazardness o f a 
finite existence shattered by God’s violence, «[le] dandy crée sa propre unité par des moyens 
esthétiques. Mais c’est une esthétique de la singularité et de la négation. « Vivre et mourir 
devant un miroir », telle était, selon Baudelaire, la divise du dandy.» (HR, 462). The aesthetic 
unity' is that o f the character, le personnage, as opposed to the person , a term which also 
belongs to the theatrical constellation, but which acquires a precise moral connotation both in 
Camus and Arendt’s work:
Le romantisme démontre en effet que la révolte a partie liée avec le dandysme ; l’une de ses directions 
est le paraître. Dans ses formes conventionnelles, le dandysme avoue la nostalgie d ’une morale. Il n’est qu’un 
honneur dégradé en point d’honneur. Mais il inaugure en m êm e temps une esthétique q u i règne encore sur no tre  
m onde, celle des créateurs so lita ires, rivaux obstinés d ’un D ieu qu'ils condam nent. A partir du romantisme, la 
tâche de l'artiste ne sera plus seulement de créer un monde, ni d’exalter la beauté pour elle seule, mais aussi de 
définir une attitude. L’artiste devient alors modèle, il se propose en example : l ’a rt est sa  m orale. Avec lui 
commence l'âge des directeurs de conscience. (HR, 463) [My italics]
Against the backdrop of the post-metaphysical horizon disclosed by modem European 
nihilism, in which Camus conducts his analysis, (anti-)metaphysical revolt and dandyism are 
seen as being rooted in a common anti-Platonic reduction of being to appearance. But 
dandysm remains, nevertheless, anchored to a foundational perspective, traceable in its
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«nostalgie d ’une morale», in which art takes over, and fills, the ab-solute space left vacant by 
a contested, but yet not “murdered” (HR, 461), God.64
The dandy as personnage is the “aesthetic”, i.e.9 fictional, product o f the artist’s meta­
physical revolt against the injustice and dispersedness o f divine creation (HR, 462). The meta­
physical refusal o f finitude (identified with God’s “bad” unity) drives the dandy’s effort 
toward the absolutisation of sheer appearance {paraître), and to the sacrifice o f “reality” to the 
internal consistency o f his own system - «[djissipé en tant que personne privée de règle> [le 
dandy] sera cohérent en tant que personnage» (HR, 462).
The opposition «personne»!«personnage» is amplified by the reference to the dandy’s 
incessant search for a  public that will secure his own existence, that will create him by 
reflecting his own image as in a mirror: «un personnage suppose un public; le dandy ne peut 
se poser qu’en s’opposant. Il ne peut s’assurer de son existence qu’en la retrouvant dans le 
visage des autres. Les autres sont le miroir.» (Id.).65
It is not excellence or greatness, which result from words and deeds in the plural 
appearing-together, but splendour which is the mark o f  the dandy’s attitude (IcL), as the 
solitary effort to provoke the attention o f  the public, which is reduced to an abstract and 
monolithic entity - «Sa vocation est dans la singularité, son perfectionnement dans le 
surenchère» (Id.).
The image o f the mirror -  which traditionally belongs to the constellation of 
knowledge, and figures in the rich metaphorical texture o f the absurd in the MdS as that 
which «fait apparaître l’étranger» (MdS, 108), disclosing the tragic awareness o f  the fictional 
or illusory character o f man’s identity - 66 exposes, from the 1943 notebooks onwards, the 
danger inherent in the “aesthetic” de-foundation brought forth by the absurd thought, which 
lies precisely in the absolutisation o f the fiction itself, and in the withdrawal from the con-tact 
with reality:
L’absurde, c’est l’homme tragique devant un miroir (Caligula). Il n’est donc pas seul. Il y a le germe 
d’une satisfaction ou d’.une complaisance. Maintenant, il faut supprimer le miroir. (Cil, 94).
64 « Le dandysme, quel qu’il soit, est toujours un dandysme par rapport à Dieu. L’individu, en tant que créature, 
ne peut s’opposer qu’au créateur. Il a besoin de Dieu avec qui il poursuit une sorte de sombre coquetterie. 
Armand Hoog a raison de dire que, malgré le climat nietzcshéen de ces œuvres, Dieu n 'est pas encore mort. » 
(HR, 465).[My italics]
65 «Toujours en rupture, en marge, il force les autres à le créer lui-même, en niant leur valeurs. II joue sa vie, 
faute de pouvoir la vivre.» (HR, 462). The absolutization o f the fictional dimension of the character is visible in 
the fact that, in Camus’s words, in solitude, that is, without a public -  without a mirror to reflect his image -  the 
dandy is no-body («Être seul pour le dandy revient à n’être rien», ld.).
66 M.-L. Audin, op. cit., p. 206-ff.
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It is significant that Camus employed the same image in the Introduction to the 1951 
philosophical essay:
D’une certaine manière, l’absurde qui prétend exprimer l'hom m e dans sa  so litude  te fait vivre devant un 
miroir. Le déchirement initial risque alors de devenir confortable. La plaie qu’on gratte avec tant de sollicitude 
finit par donner du plaisir. [...] Si donc il était légitime de tenir compte de la sensibilité absurde, de faire le 
diagnostic d’un mal tel qu’on le trouve en soi et chez les autres, il est impossible de voir dans cette sensibilité, et 
dans le nihilism e qu 'elle suppose, rien d’autre qu’un point de départ, une critique vécue, l’équivalent, sur le plan 
de l’existence, du doute systématique. Après quoi, il  fa u t briser les je u x  fix e s  du  m iroir et entrer dans le  
m ouvem ent irrésistible par leq u el l  'absurde se  dépasse lui-m êm e (HR, 418-419). [My italics]
The reference to Caligula, the «empereur artiste» (T, 1753) o f  the tragedy of the same name, 
acquires a peculiar relevance in the 1943 Carnets: in the 1939 version o f  the manuscript of the 
play, the redaction of which runs parallel to that of the MdS, Caligula resigns the finite 
aisthetic awareness, rooted in love as sensual touching-upon, which is shattered by the sudden 
death o f his sister and lover Drusilla:
Mais aujourd’hui son corps pour m oi n ’est p a s  p lu s réel que l'im a g e  de ce m iroir. Ce dialogue de ce  
m iroir à moi, et de son om bre à moi, s i tu savais, C aesonia, Vaffreuse envie que j ’a i de le  jo u er . [...] vivre, c ’est 
le con tra ire d ’aimer. [...] L e beau spectacle, Caesonia. Et il me faut du monde, des spectateurs, des victimes et 
des coupables. [...] Je veux qu’on fasse entrer les condamnés à mort. D u public, du  pub lic , Caesonia. Je leur 
montrerai ce qu’ils n’ont jamais vu [...] -  Je leur montrerai un homme libre [...] (T, 1760-1) [My italics]
We can trace some important affinities between the dandy’s “aestheticizing” attitude and 
Caligula reduction of life to a «beau spectacle», in which the Emperor plays his pedagogic 
role with murderous coherence.67 *69The figure o f Caligula is essential, in my view, to elucidate 
the link and the transition from the figure o f the dandy to Camus’ political reflection on the 
20th century policies o f terror.
Remembering their first encounter in Oran in 1941, the anti-fascist writer Nicola 
Chiaromonte recalls his own perplexities, when the young Camus confided to him that he was 
writing a tragedy on the Roman Emperor. In his view, the analogies between Caligula’s 
tyranny and the 20th century forms of total dominion could not justify the interest o f a 
modem, politically-concerned writer. I suggest that the political meaning of the tragedy 
Caligula transcends the analogical level: its focus is not on form s o f  government (on the 
affinities between ancient and modem tyrannies, in the specific case), but on the logic that
67 «J’ai décidé d ’être logique. [...] J’ai le pouvoir. J ’exterminerai les contradicteurs et les contradictions. » (T,
1757).
69 «Camus mi disse allora che stava scrivendo una tragedia su Caligola, e io cercai di immaginare che cosa 
potesse attirare uno scrittore moderno in un tal soggetto: la tirannia sfrenata? Ma la tirannia contemporanea non 
mi sembrava aver molto in comune con quella di un Caligola» (in N. Chiaromonte, A lbert Camus, in “Tempo 
Presente”, gennaio 1960, raccolto in N.C., I l tarlo  della coscienza, Bologna, Mulino 1992, pp. 219.)
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governs what is also addressed in Arendt’s essay on Broch as the “aestheticizing” drives at 
the core o f contemporary politics.
It is significant, in this respect, that, in his 1949, notes for the project of a book on 
Albert Camus, la Morale et la Politique, Georges Bataille would bring together the figure of 
Caligula and that o f  de Sade as illustrations o f the position o f evil «comme souveraineté de 
fait dans la vie». Both shatter the utilitarian logic o f «le monde qui rassure, qui est à la mesure 
de l’homme»,69 bringing about revoit as transgression o f law qua law .69 70
In his 1947 critical review, La morale du malheur: "La Peste ", Bataille drew a strong 
contrast between what he defined as la morale du malheur ou morale déprimée o f Camus’ 
novel La Peste, published with an immediate widespread success in 1947, and the morale de 
la révolte o f the tragedies, «dont l’œuvre la plus belle est sûrement Le Malentendu (mais la 
plus riche de sens Caligula) »,71 the former resting precisely on the immunitarian « souci de 
protection de la vie » (resumed by the notion o f santé),72 governed by the logic o f utility, as 
the effort to pre-serve life against suffering and death {malheur).
As legal power is the institutional embodiment o f  that «soif de sécurité», which is the 
effort to ban murder and death from the body politic, in order to secure happiness (le 
bonheur) by sanctifying the limits o f human action, the morale de la révolte is seen as 
expressing the limitless tragedy o f sovereign thought {la pensée souveraine) which destroys 
the logic of the object -  de la chose, du sérieux, du devoir, de la morale -  at the very core of 
the poietic principle o f creation,73 74by consecrating that of le jeu  — du désir, du rien.™
Now, it is clear that, in his “aestheticizing” «ascèse dégradée», the Emperor-Artist 
Caligula, like de Sade or the dandy, turns his art into a moral system, the (Nietzschean) 
“innocent” game (jeu) into a new murderous law, man into an object to be manipulated. 
Caligula becomes the Plague to eradicate death and suffering,75 namely, the finiteness o f the
69 G. Bataille, CEC, op. cit., p. 413. My italics.
70 «La révolte [du héros tragique] est toujours la contestation d’un pouvoir légal et celle de la légitimité de la 
loi » (Ivi, p. 10).
71 G. Bataille, « La morale du malheur L a P este », C ritique , Juin-Juillet 1947, n. 13-14, p. 5.
72 «La valeur n’est pas celle que l’insoumission, la révolte fonde : c ’est la « santé », le fait d’éviter la mort sans 
souffrir », Ivi, p. 14.
73 « L’objectivité de Dieu répond à ceux qui demandent l ’origine des choses : le cordonnier f i t  la chaussure e t de 
m êm e Dieu créa le  m onde », G. Bataille, op. cit., p. 408.
74 G. Bataille, op. cit., p. 409.
As Bataille points out, «c’est justement la crainte du malheur qui réintroduit dans l’Etat la passion nécessaire 
au meurtre. Le souci du malheur est générateur de toute morale haineuse, qui donne la bonne conscience au 
procureur et au juge. II est surtout l’origine des terreurs légales [...]» - of the legalization of violence and murder 
at work in (totalitarian) terror, as well as in the concepts of just war and death penalty (G. Bataille, « La morale 
du malheur: L a P este  », artcit., p. 15).
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human condition: his quest for the moon represents the absolute attempt to realize the 
definitive unity (bonheur) “aesthetically”.76 7
What is interesting to bring into focus here is the relationship, highlighted by Camus in 
his 1951 essay, between the “aestheticizing” attitude of the dandy and the 20th century 
revolutionaries («les “conquérants” du XXe siècle», HR, 464). The figure of the Romantic 
dandy -  o f which Byron and Shelley offer the clearest example -  illustrates the transition o f  
metaphysical revolt from «le monde du paraître» to «le monde du faire» (Id.):
Les étudiants français de 1830 et les décembristes russes apparaîtront alors comme les inclinations les 
plus pures d’une révolte d’abord solitaire et qui cherche ensuite, à travers les sacrifices, le chemin d’une réunion. 
Mais, inversement, le goût de l'apocalyspe et de la vie frénétique se retrouvera chez nos révolutionnaires. La 
parade des procès, le jeu  terrible du juge d ’instruction et de l’accusé, la mise en scène des interrogatoires, 
laissent parfois deviner une tragique complaisance au vieux subterfuge par lequel le révolté romantique, refusant 
ce qu’il était, se condamnait provisoirement au paraître dans le malheureux espoir de conquérir un être plus 
profond.(HR, 464). [My italics]
The strongly negative connotation o f the metaphoric constellation of theatricality, 
employed in this passage to convey the transition from appearing into doing, from the 
aesthetic sphere o f artistic creation into the political sphere of revolutionary action, brings 
forth two related remarks: firstly, that revolutionary action was sought by the Romantic 
dandys as a (sacrificial) means of recovering some kind o f con-tact (reunion) beyond the 
solitary movement of metaphysical revolt -  in order, that is, for the “aesthetic” creation to 
acquire some “reality”; secondly, that the «goût de l ’apocalyspe» and the frenzy, which 
characterises the latter, finally succeeded in dissolving the aistheiic and pluralistic sphere o f 
the political acting-together.
The political sphere is, thus, “aestheticized”, emptied of its sensory, contingent, and 
risky elements, and is devoided o f er-istence. Hence the clear pejorative sense o f the 
theatrical metaphors (“parade”, “jeu terrible”, “mise en scène”, “subterfuge”) applied to the 
human activity o f  judgement, whose institutional locus is in trial, and which, in Camus’ 
understanding, is inseparable from an aisthetic thought/appraisal o f man qua person 
responsible for his conduct, as opposed to man as an abstract silhouetteV
76 In this identification of Caligula/Emperor, Law and Plague we can, finally, boucler le boucle of our argument, 
by linking the Caligula to the 1944-45 notebooks, analysed earlier on, where the Plague is precisely related to 
what Camus addresses as the problem of abstraction, in other w ords, of the loss of aisthetic awareness, which is 
the mark o f a finite or tragic thought of the finite.
77 We observe an analogous negative connotation of the metaphoric constellation o f theatricality applied to 
judgment in the opening pages of Hannah Arendt’s report on Eichmann’s trial.
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In order to elucidate Camus’ reference to the «gout de l ’apocalyspe» inherent in the 
dandy’s aestheticizmg attitude, I will now proceed to mvestigate a source, which recurs in 
both the French author’s political reflection and in Hannah Arendt’s 1951 study on 
totalitarianism, which played a pivotal part in the development o f Camus’ definition of 
nihilism after 1947.
2.3.2. REVOLUTIONARY “APOCALYPTISM” AND “ABSOLUTE”  NIHILISM.
In the Carnets, we find a considerable amount o f  notes, taken around 1947, simultaneously, 
and in preparation to, the writing o f Les Justes and UHomme Révolté, on the Russian 
intelligentzia till the Bolshevik Revolution (C II, 224-229). The comparative study o f  the 
notebooks has allowed to trace the source for Camus’ notes at that date in the 1938 essay by 
the Russian philosopher Nikolaj Berdiaev, Sources et sens du communisme russe. 78 9
In the scholarly critique o f Camus’ political writings the work of Berdiaev is usually 
noticeably overlooked;80 indeed his name is almost completely absent from even the general 
studies on the political debate of the thirties and forties.81
What I suggest is that Berdiaev’s definition o f Nihilism, and his emphasis on the 
apocalyptic drives o f the Russian movement, as passing over in the theories o f Russian 
revolutionaries, and culminating in the Soviet system as «totalitarian state», offers some 
important insights into the continuity, suggested by Camus in HR, between the aestheticizing
78 One of its illustrations is the Russian writer Lermontov, quoted by Camus in HR, 460.
19 For the comparative analysis of Camus’ notebooks and Berdieav’s work see my article « Du nihilisme aux 
théocraties totalitaires: L es sources e t le  sens du com m unism e russe de Berdiaev dans les C arnets d'Albert 
Camus », C ahiers A lbert C am us 20, La revue des le ttres m odernes, Paris, Minard, 2004, pp. 175-195.
80 While it has been widely accepted that the Russian writer was an authoritative source for Camus' plays and 
essays in the late forties, the impact of his reflections on the Russian intelligentzia and the Communist 
Revolution on Camus' political thought has not yet been seriously explored (See Viggiani’s intervention in 
A lbert Camus 1980, S eco n d  International C onference, ed. R. Gay-Crosier, University Presses Florida, 
Gainesville, 1980, 218-219; and Paul Archambault “Albert Camus et la métaphysique chrétienne”, in A lbert 
Cam us 1980, op. cit., 211-219).
81A leading figure, with Simon Frank and Shestov, o f the neo-idealistic movement, which played an important 
role in the philosophical and religious ferments in Russia between 1890 and the beginning of the XXth century, 
Berdiaev was exiled in 1922, and lived first in Berlin, and then in Paris from 1924 onwards. Here, he revived his 
philosophical Academy and the review P ut, and came close to Jacques Maritain and the intellectual circle of 
E sprit. During his exile, Berdiaev published two of his major works, L 'E sprit de D ostoïevski, first appearing in 
Russian in 1923, and translated into French in 1929, and U n N ouveau M oyen-Â ge, published in Berlin in 1924, 
and in French in 1930. A year before being appointed professor at the Sorbonne in 1939, Gallimard published his 
Sources e t sen s du C om m unism e russe, in which the author develops his thesis of a connection between 
Nihilism, Russian Socialism and Stalin’s “Totalitarian” State.
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attitude of the dandy and the totalitarian revolutions of the 20th century, thus shedding further 
light into Camus’ political reflection.
In Les sources et ie sens du communisme russe, Berdiaev defines nihilism as a purely 
Russian phenomenon (SS, 82). That is to say, he distinguishes a strict sense of the term *  used 
to describe the Russian intellectual movement o f  the 1860’s, represented by Pissarev - from a 
broader sense, including, in Berdiaev’s view, all the Russian social movements of the 19th 
century, and culminating in Lenin’s political thought.82 Nihilism is identified with the 
negation of God, and all spiritual, theoretical and moral dimensions of human existence 
(«l'esprit, l'âme, les idées, les normes et les valeurs suprêmes...», Id.). However, as Berdiaev 
points out, this remains nonetheless an ultimately religious phenomenon, stemming from 
orthodoxy, as a deviate ascesis («ascèse déviée») or an ascesis without the grace (SS, 83):
A u fo n d  le  nihilism e est l'ancien apocalyptism e russe avec un signe n é g a tif II en a tous les caractères: 
révolte contre l'injustice de l’histoire, contre le mensonge de la civilisation, aspiration vers la fin des temps 
historiques, avènement d'une nouvelle vie extra-historique et supra-historique (SS, 84).S3
Berdiaev poses nihilism as the source o f  the Russian revolutionary ideas o f  the second 
half o f  the 19th century in Pissarev, but also Tchemichevski, Dobrolioubov, and later in a 
more extreme form, in Netchaev, w hich are taken over at the beginning o f  the 20th century by 
Lenin and Bolshevism.
In order to understand Berdiaev’s argument in Sources, it is useful to go back to 
another text, a collection o f essays by Berdiaev, Frank, Struve and others, published in 
Moscow in 1909 under the title Vechi. The various essays collected in Vechi are 
complementary and extraordinarily homogeneous in their intentions and conclusions: this 
allows us to clarify certain aspects o f Berdiaev’s definition o f nihilism in Sources through a 
comparison with his 1909 article on "Philosophical truth and the truth o f  the intelligentzia ", 
but also with S. Frank's illuminating essay on 'The ethics o f  nihilism ", which shows many 
similarities with the former's later argument.
In Vechi, nihilism is defined as the negation of absolute or objective values, that is, o f 
the transcendent values o f the Judaeo-Christian tradition. As a Russian phenomenon, it 
coincides with a moralistic divinization of the material, “earthly” happiness of the majority of
12 «Il y a des racines nihilistiques chez Lénine [...] Nous sommes tous nihilistes" disait Dostoïevski» (SS, 82).
*3 Berdiaev had already developed this idea in an essay published in Russian in 1918, D uchi russkoj revoljucij, in 
which he highlighted the relation between nihilism and Russian traditional "apocalyptism". If the former is total 
negation - o f the state, of morals, and of culture, art and science - and the latter is the expectation of the end of 
the world; apocalyptism turns into nihilism as the negation of the highest values of the historical and earthly 
sphere, so that nihilism is apocalyptic, in that it entails the expectation of the end. In Russian thought, states 
Berdiaev, these two elements - the nihilistic and the apocalyptic - are closely intertwined, and very difficult to 
separate.
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the people - that is, in Frank and Berdiaev's terms, with the absolutisation of relative and
84purely subjective values and interests (V, 179).
It is precisely in the light o f this “divinization” of (material) happiness that, as 
Berdiaev points out in 1909 and again in 1938, the problem o f nihilism coincides, and is 
founded on the problem of evil. In Sources, the russian “apocalyptic” nihilism stems from 
contempt o f  the world  as evil, and is defined as an exit from the «kingdom o f evil» («Qu'est- 
ce en effet que le nihilisme, sinon une issue hors d'un monde qui croupit dans le mal [...]?», 
SS, 86), identified with the historical world o f  despotism, servitude, and social injustice (V, 
24,27).
The link between nihilism and the socialist revolutionary ideas o f  the Russian 
intelligentzia is spelt out clearly by Frank: i f  life has no objective meaning - a sense in se 
(«intrinsic») o f life - the only real and necessary end of existence is the satisfaction of 
material (subjective) needs. However, in the Russian intelligentzia the nihilistic disbelief and 
rejection o f metaphysical principles is combined with a moralistic and ascetic abnegation of 
the individual to the «empirical» - i.e., conditioned and subjective - principle o f the «good of 
the people». The interest o f the people is divinized, and everything that may distract from this 
exclusive end must be destroyed as evil (V, 177).
We are faced here, in Frank’s definition, with a “religion” o f  socialism, that is, with an 
optimistic fa ith  in the radical realization o f  an ultimate and absolute happiness: however, the 
«good of the people» is not the love for the immediate and proximate, an altruistic feeling 
towards living men, but the love for an abstract ideal (Mankind) - the «far away» (V,181-2).* 85
Now, as Frank points out in 1909, this love for future mankind turns into hatred for 
present men, and the passion for the realization o f an earthly paradise develops into a passion 
for sheer destruction. The populist and socialist intelligentzia becomes revolutionary in a 
moral, rather than political sense: destruction becomes the only means to remove the 
historical events hindering the realization o f  their moral and social Ideal (V, 184). The 
nihilistic theory of happiness, thus, leads to a metaphysical absolutization o f the principle of 
destruction. This recurs in Sources (SS, 74-77) where Berdiaev identifies Russian nihilism as 
an eschatological movement aiming at the destruction of the historical order, and at the 
rebuilding o f a new one that will emancipate human beings.
^Populism is pointed out as the ethical drive o f the Russian intelligentzia, dominated in an exclusive and 
dispotical way by the utilitarian-m ora listic  end o f the "good of the people" (V, 16). Frank talks about a 
"u tilitarian  n ih ilism " or a "n ih ilistic  u tilitarianism ", which erases all transcendent principles, and absolutizes "the 
satisfaction of the subjective needs in life" (V, 178). The Russian intelligentzia is in this sense nihilistic, in that 
it does not conceive anything outside the love for justice and the people, its only aim being human happiness.
85 SS, 56-57.
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What emerges from Vechi and Berdiaev’s later works is a definition of nihilism that 
has strong escathological or messianic implications. In Duchi, Berdiaev highlights the 'hubris' 
of the russian nihilistic-moralists who have the presumption o f loving men more than God, 
and o f being able to correct God’s plan in their favour (SRR, 35). Here he echoes Frank’s 
definition of Russian «moralistic nihilism», as a contradictory combination of an absence o f 
principles with a personal ascetism and faith in a universal utilitarianism (V, 190): in that it 
rejects the divine order o f the world, nihilism represents, in Berdiaev’s view, a hubristic 
thought that judges God's creation in the name of the superior value o f justice.
Both Berdiaev and Frank insist on the co-implication of nihilism and atheism in the 
thought of the Russian intelligentsia since the 19th century: God as the creator of this world 
does not exist, because if He did, He could not be but evil (SS, 77). However, the Russian 
nihilistic-atheistic revolt against God is still a religious phenomenon.
Founded on a total love for justice, it finds its extreme expression in the fanatism and 
intolerance of the Russian revolutionary intelligentsia (SS, 78). This latter is at the same time 
nihilistic and idealistic in that it replaces the transcendent idea of the Judaeo-Christian 
tradition with an earthly ideal (human happiness and emancipation), which becomes the new 
object o f their dogmatic belief. Nihilism can therefore be defined as an «ascèse orthodoxe 
transposé» (SS, 116), a pseudo-religious phenomenon, or even a reversed religion (SRR, 
32).86
The echoes of Nietzsche’s posthumous fragments on nihilism dated 1886, and in 
particular of the affinity between socialism and Christian tradition betrays the German 
philosopher’s profound and widespread influence among the Russian thinkers.87
Nowr, according to Mihajlov, Dostoevsky’s influence on Russian philosophers is even 
more significant. In Duchi, Dostoïevski is the author who has analysed Russian apocalyptic
86 This idea is confirmed by Frank, who goes as far as to define the Russian intellectual as a «militant monk of 
the nihilistic religion o f material welfare» (V, 191).
87 Nietzsche, F., A l d i la  del bene e del m ale — Scelta  d i fram m enti postum i (1885-1886), a cura di G. Colli e M. 
Montinari, Mondadori, 392 (Fr. 2, 127). As Glatzer Rosenthal points out, «Nietzsche's influence in Russia was 
profound, widespread, and enduring" (NR, 3), and that his work had been translated into Russian since 1898. It 
was precisely in 1909 - the date of the appearance of Vechi - that the full academic edition of his complete 
works was planned, and one of the editors was the philosopher Simon Frank» (NR, 11). Thus Nietzsche was a 
crucial figure in the Russian philosophical and religious “renaissance” of the 1890'$, and his thought inspired the 
neo-idealistic reflections of the “legal Marxists” - Berdiaev, Bulgakov, Struve, and Frank (NR, 18). In an 
important collection, Problem s o f  Idealism  (1902), Berdiaev dedicated a long article to Nietzsche, «The problem 
of ethics in the light o f philosophical Idealism»; and Frank produced an essay on «Friedrich Nietzsche and the 
ethics o f  love of distant and remote» (INR, 140). However, as Mihajlov points out, «Shestov, Berdiaev, Frank 
[...] all read and reread Dostoevsky before anyone began to read Nietzsche in Russia». (Mihajov, Mihajlo, “The 
Great Catalyzer: Nietzsche and Russian Neo-Idealism”, in B. Glatzer-Rosenthal, N ietzsche in Russia, op. cit., p. 
139). Nietzsche himself «studied Dostoevsky especially intensely at the very last stage o f his life while he was 
contemplating nihilism. Nietzsche even made an abstract of Dostoevsky's The P ossessed (...)» (Ivi, p. 138).
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Nihilism. The novelist revealed how the problem o f the Russian Revolution coincided with 
the nihilistic and atheistical question of the Tower o f Babel, built without God not in order to 
reach the skies, but to pull the skies down to earth (SRR, 33). In this sense, the problem of 
socialism is the apocalyptic search towards an end that would redeem everything.
In his critical study on the work o f Dostoyevsky - published in Russian in 1923 and 
translated into French in 1929 under the title L'esprit de Dostoïevski - Berdiaev described 
Ivan, the character from the novel The Brothers Karamazov, as nothing less than «the 
philosopher o f Russian nihilism and atheism» (SRR, 34), who embodies the atheistic and 
rationalistic revolt against God's creation in the name o f the innocent's suffering. In the same 
book, he also highlights the idea o f Russian Socialism as a «laic Catholicism» (CD, 141), 
referring to Dostoyevsky’s Legend o f  the Grand Inquisitor.
For Dostoyevsky, in both the Catholic Inquisition and the Russian socialists, 
individual freedom is incompatible with the eudemonistic ideal o f  universal happiness (CD, 
190). The Grand Inquisitor knows the weaknesses o f humankind and is aware that its 
happiness lies in the negation of freedom o f will: according to Berdiaev, through this figure 
Dostoyevsky was denouncing not so much the papist theocracy o f the past but the socialist 
religion o f the present (FM, 281).
This idea o f a link beteween the traditional religion and the nihilistic-Socialism o f the 
Russian intelligentzia is stressed again in chapter IV o f Sources, where Dostoyevsky’s name 
o f recurs again as the prophet of the Russian Revolution, who foresaw the events o f the 20th 
century (SS, 166). According to René Fülop-Miller, in the 1927 The Mind and Face o f  
Bolshevism:
Dostoïevski [...] in his "Legend o f the Grand Inquisitor", which now seems prophetic, intuitively 
grasped and developed the identity between the peculiar variety of socialism long cherished in Russia and the 
ideas of the Jesuits. Dostoïevski found the same spirit in this Socialism and in Jesuitism. [„.] Berdiaev has shown 
in an excellent analysis o f"  Dostoïevski's Weltanschauung" that this writer found in the nihilistic and terroristic 
socialism of this time an idea which was identical with that at the root of the Catholic Inquisition.8 9
It comes as no surprise to find this idea in Camus’ HR: «Le socialisme moderne tend à 
créer une forme de jésuitisme séculier, à faire de tous les hommes des instruments» (E, 488-
88The «Nietzschean “revaluation of ali values", “beyond good and evil”, his radical nihilism and theomachy, 
even the idea o f a “superman”, can all be easily found in Dostoevsky’s novels [...]». Almost all of the Russian 
neo-idealists «wrote a major work about Dostoevsky, and were intimate with Dostoevsky’s "Nietzschean" ideas 
well before they became acquainted with Nietzsche himself» (M. Mihajov, “The Great Catalyzer: Nietzsche and 
Russian Neo-Idealism”, in B. Glatzer-Rosenthal, Nietzsche in Russia, op. cit., p. 132, 139).
89 Réné Fülop-Miller, The M ind and Face o f Bolshevism, op. cit., pp. 280-281.
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on
9). Camus was a passionate reader not only of Nietzsche but also o f Dostoyevsky, whom he 
had read through the critical inteipretation o f Shestov (E, 1625). This emerges clearly in the 
chapter on metaphysical revolt («Le refus du salut») in HR, where he discusses Ivan 
Karamazov’s argument, and sees with Berdiaev the starting point o f modern nihilism in his 
protest against evil.
Ivan rejects God’s creation in the name of justice, and refuses the pivotal principle of 
Christian morality, that is immortality (HR, 467), - «Je crois qu'il riy a pas de vertu sans 
immortalité» (Id.). However, if there is no immortality, there is no moral law, or distinction 
between good and evil: if  there is no immortality - confirms Berdiaev in his L'Esprit de 
Dostoïevski - everything is permitted.
Glatzer Rosenthal draws the attention to the affinity with Nietzsche's sentence in The 
Genealogy o f  Morals?1 where the philosopher states «Nothing is true, everything is 
permitted» (GM, III, 24). But, as Camus points out, Ivan does not say that there is no truth. 
He says that if there is a truth, it is not acceptable because it is unjust (HR, 466): his revolt 
remains within a metaphysical horizon, which is precisely erased in Nietzsche's argument. 
W hat Camus seems aware of is that Nietzsche represents a  further step in the movement of 
nihilism, which starts with Karamazov’s «Tout est permis» (HR, 467).90 12
What it is interesting to point out is that, where Berdiaev conceives Ivan as the 
embodiment o f Russian nihilism, and Dostoyevsky as the prophet o f the nihilistic roots o f 
Russian socialism, Camus turns Berdiaev's notion o f Nihilism from a purely Russian 
eschatological movement into a comerstone-event in the Western tradition between the 18th to 
the 20th century, culminating in ‘individual’ terrorism (the Russian intelligentzia till the 1905 
revolution) and State terrorism (under Fascism, Nazism and Soviet Communism).
As for Berdiaev in his book on Dostoyevsky, nihilism for Camus stems from modem 
rationalism, what the Russian calls the «Euclidean mind», which brings into question, and 
thus to final dissolution, traditional theodicy (E, 438). We find in HR the same argument as
90M y italics. The source o f this quote is not, as we might imagine, Berdiaev, but Nietzsche, who in H um an, A ll to 
H um an  (aph. 473) points out the terroristic character of Socialism, which outbids all the despotism of the past 
inasmuch as it expressly aspired to the annihilation of the individual, who appears to it like an unauthorized 
luxury of nature, destined to be improved into a useful organ o f  the com m unity. Socialism thus desires a more 
completely subservience o f the citizen to the absolute sta te  than has ever existed before, through the means of 
extreme terrorism.
91 Glatzer Rosenthal, N ietzsche in Russia, op. cit., p. 29.
92 Even though it is not possible to trace the inequivocable influence of Berdiaev’s work on Camus, it is 
nonetheless possible to detect many affinities in HR with the Russian’s argument in Sources. Camus, like 
Berdiaev, traces in this idea the root of a nihilistic religion that divinises man, and leads to the justification of 
murder (E, 468-9). And Dostoïevski becomes the “prophet” of this new religion, who foresaw it and announced 
it through his novels.
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Berdiaev's critique o f Dostoyevsky: illimited freedom without God only generates illimited 
despotism.
The rejection o f transcendency leads to the absolutisation of this world, and to the 
deification o f man’s arbitrary will (CD, 81) in order to realize the moralistic and socialist 
ideal of man’s ultimate emancipation. But this does not culminate historically in the «earthly 
paradise» o f  the nihilistic rationalists; instead it opens the way to tyranny and the destruction 
of personal freedom (CD, 83), illustrated by Chigalev and the Grand Inquisitor.
In HR we find the two sides o f the “rational dialectics” o f nihilism highlighted both by 
Frank and Berdiaev, that is, the absolutization and deification o f the relative and conditioned 
sphere of the human, on the one hand, and the destruction o f the world in the name of an 
abstract ideal, on the other.93
It is in Sources that Berdiaev first develops his thesis o f a Gnostic matrix o f modem 
nihilism, stressing the analogy between Bielinski’s atheistic theses - but also Bakunin and 
Lenin’s (SS, 77, 91) - with the Gnostic doctrine o f  the evil God, which the Russian author 
attributes to Marcion. It is interesting to notice that the name o f the Gnostic philosopher 
Marcion, quoted by Berdiaev in his analysis o f  Russian nihilistic thought, also recurs in the 
chapter on metaphysical revolt in l’H R .94
Now, in his analysis of the Russian intelligentsia Berdiaev raises the question o f  the 
relation between nihilism and contemporary forms o f apocalyptism, which draw upon, and are 
inseparable from the messianic («idolatrous») affirmation o f  a fatalistic or totalitarian 
“Weltanschauung”. The co-implication o f  nihilism and fatalism or totalitarianism in
93 In discussing the atheistic revolt of Ivan Karamazov, Berdiaev traces the contradictory outcomes of nihilism: 
on the one hand, it leads to the deification o f the world. If  there is no divine Sense, there is nothing outside "this 
world", and man can be the author of the future universal harmony. We find here a principle of metaphysical 
optimism, already pointed out by Frank in Vechi. However, on the other, the nihilistic revolt taken to its extreme 
consequences culminates in the destruction of the world -  n ih il The illusoriness of the revolutionary religion of 
progress is therefore revealed (CD, 152). «La négation - voilà mon dieu!» (SS, 74) states Bielinski. The Gnostic 
motive of the annih ila tio  m undi is apparent here.
^Camus was well acquainted with Gnosticism, and with Marcion in particular, from his graduation thesis in 
philosophy on M étaphysique C hrétienne e t N éoplatonism e in 1936 (E, 1255-fï). However, the link between 
Marcion’s Gnosticism and the nihilistic movement o f  revolt seems to be a later formulation. If  it is not possible 
to say whether Camus borrowed the idea o f a relation between the Gnostic contempt of the world and modem 
Nihilism from Berdiaev alone, there is no doubt that Sources -  which, as we believe, Camus read in 1947 -  
confirmed, if  not forming the original suggestion in the first place, this thesis in HR. In the Introduction to 
Science, P o litics and  G nosticism  Eric Voegelin mentions Camus’ L ’H om m e Révolté as one of the most 
comprehensive studies o f the post-war years (along with the work o f Henri de Lubac) on Gnosticism and the 18th 
and 19* century movements. As he points out, the interest in the Gnostic roots of modem philosophies (from 
Positivism, to Hegelianism and Marxism) goes back to the 1930’s, namely to Jonas’s G nosis und Spàtantiker 
Geist, and von Balthasar’s Prom etheus: he does not mention Berdiaev (See Eric Voegelin, Science, P olitics and  
G nosticism , Regnery Company, Chicago, 1968, pp. v and 7). In the chapter on "Nihilism, Existentialism and 
Gnosticism" Volpi focuses on Voegelin's contribution, and praises Camus for having pointed out the gnostic root 
in the nihilistic principle o f  the annihilatio m undi (Id., 84), but he does not seem to be aware that Berdiaev had 
already formulated this thesis in 1938 in Sources (Volpi, II N ichilism o, Laterza, Bari, 1999).
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Berdiaev’s work emerges from his definition of the Russian attitude as an «integral 
affirmation» of a religious kind (SS, 86). This idea is developed in Sources, in the pages on 
Lukács and the Russian revolutionary attitude:
L e sens révolutionnaire, c'est la totalité, c 'e st l'intégralité au regard de chacun des actes de la vie. Le 
révolutionnaire est celui qui, dans chaque acte particulier accompli par lui, se réfère au tout, à la société entière, 
se soumet à son universalité. Pour le révolutionnaire, il n'est pas de sphères délimitées, il n’admet pas le 
morcellement, il n’admet pas l'autonomie de l'action vis-à-vis de la pensée. Le révolutionnaire possède une 
conception du m onde to ta le  où la théorie et la pratique sont organiquement fondues. Le totaîism e - c'est le 
principe fondamental de l’attitude révolutionnaire par rapport à la vie. [...] Car les révolutionnaires russes, même 
dans le passé, avaient tou jours été to ta listes ou  "to ta li ta ir e s La révolution était pour eux à la fois une religion et 
une philosophie, et non seulement un combat lié aux côtés politique et social de l’existence. (SS, 204-206) [My 
italics]
Berdiaev uses the terms totalisticftotalitarian, referring to the Russian revolutionary 
intelligentsia, in the sense of a total or integral conception of the world that embraces every 
aspect o f existence - the fusion of theory and practice, annihilation o f the dualism between the 
private sphere o f the individual and the political sphere o f the social and political struggle, 
devoting the life of the single individual to a transcendent aim. 95 Hence, the definition o f 
Russian communism as a secularised religion, which replaces the Judeo-Christian God with a 
rational idea (social collectivity, the mission of the proletariat) .96
Like Frank (V, 183), Berdiaev emphasizes the philosophical and moral dimension o f 
the notion of toialism/totalitarianism, identifying it with the nihilistic faith o f the Russian 
revolutionary. Totalitarianism is the urge for an integral faith as the moral and political 
foundation, which stems from a messianic and escathological form of nihilism: «Le 
totalitarisme, la nécessité d'une fo i  intégrale commes bases d’un royaume, répondent aux 
besoins profonds des instincts religieux et sociaux du peuple russe» (SS, 285).97
We must not forget that at the time Berdiaev was writing Sources et sens du 
communisme russe the term ‘totalitarianism’ was no longer a neutral philosophical concept, 
but had already entered the intellectual debate with a strong political connotation. Abbott
95 Berdiaev clearly stresses the Hegelian root of the term ’totalistic'/’total itarian' in the opening pages of Sources, 
where he focuses on the opposition between the “Occidentalists” and the “Slavophiles”, and highlights the 
influences of German Idealism on the Russian thought of the 1830-40’s (SS, 49).
96 Berdiaev uses the term “totalitarian” to describe the Russian revolutionary conception o f existence, as a 
secularized religious perspective “totally”and idealistically projected towards the realization of a future aim * the 
communist society without classes, as the ultimate liberation of man from oppression and alienation. Berdiaev 
talks about a «conception to ta le  du monde» (SS, 220) among Russian intellectuals, which echoes Struve's 
definition of a Russian “maximalist” conception («all or nothing») of existence (V, 155), and Frank's definition 
o f  revolutionarism  as the moral-social conception o f the world of the Russian intelligentsia (V, 183). Camus 
uses the expression «All or nothing» to describe Ivan Karamazov’s revolt against God’s unjust order (HR, 467).
97 My italics.
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Gleason highlights the ideological roots o f the use of the term ‘totalitarianism’ in the 
intellectual debate o f  the Thirties:
The idea of totality, like the idea of totalitarianism, is ultimately derived from the organic thinking of 
nineteenth-century Romantics. It was given classic formulation by Hegel and has become central to the whole 
history of Marxism [...]. There is some overlap between ’’totality", grasping/understanding the world as an 
integral whole, and "totalitarianism", m aking  it a whole [...].It is easy to see how the statism that derived from 
conservative followers o f  Hegel set as a goal the absorption of the individual by the state. [...] this project is 
easily seen in the philosophical system of Giovanni Gentile [...]. But it may also be that the Left Hegelianism of 
Marx and others pushed humanity in the same direction. As A. Walicki noted in 1983, Marx was quite willing to 
sacrifice the human beings o f his present day for the better ones that the revolution would create. In addition, he 
"saw no positive value in privacy; his ideal o f  the total subordination of the private sphere to the public sphere 
[...] deserves to be classified as a kind o f democratic totalitarianism.9*
Berdiaev highlights the nihilistic and messianic roots o f the Bolshevik idea o f totality. 
In chapter VI of his work he traces a clear line o f continuity between the nihilists o f the 19th 
century - Tchemichevski, Netchaev, Tkachev and Jeliabov - and Lenin (SS, 225-6).
Nihilism in this sense coincides with a form of immoralism, which negates all transcendent 
values and divinizes the political ends o f revolution -  hence Netchaev's idea, taken over by 
Lenin, that moral is only what serves the aim o f revolution (SS, 119).
Materialism is, in Berdiaev’s view, the intellectual expression o f this form o f nihilism. 
But, as he had already stressed in Vechi, the Russian moralistic need for an integral 
conception o f  the world, for an absolute and pseudo-religious truth, entails the opportunistic 
and utilitarian use o f  every possible philosophical doctrine that could confirm the social and 
political interests o f  the party (V, 16). A  disinterested love for truth is reduced among the 
Russian intelligentsia to a means for social revolution, that is, for the realization o f  the 
material happiness o f  mankind («paradise on earth», V, 21). Thus, the escathological 
perspective o f  the Russian nihilistic tabula rasa o f transcendence betrays an idealistic 
conception o f  a total system that could unify the theoretical and practical aspects o f  human 
life in view o f  a superior end. 98
98 Gleason, A., Totalitarianism : the inner h isto ry o f  the C old  War, op. cit., 9. It is interesting to notice that the 
expression «to ta l conception o f life», used by Berdiaev to describe Russian revolutionary Socialism, also recurs 
in Giovanni Gentile's definition of Fascism. In the early twenties the Italian philosopher had taken over the use 
of the notions oftotality ' and 'totalitarianism' in a strong statist sense, to describe the Fascist «all-embracing state 
which would overcome the state-society divide». The term ‘totalitarian' was first introduced in the political 
debate by Giovanni Amendola in 1923, and soon employed by Liberal opponents of fascism to describe the 
regime (see Tarchi, “II Totalitarismo nel dibattito politologico”, F iloso fia  P o litico , XI, aprile 1997, 63 ff.; I. 
Kershaw, C he c o s ’e  il N azism o?, op. cit, 41; and S. Forti, II  totalitarism o , Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2001). Berdiaev 
seems to be aware of these acceptions when he stresses in Sources the “totalitarian” absorption of the private in 
the public sphere, of the individual in the collectivity, realized by Russian Marxism. The author distinguishes a 
“critical” Marxism from what he defines as the «nouveau marxisme orthodoxe to talitaire»  (SS, 209), that is, 
Bolshevism. «Orthodox» in that it constitutes a philosophy/religion o f revolution (SS, 206), Bolshevism is 
to ta listic  or to ta lita ria n  in that it propounds an ideal o f integrity, o f non-dispersal, which involves and unifies 
every sphere o f life.
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One o f its logical consequences is the idea of man’s freedom as “collective”, what 
Camus defines as total freedom: «Ce qui existe en Russie, - he notes in his Carnets - c'est une 
liberté collective ‘‘totale” et non personelle. Mais qu'est-ce qu’une liberté totale? On est libre 
de quelque chose - par rapport à. Visiblement, la limite c’est la liberté par rapport à Dieu. On 
voit alors clairement qu’elle signifie l’asservissement à l’homme» (Cil, 229).
The problem, that Camus synthetizes here, is developed by Berdiaev in chapter VI of 
Sources, where he discusses the problem of freedom in Soviet Union from a Christian 
viewpoint. Freedom in the Russian «Communist Empire» (SS, 304), argues Berdiaev, is 
conceived as freedom o f  action, as the realization of a creative drive, which culminates in 
social reconstruction and revolution:
Mais comprendre ainsi la liberté comme un acte, et ne pas vouloir considérer ce qui intérieurement 
précède cet acte [...] c'est nier la liberté de conscience, la liberté de pensée. L'une comme l’autre, en effet, sont 
totalement annihilées dans l'empire communiste russe. La liberté ne s'y entend que dans un sens collectif et non 
personnel. La personnalité n'a aucune autonomie au regard de la collectivité sociale, il n'existe ni liberté, ni 
conscience personnelles. La personne humaine n'est libre qu'autant qu'elle s'incorpore à la communauté. (SS, 
304)
As Berdiaev points out, this type o f community, which absorbs the individual, 
historically developed in Russia in the form of an extreme statism, in perfect continuity with 
the ancient Russian tradition of government (SS, 284-5).
The nihilistic-materialistic reduction o f the Kingdom of God to the Kingdom of Caesar
(SS, 305), and the Idealistic conception o f a superior political aim pursued by Russian
communism, entails the annihilation o f personality and the reduction o f the living individual
to a means for the building o f the communist society: «La morale communiste révolutionnaire
se révèle sans merci envers l'homme concret, vivant, envers le prochain. L’individu n’est rien
qu’un brique indispensable pour la construcion de la société communiste, il n'est qu'un 
00moyen» (Id.).
The nihilistic and totalitarian character of the Russian Revolution, which, in 
Berdiaev’s, view brings forth the apocalyptic and messianic tendencies of Russian thought, 
led the author in 1935 to the conclusion that «l’État communiste russe est à l’heure actuelle le 9
99 My italics. Berdiaev's stress on the etatist implications of the notion of Totalitarianism, and on totalism as the 
ideological dimension of a phenomenon that erases all distinction between private and public sphere, between 
the individual and the collectivity, shows many affinities with a certain political debate, that developed from 
Italy (1923) to Germany, and to the English-speaking world during the Thirties. There is a clear affinity, for 
instance, between Berdiaev's argument in Sources and Waldemar Gurian's definition of the Bolshevik state as a 
“totalitarian state that cannot, like the Fascist, leave particular spheres o f life -  for example religion -  outside its 
orbit” {Bolshevism, New York, Macmillan, 1932), see A. Gleason, Totalitarianism, op. cit., p. 223-224, note 12.
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seul example qui existe d'un État "totalitaire", fondé sur la dictature d'une conception du 
monde, sur une doctrine orthodoxe, imposée à la population entière» (SS, 284).
In the intellectual debate o f the thirties and forties Berdiaev was not the only one to 
stress a connection between Nihilism and Totalitarianism: as w e have already pointed out, in 
1938 Hermann Rausching had published in Zürich Die Revolution des Nihilismus, where he 
offered an interpretation o f National Socialism in terms o f a movement of «sheer destruction» 
and «utter nihilism» (RD, xii).
But, while the German writer conceives nihilism as the outcome of a  sceptical 
movement that swept Europe at the beginning of the 20th century; not only does Berdiaev 
exclude scepticism as a possibility of Russian thought, but he conceives Nihilism as the 
product o f a peculiar combination of the Russian dogmatical and apocalytpical attitude with 
an extreme rationalism (the «Euclydean Mind», CD, 151).100
Thus conceived, nihilism is the intellectual source of a totalitarian conception o f  the 
world, which characterizes Russian revolutionary thought from the second half o f  the 19th 
century, which culminates into Bolshevism, resulting in the institution under Stalin’s regime 
o f a totalitarian State.
Berdiaev is surely aware o f  the similarities with the regimes in Fascist Italy and Nazi 
Germany.101 The difference, in his view, between Fascism and Nazism, on the one hand, and
100Even though both Berdiaev and Rauschning analyse the problem of Nihilism from a Christian point o f  view - 
which identifies Nihilism with the tabula  rasa  of spiritual values (im m oralism ), they develop the notion of 
Nihilism in different directions. For Rauschning, nihilism is «belief in nothing», a total lack o f faith and moral 
disintegration, leading to an unscrupulous cynicism (RD, 99) and to an «unprincipled policy of violence» (RD, 
29). The logical consequence o f the nihilistic «loss o f standards» is the reduction o f man to his animal instincts 
and drives, and the idea o f violence as prim a  et vn ica  ratio . Nihilism, in Rauschning's view, entails a radical and 
all-embracing «permanent revolution o f sheer destruction» o f the political sphere, disguised under a surface of 
discipline and order. Rauschning's definition of nihilism allows him to formulate the paradoxical thesis that those 
policies which come «before the world in the heavy armour o f a comprehensive and absolutely binding 
philosophy» are actually revolutions without a doctrine, or rather, with doctrines that are reduced to 
«philosophies for show», carefully manifactured by the élite for propaganda purposes, in order to mobilize the 
masses. Rauschning's focus is on National Socialism in Germany, although in the concluding section o f his book 
he suggests that the notion o f nihilism may be extended also to describe the Russian communist regime under 
Stalin (RD, 60). Rauschning distinguishes Stalinism, as total nihilism, from Leninism - the backbone o f which, 
he argues, is still an unshaken belief in human reason. The anti-metaphysical negation o f all traditional and 
transcendent values is masked, in his view, by the fact that «po litica l nihilism  has dressed itself up in the paradox 
of an absolutely binding, more or less rationally argued, philosophy or doctrine realised to a religion» (ibidem). 
The distance from Berdiaev's definition o f nihilism as a religious phenomenon stemming from the anti-sceptical 
and messianic tendency o f Russian spirit in Sources is apparent.
101 In Sources he defines Stalinism as «une sorte de fa sc ism e  à  la  m anière russe»: «Les caractères essentiels du 
fascisme sont là ressemblés; le capitalisme d'État, servant de base à l'É ta t to ta l, le nationalisme, le césarisme 
suscitant une jeunesse militarisée. [...] si Lénine n'était pas encore dictateur, au  sen s actuel du mot, Staline l’est 
pleinement» (SS, 292-3). And further down he adds: «La société et l’État communistes prétendent à l’intégralité. 
Mais seul un Royaume de Dieu peut être intégral, le royaume de César sera toujours partiel. Or, le communisme 
a érigé le royaume de César en royaume divin, com m e a  fa it  le  na tional-socia lism e allem and [...]» (SS, 307).
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Stalinism, on the other, is precisely that the latter has realized the integral or totalitarian idea 
«d’une façon plus cohérente et plus complète» (Id.). This is the reason why only the 
Communist State fully realizes the «totalitarian State», which is according to Berdiaev, a state 
founded on the dictatorship of a Weltanschauung, on an “orthodoxe” doctrine imposed on the 
entire population (SS, 284).102
That Camus was familiar with La révolution du nihilisme is stressed by JeanYves 
Guérin,103 and emerges clearly from the chapter on «Terrorisme d’État et la Terreur 
irrationnelle», where the author discusses the German’s thesis o f  National Socialism as a 
nihilistic mouvement o f  pure dynamism (HR, 584). However, Berdiaev’s use o f the terms 
nihilism and totalitarian in SS  is clearly the source for his argument on «Le terrorisme 
individuel» in the section devoted to Historical Revolt, especially dealing with Russian early 
Nihilism, from Pisarev to Bakounine and Netchaev (HR, 556-570), and in the section on 
«Terrorisme d'État et la Terreur Rationnelle», where Berdiaev figures,104 together with 
Simone Weil’s La condition ouvrière (HR, 619),105 and Grenier’s Essai sur Vesprit 
d'orthodoxie, among the sources for Camus’s critique of Marxism.
The relevance o f this source is all the more significant if  we compare Camus’s use o f 
the term “nihilism” in HR with the earlier (ante 1947) writings.
In the 1946 article «Le socialisme mystifié» the author still distinguished the 
«ideologies nihilistes» - by which he refers in particular to Hitlerism, that Camus resumed in 
the idea «tout est permis, ce qui compte est de réussir» (CAC8, 617) -  from the «philosophies 
qui font de l’histoire un absolu (Hegel, puis Marx: le but étant la société sans classes, tout est
102It is interesting to point out that the very idea of a "totalitarian S ta te” is rejected by Rauschning in 1938: he 
uses the term ’totalitarianism' in the sense of 'totalism', but he refuses the equation 'totalisin'-'statism', pointing 
out the contradictory nature of the notion of "totalitarian State" - «Nothing is more mistaken than to talk o f a 
'to ta litarian  S ta te 'o r  'classless society' within the realm o f a nihilist revolution. In the place of these there is the 
machinery of absolute dominion, recognizing independence in no sphere at all, not even in the private life o f the 
individual; and the to ta litarian collectivity of the Volksgemeinschaft, the 'national community’, a euphemism for 
an atomized, structureless nation» (RD, 28). Rauschning's definition of to ta l N ihilism  as an omnipervasive 
movement of destruction is incompatible, in his view, with the idea of State: «There is no true sphere of the State 
in the Third Reich» (RD, 28). Franz Neumann comes to similar conclusions in the chapter "Is Germany State?" 
in B ehem oth. Rauschning's thesis on nihilism is also discussed by Leo Strauss in a conference paper on "G erm an  
n ih il ism ", presented at the N ew  School fo r  Social R esearch  of New York in 1941. Exiled in the USA, and 
professor at the Faculty of Political and Social Science from 1938 on, Strauss analyses the problem of nihilism, 
and its identification with National Socialism. Echoing Rauschining he identifies nihilism with the rejection of 
civilization («the conscious culture of human reason» in science and moral) and with the reduction o f man to the 
«natural» foundation of human existence, culminating in the heroic exaltation o f war and conquest, as a 
Hobbesian “state o f nature”. (Leo Strauss, “II nichilismo tedesco”, in Esposito, Galli, Vitiello, N ichilism o e  
P o litico , Laterza, 2000, pp. 111-134).
103 JeanYves Guérin, “L’Europe entre la démocratie et le totalitarisme”, in C am us. P ortrait de l'a rtiste  en  
citoyen , Bourin, Paris, 1993, p. 205.
104 Cf. E, 603 with SS, 193.
105 On the influence of Simone Weil’s critique o f Marxism in L ’H om m e R évo lté  see Rosen, F., “Marxism, 
Mysticism, and Liberty. The influence of Simone Weil on Albert Camus”, P o litica l Theory, 7(3), 1979.
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bon qui y conduit)» (Id.). Both ideologies are seen as justifying political realism and terror by 
elevating the efficacy o f  action to an absolute and unconditional end - «Car la terreur ne se 
légitime que si Ton admet le principe: “La fin justifie les moyens”.» (CAC8, 617) - implying 
the consequent de-valuation of life to sheer expendable means - «[...] le meurtre est légitimé 
et [...] la vie humaine est considérée comme futile. Voilà le premier problème politique 
d ’aujourd’hui» (CAC8, 612). Camus is, here, still using the adjective nihilist in the sense of 
Rauschning’s loss o f  belief, or «néant de toute morale» (HR, 508), thus insisting on the 
relation between moral nihilism and power policies or will to power (HR, 511).
Echoes o f this use may still be found in the Introduction to HR : «Si notre temps 
admet aisément que le meurtre ait ses justifications, c’est à cause de cette indifférence à la vie 
qui est la marque du nihilisme» (HR, 416). This nihilistic «indifference to life», in the sense 
o f an absolute negation o f all value to human life and personal dignity, already recurred in 
Camus’s LAA to describe the Nazi philosophy o f violence (E, 240-241): the affinity with 
Rauschning's thesis o f  the Nazi power policy as the outcome o f the nihilistic reduction of man 
to the instinctual being is apparent.
I would argue, nevertheless, that after 1947 Camus complements the earlier thesis with 
his appropriation o f Berdiaev’s thought. In HR Camus identifies nihilism with an absolutist 
thought (pensée absolutiste) (HR, 692): «On peut être nihilistes de deux façons -  he writes in 
1951 - et chaque fois par une mtempérence d ’absolu». The Nietzschean motif o f the death of 
God, coupled with Karamazov’s immoralistic awareness that «if there is no immortality, 
everything is permitted» (HR, 467), may be traced at the root o f  a twofold attitude: the 
superhuman love o f  this world (amor fati), culminating in a unconditional consent to evil, or 
the absolute yes  to reality and crime (HR, 509), on the one hand; and the Gnostic contempt of 
the world, the asbolute no to the finitude o f  existence, which leads to the hubristic project o f 
destroying the evil creation to build a new order, on the other.106
Now, in both cases we are dealing, in Camus’s view, with forms o f  «secularized 
religion», these nihilistic perspectives culminating logically in the God-making o f man, that 
is, in the negation o f  all transcendent limit to human power and the deification o f human 
beings, which in both cases justifies terror or «absolute destruction» (E, 510).
Like Berdiaev, Camus traces nihilism back to man's revolt against an evil condition, to 
a revendication, that is, o f unity (happiness and eternity) against the unjust finitude o f an 
existence o f  suffering and death (HR, 508). This metaphysical revendication o f unity enters
106 We can trace a strong affinity with Dostoïevski's two sides of nihilism, total deification and total annihilation 
of the world, stressed by Berdiaev in his L'Esprit de Dostoïevski (CD, 151-152).
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history through the violent means o f revolution, «la révolution obéiss[e] au nihilisme», (HR, 
649) - «Le nihilisme, étroitement mêlé au mouvement d'une religion déçue, s’achève ainsi en 
terrorisme» (E, 572). New transcendentless “religions” are defined by Camus the 20th century 
totalitarian ideologies o f  State terrorism, that is, Nazism and Soviet Communism.
Now, according to Pisier and Bouretz :107
Camus rejoint tous ceux penseurs contemporains qu'essayent à penser ensemble stalinisme et nazisme, 
et particulièrement Hannah Arendt ou Raymond Aron. Singulièrement, dès 1944, Aron proposait, pour analyser 
ce phénomène double, le concept de « religion séculière» [...]. Même si la construction aronienne est 
théoriquement plus solide que celle de Camus, il est clair que l'intuition est similaire. On ne sait si Camus avait 
lu Arendt ou Aron, mais en voyant dans le totalitarisme le jeu d’idéologies qui fonctionnent sur un mode 
religieux, adapté certes aux exigences d'un univers désenchanté, il rejoint ce dernier (CP, 273-4).
As the two authors point out to confirm their argument, Camus uses the expression 
«théocratie totalitaire» (HR, 581) to refer to the Communist regime. What they both overlook, 
in m y view, is not only that the formula already figures in, and was plausibly taken from, 
Berdiaev’s SS  (« Lorsque la politique obéit ainsi aux mots d’ordre de l'orthodoxie, l’État 
devient une Église. Telle fut la théocratie chrétienne du moyen âge, telle est la ,fthéocratie” 
soviétique, et il en sera de même pour tout gouvernement qui prétendra au "totalitarisme".», 
SS, 337), but that Camus’ use of the same exceeds all attempts to place his analysis among 
Christian-Conservative (Berdiaev), as well as Liberal (Aron) theories o f totalitarianism.
The fact that Camus did not share, as the lyrical essays and the articles of Combat 
prove, the philosophico-political and religious premises of conservative thinkers such as 
Berdiaev and Rauschning, 108 109makes the appropriation of their arguments all the more 
significant. The author’s choice, in 1950-51, to take over the terminology and diagnosis of 
Soviet Communism by an eminent outsider in the French intellectual panorama o f the ‘40’s 
and ‘50’s, deserves a particular attention, forcing us to reconsider the critical intentions o f the 
author against the hastly dismissal of the argument of HR as outmoded and dated, or 
against the socio-political scientists’ critique of lack of analytical rigour.110
107 Éveline Pisier, Pierre Bouretz, « Camus et le marxisme », Camus e t la p o litique, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1986, 
269-280.
,0* For both Rauschning and Berdiaev the revaluation or “return” to Christian values of the tradition is the only 
possible solution against nihilism and its totalitarian offspring (see Camus’ draft for an insert to the first edition 
o f MdS).
109 Chiaromonte defines as « dated» the arguments and conclusions o f the essay on revolt, and further on he 
writes that «Camus formulates against the modem world the same indictment as Tolstoy», in N. Chiaromonte, 
“Sartre versus Camus: A Political Quarrel”, a r t cit., p. 147.
1,0 According to Pisier and Bouretz, «l'analyse camusienne du totalitarisme pèche quelque peu du coté de la 
précision méthodique [...]» (Camus et la politique, op. cit., p. 274).
157
WMHDmwwwiMnwwm
Although we have no proof as to whether Camus had read Arendt, we have textual 
evidence that Arendt had read Camus’ work - the 1946 article The Human Crisis, which she 
cites in OT, and HR -  but at no time does she suggest that HR m ight fall into, and be reduced 
to, the categories o f  Conservative political theories, which were the object o f extensive 
criticism in her writings of the Fifties.
The point that I want to make is that Camus’ analysis o f  totalitarian ideologies in HR 
cannot, and is not intended to be read through the lenses o f the Political Sciences.111 The 
argument for such thesis is provided by Hannah Arendt herself in  the 1953 essay Religion and 
Politics. As she points out, in terms that echo Camus’ argument on metaphysical revolt in HR, 
the «interpretation o f the new political ideologies [such as Communism] as political, or 
secular, religions has paradoxically, though perhaps not accidentally, followed Marx’s well- 
known denunciation of all religions as mere ideologies. But its true origin is even older. Not 
Communism,buth atheism, was the first ism to be denounced or praised as a new religion. 
[...] For atheism was something more than the rather stupid claim to be able to prove the non­
existence o f  God; it was taken to mean an actual rebellion o f  modem man against God 
him self In Nietzsche’s words: “I f  there were gods, how would I bear not to be one”.» (EU, 
369). Now,
[...] recently the term of “political or secular religion” has been adopted by two quite distinct trends of 
thought and approach. There is first the historical approach for which a secular religion is quite literally a 
religion growing out o f the spiritual secularity of our present world so that Communism is only the most radical 
version of an “ immanentist heresy”. And there is second the approach o f the social sciences which treat ideology 
and religion as one and the same thing because they believe that Communism (or nationalism or imperialism, 
etc.) fulfills for its adherents the same “function” that our religious denominations fulfill in a free society. (EU, 
372)
Arendt’s argument is of a particular interest for it can be read en filigrane with Camus’ 
raisonnement absurde in the first part o f the MdS: by defining secularity as the key-feature of 
the modem world, which coincided with the entering o f  doubt into «belief no less than non­
belief», historically brought about by the rise o f  natural sciences in the 17th century, Arendt
111 We know, nevertheless, that Camus was well aware o f the contemporary debate on Totalitarianism: for HR he 
had read, among the philosophical works (Heidegger, and Lenin in particular), Halévy’s L ’Ere des tyrannies, and 
Popper’s The Open Society. Between 1943 and 1947 he was in touch, and exchanged views with Aron and 
Nicola Chiaromonte, who represents an important tra it-d’vnion with the American debate on Totalitarianism 
prior to the publication o f Hannah Arendt’s The Origins o f Totalitarianism  (Dwight MacDonald and Mary 
McCarthy). In the post-war years Camus had become close to Arthur Koestler, and the Carnets testify of 
political discussions with Manés Sperber(C II, 185).
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argues that modem belief, represented by Kiekegaard («which has leaped from doubt into 
belief»), and modem atheism («which has leaped from doubt into non-belief»),112
[...] have this in common: both are grounded in modem spiritual secularism and have evaded its 
inherent perplexities by a violent resolution once and for all. (EU, 369) [My italics]
Secularity is inseparable from a philosophy of doubt, which Arendt traces at the root 
o f modem science, as opposed to the ancient philosophy o f thaumadzein, or «wonder at that 
which is as it is» (EU, 370):
Instead of marveling at the miracles of the universe which revealed themselves in their appearance to 
human senses and reason, we began to suspect that things might not be what they seemed. [...] From this basic 
distrust of appearances, this doubt that appearance reveals truth, two radically different conclusions could be 
drawn: Pascal’s despair that “les sens abusent la raison par de fausses apparences” from which comes the 
“recognition of human misery without God”, or the modem scientific pragmatic affirmation that truth itself is by 
no means a revelation but, rather, a process of ever-changing patterns o f working hypotheses.
[...] This suspicion could only rise out o f so passionate a desire fo r security that men forgot that human 
freedom of thought and action is possible only under conditions of insecure and limited knowledge, as Kant 
demonstrated philosophically. (EU,370) [My italics]
Now, her main argument against the identification of Communism as a secular 
religion, in the sense traditionally ascribed to atheism, is that the former «never tries to 
answer religious questions specifically, but makes sure that its ideologically trained adherents 
will never raise them. Nor do ideologies, which always are concerned with the explanation o f 
the movement of history, give the same kind o f explanation as theology. Theology treats man 
as a reasonable being that asks questions and whose reason needs reconciliation [...]. An 
ideology, and Communism in its politically effective totalitarian form more than any other, 
treats man as though he were a falling stone, endowed with the gift o f  consciousness [...]» 
(EU, 371).113 According to Arendt, totalitarian ideology (Communism in the specific case) 
«though it grew out o f Western history, no longer belongs in the same tradition o f  doubt and  
secularity», so that to use the notion of «secular religion» to describe this new ism is not only 
inappropriate, but an «entirely undeserved compliment» (EU, 371).
This argument is further elucidated in another essay, The Concept o f  History. Ancient 
a n d  Modern, where Arendt dwells upon the question of secularisation:
If by “secularization” one means no more than the rise of the secular and the concomitant eclipse o f a 
transcendent world, then it is indéniable that modem historical consciousness is very intimately connected with 
it. This, however, in no way implies the doubtful transformation o f religious and transcendent categories into
n * EU, 369.
113 My italics.
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immanent earthly aims and standards on which the historians o f ideas have recently insisted. Secularization 
means first o f all simply the separation ofreligion and politics (BPF, 69) [My italics]
Arendt suggests that this separation entailed the coining to the fore of the political 
dimension in the modem age, in terms which had been unknown to the Western world since 
ancient, pre-Socratic, Greek culture - with a renewed emphasis on the experience o f action 
(BPF, 85), as the most fragile, futile and unpredictable o f human capacities:
Action, [...] as the Greeks were the first to discover, is in and by itself utterly futile; it never leaves an 
end product behind itself. If it has any consequences at all, they consist in principle in an endless new chain of 
happenings whose eventual outcome the actor is utterly incapable o f knowing and controlling beforehand. The 
most he may be able to do is to force things into a certain direction, and even o f this he can never be sure. (BPF, 
59-60)
Thus, the modem separation o f  political thinking from theology entailed that 
«[politically speaking, within the secular realm itself secularization meant nothing more or 
less than that men once more had become mortals» (BPF, 74), in other words, they were 
exposed to that fragility and contingency o f human action, against which the Western 
tradition -  summarised by Arendt in the Greek-Roman, on the one hand, and the Christian 
notion of History, on the other (Augustine) (Id.) -  can be read as an attempt to secure, to 
bring stability, in the realm o f human affairs - what Arendt addresses, through Aristotle, as the 
activity of “immortalizing” (BPF, 71).
As immortalizing is defined by Arendt as «an activity o f  mortal men, [which] can be 
meaningful only if  there is no guarantee o f  life in the hereafter» (BPF, 74), the author 
summarises the traditional alternative to the necessity o f immortalizing in the twofold solution 
o f bestowing immortality upon the world -  illustrated by the Greek and Roman emphasis on 
the foundation of the body politic, as an artificial imperishable “space”, within and through 
which men’s life could exclusively acquire that meaning and dignity that would overcome its 
mortality and futility - 114 and o f bestowing immortality upon life, represented by Christian 
thought, whose radical anti-political attitude, which took over and developed the apolitical 
tradition o f ancient philosophy, was transformed into a political theory by Augustine («who,
1,4 «For Greeks and Romans alike, all differences notwithstanding, the foundation of the body politic was 
brought about by man’s need to overcome the mortality of human life and the futility of human deeds. Outside 
the body politic, man’s life was not only and not primarily insecure, i.e., exposed to the violence of others; it was 
without meaning and dignity because under no circumstances could it leave any traces behind it. [...] What 
Homer had done was to immortalize human deeds, and the polls could dispense with the service of “other of his 
craft” because it offered each o f its citizens that public-political space that it assumed would confer immortality 
upon his acts.» (BPF, 71-72).
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though hardly the father o f our concept o f history, is probably the spiritual author and 
certainly the greatest theorist o f Christian politics» (BPF, 73).115
The modem emancipation o f the secular sphere of human life from religion, generally 
addressed as “secularization”, entailing the dissolution o f the Christian identification o f  
political life with the immortal life realized by Augustine (BPF, 73), rendered the former to its 
mortality and futility without, nevertheless, being able to recover the «ancient trust in the 
world’s being more permanent than individual men and in political structures as a guarantee 
of earthly survival after death» (BPF, 74). The modem age, thus, coincides, in Arendt’s 
words, with the emergence and affirmation o f the notion of absolute mortality, which is 
intimately linked to the renewed emphasis, in contemporary times, on political action.116
This development is visible, according to Arendt, in the modem concept o f History, 
which has its most accomplished formulation in Hegel’s philosophy.
Hegelian metaphysics breaks with the tradition o f Western (Platonic) metaphysics, 
which Arendt traces back to the philosophers’ a-political effort to add to that human artifice, 
which is the polls > something more permanent (the eternal Being, or the everlasting Ideas) 
than the insecure and contingent realm o f human affairs (BPF, 68, 71): «To think, with Hegel, 
that truth resides and reveals itself in the time-process itself is characteristic o f all modem 
historical consciousness» (BPF, 68),
Now, the notion o f process «does not denote an objective quality of either history or 
nature; it is the inevitable result o f  human action» (BPF, 62), and its emergence in modem 
time proceeds from, and is the mark of, the progressive retreat of the world or the loss o f the 
human artifice, concomitant with the blurring of the boundaries between nature and history.
The splitting o f the atom as a «man-made natural process» is, in Arendt’s view, the 
climatic moment of the obliteration o f the «defensive boundaries between natural elements 
and the human artifice», and the entering o f human action («up to our own age [...] confined 
to the human world», BPF, 60) into nature, which, only apparently, meant the incorporation 
and mastering o f the natural elements into the stable man-made world. Technology, «the
115 «To Christians only individual men were immortal, but nothing else o f this world, neither mankind as a whole 
nor the earth itself, least o f all the human artifice [i.e. the world]. Only by transcending this world could 
immortalizing activities be performed, and the only institution that could be justified within the secular realm 
was the Church, the Civitas Dei on earth [...]» (BPF, 72). It was Augustine, «still firmly rooted in the Roman 
tradition» (BPF, 73), who added to «the Christian notion of an everlasting life the idea of a future civitas, a 
Civitas Dei, where men even in the hereafter would continue to live in a community.» (Id.). As Arendt points 
out, «the insight into the perishability of all human creations had no great relevance for Christian thought and 
could even in its greatest thinker be in accord with a conception of politics beyond the secular realm [...]» (BPF, 
73).
1,6 «Now both life and world had become perishable, mortal, and futile» (BPF, 74.).
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ground on which the two realms o f history and nature have met and interpenetrated each other 
in our time» (BPF, 61), by starting natural artifices decreets the ultimate and irreparable 
defeat of homo faber :
The dangers o f this acting into nature are obvious if we assume that the aforementioned characteristics 
of human action are part and parcel of the human condition. Unpredictability is not tack of foresight, and no 
engeneering management of human affairs will ever be able to eliminate it, just as no training in prudence can 
ever lead to the wisdom of knowing what one does* Only total conditioning, that is, the total abolition o f action, 
can ever hope to cope with unpredictability. And even the predictability o f  human behaviour which political 
terror can enforce for relatively long periods o f time is hardly able to change the very essence of human affairs 
once and for all; it can never be sure o f its own future. [...] If, therefore, by starting natural processes, we have 
begun to act into nature, we have manifestly begun to cany our own unpredictability into the realm which we 
used to think of as ruled by inexorable laws. The “iron law” o f history was always only a metaphor borrowed 
from nature; and the fact is that this metaphor no longer convinces us because it has turned out that natural 
science can by no means be sure of an unchallengeable rule o f law in nature as soon as men, scientists and 
technicians, or simply builders of the human artifice, decide to interfere and no longer leave nature to herself. 
(BPF, 60-61)
Arendt’s inquiry into the contrast between the ancient (Greek and Roman-Christian) 
and the modem (Hegelian) concept o f history is guided by the focus on action, which allows 
her to refute the thesis that «the modem historical consciousness has a Christian religious 
origin and came into being through a secularization o f originally theological categories» 
(BPF, 65).117
Not only does the latter reject the notions o f exemplarity and of the repetition of 
secular events at the core of the ancient understanding(s) o f history, but also nothing is «more 
alien to the modem concept o f history [than] the Christian notion that mankind has a 
beginning and an end, that the world was created in time and will ultimately perish, like all 
things temporal» (BPF, 67).118
117 «This similarity between the Christian and the modem concept o f  history is deceptive, however. It rests on a 
comparison with the cyclical history-speculations o f late antiquity and overlooks the classical history-concepts of 
Greece and Rome.» (BPF, 65) «To the Christian, as to the Roman, the significance of secular events lay in their 
having the character o f  examples likely to repeat themselves, so that action could follow certain standardized 
patterns. (This, incidentally, is also very far removed from the Greek notion o f the heroic deed, related by poets 
and historians, which serves as a kind of yardstick with which to measure one’s own capacities for greatness. 
The difference between the faithful following o f a recognized example and the attempt to measure oneself 
against it is the difference between Roman-Christian morality and what has been called the Greek agonal spirit, 
which did not know any “moral” considerations [...].) For us, on the other hand, history stands and falls on the 
assumption that the process in its very secularity tells a story of its own and that, strictly speaking, repetitions 
cannot occur.» (BPF, 66-67). My italics.
118« [...] now, for the first time, the history o f mankind reaches back into an infinite past to which we can add at 
will and into which we can inquire further as it stretches ahead into an infinite future. This twofold infinity of 
past and future eliminates all notions o f beginning and end, establishing mankind in a potential earthly 
immortality» (BPF, 68).
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According to Arendt, the modem concept of history comes to terms with the 
experience of action, from which the notion o f process has its origin, and to which the modem 
phenomenon o f secularization is seen to lend an emphasis (BPF, 85).119
So while, on the one hand, secularization, exposing men to absolute mortality, 
coincided with the revival of the old desires for earthly immortality,120 which were satisfied 
by Hegel’s philosophy o f  history in the notion of immortality of mankind,121 on the other, the 
conditions were laid for the “melancholy haphazardness” o f human action to catch up with 
modem men and pursue them «into the very region where the generations before us had fled 
in order to escape it» (BPF, 89), namely, into history.
In The Concept o f  History, Arendt traces this experience at the root of the totalitarian 
phenomenon, which
[...] with its striking anti-utilitarian traits and its strange disregard for factuality, is based in the last 
analysis on the conviction that everything is possib le -  and not ju s t perm itted, m orally or otherwise, as w as the  
case w ith early nihilism . (BPF, 87). [My italics]
This passage is pivotal, for here Arendt identifies the idea that «everything is 
permitted» - quoted by Berdiaev as the central idea of Russian Nihilism, expressed in the 
words of Dostoevsky’s character Ivan Karamazov - as the mark o f a specific historically 
situated moral attitude, which she addresses as «early nihilism», thus, suggesting that we 
distinguish it from another later form of nihilism -  the one, as we will see in more detail in 
Chapter 3, summarised in the 20th century idea that «everything is possible».
In the cited essay, it is possible to trace a link between this form of nihilism - as 
distinguished from the nihilism of the «metaphysical rebel» (Karamazov) (HR, 467) - and the 
aestheticizing drives, which Arendt detects in the process o f action.
119 «The conviction of the modem age that man can know only that which he himself has made seems to be in 
accordance with a glorification of action rather than with the basically contemplative attitude of the historian and 
o f  the historical consciousness in general.» (BPF, 76).
120 « Our concept o f history, though essentially a concept o f the modem age, owes its existence to the transition 
period where religious confidence in immortal life had lost its influence upon the secular and the new 
indifference toward the question of immortality had not yet been bora.» (BPF, 74).
121 «History, stretching into the twofold infinity of past and future, can guarantee immortality on earth in much 
the same way as the Greek polis or the Roman republic had guaranteed the human life and human deeds, insofar 
as they disclosed something essential and something great, would receive a strictly human and earthly 
permanence in this world. The great advantage of this concept has been that the twofold infinity o f the historical 
process establishes a time-space in which the very notion of an end is virtually inconceivable, whereas its great 
disadvantage, compared with ancient political theory, seems to be that permanence is entrusted to a flowing 
process, as distinguished from a stable structure. At the same time the immortalizing process has become 
independent of cities, states, and nations; it encompasses the whole of mankind, whose history Hegel was 
consequently able to see as one uninterrupted development of the Spirit. Therewith mankind ceases to be only a 
species of nature, and what distinguishes man from the animals is no longer merely that he has speech [...] or 
that he has reason [...]: his very life now distinguishes him, the one thing that in the traditional definition he was 
supposed to share with the animals.» (BPF, 75).
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The process o f action is thus conceived as inherently entailing a destructive dimension 
- of nature and o f  the human artifice, hence, o f all history (BPF, 89) - and a creative one, of «a 
world in which the assumption becomes axiomatic and self-evident» (BPF, 88), to the point, 
made visible in totalitarian terror,122 that
[w]hat was originally nothing but a hypothesis, to be proved or disproved by actual facts, will in the 
course of consistent action always turn into a fact, never to be disproved. (BPF, 87-88).
The “paradox’* o f human action, which is exposed and has its climatic manifestation in 
the totalitarian phenomenon, lies in its peculiar creativity, one which is brought about through 
the erosion or de-materialising o f  reality (of the «world»), and the rea-lisation of an idea or 
intellectual construction («of what was originally nothing but an hypothesis», BPF, 87):123
These processes, after having devoured, a s it w ere, the so lid  o b jec tiv ity  o f  the g iven , ended by rendering 
meaningless the one over-all process which originally was conceived in order to give meaning to them, and to 
act, so to speak, as the eternal time-space into which they could all flow and thus be rid o f their mutual conflics 
and exclusiveness. (BPF, 89) [My italics]
If we admit that Arendt thought o f a later (i.e., 20th century) form o f nihilism, one that cannot 
be reduced to the 19th century contestation o f  traditional moral norms and values, and 
expressed by the idea that everything is possible, which she traces at the core of totalitarian 
terror; this latter form o f nihilism is not only inscribed in human action - unrestrained and 
unchecked under the modem conditions o f  “loss o f the world”, which the process o f action 
itself contributes to bring about, but is also linked to, and is inseparable from, the 
aestheticisation o f the human world, and o f the political as human artefact, which, in the 
essay on Broch, is the mark o f the totalitarian phenomenon. This thesis will be articulated in 
more detail in Chapter 3.
If we, now, compare these pages with Camus’ HR, we observe that in the chapter on 
«Le terrorisme d ’état et la terreur irrationnelle», devoted to the Nazi-Fascist nihilist 
revolutions o f the 20th century (E, 583), the author insists, in analogous terms, on the 
aestheticizing attitude shown by Nazi political leaders,124 which he relates to the primacy of 
action at the core o f Hitlerism, as stemming from moral nihilism.
122 «The totalitarian systems tend to demonstrate that action can be based on any hypothesis and that, in the 
course o f consistently g u id ed  action , the particular hypothesis will become true, will become actual, factual 
reality. [...].» (BPF, 87).
123 «[...] we can take almost any hypothesis and act upon it, with a sequence o f  results in reality which not only 
make sense but w ork. This means quite literally that everything is possible not only in the realm of ideas but in 
the field o f reality itself.» (BPF, 87).
124 « On sait que Goering recevait parfois en costume de Néron, et fardé » (HR, 585, note **).
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Hitlerism is discussed partially through Rauschning, and partially through Ernst 
Junger,125 who according to Camus «a d’ailleurs choisi les formules mêmes du nihilisme» to 
define Nazism (HR, 584).126
The French writer focuses on the emphasis, within Nazism, on the sheer movement o f  
action -  what Rauschning describes as «pure dynamism» (HR, 584) -  and on its relationship, 
on the one hand, with a total absence o f values and principles,127 128which according to Camus 
(as for Arendt in Section III o f OT), is the source that provides both Nazism and Communism 
with the means o f political cynicism (HR, 649), and, on the other, with aestheticism.
Quoting Frank’s deposition at the Nuremberg trial, Camus draws the attention to
«la  haine de la  fo rm e»  qu i anim ait H itler. [...] cet homme était seulement une force en mouvement 
Seule, l'action  le tena it debout. Être pour lui, c'était faire. Voilà pourquoi Hitler et son régime ne pouvaient 
se passer d’ennemis. Ils ne pouvaient, dandys fo rcenés, se définir que par rapport à ces ennemis, prendre forme 
que dans ce combat acharné qui devait les abattre. Le Juif, les francs-maçons, les plutocraties, les Anglo-Saxons, 
le Slave bestial se sont succédé dans la propagande et dans l’histoire pour redresser, chaque fois en peu plus 
haut, la force aveugle qui marchait vers son terme. Le combat permanent exigeait des excitants perpétuels.
Hitler était l’histoire à l’état pur. « Devenir, disait Junger, est mieux que vivre.» Il prêchait donc 
l’identification totale avec le courant de la vie, au niveau le plus bas et contre toute réalité supérieure. Le régim e 
qui a inventé la p o litique étrangère biologique a lla it contre ses in térêts le  p lu s  évidents. M ais il obéissait au  
m oins à  sa  logique particu lière. (HR, 585) [My italics]
It is significant that Camus used the term «dandyism» to characterise the Nazi attitude: the 
notion brings forth the coincidence o f the aesthetical dimension -  illustrated in the anecdote 
of Goring receiving, like the Caligula-Venus of Camus’ tragedy, dressed and made-up as the 
Roman Emperor Nero -  with the oppositional logic, already pointed out in the chapter on 
Romantic revolt (HR, 462). The oppositional logic is also visible in the totalitarian creation o f 
the «objective ennemi», entailed by the process of action itself, and determining its anti­
utilitarian internal consistency («logique particulière»): «[...] l’ennemi perpétuel, c’est la 
terreur perpétuelle» (HR, 587).
Beyond the apparent affinity with the conservative theses (Berdiaev, Rauschning), the 
emphasis in Camus* analysis o f Nazism is not so much on the «idolâtrie et [...] sacré 
dégradé», restored in the nihilistic tabula rasa of moral values and principles through «le
125 «Le seul homme de culture supérieure qui ait donné au nazisme une apparence de philosophie [...]», (E, 584).
126 Camus quotes the following passage as an example of formula o f nihilism employed by Junger to address 
Nazism : «La meilleure réponse à la trahison de la vie par l’esprit, c’est la trahison de l’esprit par l’esprit, et 
l’une des grandes et cruelles jouissances de ce temps est de participer à ce travail de destruction.» (E, 584).
127 «Dans l’Allemagne, secouée jusqu’aux racines par une guerre sans précédent, la défaite et la détresse 
économique, aucune valeur ne tenait plus debout. [...] Il n’y avait plus de valeur, à la fois commune et 
supérieure à tous ces hommes, au nom de laquelle il leur fut possible de se juger les uns les autres. L’Allemagne 
de 1933 a donc accepté d’adopter les valeurs dégradées de quelques hommes seulement [...]. » (HR, 584-585).
128 «Le pur dynamisme doctrinal ne peut se diriger vers le bien, mais seulement vers l’efficacité. Aussi 
longtemps qu’il y aura des ennemis, il y aura terreur ; et il y aura des ennemis aussi longtemps que le dynam ism e 
sera [...]» (HR, 589).
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premier et le seul principe de cette basse mystique, le Fuhrerprinzip» (HR, 588): at no time 
does Camus seem to believe that Hitlerism is a “secularized religion”, the Nazi use of 
religious language being reduced to a purely rhetorical device for propaganda purposes (Id.). 
Instead, the emphasis is on the term, «individualisme romantique» (HR, 589), used to denote 
Nazism, which integrates the formula «dandys forcenés» by recalling the chapter on 
aestheticizing rebellion:
L’individualisme rom antique de la révolution allemande s’assouvit enfin dans le monde des choses. La 
terreur irrationnelle transform e en choses les hom m es, « bacilles planétaires » selon la formule de Hitler. Elle se 
propose la destruction, non  seulem ent de la  personne, m ais des possib ilités universelles de la  personne, la 
réflexion, la  solidarité, ra p p e l vers l ’am our absolu. (HR, 589) [My italics]
The textual correspondence with the chapter on de Sade, the «homme de lettres parfait [...] 
qui a orienté la révolte sur les chemins de l’art où le romantisme l’engagera encore plus 
avant» (HR, 456-457),129 opening the way to the 19th and 20th century revolutionary attempts 
to leave the (aesthetic) realm of appearance {paraître) through action (HR, 464), immediately 
suggests that the aestheticizing drive, made visible in the creation o f closed spaces - be it de 
Sade’s «château tragique» or the 20th century concentration camps, «où, selon sa propre règle, 
régnait farouchement l ’homme sans dieu» (HR, 510) - culminates in a process o f de- 
humanisation and reduction of man to an object (HR, 457).
It is significant that in his 1951 philosophical essay, Camus designated as «nihilisme 
historique» both Russian Communism and the Nazi affirmation o f history («Hitler était 
l’histoire à l’état pur», HR, 585), identified with the sheer, unprincipled, movement o f  action 
(HR, 648). As the latter coincided with the affirmation of power and efficacy, and thus with 
the perpetuation o f the master-slave relationship of dominion, it culminated, in Camus’ own 
words, which are strikingly similar to Arendt’s, in a systematic and consistent fabrication o f  
corpses:
Si l’homme veut se faire Dieu, il s’arroge le droit de vie ou de mort sur les autres. F abricant de 
cadavres, et de sous-hommes, il est sous-homme lui-même et non pas Dieu, mais serviteur ignoble de la mort. 
(HR, 648) [My italics]
The focus on the aestheticizing drives o f 20th century nihilistic movements is even 
more prominent in Camus’ criticism of Communism, in the light of which, I argue, his 
appropriation of Berdiaev’s argument and terminology acquires a  specific meaning - «dès 
l’instant où [le nihilisme historique] veut créer dans le siècle, hors de toute règle morale, il 
bâtit le temple de César. [...] Ceux qui se ruent dans l’histoire au nom de l’irrationnel [i.e. the
129 My italics.
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Nazis], criant qu’elle n ’a aucun sens, rencontrent la servitude et la terreur et débouchent dans 
l’univers concentrationnaire. Ceux qui s’y lancent en prêchant sa rationnalité absolue [i.e. the 
Communists] rencontrent servitude et teneur, et débouchent dans l’univers 
concentrationnaire» (HR, 648).
Now, according to Camus, the Nazi revolution
n’était qu’une poussée primitive dont les ravages ont été plus grands que l’ambition réelle. Le 
communisme nasse, au contraire, a pris en charge l’ambition métaphysique que cet essai décrit, l’édification, 
après la mort de Dieu, d’une cité de l’homme enfin divinisé, (HR, 592)
For this reason the «aventure hitlérienne» cannot, strictly speaking, be defined as 
“revolution”, the latter implying, in the author’s understanding, the totalistic and totalitarian 
aim of «1’unification finale du monde» (HR, 592).130
It is significant that, in HR, Camus not only used the adjective «totalitarian», and 
always referred, in Berdiaev’s acceptation, to the philosophical notion o f “totality”, which the 
French writer identifies with «le vieux rêve d'unité commun aux croyants et aux révoltés, 
mais projeté horizontalement sur une terre privée de Dieu» (HR, 636).
It is with Russian Communism, he argues, that, for the first time in history, «une 
doctrine et un mouvement appuyés sur un Empire en armes se proposent comme but la 
révolution définitive [...]» (HR, 592).131 132Thus,
[...] les révolutions fascistes du XXe siècle ne méritent pas le titre de révolution. L'ambition universelle 
leur a manqué. [„.] dans l’héritage nihiliste, ils ont choisi de déifier l'irrationnel, et lui seul, au lieu de diviniser la 
raison. Du même coup, ils renonçaient à l'universel. (HR, 583)
Now, as Hannah Arendt points out in very similar terms in The Concept o f  History, the 
idea o f a completion, inscribed in the Marxian notion o f an «end to history» through the 
ultimate realisation o f a classless society (HR, 627), betrays the reduction of history to the
175object o f a process of fabrication.
Firstly, the Marxian notion o f “making history”, taken over by revolutionaries, is, in 
Arendt’s view, the result of a combination o f the idea that history is man-made (Vico), with 
«the teleological political philosophies of the earlier stages of the modem age, so that in his 
thought the “higher aims” -  which according to the philosophers of history revealed
130 «L'héritage conjugué de Netchaiev et de Marx - writes Camus echoing Berdiaev's Sources - donnera 
naissance à la révolution totalitaire du XXe siècle» (HR, 579).
131 My italics.
132 «[...] if  one imagines that one can “make history”, one cannot escape the consequence that there will be an 
end to history. Whenever we hear of grandiose aims in politics, such as establishing a new society in which 
justice will be guaranteed forever, or fighting a war to end all wars or to make the whole wrorld safe for 
democracy, we are moving in the realm of this kind o f thinking» (BPF, 79).
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themselves only to the backward glance o f the historian and philosopher -  could become aims 
of political action» (BPF, 77).
The consequence of this combination is the reduction o f  meaning, which is disclosed 
by the backward-directed glance o f the historian on human deeds after the process o f action 
has come to an end, to the aim of action itself, aso the end-product of a manufacturing process 
(BPF, 78). Secondly, she highlights, as a consequence, the Marxian combination o f the old- 
age (Platonic) identification o f action with fabricating, and the identification of the 
«contemplative gaze o f the historian with the contemplation o f the model» (eidos) that guides 
the work o f the craftsman (BPF, 78).133
According to Arendt, in the Marxian attempt to derive political conscience from 
historical conscience «we can easily detect the age-old attempt to escape from the frustrations 
and fragility o f human action by construing it in the image o f making.» (BPF, 79).
A similar remark can be traced in HR, where Camus points to the revolutionary 
attempts at creating or re-making the world in conformity to a superior idea or higher end, 
which he sees as stemming from the modem metaphysical rebellion against a transcendent 
Creator - « Dans toute révolte se découvrent l’exigence métaphysique de l ’unité, 
l’impossibilité de s’en saisir, et la fabrication  d’un univers de remplacement. La révolte, de ce 
point de vue, est fabricatrice d ’univers. Ceci définit l’art, aussi. L’exigence de la révolte, à 
vrai dire, est en partie une exigence esthétique.» (HR, 659).134
Now, in Arendt’s view, the Marxian notion o f “making history” harbours the 
possibility o f a  further degradation o f  all ends into means (BPF, 79), which is the mark of the 
utilitarian reasoning in which she traces the modem loss o f  meaning.135 So, i f  Marx’s 
mistaking o f  “man-made” patterns for historical meaning inscribes his thought into a 
fabrication model of political action -  hence, the need to “close” the process of history, to 
conceive its ultimate end - this process
Ijj The same argument is formulated by Camus: « L’originalité de la révolution du XXe siècle est que, pour la 
première fois, elle prétend ouvertement réaliser le vieux rêve d’Anacharsis Cloots, Vunitê du genre humain, et en 
même temps, le couronnement définitif de l’histoire. [ . ..]»  (HR, 517). «La révolution commence à partir de 
l’idée. Précisément, elle est l’insertion de l’idée dans l’expérience historique [...], une révolution est une 
tentative pour modeler l’acte sur une idée, pour façonner le monde dans un cadre théorique. [...] La révolution 
totale finit ainsi par revendiquer, nous verrons pourquoi, l’empire du monde.» (HR, 516)
134 My italics.
135 «The trouble lies in the nature of the categorical framework of ends and means, which changes every attained 
end immediately into the means o f a new end, thereby, as it were, destroying meaning wherever it is applied.» 
(BPF, 80). «[...] it was as though meaning itself had departed from the world o f men and men were left with 
nothing but an undending chain of purposes in whose progress the meaningfulness of all past achievements was 
constantly canceled out by future goals and intentions» (BPF, 78).
lj6 «[...] here the process o f history, as it shows itself in our calendar’s stretching into the infinity of the past and 
the future, has been abandoned for the sake o f an altogether different process, that of making something which
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is incapable of guaranteeing men any kind of immortality because its end cancels out and makes 
unimportant whatever went before: in the classless society the best mankind can do with history is to forget the 
whole unhappy affair, whose only purpose was to abolish itself. It cannot bestow meaning on particular 
occurrences either, because it has dissolved all of the particular into means whose meaningfulness ends the 
moment the end-product is finished: single events and deeds and sufferings have no more meaning here than 
hammer and nails have with respect to the finished table. (BPF, 79-80)
The irreconciliability of the utilitarian perspective with its emphasis on achievement, 
which is inherent in the teleological idea o f the “end o f history”, and Hegelian dialectics, 
which provide the «law o f  all movements, natural and historical», taken over and adapted by 
Marx in the notion of “class struggle” (BPF, 80), is repeatedly pointed out both by Arendt and 
Camus. In his extensive commentary of the Communist revolutionary theory, in the chapter 
on «L’échec de la prophétie», the latter observes:
Un mouvement [i,e. Hegel’s dialectics of history), auquel on refuse un commencement, ne peut avoir de 
fin. « Si le socialisme, dit un essayiste libertaire (i.e. Emestanj, est un étemel devenir, ses moyens sont sa fin ». 
Exactement, il n ’y a pas de fin, il n’y a que des moyens qui ne sont garantis par rien s’ils ne le sont par une 
valeur étrangère au devenir. En ce sens, il est juste de remarquer que la  dialectique n  ’est pas et ne p eu t p a s ê tre  
révolutionnaire. Elle est seulement, selon notre point de vue, nihiliste, p u r  m ouvem ent qui vise à n ier tout ce q u i 
n ’est pas lui-m êm e. (HR, 628) [My italics]
Here, Camus opposes the Hegelian dialectics -  whose concept of history as a pure 
movement he calls nihilistic (what Arendt defines as the de-realising process o f action, 
infinitely stretching in past and in the future, thus without beginning nor end) -  to the notion 
o f «revolution», with its marked aesthetic and totalizing dimension, rooted in a fabricating 
model of human action.
Here, Camus uses the term “nihilism” in a strictly Nietzschean sense to address all 
thinking, which dwells in the systematic «calomnie de ce monde» (HR, 651), stripping man o f 
the means and reasons to live. We touch, here, upon the problem of the world’s 
meaninglessness, addressed by Arendt in her discussion o f  the end-means category.
According to Camus, the Marxian «end of history» is an arbitrary principle, a value 
introduced from without a nihilistic process of endless reduction, and consequent de­
valuation, of end into means. From this perspective, «la seule histoire n’offre aucune 
fécondité. Elle n ’est pas source de valeur» - as, he argues, the Communists would have it - 
«mais encore de nihilisme» (HR, 651).
Thus, the future, identified in Marxian thought with the advent of a classless society 
and the end o f  history, is turned into a value (HR, 613) «en même temps étrangère à la *
h a s a beginning as well as an end, whose laws o f motion, therefore, can be determined (for instance as 
dialectical movement) and whose innermost content can be discovered (for instance as class struggle).» (BPF, 
79).
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morale, elle n’est pas à proprement parler une valeur sur laquelle on puisse régler sa conduite, 
elle est un dogme sans fondement qu’on peut faire sien dans le mouvement désespéré d’une 
pensée qui étouffe de solitude ou de nihilisme, ou qu’on se verra imposer par ceux à qui le 
dogme profite.[...] La fin de l’histoire n ’est pas une valeur d ’example et de perfectionnement 
Elle est un principe d’arbitraire et de terreur. » (HR, 628).137 138
It is in this sense that all utopian political thinking - and «tout socialisme est utopique, 
et d’abord le scientifique» (HR, 613) - replaces God by the future, the latter being the 
(immanent or secularised) foundation for a  morality in the Nietzschean acceptation o f the 
term, a transcendent (nihilistic) table o f norms: «L’âge d’or renvoyé au bout de l ’histoire et
coïncidant, par un double attrait, avec une apocalypse, justifie donc tout» (HR, 612).
Apocalyptism, and the twofold tradition o f historical and bourgeois messianism - 
which Camus emphases, with Berdiaev, in Marxian revolutionary thought - are traced back to 
the notion o f totality, and to the teleological dimension implied in the idea o f the revolution 
définitive: «Pour les chrétiens -  he writes in the Carnets between the end o f 1947 and the 
beginning o f ’48 -  la Révélation est au début de l’histoire. Pour les marxistes, elle est à la fin. 
Deux religions.» (C il, 240).
It is significant that Camus define as «fatalisme créateur» (HR, 597) an attitude, in his 
view, common to M arx and the Christian conservative thinker Joseph de Maistre, which 
orients human action toward a higher end (the final realisation o f  a  mysterious unity, be it «la 
cité chrétienne universelle» (HR, 596) or the classless society), and aims at making truth.139
[...] l’esprit historique de totalité que le christianisme a inventé [...], coupé de ses origines religieuses, risque 
aujourd’hui de tuer l’Europe (HR, 598).
What Arendt observes three years later, in Concern with Politics in Recent European 
Philosophical Thought, is that Hegel’s concept o f history, not only gave the realm of human 
affairs a dignity that it never enjoyed before among philosophers, but, more importantly, that 
it enabled philosophers -  and Marx, especially (BPF, 80) - «to discover meaning in the 
political realm, and yet to understand this meaning as an absolute truth which transcended all 
willed intentions and worked behind the back o f the political actor. [...] In Hegel’s solution,
lj7 My italics.
138 The echoes o f Nietzsche’s Genealogy o f Morals may be easily detected in Camus’s remark: «L’avenir est la 
seule sorte de propriété que les maîtres concèdent de bon gré aux esclaves » (HR, 599), thus confirming our 
reading of the French writer’s identification o f future/God with a nihilistic or religious thought.
Ij9 «[Maistre] citait saint Jean qui demande que nous fassions la vérité, ce qui est proprement le programme de 
l’esprit révolutionnaire moderne» (E, 596). My italics.
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individual actions remain as meaningless as before, while their process in its entirety reveals 
a truth that transcends the realm o f  human affairs.» (CP, 430).
Furthermore, to the modem (Hegelian) notion o f  process Camus relates that o f 
progress, which 19th century Positivism had posed as the iron law o f a necessary evolution o f 
society, and which the author traces at the core Marx’s scientific messianism («d’origine 
bourgeoise», HR, 598):140
[...] la religion de l ’humanité a été effectivement prêchée vers ta fin du XIXe siècle et Marx, bien qu’il 
n’ait sans doute lu Comte, fut l’un de ses prophètes. Marx a seulement compris qu’une religion sans 
transcendance s’appelait proprement une politique. Comte le savait, au demeurant, ou du moins il comprenait 
que sa religion était d’abord une sociolâtrie et qu’elle supposait le réalisme politique, la négation du droit 
individuel et l’établissement du despotisme. Une société dont les savants seraient les prêtres, deux mille 
banquiers et techniciens régnant sur une Europe de cent vingt millions d’habitants où la vie privée serait 
absolument identifiée avec la vie publique, où une obéissance absolue « d’action, de pensée, et de coeur » serait 
rendue au grand prêtre telle est l’utopie de Comte qui annonce ce qu’on peut appeler les religions 
horizontales de notre temps. Elle est utopique, il est vrai, parce que, convaincu du pouvoir illuminant de la 
science, il a oublié de prévoir la police. D’autres seront plus pratiques ; et la religion de l’humanité sera fondée, 
effectivement, mais sur le sang et la douleur des hommes. (HR, 600-601) [My italics]
In the article “Le monde va vite " (27th November 1946), Camus had already denounced the 
disastrous attempts o f the two «grandes politiques d’aujourd’hui» - the Marxist ideology on 
the one hand, and the Capitalist ideology on the other, as being both grounded on the idea o f 
progress -141 to “square the circle” of the historical reality of post-war Europe, by fixing 
«l’avenir du monde au moyen de principes formés au XVIIIe siècle en ce qui concerne le 
libéralisme capitaliste, et au XIXe siècle en ce qui regarde le socialisme dit scientifique. Dans 
le premier cas, une pensée née dans les premières années de l’industrialisme moderne et dans 
le deuxième cas une doctrine contemporaine de l’évolutionnisme darwinien et de l’optimisme 
renanien se proposent de mettre en équation Vêpoque de la bombe atomique, des mutations 
brusques et du nihilisme. Rien ne saurait mieux illustrer le décalage de plus en plus 
désastreux qui s ’effectue entre la pensée politique et la réalité historique » (CAC8, 630).
It is, precisely, this gap, detected by Camus between the historical reality o f the post- 
Atomic bomb world, and the two “ideologies of progress”, which had emerged victorious 
from the end o f the war and the defeat of the Nazi regime, that justifies the author’s effort to
140 «Le progrès, l’avenir de la science, le culte de la technique et de la production sont des mythes bourgeois qui 
se sont constitués en dogme au XIXe siècle. [...] l’esprit révolutionnaire a repris ce thème ambigu et commode 
de progrès. Certes, il ne s ’agit pas de la même sorte de progrès ; Marx n’a pas assez de railleries pour 
l’optimisme rationnel des bourgeois. Sa raison [...] est différente. Mais la marche difficile vers un avenir 
réconcilié définit cependant la pensée de Marx. Hegel et le marxisme ont abbattu les valeurs formelles qui 
éclairaient pour les Jacobins la route droite de cette heureuse histoire. Ils ont cependant conservé l’idée de cette 
marche en avant, confondue simplement par eux avec le progrès social et affirmée comme nécessaire. Ils 
continuaient ainsi la pensée bourgeoise du XIXe siècle. » (HR, 599).
141 «Les idéologies marxiste et capitaliste, basées toutes deux sur l’idée de progrès, persuadées toutes deux que 
l’application de leurs principes doit amener fatalement l’équilibre de la société, sont des utopies d’un degré 
beaucoup plus fort. En outre, elles sont en train de nous coûter très cher.» (« Sauver les corps », 20 Novembre 
1946, CAC8, 615).
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make sense o f  the disquieting continuity between nihilism and terror, which Camus 
individuates as one o f  the fundamental problems o f contemporary society, and with which 
post-war political thought proved incapable o f dealing.
I argue that Camus’ appropriation o f the «political or secular religion» thesis, 
widespread among Conservative and Liberal political thinkers, from Berdiaev to Aron, does 
not fall within either o f the «two quite distinct trends o f thought and approach», exposed by 
Arendt in her 1953 essay Religion and Politics (EU, 372), in other words, neither in the 
historical approach («for which a secular religion is quite literally a religion growing out o f 
the spiritual secularity o f our present world so that Communism is only the most radical 
version o f an “immanentist heresy”, Id.), nor in the social sciences approach («which treat 
ideology and religion as one and the same thing because they believe that Communism (or 
nationalism or imperialism, etc.) fulfills for its adherents the same “function”that our religious 
denominations fulfill in a  free society», Id.).
Secondly, Camus’ use o f  the term «nihilism» to approach the problem o f 
totalitarianism cannot be placed either among the Existentialist or among the Christian- 
Conservative perspective, analysed by Arendt in the 1954 essay Concern with Politics.
We must not forget that Camus approaches the problem of the Nazi and Communist 
ideologies when dealing with the problem o f state terror, the two aforementioned ideologies 
providing a justification, respectively, for an irrational and a rational form o f  state conducted 
political practice o f  violence and murder. Now, the author uses the formula «[I]es théocraties 
totalitaires du XXe siècle» as synonymous with «la terreur d ’Etat» (HR, 581), and in the 
course o f his argument he suggests, along with Berdiaev’s argument in Sources (SS, 307), 
that not every nihilistic revolution may be defined as totalitarian, the term «totalitaire» 
implying a metaphysics o f  man’s godhood, structured on the fabrication model o f  God as 
maker o f the w orld .142
The analogy with religion is not developed from the Social Sciences perspective of 
functional equivalence with totalitarian ideologies (EU, 374), but from the philosophical 
focus on notion o f «totality», identified with the end-product o f  man’s refusal of the fragility 
and finitude o f the human condition, and with the god-like hubristic attempt to re-make the 
world (HR, 597).
142 « La révolution nihiliste, qui s’est exprimée historiquement dans la religion hitlérienne, n'a ainsi suscité qu'une 
rage démesurée de néant» (HR, 590). Camus shifts away from Rauschning’s thesis of the nihilistic revolution of 
destruction when he compares the Fascist revolutions o f the 20* century with the Communist revolution: we 
must distinguish, he argues, two forms o f nihilism - a purely negative or destructive form of nihilism, 
represented by Hitlerism, which culminates in collective suicide (HR, 591); and a creative one, which aims at 
«l'édification d'une cité de l'homme enfin divinisé» (HR, 592), represented by the Soviet regime.
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Pointing to the parallels between Comte’s religion o f humanity as an immanent 
«religion de Vespèce» (HR, 600), andthe 20th century ideologies, also referred to as ideologies 
o f consent (HR, 649) and conformism, Camus insists that «[P] homme qui haïssait la mort et 
le dieu de la mort [ . . . ] -  namely, the metaphysical rebel in the modem nihilistic horizon o f the 
death o f God - a voulu se délivrer dans l 'immortalité de I 'espèce» (HR, 649).
In terms that recall Arendt’s essays, Camus highlights the modem resentment against 
the frailty and finitude o f the human condition. In his view, the 20th century men resorted to 
terror in their attempt to realise their metaphysical need for unity against their finitude, the 
definitive “redemption” of humanity from its mortality, into some kind of immortality o f 
future mankind:
la terreur reste donc le plus court chemin de l’immortalité. [...] La terreur et les camps de concentration 
sont les moyens extrêmes que l’homme utilise pour échapper à la solitude. La soif d’unité doit se réaliser, même 
dans la fosse commune. S’ils tuent des hommes, c’est qu’ils refusent la condition mortelle et veulent 
rimmortalité pour tous. (Id.).
Thus, from a Nietzschean perspective, religion (“totality” being the Christian divine 
City projected horizontally in the future) and totalitarian ideology are both rooted in a 
ressentiment against life. They are, in this sense, an absolute or incomplete form o f nihilism.
I suggest that Camus’s anti-Platonism, mediated by Nietzsche, is the key to understand 
his critique o f what he defines as «totalitarian revolution».
In a long letter to Les Temps Modernes, written in June 1952,143 Camus stresses that 
«le nihilisme pour moi coïncide aussi avec les valeurs désincarnées et formelles» (E, 762). 
H is critique o f the 20th century cynical, Le., Communist, revolution, runs parallel to the 
critique of the French Revolution («la révolution bourgeoise et formelle de 89», Id ) , to which 
he devotes the first two sections o f « La révolte historique » (« Les régicides » and « Les 
déicides »):144
[...] dans les deux cas, quoique par des excès contraires, soit que les va leurs so ient p lacées au-dessus de 
l'h is to ire , so ir qu 'elles y  so ien t absolum ent identifiées, le  nihilism e et la  terreur so n t ju s tifié s . (E, 762).145
143 “Révolte et servitude” (30* June 1952), letter addressed to the Director of L es Tem ps M odernes (E, 754-774). 
In replying to the attacks o f L es Temps M odernes, Camus defines 1’HR as a study o f the ideological aspects of 
20* century revolutions: «J’ai montré seulement, et je  le maintiens, qu’il y a dans les révolutions du XX siècle, 
parmi d ’autres éléments, une évidente entreprise de divinisation de l’homme et j ’ai choisi d’éclairer spécialement 
ce thème» (E, 759). By placing itself in the midst o f historical actuality and bringing its protest against the 
present situation, the essay on revolt was in itself conceived by its author as a (though modest) a ct (E, 757),
144 «[•••] les juristes bourgeois du XVIIIe siècle, en écrasant sous leurs principes les justes et vivantes conquêtes 
de leur peuple, ont préparé les deux nihilism es contem porains : celui de l ’individu e t celu i de l ’É ta t » (HR, 539).
145 In L ’artiste et son tem ps Camus declares : «Il me semble au contraire que je  plaide pour un vrai réalisme 
contre une mythologie à la fois illogique et meurtrière, et contre le nihilism e rom antique, qu 'il so it bourgeois ou 
p rétendum en t révolutionnaire.»  (E, 801).
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The emphasis on the aesthetic or fabricating paradigm o f  political action, made visible 
in the concepts o f totality/achievement/end, under the conditions o f a totalitarian or absolute 
revolution are further stressed in an interview to Gazette des Lettres in February 1952, which 
offers some interesting parallels w ith Arendt’s argument in the section on work in HC.
Questioned on the ethical and political role o f the intellectuals in the post-war context, 
Camus replies:
Les intellectuels n’ont tant d’importance aujourd’hui que parce que deux fois en cent cinquante années 
ils ont inspiré et, dans le deuxième cas, exécu té , une grande révolution. S u r  des centaines de m illions d 'hom m es 
règne au jourd ’hui le  gouvernem ent des p h ilo so p h es don t la  trad ition  occidentale a  tant rêvé . Mais voilà, les 
philosophes n’ont pas la tête qu’on croyait. C’est que, pour régner, la philosophie a dû passer par la police [...]. 
Les deux fo rm es du n ih ilism e contem porain , bourgeo is e t révolutionnaire, o n t é té  lancées p a r  des in tellectuels. 
(E, 739) [My italics]
By tracing in the Communist regime the <<gouvernement des philosophes dont la tradition 
occidentale a tant rêvé », Camus’ emphasis is on the concept o f  execution - revolution, thus, 
being identified with the end-product o f  a  process o f mise en œuvre of a superior Idea, the 
Marxian creative fatalism , which in Camus’ view «fait passer le système avant la réalité» 
(HR, 609) for the definitive reconciliation and the building o f  «le royaume des fins» (HR, 
610).14<
From an unmistakable Nietzschean perspective, the term «revolutionary nihilism», 
employed by Camus in HR, aims to denounce and reject the Platonism inscribed in the 
Communist concept of revolution, which combines the philosophical moment of 
contemplation of the Idea with the aesthetic dimension o f  fabricating, and with a power policy 
sustained by the principle that the end justifies the means. 146
146 In discussing Marx’s theory of the mission o f the proletariat, Camus quotes the following passage: «La 
philosophie ne peut se réaliser sans la disparition du prolétariat, le prolétariat ne peut se libérer sans la 
réalisation de la  philosophie»  (HR, 610). Beside her emphasis on Marx’s break with the philosophic (Platonic) 
tradition, made visible in the reduction o f work to labor, in The C oncept o f  H istory  Arendt observes that Marx’s 
notion of “making history” is the specific result of the philosopher’s perspective on the political: «It was the 
historian and the philosopher of history who were politicalized. By the same token, the age-old identification of 
action with making and fabricating was supplemented and perfected, as it were, through identifying the 
contemplative gaze o f the historian with the contemplation of the model (the eiSoç or “shape” from which Plato 
has derived his “ideas”) that guides the craftsmen and precedes all making.» (BPF, 78). Arendt seems to take her 
distances from the argument of HR when she writes that «the danger o f these combinations did not lie in making 
im m anent w hat was fo rm e rly  transcenden t, as is o ften  a lleged , as though Marx attempted to establish on earth a 
paradise formerly located in the hereafter. The danger o f transforming the unknown and unknowable “higher 
aims” into planned and willed intentions was that meaning and meaningfulness were transformed into ends [...] 
-  the progressive unfolding and actualisation of the idea of Freedom -  to be an end of human action, and when 
he furtherm ore, in  accordance w ith tradition , view ed  th is ultim ate “e n d ” as th e  end-product od  a m anufacturing 
process.»  (BPF, 78). In a similar way, Camus observes: «Le socialisme autoritaire a confisqué [.,.] cette liberté 
vivante [des ouvriers] au profit d’une liberté idéale, encore à venir. Ce faisant [...] il a renforcé l’entreprise 
d’asservissement commencée par le capitalisme d’usine.» (HR, 622).
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Developing an idea, already formulated in Aï victimes ni bourreaux (« Le socialisme 
mystifié», 21st November 1946), 147 Camus maintains in HR that revolution (be it 
«bourgeoise ou socialiste») «renvoie la justice à plus tard, au profit de la seule puissance» 
(HR, 623).
It is significant to observe that Camus defines power (or will to power) as «frénésie 
historique» (HR, 629).148 Now, frenzy is together with apocalyptism, the key feature, which 
revolutionary nihilism has in common with the dandyism (HR, 464).149 Their common 
aestheticism, summarised in the nihilistic notion of «le règne de rhomme»,150 elevates action 
to the unique principle, and it is here that Camus traces the root of the totalitarian «camps 
retranchés» in post-war Eastern Europe (HR, 630).
«[F]antômes, victorieux ou asservis, de la puissance» is the description o f the 
inhabitants of the 20th century «Europe décharnée» (HR, 643).151 The metaphoric 
constellation, emphasised in these passages, points to the interwovenness of contemporary 
power policy with the problem of abstraction, which Camus identifies with the creation o f a 
state o f siege (HR, 643), or what he refers to as «rationational terror»:
L’abstraction, p ro p re  au monde des forces et du calcul, a remplacé les vraies passions qui sont du 
domaine de ta chair et de l’irrationnel. Le ticket substitué au pain, l’amour et l'amitié soumis à la doctrine, le
147 CAC8, 617. It is interesting to observe that in 1946, Camus, like Hannah Arendt Ín the same years, is still 
insisting on a distinction between the nihilistic idéologies -  which he, much in the line of Rauschning, idcntificd 
as the condition of Nazi power policy, electing efficacy as the highest value in the general moral “vacuum" of 
the 20* century ( “tout est perm is”) -  and the Philosophies of History, fostering the messianic ¡dea of a Paradise 
on earth (CAC8,616).
148 «La volonté de puissance est venue relayer la volonté de justice, faisant mine d'abord de s’identifier avec elle, 
et puis la reléguant quelque part au bout de l'histoire, attendant que rien sur la terre ne reste à dominer» (HR, 
629).
149 «La question du XX siècle [...] : comment vivre sans grâce et sans justice ? À cette question, seul le 
nihilisme, et non la révolte, a répondu. Seul, jusqu’à présent, il a parlé, reprenant la formule des révoltés 
romantiques : « Frénésie ». » (HR, 629).
150 Camus’s Nietzscheanism in apparent in his view that the Marxian «royaume des fins est utilisé, comme la 
m orale étemelle et le royaume des deux, à des fins de mystification sociale. [...] Comment vivre sans la grâce, 
c’est la question qui domine le XIXe siècle . « Par la justice », ont répondu tous ceux qui ne voulaient pas 
accepter le nihilisme absolu. Aux peuples qui désespéraient du royaume des cieux, ils ont promis le royaume de 
l'homme. La prédication de la cité humaine s’est accélérée jusqu'à ce la fin du XIXe siècle où elle est devenue 
proprement visionnaire et a mis les certitudes de la science au service de l’utopie. Mais le royaume s’est éloigné, 
de prodigieuses guerres ont ravagé la plus vieille des terres, le sang des révoltés a couvert les murs des villes, et 
la ju stice  totale ne s’est pas rapprochée.» (HR, 629) (My italics). According to Camus, «(la] révolution, dans 
l’impasse où l’ont engagée ses ennemis bourgeois et ses partisans nihilistes, est l'esclavage. À moins de changer 
de principes et de voie, elle n’a pas d’autre issue que les révoltes serviles, écrasées dans le sang, ou le hideux 
espoir du suicide atomique. La volonté de puissance, la lune nihiliste pour la domination et le pouvoir, ont fait 
mieux que balayer l’utopie marxiste. Celle-ci est devenue à son tour un fait historique, destiné à être utilisé 
comme les autres. [...] asservir tous les moyens, a été réduite à l'état de moyen et cyniquement manœuvrée pour 
la plus banale et la sanglante des fins. Le développement ininterrompu de la production [...] a miné également la 




destin au plan, le châ tim en t appelé norm e, e t la  production  substituée à la  création vivante. (HR, 642-643) [My 
italics]
By rational terror Camus designates, in the chapter on «La totalité et le procès» 
devoted to the 20th century Communist system o f secret police and show trails, the refusal, 
which the author attributes to Russian Marxism, o f the world o f the irrational, by which he 
means man’s spontaneity and unpredictability:
Les personnes ne sont pas hostiles à l ’Empire en tant qu’individus seulement : la  terreur trad itionnelle  
pourra it alors su ffire . Elles lui sont hostiles dans la mesure où la nature humaine jusqu’ici n’a jamais pu vivre 
de l’histoire seule et lui a toujours échappé par quelque côté. L’Empire suppose une négation et une certitude : 
la certitude de l’infinie plasticité de l’homme et la négation de la nature humaine. Les techniques de propagande 
servent à mesurer cette plasticité et tentent de fa ir e  coïncider réflexion e t réflexe conditionné. (HR, 640) [My 
italics]
The pivotai point which Camus makes here is that traditional terror and rational or 
totalitarian terror are not the same, and what distinguishes them is the assault, systematically 
brought about by the latter, against the human condition in its uncalculable «originality» - 
which, in Arendtian terms, is the endless capacity to begin something new.152 Camus’ 
emphasis on the reduction o f m an’s free thinking to a «réflexe conditionné» immediately 
recalls Arendt’s passage in OT on the totalitarian effort to transform man into Pavlov’s dog 
(see Chapter 3).
In a passage, which has a  striking echo in Arendt’s 1953 pages on totalitarian terror, 
Camus declares that «la seule révolution psychologique que notre temps ait connue, après 
Freud, a été opérée par le N.K.V.D. et le polices politiques en general» (HR, 642),153 which 
allowed the Russian «système concentrationnaire» to enact the transition from the 
govemement o f people, under which traditional terror can still be subsumed, to the 
administration o f  things (HR, 641).
What characterises «rational» terror is, in Camus’s view, the con-fusion of person and 
thing: totalitarian police techniques, he argues, «[gjuidées par une hypothèse déterministe, 
calculant les points faibles et le degré d ’élasticité des âmes, [...] ont encore repoussé une des
152 «L’irrationnel [...] échappe au calcul et le calcul seul doit régner dans l’Empire. L’homme n’est qu’un jeu de 
forces sur lequel on peut peser rationnellement. Des marxistes inconsidérés ont cru pouvoir concilier leur 
doctrine avec celle de Freud, par exemple. On leur fit bien, et rapidement, voir. Freud est un penseur hérétique et 
« petit bourgeois » parce qu’il a mis au jour l'inconscient et qu’il lui a conféré au moins autant de réalité qu’au 
sur-moi, ou moi social. C et inconscient p e u t a lors défin ir l ’orig ina lité d ’une nature humaine, opposée au moi 
historique. L’homme, au contraire, doit se résumer au moi social et rationnel, objet de calcul. I l  a  don t fa llu  
asservir, non seu lem ent la  vie  de chacun, m ais encore l'événem ent le  p lu s  irrationnel et le  p lus so lita ire, dont 
l ’a ttente accom pagne l ’hom m e tou t au  long  de sa  vie. L ’Em pire, dans so n  effort convulsé vers le  royaum e 
d é fin itif ten d  à in tégrer la  mort.'» (HR, 641). My italics.
152 My italics.
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limites de l’homme et s’essaient à démontrer [...][que] la commune mesure des caractères est 
la chose. Elles ont littéralement créé la physique des âmes.» (HR, 642).154
The focus on the rational-terroristic annihilation of human nature - thus not identified 
with some transcendent and a-historical entity, but precisely designating all which 
characterises the human condition in its utter fragility, and, in this way, escaping all meta­
physical and nihilistic objectivization - into a calculable and manipulable thing, recalls the 
pages on de Sade and the dandies, which lend the following passage its full meaning:
S’il n’y a pas de nature humaine, la plasticité de rhomme est, en effet, infinite. Le réalism e politique, à 
ce  degré, n  ’est qu 'un rom antism e sans fre in , un romantisme de l’efficacité. (HR, 640) [My italics]
In Camus’ understanding, political realism, grounded on the principle that the end 
justifies the means, under the conditions of rational or totalitarian terror is coupled with, and 
overshadowed by, that same aestheticising drive, analysed in the chapters o f HR on the 
homme de letters and the Romantic rebels, and is identified by Camus with the murderous 
reduction of man to a thing, according to the perfect consistency of a pre-conceived system 
or hypothesis.
Thus, the infinite plasticity o f human nature is nothing other than what Arendt defines 
as the totalitarian nihilistic principle that everything is possible (HU, 431). Thus,
La contradiction ultime de la plus grande révolution que l’histoire ait connue n ’est point tant, après tout, 
qu'elle prétende à la justice à travers un cortège ininterrompu d ’injustices et de violences. Servitude ou 
mystification, ce malheur est de tous les temps. S a  tragédie est celle du  nihilism e, elle se confond avec le drame 
de l’intelligence contemporaine qui, prétendant à  l ’universel, accum ule les m utilations de l ’hom m e. (HR, 643) 
[My italics]
I suggest that we read Camus’ thesis in HR together with Arendt’s 1953 review of the the 
nihilism/totalitarianism debate o f the Forties and Fifties in order to bring forth the 
distinctiveness of the French writer’s position against the post-w'ar panorama o f political 
theorv.
154 «Sur un autre plan, la fureur irrationnelle d’une brute peut seule imaginer qu’il faille torturer sadiquement des 
hommes pour obtenir leur consentement. Ce n’est alors qu’un homme qui en subjugue un autre, dans un 
immonde accouplement de personnes. Le représentant de la totalité rationnelle se contente, au contraire, de 
laisser dans l’homme la chose prendre le pas sur la personne. L’esprit le plus haut est d’abord ravalé au rang de 
l’esprit le plus bas par la technique policière de l ’am algam e. Puis, cinq, dix, vingt nuits d’insomnie viendront à 
bout d’une illusoire conviction et mettront au monde une nouvelle âm e m orte. » (HR, 642). My italics.
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2.4. History and N arrative: from l e  g ra n d  style  to council system.
In Concern with Politics Arendt takes into examination the two main post-war approaches, 
which recur of the concept o f nihilism in their diagnoses o f the contemporary (especially 
political) world: the Heideggerian approach -  which considers nihilism in terms o f historicity 
as «the innermost fate of the modem age, which sent modem man along his road and 
therefore can be overcome only on its own terms» (CP, 433) -  and the Christian-Conservative 
approach -  which views nihilism as «that which happened to man when the modem age 
wandered in error from  the “right path  ", strayed from  the road o f  ancient and Christian 
tradition» (EU, 433-434).155
From the latter perspective, she points out, «[the] reality o f totalitarian domination is 
depicted almost exclusively under its ideological aspect, with ideologies understood as 
“secular religions” which either grow out o f the “heresy” o f secularization and immanentism 
or are supposed to answer m en’s assumed eternal need fo r  religion. In both cases, a simple 
return to right religion appears to be the adequate cure. This interpretation minimizes the 
shock of the crimes actually committed and dodges the question posed by that aspect of 
modem society most conspicuous in, but not confined to, totalitarianism -  the tendency to 
deny the relevance o f religion and profess an atheism o f utter indifference.» (EU, 435).
This «return to tradition», understood as the «re-subordination o f the temporal- 
political realm to the spiritual, in which the spiritual can be represented by the Catholic 
Church or the Christian faith in general or by all sorts o f  revived Platonism»15 56 - thus, resting 
on the assumption o f  the «inherent superiority o f the ends over the means, the eternal over the 
temporal» (EU, 434) -  is what Camus had strongly rejected, on the grounds of his 
Nietzschean anti-Platonism, since the 1942prière d'insérer to the MdS.157
As we have extensively shown, the «raisonnement absurde» of the MdS rejects as 
metaphysical fallacy the «main impulse [...] to bring order into the things o f  the world , which 
cannot be grasped and judged without being submitted to the rule o f  some transcending 
principle» (Id.).158 In the MdS, from the anti-metaphysical horizon of the nihilistic absence of
155 My italics. Berdiaev’s Origins o f Russian Communism, focusing on the relation between Russian nihilism and 
German (Hegelian) Historicism, is a vivid example of the Christian approach to modem nihilism from, in the 
specific case, the Russian «experiences with continental, particularly Central European, historicism», and figures 
among those thinkers who «no longer believe with Meinecke that historicism will be able “to heal the wounds it 
inflicted [on modem man] through the relativization o f values.» (EU, 434)
156 My italics.
157 Already in 1942 Camus, like Arendt (EU, 435), insisted on the utter inadequacy of sheer «restatements of 
“old truths”» in order to solve the problems posed by modem nihilism.
158 My italics.
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transcendent principles, the aestheticizing drive to unify or give a form to the haphazardness 
and chaos of existence is recomprised within the limits highlighted by the tragic or aisthetic 
thought.
Moreover, we should not overlook the important point that, in the 1951 essay, Camus’ 
focus is not on the ideological dimension o f the totalitarian phenomenon per se, but -  as in 
Arendt’s analyses - in that the former plays a pivotal role in the functioning o f rational or 
totalitarian terror. When pointing to the affinity between Christianity and Marxism (HR, 
436), his perspective is neither sociological (focusing, in Arendt’s words, on men’s assumed 
eternal need for religion, according to which totalitarian ideology plays within society the 
same function as religion),159 nor historical,160 but, we could argue, genealogical
In the 1953 manuscript L ’artiste et son temps, a selection o f extracts from interviews 
concerning the ethical and political role of the artist in the post-war age published in Actuelles 
II, Camus confirmed his refusal of «Ie nihilisme romantique, qu’il soit bourgeois ou 
prétendument révolutionnaire» (E, 801), thus identifying «romanticism» with all which 
«choisit Ie mouvement perpétuel de 1 ’hist oir e, la grandiose épopée, et l’annonce d’un 
événement miraculeux, a la fin  des temps» (E, 800-801).
Even though Camus had considered the Marxist and the capitalist ideologies o f 
progress as two equally dangerous «utopie[s] absoluefs]» (CAC8, 615) ever since 1946, in Ni 
victimes ni bourreaux he still distinguished the «ideologies nihilistes» (identified with the 
ideologies of the «tout est permis»), from the «philosophies qui fo n t de l 'histoire un absolu 
(Hegel, puis Marx [...]» (CAC8, 617). In HR this distinction is clearly dropped: the Nazi and 
the Communist ideologies are both addressed in terms o f a «romantisme sans freins», which 
uses, but cannot by any means be reduced to (HR, 579), an unprincipled and cynical political 
realism :161
La suppression de toute valeur morale et des principes, leur remplacement par le fait, roi provisoire, 
mais roi réel, n’a pu conduire, on l’a bien vu, qu’au cynisme politique, qu’il soit le fait de l’inividu ou, plus
159 When employing the metaphor of «immanent or horizontal religion», the author insists that the totalitarian 
terrorist machine uses 19th century (i.e. Marxian) messianism for mystifying purposes.
160 «L’histoire de la révolte métaphysique -  in which Camus in HR roots revolutionary thought - ne peut donc 
pas se confondre avec celle de l’athéisme» (HR, 436).
161 It is significant that Camus, like Arendt (see Chapter 3), linked the unprincipled and cynical realism of the 
19th and 20th centuries to the Hegelian philosophy of History : «Hegel détruit définitivement toute 
transcendence verticale et surtout celle des principes, voilà son originalité incontestable. Il restaure, sans doute, 
dans le devenir du monde, l’immanence de l’esprit. Mais cette immanence n’est pas fixe [...]. L’esprit est, et 
n ’est pas, dans le monde ; il s y  fa it et il y  sera. La valeur est donc reportée à la  fin  de l'h isto ire. Jusque-là p o in t 
de critère  propre à fo n d er un jugem ent de valeur. Il faut agir et vivre en fonction de l’avenir. Toute morale 
devient provisoire. Le XIX et le XX siècle, dans leur tendance la plus profonde, sont des siècles qui ont essayé 
de vivre sans transcendance.» (E, 550). My italics.
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gravement, celui de l’État. Les mouvements politiques, ou idéologiques, inspirés par Hegel, se réunissent tous 
dans l’abandon ostensible de la vertu. [...] Après tout, dire que la négation est en elle-même un acte positif 
justifiait par avance toutes les sortes de négation et annonçait le cri de Bakounine et Netchaiev : « Notre mission 
est de détruire, non de construire .» L e n ih iliste  p o u r  H egel éta it seulem ent le  sceptique qu i n 'avait d 'a u tre  issue  
que la contradiction ou le  suicide ph ilo soph ique . M ais il donnait lui-m êm e naissance à une autre sorte de 
nihilistes qui, fa isa n t de l'en n u i un p rin c ip e  d 'a c tio n , identifieront leur suicide avec le m eurtre philosophique. 
Ici naissent les terroristes qui ont décidé qu’il fallait tuer et mourir pour être, puisque l ’homme e t l'h isto ire  ne  
peuvent se créer que p a r  le  sacrifice e t le  m eurtre . (HR, 551-552) [My italics]
Now, Camus adds that the nihilism o f the terrorists «malgré les apparences, est encore 
nihilisme au sens nietzschéen, dans la mesure où il est calomnie de la vie présente au profit 
d ’un au-delà historique auquel il s ’efforce de croire» (HR, 552 note *).
There is sufficient evidence that Camus knew, and incorporated, Nietzsche’s critique 
o f Historicism : notes in the Carnets attest that, in May 1943, he was reading the French 
edition o f the II volume of the Intempestives (CII, 96).
Furthermore, the note on Nietzsche’s remark on beauty (CII, 60) could antedate the 
reading o f  La Généalogie de la morale from 1948-53 to the early ’43. It is in this latter work 
that Nietzsche comprises, under the term nihilism, both the suicidal drive to nothingness and 
the priestly ascetic ideal, which offers a reason and a meaning, an “anaesthetics” (GM, III, 15) 
to human suffering (GM, III, 28). Thus, modem science is not the «natural antagonist» o f  the 
religious ascetic ideal but, is, instead, the latter’s own «most recent and noble manifestation» 
(GM, III, 23), the so-called scientific conscience being nothing else than a sublimated form of 
Christian morality (GM, III, 22).
Camus’ own use of the term “idealism” in HR is much in the line of Nietzsche’s 
argument in GM III, 24, where the Medieval invincible order o f  the Assassins, defined as the 
ffee-spirits par excellence, and founded on the secretum that «nothing is true, everything is 
permitted», is opposed to the European and Christian so-called free spirits, whose un­
conditional will to truth («more absolute and rigid than anyone else») is the ascetic ideal.
According to Nietzsche, the «truthful man» affirms another world against this world 
o f life, nature and history: his scientific ideal is a metaphysical faith that denies this world,162 
and this was also for Camus. In the chapter on «L’échec de la prophétie» Camus writes:
162 It is in a Nietzschean sense that Camus resorts to the notions of « nihilism » and « religion » to define 
Marxian political philosophy, and in particular the philosophy of history on which it rests. It is significant, in this 
respect, that, in his analysis of Marx’s thought, he drew especially on the commentaries of Karl Jaspers: «En 
opposition au monde antique, l’unité du monde Chrétien et du monde marxiste est frappante. Les deux doctrines 
ont, en commun, une vision du monde qui les sépare del’attitude grecque. Jaspers la définit très bien: « C’est une 
pensée chrétienne que de considérer l’histoire des hommes comme strictement unique ». Les chrétiens ont, les 
premiers, considéré la vie humaine, et la suites des événements, comme une histoire qui se déroule à partir d’une 
origine vers une fin, au cours de laquelle l’homme gagne son salut un mérite son châtiment. » (HR, 594).
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Hegel termine superbement Phistoire en 1807,163 les saint-simoniens considèrent que les convulsions 
révolutionnaires de 1830 et 1848 sont les dernières, Comte meurt en 1857, s’apprêtant à monter en chaire pour 
prêcher le positivisme à une humanité enfin revenue de ses erreurs. À son tour, avec le  même rom antism e  
aveugle, Marx prophétise la société sans classes et la résolution du mystère historique. Plus avisé, cependant, il 
ne fixe pas de date. (HR, 614)
[...] Le marxisme n’est pas scientifique; il est au mieux, scientiste. Il fait éclater le divorce profond qui 
s’est établi entre la raison scientifique, fécond instrument de recherche, de pensée, et même de révolte, et la 
raison historique, inventée par l’idéologie allemande dans sa négation de tout principe. La raison historique n’est 
pas une raison qui, selon sa fonction propre, juge le monde. [...] Si l’on réduit l’homme à l’histoire, il n’a pas 
d’autre choix que de sombrer dans le bruit et la fureur d’une histoire démentielle ou de donner à cette histoire la 
forme de la raison humaine. L ’histo ire du n ihilism e contem porain n 'est donc gu ’un long effort pour donner, p a r  
les seules fo rces de l ’homme, et p a r  la  fo rce  tou t court, un ordre à une h isto ire qui n ’en a  p lus. Cette pseudo- 
raison finit par s’identifier alors avec la ruse et la stratégie, attendant de culminer dans l’Empire idéologique. 
[...] La raison ne prêche pas, ou si elle prêche, elle n’est plus raison. C’est pourquoi la raison historique est une 
raison irrationnelle et romantique, qui rappelle parfois la systématisation de l’obsédé, l'affirmation mystique du 
verbe, d’autre fois. (HR, 624-625)
Aestheticism, implicit in the term “romantic/romanticism” and identified with the 
effort to give order to a senseless chain o f events, and anaesthetics, brought about by historic 
reason - which providing a meaning that coincides with absolute truth, allows us to evade the 
absurdity o f a finite condition into a comfortable and thoughtless conformism - concur in 
Camus's definition o f  contemporary nihilism.164
Now, the French writer opposes the Historic reason o f the nihilistic/totalitarian 
«romantisme sans freins», which, in his view, reduces political action to the sheer exercise of 
force (will to power) to another kind o f  reason, characterised as «fécond instrument de 
recherche, de pensée, et même de révolte», whose proper function is judgement. In terms that 
echo Arendt’s later writings, Camus identifies Historic reason (or the reason o f the 
philosophies of History) with the negation of judgement (HR, 625), opposing the 
contemporary revolutionary thought, that stems from the former, with revolt.
Historical or totalitarian revolution is «une tentative pour conquérir un être neuf, par le 
faire, hors de toute règle morale» (HR, 652) : totality is the object or the end-product o f a 
limitless fabrication process projected in the future. In its effort, revolution «part de la 
negation absolue et se condamne à toutes les servitudes pour fabriquer un oui rejeté à 
l’extrémité des temps» (HR, 653), «[P]homme n'est rien, selon elle, s’il n’obtient pas dans 
l’histoire, de gré ou de force, le consentement unanime» (HR, 652).
Totality is opposed to unity, which, as Camus carefully points out, is not produced or 
made, but endlessly created through «l’affirmation d’une limite, d’une dignité et d’une beauté 
communes aux hommes» (HR, 653). On this ineliminable “yes” rests («[est] appuyé») the
163 Camus, like Arendt, points out that Hegelian dialectics «appliqué correctement ne peut pas et ne doit pas 
s ’arrêter. [...] Un mouvement, auquel on refuse un commencement, ne peut avoir de fin.» (HR, 627-628).
164 It is significant that in the manuscript version of L ’artiste et son  tem ps Camus had noted (and successively 
erased) the following sentence: «Après tout L ’H om m e révolté est dans so n  en tier une critique du rom antism e.» 
(E, 1742).
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“no” of the rebel - 165 «[la révolte] n’a jamais affirmé dans son mouvement le p lus pur  que 
l’existence d’une limite, justement, et / 'être divisé que nous sommes : elle n ’est pas à  l’origine 
la négation totale de tout être» (HR, 652).
Now, according to Camus, «l’une [la révolte] est créatrice, l’autre [la révolution] 
nihiliste. La première est vouée à créer pour être de plus en plus, la seconde forcée de 
produire pour nier de mieux en mieux. La révolution historique s’oblige à faire toujours dans 
l’espoir, sans cesse déçu, d’être un jour» (HR, 653).
The genealogical approach is apparent in the concluding pages of the chapter on «La 
révolte historique», which introduce the IV Section o f HR on Révolte et Art. Here Camus 
insists on the revolutionary denial or loss o f  the origins: what I suggest is that the 
normativeness o f the original movement (arche) o f revolt may be re-thought in an extra-moral 
sense:
La révolution pour être créatrice ne peut se passer d ’une règle, morale ou métaphysique, qui équilibre 
le délire historique. Elle n’a sans doute qu’un mépris justifié pour la morale formelle et mystificatrice qu’elle 
trouve dans la société bourgeoise. Mais sa fo lie a été d ’étendre ce mépris à toute revendication morale. A ses 
origines mêmes, et dans ses élans les plus profonds se trouve une règle qui n *est pas formelle et qui, pourtant, 
peut lui servir de guide. La révolte, en effet, lui dit et lui dira de plus en plus haut qu’il faut essayer de faire, non 
pour commencer d’être un jour, aux yeux d’un monde réduit au consentement, mais en fonction de cet être 
obscur qui se découvre déjà dans le mouvement d’insurrection. Cette règle n ’est ni form elle n i soumise à 
l ’histoire, c ’est ce que nous pourrons préciser en la découvrant à l ’état pur, dans la création artistique. [...] la 
révolte aux prises avec l’histoire ajoute qu’au lieu de tuer et mourir pour produire l’être que nous ne sommes 
pas, nous avons à vivre et fa ire vivre pour créer ce que nous sommes. (HR, 653).166
Communist or totalitarian revolution is justified, according to Camus, in its rejection 
o f the formal or mystifying morality o f bourgeois society, but it falls back upon nihilism -  
namely, in Nietzschean terms, upon the calumniation o f life -  in its absolute negation o f all 
moral value and norm. This passage explicitly points to the need for a « règle, morale ou 
métaphysique», which is extra-moral or anti-metaphysical in the (anti-Platonic) sense of 
Nietzsche’s GM, and is, thus, «moral and metaphysical» in the narrow acceptation o f a tragic 
or aistketic thought, as outlined in Chapter 1.
The folly o f totalitarian revolution, in the a-moral and anti-foundational horizon 
disclosed by the «death o f God», and the collapse of transcendent, i.e., formal, table o f values, 
lies precisely in its incapability to draw from  its very origin an altogether different kind of 
moral norm or principle, neither formal, nor reduceable to sheer becoming (history)- which in 
the WP is addressed by Nietzsche as aesthetic morality.
165 «[La révolte] dit en même temps oui et non. Elle est le refus d’une part de l’existence au nom d’une autre paît 
qu’elle exalte. Plus cette exaltation est profonde, plus implacable est le refus. » (HR, 652).
166 My italics.
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Significantly, Camus turns to artistic creation in order to grasp («à l’état pur») this 
peculiar type o f norm: «L’art -  he writes in the IV part on Révolte et art -  nous ramène [...] 
aux origines de la révolte, dans la mesure où il tente de donner sa forme à une valeur qui fu it 
dans le devenir perpétuel, mais que l’artiste pressent et veut ravir à l’histoire» (HR, 662).
The point o f art is brought forth in the analysis o f three artistic forms : sculpture, 
painting, and novel writing:
Le plus grand et le plus ambitieux de tous les arts, la sculpture, s ’acharne à fixer dans les trois 
dimensions la fig u re  fu ya n te  de l’homme, à ramener le désordre des gestes à l’unité du grand style. [...] Son 
propos n’est pas d’imiter, mais de styliser, et d’emprisonner dans une expression significative la fu reu r  
passagère des corps ou le tumoiement infini des attitudes. [...] Le principe de la peinture est aussi dans un 
choix. [...] Le peintre isole son sujet, première façon de 1'unifier. Les paysages fu ien t, disparaissent de la  
m ém oire ou se détruisent l'u n  Vautre. C’est pourquoi le paysagiste ou le peintre des natures mortes iso le  dans 
l'espace et dans le tem ps ce qui, norm alem ent, tourne avec la  lum ière, se  p e rd  dans une perspective in fin ie  ou 
disparaît sous le choc d 'au tres valeurs. Le premier acte du paysagiste est de cadrer sa toile. 11 élimine autant 
qu’il élit De même, la  pein ture de su jet isole dans le  temps com m e dans l ’espace l ’action qui, norm alem ent, se 
p e rd  dans une autre action. Le peintre procède alors à une fixation. [...] Tous les personnages [de grands 
créateurs] donnent alors l’impression que, p a r le  m iracle de Vart, ils continuent d ’être vivants, en cessant d ’être 
périssables. [....] « Vaine chose que la peinture qui nous plaît par la ressemblance des objets qui ne sauraient 
nous plaire. » [...]  Ces objets ne sauraient nous p la ire  puisque nous ne les voyons pas ; ils so n t ensevelis e t niés 
dans un devenir perpétuel. [...]
[L’Art réalise] sans effort apparent, la réconciliation du singulier et de l’universel [style residing, 
precisely, in this conjunction of nature and history] cette présence im posée à  ce qui devient toujours (HR, 660- 
661). [My italics].
I have quoted extensively from Camus’ commentary as it allows us to bring forth the 
following point : the «exigence esthétique», that the author traces at the core of revolt (HR, 
659), coincides with man’s rejection o f the futility and dispersedness of existence, and o f the 
impossibility of accomplishment that haunts the mortal condition o f men. This is all the more 
visible, according to Camus, in novel writing: Proust’s Le Temps retrouvé illustrates, in this 
sense, «l’une des enterprises les plus démesurées et les plus significatives de l ’homme contre 
sa  condition mortelle» (HR, 671), his work of art marks the victory over death and the 
perennial «fuite des choses» (HR, 669) through remembrance.161
Proust’s souvenir summarises the twofold movement o f  revolt as yes-and-no: in Le 
Temps retrouvé the artist «rassemble un monde dispersé et lui donne une signification au 
niveau même du déchirement» (HR, 670). Thus, meaning stems from the artist’s recollection, 
which intails a rejection of reality that is not a negation: «Mais le goût des visages et de la 
lumière rattachait en même temps à ce monde. Il n’a pas consenti à ce que les vacances 
heureuses soient à jamais perdues. Il a pris sur lui de les recréer à nouveau et de montrer, 167
167 «D’immenses espaces morts sont ainsi rejetés de la vie parce qu’ils n’ont rien laissé dans le souvenir. [...] le 
monde de Proust n’est à lui seul qu’une mémoire. Il s’agit seulement de la plus difficile et de la plus exigeante 
des mémoires, celle qui refuse la dispersion du monde tel qu’il est et qui tire d ’un parfum retrouvé le secret d’un 
nouvel et ancien univers.» (HR, 670)
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contre la mort, que le passé se retrouvait au bout du temps dans un présent impérissable» 
(Id.).I6S
There is a part o f human experience that the artist strives to rescue from, and preserve 
against the mortality and futility o f human existence (HR, 669):
Chacun, dans ce sens, cherche à fa ire  de sa  vie une oeuvre d ’art. Nous désirons que l’amour dure et 
nous savons qu’il ne dure pas ; si même, par miracle, il devait durer toute une vie, il serait encore inachevé. Peut- 
être, dans cet insatiable besoin de durer, comprendrions-nous mieux la souffrance terrestre, si nous la savions 
étemelle. Il semble que les grandes âmes, parfois, soient moins épouvantées par la douleur que par le fait qu’elle 
ne dure pas. À defaut d ’un bonheur inlassable, une longue souffrance ferait au moins un destin. Mais non, et nos 
pires tortures cesseront un jour. [...] les êtres s ’échappent toujours et nous leur échappons aussi ; ils sont sans 
contours fermes. La vie de ce point de vue est sans style. [...] L’homme, ainsi déchiré, cherche en vain cette 
forme qui lui donnerait les limites entre lesquelles il serait roi. Q u ’une seu le  chose vivante ait sa  fo rm e  en ce  
m onde e t il sera  réconcilié  ! (HR, 664-665) [My italics]
In this creative “yes-and-no” we cannot fail to recognize the elements of that 
«reconciliation with reality», which, in A rendt’s words, since «the moment when Ulysses, at 
the court o f  the king o f  the Phaeacians, listened to the story o f  his own deeds and sufferings, 
to the story o f  his life, now a thing outside him self and “object" fo r  all to see and to hear» 
(BPF, 45), is the mark o f  storytelling. It is in this peculiar kind of «poiesis or fabrication 
which eventually becomes the written word» (Id.) that, according to Arendt, the «deepest 
human motive for history and poetry appears [...] in unparalleled purity» (Id.), as men’s strive 
for “immortalizing”.168 69
This striving for immortalising, m an’s «désir éperdu de durer» (HR, 665), which is 
inseparable from his rejection of the mortality and futility of life, is designated throughout HR 
as man’s desire for unity and coherence, which is nothing but the aesthetic drive that Camus 
traces in both the rethoric of the literary men, on the one hand - from Lucrèce to de Sade, to 
the Romantics, Nietzsche, Lautréamont and Rimbaud, and to the Surrealists - and in the
168 My italics.
169 «All things that owe their existence to men, such as works, deeds, and words, are perishable, infected, as it 
were, by the mortality of their authors. However, if  mortals succeeded in endowing their works, deeds, and 
words with some permanence and in arresting their perishability, then these things would, to a degree at least, 
enter and be at home in the world of everlastingness, and the mortals themselves would find their place in the 
cosmos, where everything is immortal except men. The human capacity to achieve this was remembrance, 
Mnemosyne, who thereforewas regarded as the mother of all the other muses.» (BPF, 43). Now, according to 
Arendt, «the works o f human hands owe part o f  their existence to the material nature provides and therefore 
cany within themselves some measure o f permanence, borrowed, as it were, from the being-forever o f nature. 
But what goes on between mortals directly, the spoken word and all the actions and deeds which the Greek 
called irpd^eii; or nporypaxa, as distinguished from Jioiricu;, fabrication, can never outlast the moment of their 
realisation would never leave any trace without the help of remembrance. The task of the poet and 
historiographer (both o f  whom Aristotle still puts in the same category because their subject is Jtpa^u;) consists 
in making something lasting out o f remembrance. They do this by translating jrpd£i$ and X&fo action and 
speech, into that kind o f 7tohyn<; or fabrication which eventually becomes the written word.» (BPF, 44-45)
184
«univers clos [...], la nation retranchée, le camp de concentration, l’empire des libres 
esclaves» (HR, 659), on the other.
Religion and crime are the nihilistic and totalizing extremes of the same aestheticising 
«fièvre d’unité», that inspires «la creation romanesque» (HR, 666), the novel being «une belle 
histoire» in which «l’action trouve sa forme, [...] où toute vie prend le visage de destin» (Id.). 
In the manuscript for a conference, used for Roman et révolte and o f the Discours de Suède™  
Camus points out that «[la] révolte de l’homme contre sa condition a deux expressions 
historiques: celle qui vise à {rebâtir [ ?]) le monde dans l’histoire et celle qui le refond 
complètement dans l’art» (E, 1653).
What emerges in these passages is the distinction/opposition between two “aesthetic” 
paradigms : the fabrication paradigm, structured on the constellation production-power- 
nihilism; and the creation paradigm, associating art, revolt and grand style.
According to Camus, revolt is creative (HR, 671) in the sense, made visible in «l’art
romanesque», that it brings about an alliance «à la beauté du monde ou des êtres contre les
puissances de la mort et de l’oubli» (id.). The artist’s selective remembrance is at the same
time a “yes” to the beauty of the creature and a “no” to its futility and mortality, brought
about in the «correction, que l ’artiste opère par son langage et par une redistribution
1 «%«
d'éléments puisés dans le réel, [qui] s’appelle le style» (HR, 672).
Style is a law, which traces the unity and perfect limits o f the artist’s re-created 
um verse (Id.) -  the «perfection close» o f an eternity «[au] visage de l’homme» (HR, 671).
Camus’ insistence on the opposition between the constellations o f creation and 
fabrication, suggests that style should be understood as a peculiar kind o f shape donation, 
which has nothing to do with the one entailed in the poietic act of (re)-building. The 
distinction is clearly made even in 1944, between « reconstruire le monde» and «repenser [le 
monde]»- «Cela [le., repenser le monde] revient à lui donner un langage » (E, 1680).170 273
The creation of a beautiful story is possible, in Camus* understanding, precisely when 
the artist applies his own language to his selective memory o f  reality - «Écrire, c’est déjà 
choisir» (HR, 673):
La vraie création romanesque [...] utilise le réel et n’utilise que lui, avec sa chaleur et son sang, ses 
passions et ses cris. Simplement, elle y ajoute quelque chose qui le transfigure. (Id.) [My italics]
170 Ms. Agnely,
171 My italics.
172 Camus quotes Shelley : « Les poètes, dit Shelley, sont les législateurs, non reconnus, du monde » (HR, 672).
173 My italics. In this sense Camus’s conception of art reflects, and must be inscribed in, an aesthetics o f failure -  
what Eduard Morot-Sir defined as esthétique de la pauvreté (see E. Morot-Sir, “Logique de la limite, esthétique 
de la pauvreté: théorie et pratique de l’essai”, in Albert Camus 1980, op. cît., pp. 192-208).
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Thus, to (re)-think the world is the same as to bestow language upon the chaos and 
dispersedness o f  life:174 «le choix et le dépassement de la réalité sont la condition même de la 
pensée et de Vexpression» (HR, 673). The futility and mortality of the human condition are 
overcome (dépassés) through «un exercice de I intelligence au service d’une sensibilité 
nostalgique ou révoltée» (HR, 668),175 which Camus defines, in Nietzschean terms, as grand 
style (HR, 674): «Le grand style est la stylisation invisible, c ’est-à-dire incarnée» (HR, 675), 
where by stylisation he means that fixation , in remembrance and words, which rescues from 
death «la fureur passagère» o f bodies and actions (HR, 660).
The grand style, as the essence o f novel writing and, consequently, in Camus’ 
argument, o f creation, coincides with a restless correction «que l’artiste effectue sur son 
expérience» (HR, 668), which is not moral or merely formal.
The equation of “moral” with “formal” rests on the aisthetic premises analysed in 
Chapter I: it is in perfect continuity with the argument o f the MdS that the creative act cannot 
be confused with a mediocre «evasion» (HR, 666) from reality, in that it takes in, and cannot 
be conceived without, the sensory dimension o f la chair.
It is, therefore, in a Nietzschean sense that Camus qualifies as nihilistic the total 
negation o f reality, i.e. of that aisthetic «goût des visages et de la lumière» (HR, 670) 
(«chaleur et [...] sang, [...] passions et [...] cris», HR, 673), brought about in what he 
addresses as “formai art”.176
Equally nihilistic is the specular logic, that governs all form of artistic realism, as 
illustrated in contemporary American novel and in Russian Communist cultural policies and 
aesthetics. The latter has its roots in the theory of the 19th century so-called Russian nihilists, 
which Camus designates, with Berdiaev, as the «gentilshommes repentants» (HR, 659),
174 «Une belle histoire ne va pas sans cette continuité imperturbable qui n’est jamais dans les situations 
vécues (HR, 667).
175 «Le roman fabrique du destin sur mesure. C ’est ainsi qu’il concurrence la création et qu'il triomphe, 
provisoirement, de la mort » (HR, 668).
176 « À la limite, si le refus est total, la réalité est expulsée dans son entier et nous obtenons des œuvres purement 
formelles. [...] le mouvement primitif de création, où révolte et consentement, affirmation et négation, sont 
étroitement liés, est mutilé au profit du refus. C’est alors l’évasion formelle dont notre temps a fourni tant 
d’exemples et dont on voit l ’origine nihiliste. » (HR, 671). My italics. Earlier in the chapter Camus observed :
«L’art réalise [_]la réconciliation du singulier et de l’universel dont rêvait Hegel. Peut-être est-ce la raison pour
laquelle les époques folles d’unité, comme est la nôtre, se tournent vers les arts primitifs, où la stylisation est 
plus intense, l’unité plus provocante ? La stylisation la plus forte se trouve toujours au début et à la fin des 
époques artistiques ; elle explique la force de négation et de transposition qui a soulevé toute la peinture moderne 
dans un élan désordonné vers l’être et l’unité. » (HR, 661).
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whose thought is summarised in Pissarev’s sentence, «Une paire de bottes vaut mieux que 
Shakespeare» (HR, 657).177
Pissarev, according to Camus, «proclame la déchéance des valeurs esthétiques au 
profit des valeurs pragmatiques» (Id.), deferring beauty to the end of history :178 in this sense 
he embodies the «folie ascétique» in the acceptation of Nietzsche’s GM, which translates 
itself in the metaphysical fallacy of realist aesthetics.
The latter aims at the reduction o f artistic creation to the sheer reproduction and 
enumeration o f “naked” reality («le reel à l’état brut», HR, 672) through the total expulsion of 
form, that is, o f choice. But, by assimilating art to the sterile repetition o f creation, «le 
réalisme ne devrait être que le moyen d’expression du génie religieux» (HR, 673), which is 
bound to a logical échec :179 180«Que l’événement asservisse le créateur [as in the modem 
aesthetics o f realism] ou que le créateur prétende nier l’événement tout entier [as in formai
I HAart], et la création s’abaisse donc aux formes dégradées deVart nihiliste » (HR, 673-674).
Now, in Camus’s view,
Il en est de la création comme de la civilisation : elle suppose une tension ininterrompue entre la forme 
et la matière, le devenir et l’esprit, l ’histoire et les valeurs. Si l’équilibre est rompu, il y a dictature ou anarchie, 
propagande ou délire form el. Dans les deux cas, la création, qui, elle, coïncide avec une liberté raisonnée, est 
impossible. Soit qu’il cède au vertige de l'abstraction et de l’obscurité formelle, soit qu’il fasse appel au fouet du
177 The notes on Pissarev and the « gentilhomme repentant » in the Carnets (Cil, 225) are taken frora Berdiaev’s 
Sources et sens du communisme russe (SS, 70-79). In this latter work the Russian author insists on the cynical 
rejection of ail “higher idea” («idées élevées») and the réduction of literature to a purely social mission. Pissarev 
is the emblem of a feeling o f guilt, widespread among the intelligentsia: «C’est en Russie, précisément dans les 
classes dites privilégiées, que naît ce type particulier du “gentilhomme repentant”. Repentant, non d’une faute 
qu’il aurait commise personnellement, mais de la faute, du péché social » (SS, 79). See also my article, « Du 
nihilisme aux théocraties totalitaires. Les sources et le sens du communisme russe de Berdiaev dans les Carnets 
de Camus », Albert Camus 20. « Le Premier homme » en perspective, Paris, Minard, 175-195.
178 Camus insists, with Berdiaev, on the Hegelian influences in Russian revolutionaiy thinkers : «Selon les 
interprètes révolutionnaires de La Phénoménologie, il n’y aura pas d’art dans la société réconciliée. La beauté 
sera vécue, non plus imaginée. Le réel, entièrement rationnel, apaisera, à lui seul, toutes les soifs. La critique de 
la conscience formelle et des valeurs d’évasion s’étend naturellement à l’a rt » (HR, 658).
179 «Pour être vraiment réaliste, une déscription se condamne à être sans fin. Là où Stendhal décrit, d’une phrase, 
l’entré de Lucien Leuwen dans un salon, l’artiste réaliste devrait en bonne logique, utiliser plusieurs tomes à 
décrire personnages et décors, sans parvenir encore à épuiser le détail. Le réalisme est l’énumération indéfinie. Il 
rélève par là que son ambition vraie est la conquête, non de l’unité, mais de la totalité du monde réel. On 
comprend alors qu’il soit l ’esthétique officielle d’une révolution de la totalité. Mais cette esthétique a déjà 
démontré son impossibilité. Les romans réalistes choisissent malgré eux dans le réel, [...]. Ecrire, c’est déjà 
choisir. Il y a donc un arbitraire du réel, comme un arbitraire de l’idéal, et qui fait du roman réaliste un roman à 
thèse implicite. Réduire l’unité du monde romanesque à la totalité du réel ne peut se faire qu'à la faveur d’un 
jugement a priori qui élimine du réel ce qui ne convient pas à la doctrine. Le réalisme dit socialiste est alors 
voué, par la logique même de son nihilisme, à cumuler les avantages du roman édifiant et de la littérature de 
propagande. » (HR, 673) My italics.
180 My italics. Ín his analysis o f modem American novel, Camus also insists on the nihilistic logic implict in the 
former’s réduction of man «soit à l’élémentaire, soit à ses réactions extérieures et à son comportement. » (HR, 
668). The identification of the logic of nihilism with an abstracting process is fuither confirmed : « La vie des 
corps, réduite à elle-même, produit paradoxalement un univers abstrait et gratuit, constamment nié à son tour par 
la réalité» (HR, 669).
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réalisme le plus cru ou le plus naïf, l’art moderne, dans sa quasi-totalité, est un art de tyrans et d ’esclaves, non de 
créateurs. (HR, 674) [My italics]
The intratextual analysis o f the chapter on Revolt and Art highlights two aesthetic 
paradigms of contemporary nihilism, which betray a strong political connotation: Camus 
associates an-archy to «délire formel» or «délire verbal», which he traces in an irrational 
negation, which is destructive o f language (HR, 676) - «Le formalisme appartient aussi bien à 
la société du passé, quand il est abstraction gratuite, q u ’à la société qui se prétend de 
l ’avenir ; il définit alors la propagande » (Id.). An-archy is, thus, inseparable from 
abstraction, which Camus traces at the core o f state terror, which exploits propaganda for the 
purposes o f  the systematic manipulation o f human nature.
The other side of «la frénésie formelle» is the realism o f the «esthétique totalitaire» 
(HR, 676), Le., o f  the Communist revolution - «Le réalisme, d’ailleurs, est aussi bien 
bourgeois -  mais il est alors noir -  que socialiste, et il devient édifiant », reducing language to 
«le mot d ’ordre» and submitting it to a determinist ideology (Id.).
Politics, like art, strives between «le nihilisme des principes formels» {anarchy), and 
the «nihilisme sans principes» (Id.), made visible in the cynical policy of 20th century 
totalitarian revolution, and in its “realist” reduction of man to history and to the sheer 
exteriority of a predictable behaviour, which culminated in total dominion and control 
(dictature).
Both forms o f nihilism do not operate in HR as separate Ideal-types, but as two 
interwoven dimensions of one and the same political paradigm, already traced in the articles 
for Combat, one, that is, constructed on the vertical power structure of master/slave 
(E,674).181
The whole chapter on revolt and art, in perfect continuity with the 1949 Conference, is 
structured around the opposition between two aesthetic-political paradigms: one, founded on 
the notion of power {puissance), developed around the master/slave (tyran/escalve or 
bourreau/victime) relationship, and associated to nihilism, in its twofold expression o f  an­
archy and dictatorship; the second, founded on the notion of creation, as inseparable for «le 
grand style».
This, I argue, had already emerged in the opposition valeurs d ’example! valeurs de 
puissance in the conclusion to the Conference o f Sâo Paulo, where Camus developed the 
distinction between the artist and the conqueror (the latter embodying, in the Cold-war
181 My italics.
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climate o f the Iron Curtain, the policy o f power/conquest/dominion/world empire: the shift 
from MdS is apparent), repeated in the opposition chair/loi:
Et ici, je me souviendrai que j e  suis écrivain. Car un des sens de l’histoire d’aujourd’hui et plus encore 
de demain, c’est la lu tte  entre les artistes et les conquérants, et si dérisoire que cela puisse paraître, entre les 
mots et les balles. Les conquérants et les artistes veulent la même chose et vivent la même révolte. M ais les 
conquérants m odernes veulent l'u n ité  du m onde e t ils ne peuvent l'ob ten ir qu  ’en passant p a r la guerre e t la 
violence. Ils n  ’on qu ’un rival, et bientôt qu ‘un ennemi, qui est l ’art. Car les artistes veulent aussi cette unité 
mais ils la recherchent e t la  trouve [sic] parfo is dans la beauté, au term e d 'u n e  longue ascèse intérieure. « Les 
poètes, dit Shelley, sont les législateurs non reconnus du monde. » Mais par là il définit, en même temps, la 
grande responsabilité des artistes contemporains qui doivent reconnaître ce qu’ils sont, et que, par example, 
qu’ils sont du côté de la vie, non de la mort. Ils  son t les tém oins de la  chair, non de la  loi. [...] leur aptitude à 
vivre la  vie d ’autrui leur permet de reconnaître la constante justification des hommes, qui est la douleur.1*2 [My 
italics]
Law is, here, associated to abstraction as coupled to the concept of legal murder (state 
terror). Its relationship to the master/slave power structure is confirmed twice in HR and in 
the 1957 Discours de Suède: in both texts Camus provocatively draws on Nietzsche - «Au 
lieu du juge et du répresseur, le créateur» (HR, 676) - «C’est pourquoi les varies artistes ne 
méprisent rien; ils s ’obligent à comprendre au lieu de juger. Et, s ’ils ont un parti à prendre en 
ce monde, ce ne peut être que celui d’une société où, selon le le grand mot de Nietzsche, ne 
régnera plus de juge , mais le créateur [...] » (E, 1072).
That Camus conceives the figure of the creator as alien to the logic of 
power/force/oppression, which he identifies with modem politics, is confirmed in the chapter 
on Revolt and Art, where the author explicitly rejects the idea o f  a city governed by artists 
(HR, 676), specular image of the rule o f the (Platonic) philosopher-kings.
Camus couples his reading of Nietzsche with Simone Weil’s commentaries on the 
relatioship between production and technocratic dominion, thus pointing to «le drame de 
notre époque où le travail, soumis entièrement à la production, a cessé d’être créateur» (HR, 
676):
Simone Weil a raison de dire que la condition ouvrière est deux fois inhumaine, privée d’argent, 
d’abord, et de dignité ensuite. Un travail auquel on peut s’intéresser, un travail créateur, même mal payé, ne 
dégrade pas la vie. Le socialisme industriel n’a rien fait d’essentiel pour la condition ouvrière parce qu’il n’a pas 182*4
182 Fernande Bartfeld, A lb ert Camus voyageur e t conférencier, op. cit., pp. 71-72. My italics.
18j My italics.
184 «Aux deux formes traditionnelles d’oppression qu’a connues l’humanité, par les armes et par l’argent, 
Simone Weil en ajoute une troisième, l’oppression par la fonction. (HR, 619). Les illusions bourgeoises 
concernant la science et le progrès technique, partagées par les socialistes autoritaires, ont donné naissance à la 
civilisation des dompteurs de machine qui peut, par la concurrence et la domination, se séparer en blocs ennemis 
mais qui, sur le plan économique, est soumise aux mêmes lois : accumulation du capital, production rationalisée 
et sans cesse accrue. L a différence politique, qu i touche à la p lu s ou m oins grande om nipotence de l ’É tat, est 
appréciable, m ais pourra it être réduite p a r l ’évo lu tion  économique. Seule, la  différence des m orales, la  vertu  
fo rm elle  s'opposant au cynism e historique, p a ra ît solide. M ais l ’im p éra tif d e  la  production dom ine les deux 
univers et n ’en fa it, su r le  p la n  économique, qu ’un seu l monde. » (HR, 622-623). [My italics]
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touché au principe même de la production et de l’organisation du travail, qu’il a exalté au contraire. Il a pu 
proposer au travailleur une justification historique de même valeur que celle qui consiste à promettre les joies 
célestes à celui qui meurt à la peine ; il ne lui a jamais rendu la jo ie  du créateur. La form e politique de la société 
n 'est plus en question à ce niveau, mais tes credo d'une civilisation technique de laquelle dépendent également 
capitalisme et socialisme. Toute pensée qui ne fait pas avancer ce problème ne touche qu’à peine au malheur 
ouvrier. (HR, 620-621) [My italics]
It is clear from this passage that «tyrannie» (and its correlative, which is «servitude»), 
«dictature» and «anarchie» are used by Camus not to refer to specific political forms of 
society - or to name the “new”, i. e., 20th century so-called totalitarian forms o f government, 
by the old, as pointed out by Hannah Arendt - but rather to designate a nihilistic or abstracting 
logic, which preserves a certain pattern o f  domination, founded on the reduction of work 
(travail) to the productive process o f the factory, and therefore, o f the craftsman to the 
labourer.
Production is seen as devesting the creative act (travail) o f the actor’s interest and
reflection, which are consequently limited to the thing or the end-product (HR, 676):
intelligence (l'esprit), which Camus conceives as the ineliminable condition o f creation,
cannot, therefore, be identified with the craftsman’s idea tout court, which is at the core of the
modem assimilation o f  work and labour which was extensively analysed by Hannah Arendt in
1her commentaries on Marx.
I would suggest that there is more in these passages than the simple re-statement of the 
traditional reconciliation o f intellectual and manual work, or than the wish to transform the 
conditions o f factory work by turning the labourer into an artisan.
Reflection, I would argue, is not the artisan’s skill and idea, realised by taming a 
shapeless matter: Camus does not separate intelligence from the revolted, namely, tragic or 
aisthetic, sensibility (HR, 668) o f the actor or creator, and the mise en forme of man’s need 
for the impossible (HR, 674), rooted in remembrance, has the character of the grand style, the 
«stylisation incarnée» (HR, 675): «Lorsque le cri le plus déchirant trouve son langage le plus 
ferme, la révolte satisfait à sa vraie exigeance et tire de cette fidélité à elle-même une force de 
création. Bien que cela heurte les préjugés du temps, le plus grand style en art est 18567
185 See HC, 85-ff.
186 According to Fred Rosen, author of an article on “Marxism, Mysticism, and Liberty. The influence of Simone 
Weil on Albert Camus” ( Political Theory, 7(3), 1979, pp. 301-319), «[Camus] advocated [...] the 
transformation o f the industrial worker into an artisan [...] Camus proposed what Simone Weil continually 
emphasized in her early writings, namely the abolition o f the separation o f intellectual and manual labor which 
Marx wrongly thought would disappear with the proletarian revolution.» (art. cit., p. 306). I would argue, in 
contrast, as emerges from our textual analysis, that Camus’ creator is not, strictly speaking, an artisan in the 
Arendtian sense.
187 As Camus writes in the preface to the re-edition o f  his first collection of essays L 'Envers et l'endroit, drafts of 
which date back to 1954, to be is to «savoir unir à doses à peu près égales le naturel et l’art» (E, 12): «Stendhal 
s’écriait un jour: «Mais mon âme à moi est un feu qui souffre, s’il ne flambe pas ». Ceux qui lui ressemblent sur
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l’expression de la plus haute révolte» (HR, 674). Comme le vraie classicisme n’est qu’un 
romantisme dompté, le génie est une révolte qui a créé sa propre mesure» (Id.). The analogy 
between creative action and «romantisme dompté» immediately recalls, in contrast, the 
dandy’s romantisme sans freins, whose reifying and abstracting logic Camus traces at the core 
of the 20th century nihilist attempts at aestheticising the political.
Now, Camus, like Nietzsche in The Greek State, insists on the powerful necessity -  
the flame from which stems the revolted cry (E, 1184, note 8) - which compels the artist to 
create. The genesis o f artistic creation, like that of the political agon, is in nature, but the 
artist’s pleased astonishment at beauty exceeds man’s wonder at nature: «Breton a raison. -  
Camus notes in 1946 -  Moi non plus je  ne crois pas à la fracture entre le monde et l ’homme. 
Il y a les instants de l’accord avec la nature brute. Mais la nature n’est jamais brute. Mais les 
paysages fuient et s ’oublient. C’est pourquoi il y a des peintres. [...] [T] erreur [de la peinture 
surréaliste] a été de vouloir préserver ou imiter seulement la part miraculeuse de la nature. Le
1 Jtflvraie artiste révolté ne nie pas les miracles mais les dompte » (Cil, 184).
Creative action couples the wonder at the miracle of what is (nature) with the maîtrise, 
which corrects necessity, sublimating it. Being is (in) such correction (E, 12) - what Camus 
defines as grand style - which transcends, in a Nietzschean sense, the sheer work o f  the 
craftsman.
Camus’ distance from the Existentialist reduction o f  être to faire is rooted in the 
author’s rejection o f the fabrication paradigm, which he traces at the core of the modem 
philosophy of History. The critique o f historicism is the cornerstone of Camus’ critique of 
Existentialism, and especially of the “Existentialo-Maxxism” of the Sartrian family o f Les
1 OQTemps Modernes, which, in the author’s view, remains trapped m nihilism:
Libérer l’homme de toute entrave pour ensuite Pencager pratiquement dans une nécessité historique 
revient en effet à lui enlever d’abord ses raisons de lutter pour enfin le jeter à n ’importe quel parti, pourvu que 
celui-ci n’ait d ’autre règle que l’efficacité. C’est alors passer, selon la loi du nihilisme, de l'extrême liberté à 
l'extrême nécessité ; ce n’est rien d’autre que se vouer à fabriquer des esclaves. (E, 770) [My italics] *189
ce point ne devraient créer que dans cette flambée. Au sommet de la flamme, le cri sort tout droit et crée ses 
mots qui le répercutent à leur tour. Je parle ici de ce que nous tous, artistes incertains de l’être, mais sûrs de ne 
pas être autre chose, attendons, jour après jour, pour consenir enfin à vivre » (Id.).
'** My italics.
189 «Mais l’histoire, seule raison et seule règle, serait alors divinisée, et c ’est l’abdication de la révolte devant 
ceux qui prétendent êtres les prêtres et l’Eglise de ce dieu. Ce serait aussi la négation de la liberté et de 
l’aventure existentielles. Tant que vous n’aurez pas éclairé ou démenti cette contradiction, défini votre 
conception de l’histoire, colonisé ou proscrit le marxisme, comment donc ne serions-nous pas fondés à dire que 
vous ne sortez pas, quoi que vous en ayez, du nihilisme ? Et ce nihilisme, malgré les ironies de votre article, est 
aussi celui de l’inefficacité. Une attitude semblable cumule deux sortes de nihilisme, celui de l’efficacité à tout 
prix et celui de l’abstention pratique.» (E, 770-771).
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We can, now, clearly see how far removed Camus’ position is from the «Existentialist 
leap» into action described by Hannah Arendt in 1954. Echoing Heidegger, Arendt interprets 
the Existentialist equation of freedom with man’s seif-creation in the light of Cartesianism, 
which she traces to the origin o f  Sartre’s “jump” from an absurd situation, made visible in the 
awareness that «man is condemned to be free», into action («just as Kierkegaard jumped into 
belief out o f universal doubt», CP, 438).190 She, thus, traces in the apparently new insight, at 
the core o f  the Existentialist activist or radical humanism, that Man can create himself (CP, 
440), the very old (modem) claim that «Man is the highest being for man, that Man is his own 
God».
I suggest that Arendt interprets (Heideggerianly) -  and, I would add, incorrectly when 
referring to Camus’ concept o f rebellion -  the concept o f défi, that guides political action 
under the conditions o f modem nihilism, in the light o f  the fabrication model.
She, thus identifies, in French Existialism, the philosophers’ extreme (political) 
attempt to eradicate the human condition and the absurdity o f human life by artificial means 
(CP, 440): «From the paradox that man, though he did not make himself, is held responsible 
for what he is, Sartre concludes that he therefore must be held to be his own Maker.»191
As I have attempted to show, Camus’ concept o f creation not only strongly refuses the 
God-like perspective, which he repeatedly refers to as absolute nihilism, as made visible in 
the modem “aestheticising” frenzy (from de Sade to Hitlerism); but, in its very definition, 
contains plurality and communicability as its ineliminable conditions, which draw him closer 
to the position of the German Existentialist thinker Karl Jaspers (CP, 441).
Camus opposes to the abstract law o f the philosophies o f  History, which reduce man 
to a corpse or a silhouette, the living law o f the creator’s grand style. The grand style breaks 
with the fabrication/production paradigm, around which contemporary society has articulated:
Toute création nie, en elle-même, le monde du maître et de l’esclave. La hideuse société de tyrans et 
d ’esclaves où nous nous survivons ne trouvera sa mort et sa transfiguration qu’au niveau de la création. (HR, 
677) [My italics]
190 We should not forget that in MdS Camus rejectes this “leap” as a metaphysical fallacy, what he addresses as 
“philosophical suicide” in MdS. In her 1946 article on French Existentialism  Arendt points out «the nihilistic 
elements, which are obvious in spite of all protests to the contrary» in Camus’s MdS and Sartre’s La Nausée, 
which according to her are «not the consequences of new insights but of some very old ideas» (EU, 193), by 
which, I take it, she means with Heidegger the Cartesianism and god-like perspective o f the uncondioned 
modem subject. For an extensive reply to this criticism, see chapter 1 of the present work.
191 Arendt explicitly draws a parallel between the Existentialist concept o f political action, interpreted as an 
attempt to «save the human nature» (or mankind) «at the expense o f  the human condition» (EU, 440), and the 
familiar attempts, in 20th century politics - «in totalitarian regimes and, unfortunately, not only there - [ . . .]  to 
change the human nature by radically changing traditional conditions.» (Id.)
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I suggest that Camus’ reflection on creation anticipates certain elements of Vattimo’s 
interrogation on the question o f nihilism as the end o f  the political, 192 or more precisely, the 
end of a certain concept of the political, which has its origin in dominion (the master/slave 
relationship) and its consolidation in the state as abstract entity. The end of politics -  the latter 
being identified by Camus with the “space” of dominion (puissance) -  would, as Vattimo 
points out, coincide with the generalisation of the political conceived, in a Nietzschean sense,
105as the sphere o f  creative action.
It is between February 1950 and February 1951 that Camus conceives the titles o f his 
«essais solaires» or Mediterranean Essays (Oil, 311) - «l’Été. Midi. La Fête». The second 
essay of the collection L ’Été, a text written in 1940 in the immediate aftermath of the French 
defeat, and republished in 1954 under the title Les amandiers, opens with a quotation: 
«Savez-vous, disait Napoléon à Fontanes, ce que j ’admire le plus au monde? C'est 
Vimpuissance de la force à fonder quelque chose. Il n’y a que deux puissances aux monde: le 
sabre et l’esprit. À la longue le sabre est toujours vaincu par l’esprit» (E, 835).192 394
Now, «esprit» in Camus’ definition is brought forth by taste (« goût de l’esprit»),195 
and its two essential joys are «sentir et créer» (E, 1824). It is significant that, as early as 1940, 
Nietzsche would provide the source for those «vertus conquérantes de l’esprit», among which 
each man is expected to choose against the modem «esprit de lourdeur », related by Camus to 
the dominion o f force : «Pour lui [Nietzsche], ce sont la force de caractère, le goût, le 
“monde ”, le bonheur classique, la dure fierté, la froide frugalité du sage. Ces vertus, plus que 
jamais, sont nécessaires [...] » (E, 837). «L’esprit -  he wrote in the early Forties- a perdu 
cette royale assurance qu’un conquérant savait lui reconnaître ; il s’épuise maintenant à 
maudire la force, faute de savoir la maîtriser » (E, 835). The virtues of intelligence (esprit) 
are extra-moral or aesthetic, in that they exercise their relative and finite regulating force 
within the anti-metaphysical horizon of modem nihilism.
In his letter to Libertaire in May 1952 (Révolte et romantisme), Camus explicitly 
refers to a good use of nihilism, as the way out of the political and moral impasse o f the 20th
192 G. Vattimo, Introduzione a Nietzsche, Laterza, pp. 102- ff.
193 It is significant that in the 1954 draft of his preface to L ’Envers et Vendroit Camus identified the artist with 
the adventurer, the Nietzschean illustration of the (anti-metaphysical) creative “great health” of the over-man 
(see G. Vattimo, op. cit.). This should come as no surprise, as the Carnets attest that around 1953 Camus was re­
reading Nietzsche’s work.
194 The quotation is noted, with a significant variation, in the Carnets in 1939: «[...] I'impuissance de la force a 
garder quelque chose. [...]» (Cl, 186). In the light of the chapter on Revolt and Art in HR, «garden» and 
«fonder» are interchangeable, the latter being identified with the aesthetic effort to rescue from oblivion 
(«garder») some elements of reality'.
195 E, 1824, note 3.
193
century.196 For Camus, as for Arendt, the solution to the question of nihilism does not lie in 
the simple revival o f traditional principles and values: there can be no going back to the 
Western (Platonic-Christian) tradition. The only retour à ia tradition is the one formulated in 
Simone Weil’s Enracinement, as the capacity «à penser juste, à  voir juste » (E, 1700).
Le monde d’aujourd'hui est un, en effet, mais son unité est celle du nihilisme. La civilisation n'est 
possible que si, renonçant au nihilisme des principes formels et au nihilisme sans principes, ce monde retrouve le 
chemin d’une synthèse créatrice. (HR, 676)
The possibility o f overcoming nihilism, and o f  «la renaissance d’une civilisation», in 
which the question o f creation and the question o f  revolution coincide (HR, 675), is traced by 
Camus in a genealogical thought that goes back to the « roots » (enracinement). This 
movement cannot be confused with the revival o f primitive mentality, or with the celebration 
o f sheer “natural” life, forms that harbour a conservative drive: nihilism, according to Camus, 
is conservative (HR, 690), only creation is truly revolutionary, that is, it transfigures reality.
According to Camus, it is «la limite découverte par la révolte [qui] transfigure tout» 
(HR, 697). The key, I argue, can be found in what the author calls «les antinomies de la 
pensée révoltée» (HR, 698):
On ne peut pas dire que rien n’a de sens puisque l ’on affirme par là une valeur consacrée par un 
jugement ; ni que tout ait un sens puisque le mot tout n’a pas de signification pour nous. L’irrationnel limite le 
rationnel qui lui donne à son tour sa mesure. Quelque chose a du sens, enfin, que nous devons conquérir sur le 
non-sens. De la même manière, on peut dire que l’être soit seulement au niveau de l’essence. Où saisir l’essence 
sinon au niveau de l’existence et du devenir ? Mais on ne peut dire que l’être n’est qu’existence. Ce qui devient 
toujours ne saurait être, U fa u t un commencement. L’être ne peut s’éprouver que dans le devenir, le devenir n’est 
rien sans l’être. Le monde n’est pas dans une pure ñxité ; mais il n’est pas seulement mouvement. Il est 
mouvement et fixité. La dialectique historique, par exemple, ne fuit pas indéfiniment vers une valeur ignorée. 
Elle tourne autour de la limite, première valeur. (HR, 699)197 [My italics]
What we find here is the intuition, striving to find its language, o f the origin as 
creative action, as (new) beginning, which ex-poses the limit, not as some-thing to be found in 
or bestowed upon being, but the limit as being - our being-at-the-limit as finite être.
Being is not reduced to the flux o f existence (what Arendt designated as sheer life, 
“zoè”), nor to an abstract «fixité» - the latter coinciding, throughout l’HR, with the limitless
1%«Nous n’avons donc pas d ’autre issue que d’étudier la contradiction où s ’est débattue la pensée révoltée, entre 
le nihilisme et l’aspiration à un ordre vivant, et de la dépasser dans ce qu’elle a de positif. Je n’ai mis l’accent 
avec tant d ’insistance sur l’aspect négatif de cette pensée que dans l’espoir que nous pourrions alors en guérir, 
tout en gardant le bon usage de la maladie» (E, 751-752) [my italics]. The metaphor o f sickness to designate 
nihilism already recurred in the 1942prière d ’insérer xo MdS (see O. Todd, op. cit, p. 303).
197 My italics.
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effort of the nihilistic «esprit historique» (E, 856) to «bâtir sur l'espèce une farouche 
immortalité» (HR, 684).198
What emerges from the passage quoted above is that the principle (la règle) o f  being is 
the same as the principle of revolt, which Camus identifies with that of creation. The author 
defines the latter as a revendication of the unity of the human condition: now, in the light of 
our reading o f the chapter on Revolt and Art, we are inclined to recognize, in the difference 
between unity and totality, that very difference, which Hannah Arendt traces in her analyses 
o f the modem concept of History, between the finite “immortalizing”, brought about in the act 
o f  remembrance and story-writing or story-telling, and the modem notion “immortality” (of 
mankind).
In the same way as naming despair, to say that nothing has meaning, conquers a 
meaning, and overcomes despair (HR, 666) -  language being, as we have seen, constitutive of 
Camus’ definition o f  grand style -  a beginning is needed for being ( l ’être) to come into being 
(«la vie [...] est sans style», HR, 665).
It is the beginning (le commencement) that inaugurates the fmitude o f being 
(summarised in the notion of «être double», HR, 708),199 which is the mark of le grand style 
as «stylisation [i.e., fixation] incarnée». So, as «l’art nous ramène [...] aux origines de la 
révolte» (HR, 662), «[â] la source de la révolte où refus et consentement, singularité et 
universel, individu et histoire s’équilibrent dans la tension la plus dure» (HR, 676), Camus 
identifies the principle (règle) o f  revolt with the principle of beauty.200 201
The revolted revendication of unity coincides with, and is brought forth as, the
revendication of «cette partie intacte du réel dont le nom est la beauté»( HR, 679). Beauty -
which Plato situated above the world, and the nihilists and revolutionaries exiled to the end of
history (HR, 657-658) -  is neither a transcendent Idea, nor in the world per se, but as «image
1
du bonheur», it is (in) the creative touching-upon of man-to-the-world.
198 «[Les hommes de l’Europe] désespèrent de la liberté des personnes et rêvent d’une étrange liberté de 
ƒ ’espèce » (E, 708) : mankind or thè human species constituting thè eternai essence, to which, according to 
Camus, «la proie des êtres » (ld.) is sacrificed.
199 Camus qualifies the nihilistic hatred o f life («[Les hommes d’Europe] ne croient plus a ce qui est, au monde 
et à l’homme vivant» as «impatience des limites», which is nothing but the contemporaiy «refus de leur être 
double, le désespoir d ’être homme [...] » (HR, 708).
200 «La beauté, sans doute, ne fait pas les révolutions. Mais un jour vient où les révolutions ont besoin d’elle. Sa 
règle qui conteste le réel en même temps qu’elle lui donne son unité est aussi celle de la révolte, Peut-on, 
éternellement, refuser l’injustice sans cesser de saluer la nature de l’homme et la beauté du monde ? Notre 
réponse est oui. Cette morale, en même temps insoumise et fidèle, est en tout cas la seule à éclairer le chemin 
d ’une révolution vraiement réaliste. » (HR, 679).
201 In L ’énigme (1950) and Retour à Tipasa (1952), Camus associâtes beauty, «et le bonheur sensuel qui lui est 
attaché» (E, 871), to light (lumière, soleil), the memory of which (E, 870 and 861) he situâtes as the centre of his 
work: «Au centre de notre œuvre, fut-elle noire, rayonne un soleil inépuisable [...]» (E, 865). The meaning of
195
Camus’ creative act, I argue, is the finite thought (o f the finite) as form-of-life,202 203as 
grand sty le™  The experience o f  thought, in which form and life, as the sensory dimension 
(aisthesis) o f our futile being-to-the-world,204 are not separable -  is always inevitably, in 
Agamben’s terms, the experience o f a «common potentiality», which is inherent in the futility 
of ex-istence.205 206
In the section “Révolte et style”, Camus designates as style the correction operated by 
the artist through language and the selective remembrance o f  reality (aisthesis), «[qui] donne 
à l’univers recréé son unité et ses limites» (HR, 672). According to Camus, «[l’art 
romanesque] ne peut ni consentir totalement au réel -  that is, to the dispersedness and futility 
o f becoming, as sheer “potentiality” -  ni s ’en écarter absolument. Le pur imaginaire -  as 
“pure act” or fixed idea -  n’existe pas et, si même il existait dans un roman idéal gui serait 
purement désincarnéf il n ’aurait pas de signification artistique, la première exigence de 
l ’esprit en quête d ’unité étant que cette unité soit communicable» (Id.). The
the artist’s work lies in the constant effort to name the light of this «soleil enfoui» (E, 866). It is, precisely, in the 
artist’s «fidélité instinctive à une lumière où je suis né et où, depuis des millénaires, les hommes ont appris à 
saluer la vie jusque dans la souffrance» (Id.) that Camus traces the key to the overcoming of nihilism.
20~ Giorgio Agamben situâtes thought as form-of-life at the centre o f his reflection in Alezzi senza fine. Note sulla 
politica (1996), as thè guiding-concept o f thè politics to come («la politica che viene»): «Solo se io non sono già 
sempre e soltanto in atto, ma sono consegnato a una possibilità e una potenza, solo se, nei miei vissuti e nei miei 
intesi, ne va ogni volta del vivere e dell’intendere stessi -  se vie è, cioè, in questo senso, pensiero -  allora una 
forma di vita può diventare, nella sua fatticità e cosatila, forma-di-vita, in cui non è mai possibile isolare 
qualcosa come una nuda vita»(G. Agamben, Mezzi senza fin e , Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1996,18-19).
203 «[•••] la seule pensée qui soit fidèle à ces origines, la pensée des limites » (HR, 697). It is possible to observe 
an affinity between Agamben’s définition of thmking («Chiamiamo pensiero H nesso che costituisce le forme di 
vita in un contesto inseparabile, in forma-di-vita», op. c it, 17) and Camus’s notion of grand style.
204 In analogous terms, Agamben defines thinking as «non semplicemente essere affetti da questa o da quella 
cosa, da questo o da quel contenuto di pensiero in atto, ma essere, insieme, affetti dalla propria ricettività, far 
esperienza, in ogni pensiero di una pura potenza di pensare.» (G. Agamben, M ezzi senza fine, op. cit., 17).
205 «L’esperienza del pensiero [...] è sempre esperienza di una potenza comune. Comunità e potenza si 
identificano senza residui, perché rinerire di un principio comunitario in ogni potenza è funzione del carattere 
necessariamente potenziale di ogni comunità. Fra esseri che fossero già sempre in atto, che fossero sempre 
questa o quella cosa, questa o quella identità e avessero, in queste, esaurita interamente la loro potenza, non vi 
sarebbe alcuna comunità, ma solo coincidenze e partizioni fattuali. Possiamo comunicare con altri solo attraverso 
ciò che in noi, come negli altri, è rimasto in potenza e ogni comunicazione (come Benjamin aveva intuito per la 
lingua) è innanzitutto comunicazione non di un comune, ma di una comunicabilità.» (G. Agamben, M ezzi senza 
fine, op. cit., 18).
206 Camus’s reflection on language dates back to 1942-44, and coïncides with his engagement in criticai 
joumalism. As he wrote in the 1944 article on the philosophy of language of Brice Parain, «[n]ous ne 
connaissons que par les mots. Leur inefficacité démontrée, c’est notre aveuglement définitif. [...] Si les mots 
justice, bonté, beauté, n’ont pas de sens, les hommes peuvent se déchirer.» (E, 1673- 74). Camus praised Parain 
for approaching the question o f language as an inquiry into thè fmiteness o f thè human condition, and the root of 
ail metaphysics (« [...] il s ’agit de savoir si même nos mots les plus justes et nos cris les plus réussis ne sont pas 
privés de sens, si le langage n’exprime pas [...] la solitude définitive de l’homme dans un monde muet » E, 
1673) - the tragic of the problem lies precisely in that «[si] notre langage n ’a pas de sens, rien n’a de sens» (Cil, 
35).
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communicability o f such unity excludes, by its very definition, its reduction to a thing, as is 
the case, in contrast, for the notion of totality.207
The unity brought about in the act o f creation is always liminal -  it is (at) the limit. It 
is in this sense, I take it, that beauty «[fait la promesse d ’] une transcendance vivante [...] qui 
peut faire aimer et préférer à tout autre ce monde mortel et limité» (HR, 662) :
En maintenant la beauté, nous préparons ce jour de renaissance où la civilisation mettra au centre de sa 
réflexion, loin des principes formels et des valeurs dégradées de l’histoire, cette vertu vivante qui fonde la 
commune dignité du monde et de l’homme, et que nous avons maintenant à définir en face d’un monde qui 
l’insulte. (HR, 679-680) 208
The limit, ex-posed in the act o f revolt as creation, founds a community, which is not 
reified, but lies in the «reconnaissance mutuelle d’une destinée commune et la communication 
des hommes entre eux» (HR, 686). The living transcendence is the être-h that de-fines the 
finitude o f the human condition in/as the plural ex-perience o f  the «Nous sommes», on the 
verge of which thinking brings forth «la longue complicité des hommes aux prises avec leur 
destin» (HR, 687):
L ’injustice, la fugacité, la mort se manifestent dans l ’histoire. En les repoussant, on repousse l’histoire 
elle-même. Certes, le révolté ne nie pas l’histoire qui l’entoure, c ’est en elle qu’il essaie de s’affirmer. Mais il se 
trouve devant elle comme l’artiste devant le réel, il la repousse sans s’y dérober. [...] La révolte, elle, ne vise 
qu’au relatif et ne peut promettre qu’une dignité certaine assortie d’une justice relative. Elle prend le parti d ’une 
lim ite où s ’établit la communauté des hommes. Son univers est celui du relatif. (HR, 693)
As the principle {règle) o f revoit is the principle of artistic création (beauty), «[la] 
révolte n’est pas en elle-même un élément de civilisation. Mais elle est préalable à toute 
civilisation » (HR, 676) : it is by ex-posing the limit, on which the community of men situâtes
207 It is not without reason that Camus insists, throughout his political writings, on the co-implication of totality 
and silence or mensonge (HR, 687). See also my article “Du nihilisme au silence totalitaire: le mensonge dans la 
réflexion politique et morale d’Albert Camus”, in Albert Camus et le mensonge, Actes du colloque organisé par 
la Bpi les 29 et 30 décembre 2002, Bibliothèque Publique d’information, Paris, 2004,129-144).
208 All thought that expels beauty is, thus, a nihilistic thought, one, that is, which eradicates the liminality o f 
being, reducing the latter to the end-product (a thing) of a process o f fabrication. As R. Gay-Crosier points out, 
«au cœur de la trinité existentielle de l ’être, de Vavoir et du faire, l’homme doit opérer un choix. On sait que 
pour Sartre c’est le fa ire  qui représente le summum bonum alors que pour Camus c’est plutôt l 'être. Sur le plan 
temporel, la disposition de la pyramide des valeurs a pour conséquence que l’on opte soit pour l'avenir (c’est la 
morale de Sartre), soit pour le présent (c’est ce qu’exige L'Homme révolté).» (R. Gay-Crosier, Albert Camus : 
Paradigmes de l'ironie -révolte et négation affirmative, Éditions Paratexte, Trinity College, Toronto, Canada, 
2000, p. 156). I disagree with Serge Doubrovsky when he maintains that «[l’Jéthique de Sartre et celle de Camus 
sont ce qu’on pourrait appeler des éthiques à une dimension, la première reposant tout entière sur la notion de 
liberté, la seconde sur celle de vie » (S. Doubrovsky, « La morale d ’Albert Camus », Preuves, n. 116, oct. 1960, 
45). As I attempted to show, Camus’s notion of life, precisely in that it is always already form-of-life, escapes the 
unidimensionality of sheer life - what Agamben would define as “naked life” (nuda vita) - defined by Camus as 
pure abstraction. Life as form-of-life carries dédoublement within itself.
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itself as finite être(~è), that revolt poses the conditions for overcoming the moral and political 
impasse o f nihilism.
Revolt dis-closes thinking as form-of-life {grand style), which is always risky, in the 
sense o f a thought of/at the limit - «Si la révolte pouvait fonder une philosophie [...], ce serait 
une philosophie des limites, de l’ignorance calculée et du risque. Celui qui ne peut tout savoir 
ne peut tout tuer» (HR, 693).
It is, thus, consistent with the aisthetic premises o f the absurd argument in the MdS 
that Camus rejects the notion o f History as totality, thus appealing, once again, to the thought 
o f Karl Jaspers:
La pensée de Jaspers, par exemple, dans ce qu’elle a d’essentiel, souligne l’impossibilité pour l’homme 
de saisir la totalité, puisqu’il se trouve à l’intérieur de cette totalité. L’histoire, comme un tout, ne pourrait exister 
qu’aux yeux d’un observateur extérieur à elle-même et au monde. Il n’y a d ’histoire, à la limite, que pour Dieu. 
Il est donc impossible d’agir suivant des plans embrassant la totalité de l’histoire universelle. Toute entreprise 
historique ne peut être alors qu’une aventure plus ou moins raisonnable ou fondée. Elle est d'abord un risque. En 
tant que risque, elle ne saurait justifier aucune démesure, aucune position implacable et absolue. (HR, 692-693)
As early as 1948, Camus posed this finite, « modest »,209 thought o f the finite as the 
premise to a political reflection touching upon the meaning o f  democracy. In the article La 
démocratie exercice de la modestie, the author denounced the fallacy at the core o f all 
argument, which introduces «dans le problème social une fix ité  ou un déterminisme absolu 
qui ne peuvent raisonnablement s’y trouver» (E, 1581). Liberalism and Communism, 
according to the author, rest on an equally murderous «certitude absolue» (Id.), which 
simplifies reality, founding their policy o f  dominion and conquest on abstraction.210
Nihilism is, thus, identified with all form of “unidimensional” reasoning : opposed to 
the «penser juste, voir juste», it coincides with «aveuglement [et] haine» (E, 725),211 namely, 
with the negation o f that creative act, which is the finite thought o f the finite as forme-de- 
vie:212 « La démocratie, qu’elle soit sociale et politique, ne peut se fonder sur une philosophie
209 « Il s’agit, en somme, de définir les conditions d’une pensée politique modeste, c’est-à-dire délivrée de tout 
messianisme, et débarrassée de la nostalgie du paradis terrestre. » (CAC8,616)
210 «Je connais deux sortes de raisonnements réactionnaires ([...] nous appellerons réactionnaire toute attitude 
qui vise à accroître indéfiniment les servitudes politiques et économiques qui pèsent sur les hommes). Ces deux 
raisonnements vont en sens contraire, mais ils ont pour caractère commun d’exprimer une certitude absolue. Le 
premier consiste à dire : « On ne changera jamais rien aux hommes. » Conclusion : les guerres sont inévitables, 
la servitude sociale est dans la nature des choses L’autre consiste à dire : « On peut changer les hommes. 
Mais leur libération dépend de tel facteur et il faut agir de telle façon pour leur faire du bien ». Conclusion : ï! est 
logique d’opprimer [...J» (E, 1580-1581).
211 Hatred {la haine) is opposed to com-prehension, which, as Camus points out, should not be confused with 
neutrality, and goes together with com-passion (E, 725). It is significant that Camus had chosen as the epigraphy 
for his collection of political writings, Actuelles /, published in 1950, a passage by Nietzsche: «Il vaut mieux 
périr que haïr et craindre; il vaut mieux périr deux fois que se fair haïr et redouter ; telle devra être un jour la 
suprême maxime de toute société organisée politiquement » (E, 249). [My italics]
212 It is in this sense that all nihilistic thought opens the way to conformism, which Camus associates to 
oppression (servitude) (see “Révolte et conformisme”, Arts, 19 octobre 1951, E, 731).
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politique qui prétend tout savoir et tout régler, pas plus qu’elle n’a pu se fonder jusqu’ici sur 
une morale de conservation absolue.» (E, 1581-82).
Against old and new «reactionary», i.e. nihilistic, reasoning, « le  démocrate est
' « I l
modeste, il avoue une certaine part d ’ignorance, il reconnaît le caractère en partie 
aventureux [i.e. open to risk] de son effort et que tout ne lui est pas donné » (E, 1582), aware 
that if « la démocratie n’est pas le meilleur des régimes, [e]lle en est le moins mauvais » 
(Id.).* 214 215
It has not been sufficiently pointed out that, in the chapter of HR on «la pensée de 
Midi», Camus explicitly traces back to the “reactionary” or nihilistic reasoning the reduction 
o f the political community to a  «corps mystique sous les espèces les plus basses» (HR, 694), 
for the restoration o f which freedom is sacrificed to an ideal o f absolute justice, that destroys 
the complicity of men.
This reified, or, to use Nancy’s terminology, “immanent” community, associated by 
Camus to the concepts of power, dominion, violence and conquest, is opposed to a  living 
community from which, in the author’s view, we «receive» being. It is significant that 
Camus identified living justice with beauty, which is liminality. As he notes in the Summer of 
1956: «Paris. La beauté c’est la justice parfaite» (CIII, 192).
It is precisely in the light of the liminality, which constitutes Camus’ conception of 
men’s com-munity, that violence, as a break in/of com-munication (HR, 695), must be re­
thought: the French writer distinguishes the concept o f “revolted” violence («par exemple, 
dans le cas de l’insurrection.», Id.) from a systematic or «comfortable» violence, normalized 
by the 20th century ten-orist regimes.
The aporia o f violence, thus, reflects the aporia o f the community itself:216 it is only by 
preserving the «caractère provisoire d’effraction» (HR, 695) o f  crime, we could argue with
215 HR, 693.
214 «La démocratie vraie se réfère toujours à la base, parce qu’elle suppose qu’aucune vérité en cet ordre n’est 
absolue et que plusieurs expériences d’hommes, ajoutées l’une à l’autre, représentent une approximation de la 
vérité plus précieuse qu’une doctrine cohérente, mais fausse. La démocratie ne défend pas une idée abstraite, ni 
une philosophie brillante, elle défend les démocrates [...]. J’entends bien que la majorité peut se tromper au 
moment même où la minorité voit clair. [...] la même modestie suppose que la minorité peut se faire entendre et 
qu’il sera toujours tenu compte de ses avis* C ’est pourquoi je dis que la démocratie est le moins mauvais des 
régimes. » (E, 1582). In the article « Défense de la liberté », published in Franc-Tireur in December 1952 and 
reedited in Actuelles II, Camus uses the term “totalitarianism” to address a System based on the police and on the 
relation force-justice, tracing in «la force d’équité et le prestige de la liberté», constantly sought by maintaining 
freedom of expression and opposition, the guiding principles of democracy (E, 779).
215 « La non-violence absolue fonde négativement la servitude et ses violences; la violence systématique détruit 
positivement la communauté vivante et l’être que nous en recevons. Pour être fécondes, ces deux notions 
doivent trouver leur limites. » (HR, 695)
2,6 HR, 684.
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Camus, that violence, while destroying the living com-munity of men, at the same time ex­
poses the limit which constitutes such a community as crisis - «risque pur» (Id.).217
Terror, in contrast, normalizes crime, instauring a permanent State o f  Exception, 
which replaces the être-à with an efficient fabrication of corpses - «Fûhrerprinzip ou Raison 
historique, quel que soit l’ordre qui la fonde, elle règne sur un univers de choses, non 
d’hommes» (Id.)
This reading is confirmed by the pages on the activism of the Russian terrorists o f 
1905, to whom Camus devotes a chapter in HR under the title «Les meurtriers délicats», and 
which illustrates «le moment où l’esprit de révolte rencontre, pour la dernière fois dans notre 
histoire, l’esprit de compassion» (HR, 573).
Now, Camus relates com-passion to friendship/fratemity as the distinctive feature o f  
the meurtriers délicats, as he describes the terrorists of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionary 
movement, among whom he takes into consideration the cases o f Kaliayev, Sasonov, Vera 
Zassoulitch, Dora Brilliant, who inspired his 1949 tragedy Les Justes.
Camus introduces friendship in his analysis o f 20th century revolutionary thought 
together with the notion of love.218 According to the author, it was the Russian nihilist 
Netchaiev who, developing a «psychologie arbitraire véhiculée par la pensée de Hegel», for 
the first time in history expelled love and friendship from revolutionary thought: «[Hegel] 
avait pourtant admis que la reconnaissance des consciences l’une par l’autre peut se faire dans 
/ ’affrontement de / 'amour»219 20(HR, 567).
Love as affrontement, as con-frontation and touching-upon, is the experience o f the 
Iiminality o f human finite being par excellence:
Ceux qui s'aiment, les amis, les amants, savent que l'amour n'est pas seulement fulguration, mais aussi 
une longue et douloureuse lutte dans les ténèbres pour la reconnaissance et la réconciliation définitives. [...] La 
revendication de justice n 'est d’ailleurs pas seule à justifier au long des siècles la passion révolutionnaire, qui 
s'appuie aussi sur une exigence douloureuse de l'amitié pour tous, même et surtout en face d’un ciel ennemi. 
Ceux qui meurent pour la justice, de tout temps, se sont appelés « frères ». La violence, pour eux tous, est 
réservée à l’ennemi, au service de la communauté des opprimés. Mais si la révolution est l’unique valeur, elle 
exige tout et même la délation, donc le sacrifice de l ’am i Désormais, la violence sera tournée contre tous, au 
service dune idée abstraite. (HR, 567-568)
Camus désignâtes the concentrationary System of Soviet Commimism as the Empire o f
«AA
«l’amitié [...] de choses», structured on the police techniques o f  délation and
217 «Il n’y a pas de justice, -  he writes in 1947 -  il n’y a que des limites» (Cil, 236).
218 The continuity between the pensée révoltée and the question o f love is confirmed in Cil, 177 and Cil, 200.
2,9 My italics.
220 «L’amitié des personnes, il n’en est pas d’autre définition, est la solidarité particulière, jusqu’à la mort, contre 
ce qui n’est pas du règne de l’amitié. L’amitié des choses est l’amitié en général, l’amitié avec tous, qui suppose,
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«l’amalgame», which reduce human beings to abstractions («âmes mortes» - E, 642) and to 
sheer expendable instruments (means) for the realisation of a higher end. Thus, the Soviet 
system is the negation of «le règne des personnes, [où] les hommes se lient s *affection.» 
( id .).221 234
The totalitarian «état de siège», as a permanent State o f Emergency, negates nature 
and beauty in the name of the (absolute) value of History - «en retranchant de l’homme sa 
force de passion, de doute, de bonheur, d ’invention singulière, de grandeur en un mot» (E, 
643), it rejects risk and creation (E, 696).
What l’HR defines is, precisely, a  «morale du risque historique», in opposition to the 
«nécessité historique qu’on trouve chez Marx et ses disciples»: the former poses the
singularity o f the creative act at the beginning, as aisthetic or tragic archè, of the community.
The latter can thus be defined as the com-munity of le malheur, not in the Arendtian 
acceptation o f the term, as pertaining to the bodily sphere o f labour, but, instead, in the 
Weilian sense, as com-munity o f fragility. 223 This is not to say that Camus’ conception of the 
com-munity excludes le bonheur.,224 on the contrary, it places happiness, in its specific tragic
quand elle doit se préserver, la dénonciation de chacun. Celui qui aime son amie ou son ami l’aime dans le 
présent et la révolution ne veut aimer qu'un homme qui n’est pas encore là. [...] La cité qui se voulait fraternelle 
devient une fourmilière d'hommes seuls. » (HR, 642)
221 Netchaiev and the group of La Volonté du people elected individual terrorism as the principle of revolutionary 
action, inaugurating a series of murders «qui s’est poursuivie jusqu’en 1905, avec le socialisme révolutionnaire» 
(HR, 570). As Camus points out, «les terroristes naissent, à cet endroit, détournés de l'amour [....]» (Id.). As 
opposed to the « possédés » (HR, 560-ff.), the « meurtriers délicats » overcome solitude and negation, i.e. 
nihilism, in friendship: «Au milieu d’un monde qu’ils nient et qui les rejette, ils tentent, comme tous les grands 
cœurs, de refaire, homme après homme, une fraternité. L’amour qu’ils se portent réciproquement, qui fait leur 
bonheur jusque dans le désert du bagne, qui s'étend à l'immense masse de leurs frères asservis et silencieux, 
donne la mesure de leur détresse et de leur espoir. Pour servir cet amour, il leur fait d’abord tuer [...] » (HR, 
576). It is in this sense that the « Nous sommes », or the com-munity of revolt, «resplendit d’un mortel éclat» in 
the extreme contradiction o f these terrorists: «[...] ces ten-oristes, au meme temps qu’ils affirment le monde des 
hommes, [as opposed to the world of things] se placent au-dessus de ce monde, démontrant, pour la dernière fo is 
dans notre histoire, que la vraie révolte est créatrice de valeurs » (HR, 578).
222 « Révolte et servitude » (« Lettres sur la révolte », Actuelles II), letter to Temps modernes ( 30th of June
1952). (E, 766).
223 Camus notes in his Carnets : « S. Weil a raison, ce n’est pas la personne humaine qu’il faut protéger, mais les 
possibilités qu’elle recouvre. Et puis, dit-elle, « on n ’entre pas dans la vérité sans avoir passé à travers son propre 
anéantissement : sans avoir séjourné longtemps dans un état de totale et extrême humiliation ». La malheur (un 
hasard peut m 'abolir) est cet état d ’humiliation, non la souffrance. Et encore « L’esprit de justice et l’esprit de 
vérité ne font qu’un ». » (Cil, 338-339) (my italics). Camus’s identification o f a living justice with beauty would 
have, in this sense, no other meaning than confirming the liminality and fragility of the human condition 
experienced by the “esprit de vérité” as malheur. Camus insists on friendship and «la longue fraternité des 
hommes en lutte contre leur destin » (F. Bartfeld, op. cit., p. 67) which founds a «dignité partagée, une 
communion des hommes entre eux » (Ivi, p. 66). Communication entails freedom : Camus incorporates the 
dimension of plurality (as être-à) and fragility in his definition of freedom - «Notre vie appartient sans doute aux 
autres et il est juste de la donner quand cela est nécessaire. Mais notre mort n’appartient qu’à nous, c’est ma 
définition de liberté » (Camus, Temps des meurtriers, in F. Bartfeld, op. cit., p. 55, note 7),
224 In our definition o f Camus’s concept o f community we must take in Camus’s Pascalian (tragic) argument: 
«L’erreur vient toujours d ’une exclusion, dit Pascal. Si on ne recherche que le bonheur, on aboutit à la facilité. Si
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acceptation o f « joie étrange qui aide à vivre et à mourir»,225 at the core o f an alternative 
conception o f the political, namely, o f a political action “disciplined” by beauty.226
It is in this sense that we understand the opposition between the artist and the 
Historic(ist) conqueror:
[...] la fin [de l’esprit historique] est la tyrannie tandis que la passion [de rartiste] est la liberté. Tous 
ceux qui aujourd'hui luttera pour la liberté combattent en dernier lieu pour la beauté. (H, 85Ô).227
It is the notion o f admiration, as related to that of love, which provides the meaning o f  
Camus’s concept of creation as a kind o f  praxis-poiesis which excludes violence and murder. 
In a note in the passage on Netchaiev’s Hegelianism, Camus points out that:
[ la reconnaissance des consciences Tune par l’autre] peut se faire aussi dans l ’admiration où le mot 
« maître » prend alors un grand sens : celui qui form e, sans détruire. (HR, 567 note *)
It is most significant that the term « admiration » recurs in the final pages o f  l’HR as 
one o f the distinctive marks o f  a tradition of thought, which, in Camus’ argument, runs 
parallel to the dominant Platonic-Christian (i.e., nihilistic) tradition in the Western world, o f  
which the contemporary philosophies o f History are seen as the direct prosecution.
Camus designates this parallel tradition as «pensée solaire», «esprit méditerranéen», 
«pensée de Midi (HR, 700-703):
Le conflit profond de ce siècle ne s'établit peut-être pas tant entre les idéologies allemandes de l’histoire 
et la politique chrétienne, qui d’une certaine manière sont complices, qu’entre les rêves allemands et la tradition 
méditerranéenne [...] ; l’histoire enfin et la nature. Mais l’idéologie allemande est en ceci une héritière. En elle 
s’achèvent vingt siècles de vaine lutte contre la nature au nom d’un dieu historique d’abord et de l’histoire 
divinisée ensuite. [...] lorsque l’Église a dissipé son héritage méditerranéen, elle a mis l’accent sur l’histoire au 
détriment de la nature [...]. La nature qui cesse d ’être objet de contemplation et d ’admiration ne peut être 
ensuite que la matière d ’une action qui vise à la  transformer. (HR, 702).[My italics]
on ne cultive que le malheur, on débouche dans la complaisance. Dans ces deux cas, une dévaluation. Les Grecs 
savaient qu’il y a une part d’ombre et une part de lumière. » (E, 379).
225 E, 708. We can trace an interesting affinity with Agamben’s argument in Mezzi senza fine: according to the 
Italian philosopher, the definition o f the concept o f “happy life” is among the essential tasks o f «il pensiero che 
viene», as alternative to the traditional forms o f political thought, founded on the notion o f sovereignty, as well 
as to modem bio-politics: «La “vita felice” su cui deve fondarsi la filosofia politica non può perciò essere nè 
nuda vita che la sovranità presuppone per fame il proprio soggetto, né l’estraneità impenetrabile della scienza e 
della biopolitica moderna, che si cerca oggi invano di sacralizzare, ma, appunto, una “vita sufficiente” e 
assolutamente profana, che ha raggiunto la perfezione della propria potenza e della propria comunicabilità, e 
sulla quale la sovranità e il diritto non hanno p iù  alcuna presa.» (G. Agamben, Mezzi senza fine , op. cit., p. 91).
226 « La Beauté, qui aide à vivre, aide aussi à mourir » (Cil, 285. Automn 1949).
227 My italics. « Bien entendu, il ne s’agit pas de défendre la beauté pour elle-même. La beauté ne peut se passer 
de l’homme et nous ne donnerons à notre temps sa grandeur et sa sérénité qu’en le suivant dans son malheur. 
Plus jamais nous ne serons des solitaires.» (E, 856). This passage is quoted from the 1948 essay L ’exil d ’Hélène. 
In the 1949 Le Temps des meurtriers, he denounces in contemporary European thought the systematic attempt to 
throw man back onto «l’angoisse des solitaires» by banning love and closing «les fenêtres sur la beauté du 
monde» (op. cit., p. 62).
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To conclude, it is thus possible to trace in Camus’ work two distinct and opposed 
paradigms o f the aesthetic mise en forme, which “operate” as paradigms of the political in 20th 
century politics: the paradigm of transformation, which coincides with the violent realisation 
of an Ideal and opens the way to a limitless manipulation o f reality, which perpetuates the 
relationship o f dominion/oppression (associated to the terms «conquête» and «tyrannie»); and 
the paradigm of transfiguration, which is rooted in admiration and coincides with «la vraie 
maîtrise» (HR, 703).228
Self-mastering and discipline must be understood in their inseparability from the finite 
law (of beauty) and «la fière compassion», at the limit of which the community of malheur 
(«le '‘Nous sommes”») «définit paradoxalement un nouvel individualisme» (HR, 700), one 
which incorporates the concept o f plurality of human action:229 to ban the law (of beauty) 
from this “collective action” is to reduce the individual to the reifying concept o f «un étranger 
ployant sous le poid d ’une collectivité ennemie» (Id.).230
“Transfiguration” takes place at the level of creation,231 and is brought about in the 
touching-upon {être-à) ex-posed by revolt, which, in my view, is in its very movement the 
continuation of the aisthetic «faire face» (HR, 708) o f the absurd or tragic thought o f  the 
MdS.
The concept o f “transfiguration” in HR goes together with an appropriation o f 
historicity which refuses the absolutizing form of the state and the concept of sovereignty,232
228 This is confirmed in another passage, in « Démocratie exercice de la modestie » (Caliban, november 1948) : 
« Il y a un mot que Simone Weil a eu le courage d’écrire et que, par sa vie et par sa mort, elle avait le droit 
d’écrire : « Qui peut admirer Alexandre de toute son âme, s’il n’a l’âme basse ? » Oui, qui peut mettre en 
balance les plus grandes conquêtes de la raison ou de la force, et les immenses souffrances qu’elles représentent, 
s’il n ’a un cœur aveugle à la plus simple sympathie et un esprit détourné de toute justice ! » (E, 1581). [My 
italics].
229 « J ’ai besoin des autres qui ont besoin de moi et de chacun » (HR, 700). This thesis is confirmed by Roger 
Dadoun in his article, «Albert Camus : fondations d’anarchie »: «Il serait bon -  he suggests -  et opportune 
d’entendre le mot “compassion” comme marquant la passion commune, partagée, communautaire -  désignant la 
communauté comme partage de joie, dans une radicale et nouvelle convivialité » (Camus et la politique, op. c it, 
p. 265). Dadoun seems to identify this joy with the «puissance érotique du monde»: «[...] cette joie [...] nous 
vient du monde.» (Id.). I would object that the joy, or tragic bonheur* which permeates and founds Camus’s 
concept of the community, does not stem from the world, but is at the limit o f man and world’s mutual 
exposedness -joy is inseparable in this sense from beauty and is “submitted” to the same morality.
230 « [...] société et discipline perdent leur direction si elles nient le « Nous sommes ». À moi seul, dans un sens, 
je  supporte la dignité commune que je ne puis laisser ravaler en moi, ni dans les autres. Cet individualisme n’est 
pas jouissance, il est lutte, toujours, et joie sans égale, quelquefois, au sommet de la fière compassion » (HR, 
700).
231 The term recurs, with a different acceptation, in L'exil d'Hélène* where Camus denounces in contemporary 
European thought the rejection of beauty, which entails that «[notre époque] se raidit pour atteindre l’absolu et 
l’empire, elle veut transfigurer le monde avant de l’avoir épuisé, l’ordonner avant de l’avoir compris. Quoi 
qu’elle en dise, elle déserte ce monde. » (E , 856).
222 In a manuscript drafted on the 5th September 1947, Camus rejects the politics o f the Blocs and the Cold war 
by pointing, instead, to «la construction de l’organisation internationale que nous annonçons dès maintenant»
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thus, disclosing the attempt to re-think human life and the political outside the juridical 
categories o f traditional political thought.
It comes, thus, as no surprise that Camus pointed to Revolutionary Syndicalism and to 
the French libertarian tradition as the contemporary political expression o f this latter 
“aesthetic” attitude (E, 700) - «Car il existe heureusement une autre tradition révolutionnaire 
[...]» (740).23 34
Rejecting the Historicist category o f efficacy, syndicalism «[part] de la base concrète, 
la profession, qui est à l'ordre économique ce que la commune est à Vordre politique, la 
cellule vivante sur laquelle l ’organisme s 'édifie, tandis que la révolution césarienne part de la 
doctrine et y fait entrer de force le réel» (HR, 700-701) i235
Le syndicalisme, comme la commune, est la négation, au profit du réel, du centralisme bureaucratique 
et abstrait. La révolution du XXe siècle, au contraire, prétend s’appuyer sur l’économie, mais elle est d’abord 
une politique et une idéologie. Elle ne peut, par fonction, éviter la terreur et la violence faite au réel. Malgré ses 
prétentions, elle part de l’absolu pour modeler la réalité. (HR, 701). [My italics]
Camus’ distinction between the economic and the political dimension,236 formulated in 
the separation between profession and commune, echoes Arendt’s analogous distinction 
between technological or economic liberation from poverty, and the soviets as the new 
institutions of (political) freedom, in her analysis o f  Lenin’s formula “Electrification and 
so view” (OR, 60).
and aiming to «[...] une société des peuples dégagée des mythes de la souveraineté, une force révolutionnaire 
qui ne s’appuie pas sur la police et une liberté humaine qui ne soit pas en fait asservie par l’argent » (E, 1578).
233 G. Agamben, Mezzi sem a fine, op. cit.
234 As Quillot points out, and is confirmed by the 1952 «Entretien sur la révolte», Camus showed a particular 
interest and sympathy toward the Revolutionary Syndicalist reviews La Révolution prolétarienne (E, 1730, note 
1 to p. 740) and Samson and Proix’s Témoins. Quillot recalls that «à l’époque du lancement de cette revue, 
[Camus] sollicita très simplement mon abonnement « Une petite revue pas chère, et qui pense juste  », me dit-il 
avec un sourire » (E, 1720). Camus collaborated to Témoins with a series o f texts (« Discours à la Mutualité 
après les événements de Berlin-Est » (1954), « Réponse à Domenach » (June 1955), « Fidélité à  l’Espagne » 
(Spring 1956), extracts from « Kadar a eu son jour de peur », texte du discours prononcé le 15 mars à la Salle 
Wagram, 1957) - «Ignazio Silone, que Nicola Chiaromonte lui avait fa it connaître en 1948, et avec lequel il s ’est 
presque toujours senti en accord politique ju sq u ’à sa mort, y  collaborait également» (E, 1720). Camus devoted 
an article to « Le pain et le vin d’Ignazio Silone » in Alger républicain (23 mai 1939), where he defines the 
antifascist novel of the Italian writer as « une grande œuvre révolutionnaire » (E, 1397), as a « livre de révolté 
[...] coulé dans la plus classique des formes» (E, 1398), in the line o f the artistic creed of a «romantisme 
dompté » that he will formulate in HR. It is here that the political and revolutionary meaning of artistic creation 
finds one o f its first formulations: « Si le mot poésie a un sens, c’est ici qu’il le retrouve, dans ces tableaux d’une 
Italie étemelle et rustique, dans ces pentes plantées de cyprès et ce ciel sans égal, et dans les gestes séculaires de 
ces paysans italiens. Retrouver le chemin de ces gestes et de cette vérité, et d'une philosophie abstraite de la 
révolution revenir au pain et vain de la simplicité, c ’est T  itinéraire d'Ignazio Silone et la leçon de ce roman. Et 
ce n’est pas sa moindre grandeur que de nous inciter, nous aussi, à retrouver, à travers les haines de l’heure, le 
visage d’un peuple fier et humain qui demeure notre seul espoir de paix » (E, 1398-99). [My italics]
235 My ita lic s .
2j6 This distinction is confirmed in a note, where Camus identifies in the Scandinavian co-existence and 
reconciliation of the political form of constitutional monarchy with a fecund  syndicalism, the realisation of the 
approximation to a ju st society (E, 701, note **)
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Camus places «les pensées révoltées, celles de la Commune ou du syndicalisme 
révolutionnaire» at the margins of, and in opposition to, the Liberal («[Ie] nihilisme 
bourgeois», HR, 703) and the Communist («socialisme césarien», Id.) concept of the political, 
o f which he, like Arendt, emphasizes the economic parentage.237
The French writer identifies, thus rejecting it, politics (la politique) with the party 
system and the abstract model o f the modem sovereign state, o f which the Historical or 
rational (terrorist) state is the extreme expression.238 The latter brings the fabrication 
paradigm o f the political, also highlighted by Arendt in HC, to paroxistic consequences: «[la 
revolution du XXe siècle] tente de s’accomplir de haut en bas» (HR, 701), in other words, 
through a top-down movement o f foundation of the body politic, which is diametrically 
opposed to the one entailed by the Syndicalist or Communard “revolted” politics -239 «de bas 
en haut» (Id.).
It is significant that Arendt expressed herself in identical terms about council systems 
in the interview, published under the title Thoughts on Politics and Revolution:
Spontaneous organization of council systems occurred in all revolutions, in the French Revolution, with 
Jefferson in the American Revolution, in the Parisian commune, in the Russian revolutions, in the wake of the 
revolutions in Germany and Austria at the end o f World War I, finally in the Hungarian Revolution. What is 
more, they never came into being as a result o f a conscious revolutionary tradition or theory, but entirely 
spontaneously, each time as though there had never been anything of the sort before. Hence the council system 
seems to correspond to and to spring from the very experience of political action.
237 In Thoughts on Politics and Revolution Arendt analyses capitalism and socialism not as two alternative 
economic systems, but as «twins, each wearing a different hat» (CR, 214): «[...] capitalism [...] owed its start to 
a monstruous process o f expropriation such as has never occurred before in history in this form -  that is, without 
military conquest. Expropriation, the initial accumulation of capital -  that was the law according to which 
capitalism arose and according to which it has advanced step by step. [...] if you look at what has actually 
happened in Russia, then you can see that there the process of expropriation has been carried further; and you 
can observe that something very similar is going on in the modem capitalistic countries, where it is as though the 
old expropriation process is again let loose. [...] In Russia there is, of course, not socialism but state socialism, 
which is the same thing as state capitalism would be — that is, total expropriation. Total expropriation occurs 
when all political and legal safeguards o f private ownership have disappeared.» (CR, 211-212). (My italics)
238 The appeal to the libertarian tradition is justified in the light o f the rejection of the nihilistic premises of 
“State communism”, which lie at the core of the Western political tradition. In his answer to Gaston Levai in the 
review Libertaire in May 1952 («Révolte et romantisme») explicitly referred to the «utilité passagère» of (a 
good use of) nihilism brought about by Bakunin, whose thought, in the author’s view, «peut utilement féconder 
une pensée libertaire rénovée et s’incarner dès maintenant dans un mouvement dont les militants de la C.N.T. et 
du syndicalisme libre, en France et en Italie, attestent en même temps la permanence et la vigueur » (E, 752). 
According to Camus, «[la pensée libertaire a] une fécondité toute prête à condition de se détourner sans 
équivoque de tout ce qui, en elle-même et aujourd’hui encore, reste attaché à un romantisme nihiliste qui ne peut 
mener nulle part. C’est ce romantisme que j ’ai critiqué [dans l’HR], il est vrai, et je continuerai de le critiquer, 
mais c’est cette fécondité qu’ainsi j ’ai voulu servir » (E, 752). Furthermore, in a Post-Scriptum to the letter he 
agreed with Levai that: « Ce n’est pas exactement contre la science que Bakounine s’élevait avec beaucoup de 
perspicacité, mais contre le gouvernement des savants. » (E, 753). (My italics)
" 9 It is in the light of a distinction between political form and living com-munity o f revolt, that I suggest we read 
the following passage : «[...] [la révolte] s’appuie d’abord sur les réalités les plus concrètes, la profession, le 
village, où transparaissent l’être, le cœur vivant des choses et des hommes. La politique, pour elle, doit se 
soumettre à ces vérités. Pour finir, lorsqu’elle fait avancer l ’histoire et soulage la douleur des hommes, elle le 
fait sans terreur, sinon sans violence, et dans les conditions politiques les plus différentes.» (HR, 701).
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In this direction, I think, there must be something to be found, a completely different principle o f  
organization, which begins from below, continues upward, andfinally leads to a parliament. (CR, 231-232) [My 
italics]
Questioned on «what other conception o f the state» she had in mind, Hannah Arendt 
pleads for a new concept o f the state, illustrated by the council-state, «to wrhich the principle 
o f sovereignty would be wholly alien, would be admirably suited for federations o f the most 
various kinds, especially because in it power would be constituted horizontally and not 
vertically» (CR, 233).240
The vertical mouvement being that o f dominion, the «monstrous development o f the 
means o f violence» (CR, 229) in the 20th century, which culminated in the post-war bi- 
polarism, had paradoxically brought about the impossibility o f war (CR, 230), driving the 
sovereign state — the concept of sovereignty which rests on war as the last resort in 
international conflicts (CR, 229) -  into an impasse.
By their very existence, the councils - «neighbourhood councils, professional councils, 
councils within factories, apartment houses, [...] by no means only workers’ councils» (CR, 
232) - declare the unsuitability of the party machine in providing public spaces o f cum- 
pearance.
As early as 1945, Camus had denounced the artificial and murderous character o f  
purely political oppositions?*1 by which he designated the sterility of the traditional party 
system,242 thus, finding himself in agreement with the ideas propounded in the aftermath o f 
the Liberation by the French Anarcho-Syndicalist movement. The coupling o f a federative 
solution with the binomial syndicalism and commune is posed as the alternative to the 
centralising bureaucratisation o f the Historicist State, brought about by the totalitarian 
revolution o f the 20th century.
240 My italics.
241 In the «Préface à un numéro spécial anniversaire de Témoins» (Spring-Summer 1956) Camus denounced, 
consistently with the line that already belonged to Combat, «la trahison des partis, la politique dégradé des 
nations» (E, 1802). Already in 1946, in the article « Le monde va vite » Camus denounced as obsolete the 
principle of nationality, and the national borders as sheer abstractions, an emanation of an anachronistic politics 
in the age o f the atomic bomb (CAC8, 631). At that date, the writer proclaimed the need to constitute a supra­
national and international order, founded on justice and dialogue, a world parliament which would correspond to 
the collectivisation on a world scale o f primary resources (petroleum, coal, uranium) (CAC8, 632). In «Un 
nouveau contrat social» (29th November 1946) we find one o f the early formulation o f the idea o f a living 
society, articulated, at that time, «à l’intérieur des nations, sur des communautés de travail et, par-dessus les 
frontières, sur des communautés de réflexion,, dont les premières, selon des contrats de gré à gré sur le mode 
coopératif,soulageraient le plus grand nombre possible d’individus et dont les secondes s’essaieraient à définir 
les valeurs dont vivra cet ordre international, en même temps qu’elles plaideraient pour lui, en toute occasion. » 
(CAC8,637).
242 In the 1957 Conference L'Artiste et son temps he confirmed that «[la beauté] ne peut servir aucun parti ; elle 
ne sert à longue ou brève échéance, que la douleur ou la liberté des hommes» (E, 1092).
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It is significant that, in both Camus and Arendt, the critique o f the Socialist State, 
systematically eradicating the professional cell {total expropriation)243 and the autonomy of 
the councils,244 is mediated by their critique of Historicism. Camus described his appeal to the 
Libertarian tradition, and to the Commune as the political expressions of a revolted thought, 
as true (although «utopian») realism (HR, 701), consistent with an intentionally assumed 
«anti-historic» and «inefficacious» approach (E, 756).
He thus roots the so-called libertarian tradition in «la pensée solaire», also evoked as 
(pensée dé) Midi, or «esprit méditerranéen» (HR, 702-703), by which he designates a 
«civilisation au double visage [qui] attend son aurore [et qui] éclaire déjà les chemins de la 
vraie maîtrise» (HR, 703). It is significant, in this respect, that he chose a sentence by Pascal 
as the epigraphy to LAA: «On ne montre pas sa grandeur pour être à une extrémité, mais bien 
en touchant les deux à la fois» (E, 2 1 7).245 Nihilism is not something «bad» (or «good», as he 
will declare in 1952) to be demonized/expelled from the civilized community of men, in 
Camus* understanding, which echoes Arendt’s thought, it constitutes the human com-munity: 
nihilism is traced to the core o f human action («une longue et féroce aventure dont nous 
sommes tous solidaires», E, 734) as the temptation of measurelessness (hubris), which 
destroys the plural con-tact (aisthesis) and communication o f men - «la démesure gardera 
toujours sa place dans le cœur de l’homme, àVendroit de la solitude» (HR, 704).
The political meaning o f the two-sided vision (theoria), which defines Camus* tragic 
thought, emerges in the author’s Preface to the Italian edition o f LAA in the image o f «nous 
autres, Européens libres» (E, 219), which is developed in HR - «L’Europe n’a jamais été que 
dans cette lutte entre midi et minuit. Elle ne s’est dégradée qu’en désertant cette lutte [...]» 
(HR, 703).246
As Gay-Crosier points out, « [...] le pari européen dont parle Camus dépasse la 
dimension politique trop exclusivement associée à la notion qu’on pouvait se faire, en 1951,
243 Total expropriation occurs, in Arendt’s view, when the government itself becomes the employer, invading the 
private sphere of its employees: «[...] the process o f expropriation, which started with the rise of capitalism, 
does not stop with the expropriation o f the means o f production; only legal and political institutions that are 
independent o f the economic forces and their automatism can control and check the inherently monstruous 
potentialities o f this process. [...] What protects freedom is the division between governmental and economic 
power» (CR, 212-213), which is, precisely, not the case in Russia, where «a spy sits in every citizen’s apartment 
anyhow» (CR, 213), sanctioning the extreme expropriation -  of man’s private life («And what else is bugging 
but a form of expropriation?», CR, 213).
244 HR, 701, note **. In Thought on Politics and Revolution Arendt observes that «the old “workers’ councils”, 
which, incidentally, also never became part o f orthodox socialist or communist doctrine, despite Lenin’s “all 
power to the soviets", (The councils, the only true outgrowth o f the revolutions themselves as distinguishedfrom  
revolutionary parties and ideologies, have been mercilessly destroyed precisely by the Communist party and by 




d’une Europe unie. Son concept opérationnel d’une Europe trouvant son unité dans la 
diversité est fondé sur une alliance de patrimoines intellectuels et culturels et non pas sur une 
alliance de nations. Puisque la tension et le déchirement sont le prix qu’exigent la mesure et 
la justice, on pourrait dire, en paraphrasant le fameux titre de Paul Hazard, que l ’avenir de 
l’Europe dépend paradoxalement de sa conscience toujours en crise».247 The concept of «crise 
prégnante» (Id.), inseparable from the notion of revolt, expresses, precisely, the being-at-the 
limit o f the «pensée solaire», which has its arché in creation, and in beauty its finite morality 
(règle).2**
What matters, we would say with Esposito, is the simultaneity (summarised in the 
image o f  the double visage) o f two conflicting perspectives, overlapping in one look - 249 
which is the mark o f the tragic.250 The continuity, on the one hand, o f the HR with the 1948 
essay Exil d'Hélène, and, on the other, o f the latter with the earlier scattered notes on the 
tragic in the juvenile Carnets, and with the aisthetic perspective analysed in Chapter 1, is 
apparent here.
Nietzsche is, once more, the trait-d'union between the 1942 tragic thought and the 
later pensée de Midi: it is under the sign o f  the «tragic» philosopher’s great word o f creation, 
that Camus poses art and the figure o f the artist (E, 1072).
247 My italics. R. Gay-Crosier, «Pour une culture européenne sans eurocentrisme», in Albert Camus : paradigmes 
d e i’ironie, op. cit, p. 174.
248 On these premises, as Camus points out in an interview to Demain (1957), Europe «prefigure notre avenir 
politique» (see R. Gay-Crosier, «Pour une culture européenne sans eurocentrisme», art. cit*, pp. 174-175).
49 «È il medesimo rapporto che, nell’Iliade, passa tra Contesa e Armonia. L’armonia non è il contrario — ma 
l’altra faccia -  della contesa: il ritmo stesso che la scandisce nei suoi movimenti altalenanti. Si potrebbe anche 
dire che: essa è la relazione che stringe in un’unica trama i due Contendenti. Che li lega all’unità di una 
medesima battaglia. Che li tiene in rapporto: sia pure di lotta. Senza rapporto non ci sarebbe lotta; ma senza lotta 
non ci sarebbe rapporto. È quanto la Weil sottolinea a partire dai frammenti di Filolao su limite e illimitato: l’uno 
implica necessariamente l’altro. E ciò non solo perché senza il limite non avremmo neanche la nozione di 
illimitato, ma perché la forzatura del limite -  la hybris -  è l’unico modo, per i mortali, di avvertire la sua 
presenza: appunto urtandovi contro.» (R. Esposito, L ’orìgine della politica. Hannah Arendt o Simone Weil?, 
Donzelli, Roma, 1996, p. 78-79). The affinity between Camus’s and Weil’s argument, also pointed out by 
Esposito (Ivi, p. 75), is all thè more apparent in thè concluding pages on «La pensée de Midi» where thè 
«civilisation au double visage» is grasped, precisely, as tension and constant conflict between the Nord- 
European, Historicist and nihilistic drive, as measurelessness (hybris), on thè one side, and the Mediterranean, 
libertarían héritage, on the other: «La commune contre l’État, la société concrète contre la société absolutiste, la 
liberté réfléchie contre la tyrannie rationnelle, l’individualisme altruiste enfin contre la colonisation des masses, 
sont alors les antinomies qui traduisent, une fois de plus, la longue confrontation entre la mesure et la démesure 
qui anime l’histoire de l’Occident, depuis le monde antique.» (HR, 702).
0 « La Méditerranée a son tragique solaire qui n’est pas celui des brumes. Certains soirs, sur la mer, au pied 
des montagnes, la nuit tombe sur la courbe parfaite d’une petite baie et, des eaux silencieuses, monte alors une 
plénitude angoissée. On peut comprendre en ces lieux que si les Grecs ont touché au désespoir, c’est toujours â 
travers la beauté, et ce qu’elle a d’oppressant. » (E, 853) [My italics]
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L’œuvre la plus haute sera toujours, comme dans les tragiques grecs, dans Melville, Tolstoï ou Molière, 
celle qui équilibrera le réel et le refus que l’homme oppose à ce réel, chacun faisant rebondir l'autre dans un 
incessant jaillissement qui est celui-là même de la vie joyeuse et déchirée. (E, 1090-91) [My italics]
It is significant that in the Discours de Suède, the speech given by Camus on the 
occasion of the awarding o f the Nobel Price in 1957, the French writer qualified the artist as 
«être double», capable o f com-prehension (E, 1072) and «partagé entre la douleur et la 
beauté» (E, 1074), who «forges» himself «dans cet aller-retour perpétuel de lui aux autres, à 
mi-chemin de la beauté dont il ne peut se passer et de la communauté à la quelle il ne peut 
s ’arracher » (E, 1072). It is the artist, and not the intellectual, that is the central figure of an 
alternative conception of the political (action) against the contemporary philosophies of 
History, which he traces at the root o f  a “vertical” (fabrication) model of a politics of 
dominion and achievement.
To conclude, it is in the light o f the good nihilism, in the sense of the aisthetic or tragic 
thought defined in the MdS, that, I suggest, we grasp the political meaning of Camus’ artiste- 
créateur. If  we compare the text o f the conference, held at the University of Upsala on the 
14th of December 1957 (L ’Artiste et son temps), with the pages o f HR on «Nietzsche et le 
nihilisme », we observe a striking coincidence between Camus’ definition of the artist and his 
analysis of what the writer calls the methodical aspect o f Neitzsche’s thought (of which we 
have already emphasized the textual correspondence with the MdS):
L Artiste et son temps :
[La liberté de l’art] «ressemble plutôt à une discipline 
ascétique » :«Cette liberté suppose une santé du coeur 
et du corps, un style qui soit comme la force de l’âme 
et un affrontement patient. Elle est, comme toute 
liberté, un risque perpétuel, une aventure exténuante 
et voilà pourquoi on fiiit aujourd’hui ce risque comme 
on fuit l’exigeante liberté pour se ruer à toutes sortes 
de servitudes, et obtenir au moins le confort de l’âme. 
[ . . . ] .Non, rartiste libre [...] n'est l'homme du 
confort. L’artiste libre est celui qui, à grand-peine, 
crée son ordre lui-même. Plus est déchaîné ce qu’il 
doit ordonner, plus sa règle sera stricte et plus il aura 
affirmé sa liberté » (E, 1093). [My italics]
Nietzsche et le nihilisme :
« [...] Nietzsche savait que la liberté de l'esprit n'est 
pas un confort, mais une grandeur que l’on veut et que 
l’on obtient [...] par une lutte épuisante. Il savait que 
le risque est grand [...]. Si rien n’est vrai, si le monde 
est sans règle, rien n ’est défendu. [...] La domination 
absolue de la loi n’est pas liberté, mais non plus 
l’absolue disponibilité. » (HR, 480). [My italics)
According to Camus, freedom for Nietzsche does not coincide with the «affreuse liberté de 
Taveugle » (HR, 480), without direction nor limit, but is identified with a constant effort o f 
self-mastering {maîtrise de soi-même). « Si nous ne faisons pas de la mort de Dieu un grand 
renoncement -  he quotes - et une perpétuelle victoire sur nous-mêmes, nous aurons à payer
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pour cette perte ». Autrement dit, avec Nietzsche, la révolte débouche dans l'ascèse. Une 
logique plus profonde remplace alors le «si rien n ’est vrai, tout est permis» de Karamazov par 
un «si rien n ’est vrai, rien n’est permis». » (HR, 481).
This textual correspondence seems to suggest the precise intention, on Camus’ part, to 
present the artist as the heir and authentic prosecutor of a certain part of the thought and work 
of the German philosopher, namely his methodical or active nihilism: «A partir du moment où 
l’on néglige l’aspect méthodique de la pensée nietzschéenne (et il n ’est pas sûr que lui-même 
s ’y  soit toujours tenu),251 sa logique ne connaît plus de limites » (HR, 486).
The great artist lives on the verge of, or at the limit («íe risque extrême », Id.), o f a 
perpetual tension between beauty and suffering, «[entre] l’amour des hommes et la folie de la 
création, la solitude insupportable et la foule harrassante, le refus et le consentement» (E, 
1092), between solitude and solidarity. In this sense he is the bearer o f the lucid or tragic 
thought («intelligence lucide», HR, 479), which, in the light o f Nietzsche’s teaching, can 
« transformer le nihilisme passif en nihilisme ac tif » (Id.) through creation. In the light o f 
these considerations, we can interpret Camus’ political writings as an attempt toward what 
Mathieu Kessler recently addressed as the (political) project «de dépassement esthétique » o f 
the incomplete forms o f nihilism, which finds a pivotal source and antecedent in Nietzsche.252
251 My italics. Camus anticipates Jacques Sojcher’s critique of Nietzsche (see, La Question et le sens, esthétique 
de Nietzsche, Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1972).
252 Mathieu Kessler, Nietzsche ou le dépassement esthétique de la métaphysique, Paris, PUF, 1999, p.5.
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Chapter 3. N ihilism and Total Domination.
The same year that Camus’ HR was published in France, Hannah Arendt published in London 
The Burden o f  Our Time, re-edited shortly afterwards in New York under the title o f  The 
Origins o f  Totalitarianism.
The affinity between the argument of the two works is striking, and can only partly be 
explained by the reference to common sources -  as is, indeed, the case with the 1937 English 
translation o f Nicolas Berdyaev’s The Origin o f  Russian Communism, which Arendt quotes in 
the bibliography to OT. It is significant that Camus’ article The Human Crisis, which 
according to Chiaromonte’s recollection touched upon the question of nihilism in the 
confrontation o f the Front generation with Nazism (Chapter 2.1.), also figured among the 
bibliographical references of OT.
The aim o f  this chapter is to contribute to the elucidation of the apparent affinity 
between Camus* argument in HR and Arendt’s analysis of Totalitarianism, by attempting a 
systematic exploration of the notion o f nihilism throughout the different parts and stages o f 
the elaboration o f  OT.
In a letter in June 1952, Heinrich Bliicher expressed his enthusiastic approval o f Albert 
Camus’ recently published essay, L ’homme révolté, judging it «essential fo r  the critique o f  
nihilism», and soliciting Hannah Arendt’s re-consideration of it. We know that in Apnl of 
the same year Arendt, who was spending a few weeks in Paris for research, and to find a 
publisher for OT,1 *3 contacted, and finally met, Albert Camus for the declared purpose of 
discussing HR, which she had read and deeply appreciated.4 Of this meeting there remains no 
record, apart from a brief remark in a letter, in which she expressed her strong positive 
judgement on the man.5
The interest o f  this biographical note goes, in my view, beyond the mere «evidence of 
some personal relationship and, at least on Arendt’s part, of some admiration» between the
1 My italics.
3 «I think you’ve underestimated Camus’s new book [L 'homme révolté]. It is essential for the criticism of 
nihilism, and I’ve come to the same conclusion on many points. Any way, he is a true modem philosopher, and 
that’s a damn comfort» (14* June 1952), in Within Four Walls, op. cit, 190.
3 Cf. E. Young-Braehl, op. cit., 281.
4 Hannah Arendt’s visiting-card, addressed to Camus and dated 21 April 1952 (Fonds Camus).
5 In her letter to Bliicher on the 24* April she wrote: « Camus just rang, and I’m seeing Raymond Aron and Jean 
Wahl next week. This evening Koyré [...] Sartre et al. I don’t want to see; it’s pointless. They have immersed 
themselves completely in their theories and live on a moon à la Hegel. [...)». On the 1“ May 1952: «Yesterday I 
was with Camus: he is, without doubt, the best man they have in France. [...]», in Within Four Walls, 162- 164; 
cf. also E. Young-Bmehl, op. cit., 281.
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two authors:6 the fact that, only a month after her Parisian meeting, Arendt’s husband was re­
directing her attention to Camus’ essay fo r  the critique o f  nihilism , draws our attention to the 
significance that this question had acquired in Arendt’s political thinking between 1950 and 
1952.
According to Blucher, Arendt had overlooked the contribution o f  Camus’ 
controversial essay, for the same reason, I take it, pointed out by Nicola Chiaromonte in  
Partisan Review that same year:7 the argument o f HR, which brings into focus the 
relationship between nihilism and totalitarian ideology, was seemingly “old fashioned”, and 
echoed the conservative theses that were flourishing in the social and political sciences 
around 1950.
As she pointed out in Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical 
Thought in 1954, which according to E. Young-Bruehl was the result o f her Parisian stay,8 it 
is possible to distinguish two distinct approaches to or perspectives on the question o f  
nihilism: a) the one which focuses on contemporary nihilism , as made visible through the 20th 
century crisis of civilization, and culminating in the «everything is possible» o f totalitarian 
ideologies and terror (EU, 431);9 and b) «the opposite point o f  view» (b) (EU, 433) o f those 
who consider nihilism, respectively, in terms of historicity - namely, with Heidegger, as «the 
innermost fate o f the modem age, that which sent modem man along its road therefore can be 
overcome only on its own terms» (Id.) -  and in terms o f tradition, which is the view o f  
modem Catholic philosophy and «by all sorts o f revived Platonism» (from Voegelin to 
Berdiaev), whose «main impulse is always to bring order into the things of this world» by 
appealing to the rule o f a transcending principle (EU, 434).
6 J. C. Isaac, Arendt, Camus, and modern rebellion, op. cit., p. 17.
7 Nicola Chiaromonte, “Sartre vs. Camus: A Political Quarrel”, Partisan Review, 1952, in A Partisan Century. 
Political Writings from  Partisan Review, Edith Kurzweil, Ed., Columbia UP, New York, 1996.
8 E. Young-Bruehl, op. cit. 281.
9 «The political events of the twentieth century, according to a very widespread sentiment in Europe, have 
brought out and made public a deep-rooted crisis o f the entire civilization including its philosophy and all its 
traditional concepts, a crisis of which the philosophers, at least the non-academic philosophers such as Nietzsche 
or Kierkegaard, have been aware before. In the nihilistic aspects of present political developments, which are so 
very obvious in the ideologies of all totalitarian movements and their inner conviction not only that “everything 
is permitted” but that “everything is possible”, that once you make an arbitrary principle the guide of a consistent 
policy, everything goes -  in this contemporary nihilism  the philosopher was only too likely to detect his own 
predicaments [...].» {Concern with P olitics..., 1954, folder 1, p., 3. My italics). The question of a «deep-rooted 
crisis» of Western civilization, generally associated with nihilism as a crucial event in the history o f the West, is 
further developed in two other writings o f the same period, that directly address the problem o f understanding 
the totalitarian event: in On the Nature o f Totalitarianism: An Essay in Understanding the very existence of 
totalitarian movements in the non-totalitarian world, according to Arendt, «bears eloquent witness to the 
breakdown of the whole structure o f morality, the whole body of commands and prohibitions which had 
traditionally translated and embodied the fundamental ideas o f freedom and justice into terms of social 
relationships and political institutions» (EU, 328).
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It is from the former perspective that Arendt uses the concept o f ‘nihilism’ to refer 
both to totalitarian ideologies and the contemporary philosophies of History («[...] the 
nihilistic implications of continental historicism»),10 which she traces at the root o f French 
Existentialism, on the one hand, and o f  the Conservative political theories on the other.
I suggest that we look for the key to Arendt’s critique o f nihilism in the sections of 
OT: in Part II on Imperialism, Arendt uses the term ‘nihilism’ to designate a «vulgar 
superstition o f  doom», which replaced the 19th century (Idealistic and Positivistic) belief in 
progress («[that] preached automatic annihilation with the same enthusiasm that the fanatics 
of automatic progress had preached the irresistibility o f economic laws»), particularly 
conspicuous in France at the turn o f the 20th century and in Germany in the ‘20’s (OT,144).
At a closer inter-textual reading the strong pejorative connotation of the term, 
associated to superstition, exceeds the immediate context -  the analysis of the philosophy of 
the bourgeois elite in the Imperialist epoch -  calling, at the level o f meta-theory, the 
contemporary debate on Totalitarianism into question.
It is significant that in her Preface to the First Edition o f OT in Summer 1950, Arendt 
pointed to a widespread «ill-defined, general agreement that the essential structure of all 
civilizations is at the breaking point», which, on the level o f historical insight and political 
thought, would hinder the comprehension o f the « the possibilities of the century», as well as 
the capacity to provide an adequate response to its horrors - « The central events of our time 
are not less effectively forgotten by those committed to a belief in an unavoidable doom, than 
by those who have given themselves up to reckless optimism. This book [OT] had been 
written against a background o f both the reckless optimism and reckless despair. It holds that 
Progress and Doom are two sides o f  the same medal; that both are articles o f superstition, not 
o f faith. [...] To yield to the mere process of disintegration has become an irresistible 
temptation, not only because it has assumed the spurious grandeur of “historical necessity?', 
but also because everything outside it has begun to appear lifeless, bloodless, meaningless, 
and unreal».11
What I intend to show is that the analysis of Arendt’s critique of nihilism in OT brings 
forth, and is closely intertwined with, the author’s critique o f  two concepts o f power -  
material power, which she traces at the core o f the bourgeois power politics and o f modem 
Liberal political thought; and organizational power, as the unprecedented form realized by
10 Hannah Arendt, Concern with Politics... 1954, folder 1, p. 5, Library Congress.
11 H. Arendt, The Origins o f Totalitarianism, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979, pp. vii-viii. My italics.
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totalitarian police regimes - as playing an important part in the further development of her 
later critique o f the “aesthetic” paradigm o f the Western concept of the political.
3.1 . T h e  c r it iq u e  o f  n ih il is m  a n d  t h e  t w o  c o n c e p t s  o f  p o w e r : o n  th e  Or ig in s  o f  
T o t a l it a r ia n ism .
In his book, J. Isaac devotes a chapter to The Critique o f Pure Nihilism, tracing, not without 
some misunderstanding, Arendt’s reflection on nihilism in the «often overlooked section in 
The Origins on “the temporary alliance between the mob and the elite”»: «the élite to which 
she refers here is the intellectual élite o f the “front generation” o f World War I, the literary 
avant-garde that gave voice to the pervasive sense o f  civilizational crisis that accompanied the 
war. [...] Like Camus, [Arendt] suggests that the nihilism o f  this generation expressed the 
nihilism o f  the bourgeois society (indeed, a major theme o f Arendt’s writing is the 
“superfluousness” engendered by modem mass society)».12 3
What I suggest is that, relating the élite’s «antihumanist, antiliberal, anti-individualist, 
and anticultural instincts [...] brilliant and witty praise of violence, power and cruelty» to the 
post-war «atmosphere in which all traditional values and propositions had evaporated (after 
the nineteenth-century ideologies had refuted each other [...]» ,14 Isaac mistakes Arendt’s 
understanding o f nihilism for the cynical divertissements o f the literaiy revolutionaries o f the 
‘20’s, reducing the phenomenon to a moral problem, and therefore precluding a political 
understanding o f the question, more in the line with Arendt’s concern in the OT.
The key to such understanding, I argue, is to be found in the paragraph on Power and 
the bourgeoisie in Part II of the OT.
In the imperialistic epoch a philosophy o f power became the philosophy of the elite, who quickly 
discovered and were quite ready to admit that the thirst for power could be quenched only through destruction. 
This was the essential cause o f their nihilism  [...] which replaced the superstition of progress with the equally 
vulgar superstition o f doom. [...] It had taken Hobbes, the great idolator o f Success, three centuries to succeed. 
(OT, 144). [My italics]
The élite she refers to here is the bourgeois “ruling class” o f Imperialist financers and 
administrators, who in the last decades o f the 19th century stepped into political affairs in 
order to secure their economic interests in the process o f expansion beyond the borders of the
12 Jeffrey C. Isaac, Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion, op. c it, pp. 92- 102. My italics.
13 Ivi, p. 95.
14 Ivi, p. 95.
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Nation-State. Arendt relates the nihilistic superstition of doom of this economic elite to their 
philosophy of power, as a peculiar kind of ideology stemming from the new, unprecedented, 
power politics o f the politically emancipated bourgeoisie (OT, 144).
Imperialism was bom when the ruling class in capitalist production came up against national limitations 
to its economic expansion. The bourgeoisie turned to politics out o f economic necessity, for if it did not want to 
give up the capitalist system whose inherent law is constant growth, it had to impose this law upon its home 
governments and to proclaim expansion to be the ultimate political goal of foreign policy. (OT, 126)15
The exportation o f power, in the form o f  a separation of the state’s instruments o f  violence 
(police, army, etc.) from the body politic of the mother-country and their promotion and 
exportation as national representatives in the countries, usually uncivilized or weak, elected 
for Imperialist investments and exploitation, turned into reality «[t]he bourgeoisie’s empty 
desire to have money beget money as men beget men [which] had remained an ugly dream so 
long as money had to go the long way of investment in production; not money had begotten 
money, but men had made things and money»16 (OT, 137).
The secret of the new happy fulfillment was precisely that economic laws no longer stood in the way of 
the greed of the owning classes. Money could finally beget money because power, with complete disregard o f 
all laws -  economic as well as ethical -  could appropriate wealth. Only when exported money succeeded in 
stimulating the export of power could it accomplish its owner’s designs. Only the unlimited accumulation o f 
power could bring about the unlimited accumulation o f capital. (OT, 137). [My italics]
The meaning o f the relationship between the Imperialist elite’s nihilism, which «preached 
automatic annihilation with the same enthusiasm that the fanatics of automatic progress had 
preached the irresistibility o f economic laws» (OT, 144), and its new policy of unlimited, i.e., 
lawless power, emerges in the pages on Hobbes’ Leviathan.
Without wanting to assess the validity of her remarks, I will attempt to reconstruct, 
and draw the attention to, the development of Arendt’s argument. According to her, Hobbes 
«was the true, though never fully recognized, philosopher o f the bourgeoisie because he 
realized that the acquisition o f wealth conceived as a never-ending process can be guaranteed 
only by the seizure o f  political power, for the accumulating process must sooner or later force 
open all existing territorial limits» (OT, 146).17
15 See also OT, 136.
16 My italics.
17 «Hobbes, indeed, is the only great philosopher to whom the bourgeoisie can rightly and exclusively lay claim, 
even if his principles were not recognized by the bourgeois class for a long time. Hobbes’s Leviathan exposed 
the only political theory according to which the state is based not on some kind of constituting law -  whether 
divine law, the law of nature, or the law of the social contract -  which determines the rights and wrongs of the 
individual’s interest with respect to public affairs, but on the individual interests themselves, so that “the private 
interest is the same with the publique”» (OT, 139).
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In her view, Hobbes gives «an almost complete picture, not o f  Man but o f  the 
bourgeois man», as a «being without reason, without capacity for truth, and without free will
1 ft-  that is, without the capacity fo r  responsibility» (OT, 139):
[...] man is essentially a function o f society and judged therefore according to his “value or worth...his 
price; that is to say so much as would be given for the use of his power”. [...] Power, according to Hobbes, is the 
accumulated control that permits the individual to fix prices and regulate supply and demand in such a way that 
they contribute to his own advantage. The individual will consider his advantage in complete isolation [...]; he 
will then realize that he can pursue and achieve his interest only with the help of some kind o f majority. 
Therefore, if man is actually driven by nothing but his individual interests, desire fo r  power must be the 
fundamental passion o f man. (OT, 139)' [My highlighting]
Now, Arendt argues that Hobbes’ insistence on power «as the motor of all things human and 
divine [...] sprang from the theoretically indisputable proposition that never-ending 
accumulation o f  property must be based in a never-ending accumulation o f  power» (OT, 143) 
- «the limitless process of capital accumulation needs the political structure of so “unlimited a 
Power” that it can protect growing property by constantly growing more powerful» (Id.). 
Arendt’s interest in Hobbes’ philosophy o f power lies in the fact that «[h]is Leviathan was not 
concerned with idle speculation about new political principles or the old search for reason as 
it governs the community of men: it was strictly a “reckoning o f the consequences” that 
follow from the rise of a new class in society whose existence is essentially tied up with 
property as a dynamic, new property-producing device» (OT, 145).
Arendt traces this birth to a change in the conception o f  property and wealth as centred 
around consumption in the bourgeoisie - « Property by itself [...] is subject to use and 
consumption and therefore diminishes constantly. The most radical and only secure form o f 
possession is destruction, for only what we have destroyed is safely and forever ours» (Id.). 
The so-called accumulation o f capital marked the transformation of property and wealth from 
the results of economic accumulation (commodities for consumption) into the new beginnings 
of a never-ending process o f property enlargement and growth o f  wealth. 189
18 My italics.
19 «It would be a grave injustice to Hobbes and his dignity as a philosopher to consider this picture o f man as an 
attempt at psychological realism or philosophical truth. The fact is that Hobbes is interested in neither, but 
concerned exclusively with the political structure itself, and he depicts the features of man according to the needs 
of the Leviathan. For argument’s and conviction’s sake, he presents his political outline as though he started 
from realistic insight into man, a being that “desires power after power", and as though he proceeded from this 
insight to a plan for a body politic best fitted for this power-thirsty animal. The actual process, i.e. the only 
process in which his concept of man makes sense and goes beyond the obvious banality o f an assumed human 
wickedness, is precisely the opposite. This new body politic was conceived fo r  the benefit o f the new bourgeois 
society as it emerged in the seventeenth century and this picture o f man is a sketch for the new type o f Man who 
would fit into it. The Commonwealth is based on the delegation o f power, and not of rights» (OT, 140-141). (My 
italics)
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Now, as Arendt points out, this new class, founded by and on capital accumulation, 
did not fall prey to the «naive delusion o f the limitless growth o f property» (OT, 143): 
accumulation o f  capital being hindered by natural limits -  the finiteness of the personal life of 
the owner («Property owners who do not consume but strive to enlarge their holdings 
continually find one very inconvenient limitation, the unfortunate fact that men must die» OT,
145) -  and by national, territorial, boundaries (OT, 144); the bourgeoisie was aware that 
constant growth o f  property and wealth could only realise its potential in never-ending 
accumulation o f  power, namely, by entering the political sphere.
By transcending the limits of human life in planning for an automatic continuous growth of wealth 
beyond all personal needs and possibilities of consumption, individual property is made a public affair and taken 
out of the sphere o f mere private life. Private interests which by their very nature are temporary, limited by 
man’s natural span of life, can now escape into the sphere of public affairs and borrow from them that infinite 
length o f time which is needed for continuous accumulation. (OT, 145) [My italics]
What Arendt hints at in this paragraph is a peculiar definition of the public sphere, which she 
identifies as typical of the Western world, founded on a concept of temporality that exceeds 
the natural limits o f human finite condition -  which she will address in her later studies, from 
the lecture Philosophy and Politics (1954) to HC, as the question of immortality.
It is the modem (Hobbesian) philosophy of power that provides the notion o f history 
as necessary for the “eternalising” o f  the private process of capital accumulation, and 
allowing the limits of human finitude to be overcome: it is to Hobbes, that Arendt attributes 
the indisputable merit of having understood that «[t]he philosophical correlative of the 
inherent instability o f a community founded on power is the image of an endless process o f  
history which, in order to be consistent with the constant growth of power, inexorably catches 
up with individuals, peoples, and finally all mankind» (OT, 143).
The eighteenth-century notion of progress, as conceived in pre-revolutionary France, intended criticism 
of the past to be a means of mastering the present and controlling the future; progress culminated in the 
emancipation of man. But this notion had little to do with the endless progress o f bourgeois society, which not 
only did not want the liberty and autonomy o f man, but was ready to sacrifice everything and everybody to 
supposedly superhuman laws o f history. (OT, 143) [My highlighting]
It is in this “endless process o f history”, as the philosophical correlate o f a limitless power- 
accumulating process, that Arendt traces the roots o f the 19th century progressive ideology -  
determined, in her argument, precisely by that «process o f never-ending accumulation of 
powrer necessary for the protection of a never-ending accumulation of capital» (Id).
The result is that the so-called liberal concepts of politics, which she addresses as the 









balance, pursuit o f “enlightened self-interest” as adequate political virtue, unlimited progress 
inherent in the mere succession of events - are constructed on the «temporary compromise 
between the old standards o f Western culture and the new class’s faith in property as a 
dynamic, self-moving principle» (OT, 146),
In Arendt’s view, this compromise, grounded on the delusory notion o f the public life 
as mere sum or total of private interests, is bound to dissolve since, in appropriating the 
limitlessness o f  political action, and replacing the latter in the public sphere, capital 
accumulation is destructive of the old standards and o f the body politic itself (Id.) - «[Hobbes] 
could already detect in the rise of the bourgeoisie all those anti-traditionalist qualities o f the 
new class which would take more than three hundred years to develop fully» (OT, 144-145).
It is in this destructive principle o f power accumulation that the meaning o f  nihilism as 
the Imperialist elite’s “superstition o f doom” is to be found:
When the accumulation of capital had reached its natural, national limits, the bourgeoisie understood 
that only with an “expansion is everything” ideology, and only with a corresponding power-accumulating 
process, would it be possible to set the old motor into motion again. At the same moment, however, when it 
seemed as though the true principle of perpetual motion had been discovered , the specifically optimistic mood 
of the progress ideology was shaken. Not that anybody began to doubt the irresistibility o f the process itself, but 
many people began to see what had frightened Cecil Rhodes: that the human condition and the limitations o f the 
globe were a serious obstacle to a process that was unable to  stop and to stabilize, and could therefore only 
begin a series o f destructive catastrophes once it had reached these limits. (OT, 144) [My italics]
Thus nihilism is on the one hand, related to the modem concept of history, as necessarily 
inherent in the notion of unlimited accumulation o f power, and inscribed in the Hobbesian 
philosophy of power of a politically emancipated bourgeoisie, and, on the other, it touches 
upon the question, which will prove to be of crucial concern in Arendt’s reflection on 
totalitarian domination, of the limits o f  the political community and the destructive logic o f 
limitless power.
From this perspective, what is truly relevant for our analysis of nihilism in OT is not 
so much the chapter on the temporary alliance between the mob and the intellectual élite, 
pointed out by Isaac, as the pages on the Alliance between Mob and Capital.
The mob was not only «the refuse but also the by-product o f  bourgeois society, 
directly produced by it and therefore never quite separable from it» (OT, 155); moreover, it 
was a composed social entity which stood outside the class-divided nation, permanently 
excluded from the productive society, gathering the superfluous human material (“human 
debris”) that economic crises of overproduction had expelled from the productive chain (OT, 
150).
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What characterises the Imperialist age is the alliance, under the new political banner of 
expansion, between these superfluous men («[prospectors, adventurers, and the scum of the 
big cities [...]») and the owners of the superfluous capital, made available by overproduction 
in the last decades o f the 19th century.20 21
Arendt focuses on this alliance - overlooked by the historical pessimists, from 
Burkhardt to Spengler (OT, 155) -  and in particular on the «high society’s constantly growing 
admiration for the underworld, which runs like a red thread through the nineteenth century, its 
continuous step-by-step retreat on all questions o f  morality, and its growing taste for the 
anarchical cynicism o f  its offspring» (Id):
This feeling of kinship, the joining together of begetter and offspring, already classically expressed in 
Balzac’s novels, antedates all practical economic, political, or social considerations and recalls those 
fundamental psychological traits o f the new type o f Western man that Hobbes outlined three hundred years ago. 
But it is true that it was mainly due to the insights acquired by the bourgeoisie during the crises and depressions 
which preceded imperialism that high society finally admitted its readiness to accept the revolutionary change 
in moral standards which Hobbes’s "realism " had proposed, and which was now being proposed anew by the 
mob and its leaders?' (OT, 156) [My highlighting]
Now, Arendt addresses the cynical “realism” of the mob, which exercised an intellectual 
attraction on the bourgeoisie, as «nihilistic». That the term primarily designates a political, 
rather than moral issue, clearly emerges in the preceding passage:
[...] the political principles of the mob as encountered in imperialist ideologies and totalitarian 
movements, betray a surprisingly strong affinity with the politicol attitudes o f bourgeois society, if the latter are 
cleansed of hypocrisy and untainted by concessions to Christian tradition. What more recently made the nihilistic 
attitudes o f the mob so intellectually attractive to the bourgeoisie is a relationship o f principle that goes far 





Arendt clearly suggests that the alliance between the superfluous wealth created by over- !
i.
accumulation and the mob «set in motion a force that had always lain in the basic structure o f  
bourgeois society, though it had been hidden by nobler traditions and by that blessed ’i
hypocrisy which La Rochefoucault called the compliment vice pays to virtue» (OT, 156), and
that «completely unprincipled power politics could not be played until a mass of people was jj
20 «The mob, begotten by the monstrous accumulation of capital, accompanied its begetter on those voyages of 
discovery where nothing was discovered but new possibilities for investment. The owners of superfluous wealth 
were the only men who could use the superfluous men who came from the four comers o f the earth. Together 
they established the first paradise of parasites whose lifeblood was gold.» (OT, 151).
21 «The very fact that the “original sin” of “original accumulation of capital” would need additional sins to keep 
the system going was far more effective in persuading the bourgeoisie to shake off the restraints o f Western 
tradition than either its philosopher [i.e. Hobbes] or its underworld. It finally induced the German bourgeoisie to 
throw off the mask o f hypocrisy and openly confess its relationship to the mob, calling on it expressly to 
champion its property interests. [...] High society’s affinity with the mob came to light in France earlier than in 
Germany, but it was in the end equally strong in both countries. France, however, because o f her revolutionary 
traditions and her relative lack of industrialization, produced only a relatively small mob, so that her bourgeoisie 







available who were free  o f  all principles and so large numerically that they surpassed the 
ability o f  the state and society to take care o f them» (Id.)-
The “nihilistic attitude” o f the mob is briefly but efficaciously outlined in that being 
free o f  all principles which, far from contradicting, actually constitutes the political principles 
o f its organisation. Arendt insists on the affinity between the nihilistic attitude o f the mob and 
the political attitude o f the bourgeoisie cleansed o f  hypocrisy andfreed from  all concession to  
Christian moral values: the mob is seen to embody the «revolutionary change in moral 
standards which Hobbes’ “realism” proposed» (OT, 156), i.e., that being without the capacity 
for truth, without free will, and therefore, incapable of responsibility, whose value is priced 
exclusively in terms o f power (OT, 139). It is significant, in this respect, that the historical 
pessimists had already repeatedly pointed to the essential irresponsibility o f this new social 
entity, parasitically living in the margins o f society (OT, 155).
It is in the mob’s fascination with modem race doctrines that Arendt traces the link 
between the absence o f principles (nihilistic attitude) and the political principles o f  a capital 
and power accumulating bourgeoisie as the emergence o f  a humanity, in the sense of a  
community o f human beings, stripped o f  the regulating «idea o f humanity». Even though we 
cannot confuse Hobbes’ philosophy with the modem race doctrines, she argues, «Hobbes at 
least provided political thought with the prerequisite of all race doctrines, that is, the exclusion 
in principle o f  the idea o f  humanity which constitutes the sole regulating idea of international 
law» (OT, 156), 22 23dissolving the solidarity o f men, as rooted in the symbol o f the common 
origin o f the human species, in a perpetual and (self-) destructive war of all against all.
Now, Arendt draws the attention to the totalitarian form of modem race doctrines as 
bringing about «forms of organization through which humanity could carry out the endless 
process o f  capital and power accumulation through to its logical end in self-destruction» 
(OT, 157).
"■ « Hobbes embodies the necessity o f  power accumulation in the theory o f  the state o f nature, the condition o f 
"perpetual w ar" o f  all against all, in which the various single states still remain vis-à-vis each other like their 
individual subjects before they submitted to the authority of the Commonwealth. This ever-present possibility of 
war guarantees the Commonwealth a prospect of permanence because it makes it possible for the state to 
increase its power at the expenses o f other states.» (OT, 142). My italics.
23 «With the assumption that foreign politics is necessarily outside o f the human contract, engaged in the 
perpetual war o f all against all, which is the law o f the “state o f nature", Hobbes affords the best possible 
theoretical foundation for those naturalistic ideologies which hold nations to be tribes, separated from each other 
by nature, without any connection whatever, unconscious o f the solidarity o f mankind and having in common 
only the instinct o f self-preservation which man shares with the animal world. If the idea o f humanity, of which 
the most conclusive symbol is the common origin of the human species, is no longer valid, then nothing is more 
plausible than a theory according to which brown, yellow, or black races are descended from some other species 
of apes than the white race, and that all together are predestined by nature to war against each other until they 
have disappeared from  the face o f the earth.» (OT, 157) [My highlighting]
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The mob’s nihilistic attitude, as the cynical exclusion in principle o f the regulating 
idea o f humanity, reducing the political to an unprincipled «perpetual war of all against all», 
is, thus, the logical consequence of that «force that had always lain in the basic structure o f 
bourgeois society» (OT, 156), namely, of that limitless process of power accumulation, 
unleashed by the necessity o f  never-ending capital accumulation, which, in the Imperialist 
age, with the political emancipation o f the bourgeoisie, enters the public sphere, replacing 
political action.
In her analysis o f Hobbes’s Leviathan, which echoes Heidegger’s analysis o f the 
essence o f  power as unconditioned super-empowering of power in his lecture on Nietzsche’s 
European Nihilism, Arendt emphasised the self-destructive logic inherent in all attempt to 
found a political community on the limitless accumulation o f power:
[_]the power-accumulating machine, without which continual expansion would not have been
achieved, needs more material to devour in its never-ending process. If the last victorious Commonwealth cannot 
proceed to “annex the planets”, it can only proceed to destroy itself in order to begin anew the never-ending 
process o f power generation. (OT, 146-147) [My highlighting]
From the perspective of a Hobbesian endless process of unprincipled power accumulation, the 
organization o f a nihilistic mob must necessarily entail, in Arendt’s view, the dissolution of 
nations, as grounded on the regulating idea of a common origin, into races, «for there is, under 
the conditions o f an accumulating society, no other unifying bond available between 
individuals who in the very process o f power accumulation and expansion are losing all 
natural connections with their fellow-men» (OT, 157).24
As Arendt consigns the concept of “doom” to the realm of Historicist ideology, which 
she rejects as superstition, the meaning o f the attraction, which she examines in part II o f OT, 
o f an Imperialist élite indulging in Nihilism for the mob’s nihilistic freedom of all principles, 
lies in the very concept o f power politics as based on unprincipled, i.e., limitless and 
destructive, power accumulation, which, as a never-ending process, inevitably clashes against, 
and aims at transcending, the natural limits which characterise the human condition.
As Roy T. Tsao points out,25 nearly all of part II o f OT, with the exception o f  the last 
chapter, was adapted from the material of a series of articles that Arendt published between
24 «If it should prove to be true that we are imprisoned in Hobbes’ endless process of power accumulation, [...] 
[rjacism may indeed carry out the doom o f the Western world and, fo r  the matter, o f the whole o f human 
civilization. [...] race is, politically speaking, not the beginning o f humanity but its end, not the origin of peoples 
but their decay, not the natural birth of man but his unnatural death.» (OT, 157) [My highlighting]
25 R. T. Tsao, “The three phases of Arendt’s theory of Totalitarianism” in Totalitäre Herrschaft und 
republikanische Demokratie. Funfiig Jahre The Origins o f Totalitarianism von Hannah Arendt, Antonia 
Grunenberg (Hrsg.), Peter Lang, 2003, p. 59.
1942 and 1946.26 It is important to observe how, in these articles, Nazism was represented as 
the heir of the racist and expansionist power politics, that emerged in the last decades o f the 
19th century. Echoing Rauschning’s argument in his Germany's Revolution o f  Destruction,27 *
in her 1946 article «Imperialism: road to suicide» Arendt pointed to the Nazis’ insane 
preoccupation with death, culminating in the systematic building and functioning o f “death 
factories” as the extreme logical offspring o f a  hidden drive for suicide contained in the 
Imperialist principle o f expansion for expansion’s sake, which led the way to the nihilistic
A
principle of total destruction for destruction’s sake, that is, to collective suicide.
The transition from Part II o f the OT, almost complete by 1947, to Part III, which 
Arendt wrote between 1948 and ’49,29 is essential in order to grasp the complexity o f her 
analysis of nihilism fully: in abandoning the thesis o f her 1946 article in Part III o f OT, she 
takes her distances from Rauschning’s position, identifying totalitarian dictatorships as 
unprincipled, i.e., nihilistic, revolutions o f destruction.
I argue that, in Part III, she develops a two-layered approach to the question o f  
nihilism, which J. Isaac fails to highlight: tracing the core of Arendt’s critique of “pure 
Nihilism” -  a formula that we would unsuccessfully search for in OT -  in the chapter on «the 
temporary alliance between the mob and the elite» in Part III (A Classless Society), Isaac 
focuses his attention on the rebelliousness o f the intellectual elite of the Thirties, in other 
words, on the literary avant-guarde's «vulgarity, with its cynical dismissal o f  respected 
standards and accepted theories [which] carried with it a  frank admission o f the worst». 
According to Isaac
Arendt deplores the nihilism o f these intellectuals, who “did not know they were running their heads not 
against walls but against open doors”, whose fascination with destruction and whose cynical repudiation o f 
humanism played right into the hands of nascent totalitarian movements. Such an elite lacked any “sense o f  
reality”, and their fascination with the rhetoric of anithumanism they remained oblivious to the terrible practical 
consequences o f their nihilistic impulses. In the sheer delight with which they welcomed the destruction o f 
bourgeois respectability they self-indulgently flaunted all standards and irresponsibility added fuel to the fires 
that were to consume Europe.
26 “We refugees” (1943), “Concerning Minorities” (1944), “Imperialism, nationalism, chauvinism” (Review o f 
Politics 1945), “Power Politics Triumphs” (Commentary 1945), “The Stateless People” (1945), “Expansion and 
the Philosophy o f Power” (1946), “Imperialism road to suicide” (Commentary , February 1946), “The Nation” 
{Review o f Politics January 1946).
27 Hermann Rauschning, Germany’s Revolution o f Destruction, London-Toronto, 1939 (from now on RD).
2* Rauschning defined «a fatal, suicidal conception» (RD, p. 127) the nihilistic conception of permanent 
mobilization proclaimed by the Nazi revolution of destruction, as «totalitarian dictatorship o f pure violence 
[which] is possible on the basis o f nihilism, but it destroys its own foundation in proportion as its principles 
become general among the masses.» (RD, p. 127). The thesis of collective suicide is also accepted by Camus: 
«Le déposition de Speer au procès de Nuremberg a montré que Hitler, alors qu’il eût pu arrêter la guerre avant 
le désastre total, a voulu le suicide général, la destruction matérielle et politique de la nation allemande » (HR, 
591).
29 R. T. Tsao, op. cit., pp. 61-62.
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In the face o f these intellectual currents, which in different ways remained stuck in their negativity, 
Camus and Arendt sought some reliable basis upon which to defend positive values.30 [My italics]
I would argue that, in the chapter’s overall line of argument, Arendt does not deplore 
the intellectual élite’s nihilistic indulgence in cruelty, violence and passion for destruction per 
se; furthermore, it is not in the face o f  these intellectual currents that she may be seen as 
developing her own reflection, precisely because the nihilistic attitude o f the élite, «who 
voluntarily left society before the wreckage of classes had come about, along with the mob, 
which was an earlier product o f  the rule o f  the bourgeoisie» (OT, 326), was hardly anything 
new and original:
No single element in this general intellectual climate in postwar Europe was very new. Bakunin had 
already confessed, “I do not want to be ƒ, I want to be We'\ and Netchayev had preached the evangel of the 
“doomed man” with “no personal interests, no affairs, no sentiments, attachments, property, not even a name of 
his own”. [...] [the] brilliant and witty praise of violence, power, and cruelty [of the front generation] was 
preceded by the awkward and pompous “scientiftc,, proofs o f the imperialist elite that a struggle o f all against 
all is the law o f the universe, that expansion is a psychological necessity before it is a political evidence, and that 
man has to behave by such universal laws. What was new in the writings o f the front generation was their high 
literary standard and great depth of passion. (OT, 330) [My highlighting]
As the universal “struggle-of-all-against-all” law is the central conviction o f what 
Arendt defines in Part II as nihilism, or the “superstition o f doom” of the Imperialist élite, 
rooted in the bourgeois philosophy o f  power, the intellectual élite’s attitude defines itself in 
comparison with, and in strong opposition to, the historicist faith o f the 19th century - «To [the 
intellectual elite], violence, power, cruelty, were the supreme capacities o f men who had 
definitely lost their place in the universe and were much too proud to long fo r  a power theory 
that would safely bring them back and reintegrate them into the world. They were satisfied 
with blind partisanship in anything that respectable society had banned [...], and they elevated 
cruelty to a major virtue because it contradicted society’s humanitarian and liberal hypocrisy» 
(OT, 330-331).3'
One “merit”  o f the intelligentsia o f the Thirties, thus, lay in the rejection o f the 19lh
century bourgeois belief in a universal and transcendent law o f history -  be it of progress or 
o f doom -32 in its doing away with the bourgeois nihilism, as defined in Part II, had it not 
remained unawares entangled in its logic (but with a reversed sign). As Arendt emphasises:
30 J. C. Isaac, Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion, op. cit., p. 95-96.
31 My italics.
32 «The postwar writers no longer needed the scientific demonstrations of genetics, and they made little if any 
use of the collected works o f Gobineau or Huston Stewart Chamberlain, which already belonged to the cultural 
household of the philistines. They read not Darwin but the Marquis de Bade. If they believed at all in universal 
laws, they certainly did not particularly care to conform to them» (OT, 330). My italics.
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Simply to brand as outburst o f nihilism  this violent dissatisfaction with the prewar age and subsequent 
attempts at restoring it (from Nietzsche and Sorel to Pareto, from Rimbaud and T.E. Lawrence to Jönger, Brecht, 
and Malraux, from Bakunin and Netchayev to Alexander Blok) is to overlook how justified disgust can be in a  
society wholly permeated with the ideological outlook and moral standards of the bourgeoisie. Yet it is also true 
that the “front generation”, in marked contrast to their own chosen spiritual fathers, were completely absorbed by  
their desire to see the ruin of this whole world o f fake security, fake culture, and fake life. This desire was so  
great that it outweighed in impact and articulateness all earlier attempts at a “transformation o f values”, such as  
Nietzsche had attempted or a reorganization o f political life as indicated in Sorel’s writings, or a revival o f  
human authenticity in Bakunin, or a passionate love of life in the purity o f exotic adventures in Rimbaud. 
Destruction without mitigation, chaos and ruin as such assumed the dignity o f supreme values. (OT, 32S)
According to Arendt, the only element that distinguished the intellectual elite from th e  
19th century nihilistic ideologists, «with whose theories they sometimes seem to have so m uch 
in common» (OT, 331), was the greater authenticity and passion with which the former would 
yearn for a violent destruction of a society erected on, and embellished by, the bourgeois 
double morality o f  respectability and hypocrisy — but these would simply be added to th e  
older, i.e., modem/bourgeois, «passion for anonymity and losing oneself» (Id.) in th e  
superhuman process o f history unawares: «[...] the self-willed immersion in the superhuman 
forces o f destruction seemed to be a  salvation from the automatic identification with pre- 
established functions in society and their utter banality, and at the same time to help destroy 
the functioning itself» (Id.).
It is here that Arendt roots the intellectual élite’s attraction to the «pronounced 
activism o f totalitarian movements», coupling the primacy of sheer action and the  
overwhelming force of necessity - what she designated as the Laws of Nature, in N azi 
ideology, and the Laws of History, in Soviet Communism, and what Camus designated in H R  
as «rhistoire à l’état pur» (HR, 585).
It is precisely to “pure” history, or what Arendt defined as the modern concept o f  
history, as a superhuman process o f  sheer becoming, that both Arendt and Camus trace their 
definition o f nihilism, as immediately linked to the totalitarian election o f activism o r 
terrorism to the highest expression o f  political action.33 As Arendt highlights, even before 
acquiring the form o f  State-administered terrorism, with the rise to power o f totalitarianism,
[t]he pronounced activism o f the totalitarian movements, their preference fo r  terrorism over all other 
form s o f political activity, attracted the intellectual elite and the mob alike, precisely because this terrorism was 
so utterly different from that of the earlier revolutionary societies. It was no longer a matter of calculated policy 
which saw in terrorist acts the only means to eliminate certain outstanding personalities who, because of their 
policies or position, had become the symbol o f  oppression. What proved so attractive was that terrorism had 
become a kind o f philosophy through which to express frustration, resentment, and blind hatred, a kind o f  
political expressionism which used bombs to express oneself, which watched delightedly the publicity given to
33 In the chapter on «Le Terrorisme individuel» Camus insists on an analogous identification o f history as 
absolute value (HR, 579) at the roots of Russian Terrorism in its extreme form ( “Chigalevisme”), preparing the 
way to Totalitarian State terrorism.
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resounding deeds and was absolutely willing to pay the price o f life fo r  having succeeded in forcing the 
recognition o f one's existence on the normal strata o f society. It was still the same spirit and the same game 
which made Goebbels, long before the eventual defeat of Nazi Germany, announce with obvious delight that the 
Nazis, in the case o f defeat, would know how to slam the door behind them and not to be forgotten for centuries. 
(OT, 331-332) [My highlighting]
The pages on the intellectual elite’s attraction to totalitarian movements actually confirm, 
against Isaac’s reading, that in OT Arendt uses the term nihilism not to designate a 
historically situated phenomenon of moral break-down, but rather to define a specific political 
attitude, which was made visible by such event. The image of the «evaporation» of traditional 
values and propositions («after the nineteenth-century ideologies had refuted each other and 
exhausted their vital appeal», OT, 334) stands in clear opposition to the Liberal and Humanist 
images o f doom, as rooted in a «bitter disappointment and [...] unfamiliarity with the more 
general experiences of the time» (Id.), which, in her view, prevented these estranged 
spectators from understanding that patently absurd propositions could be accepted -  thus, 
replacing «the old truths which had become pious banalities» (Id.) - «precisely because 
nobody could be expected to take the absurdities seriously. Vulgarity with its cynical 
dismissal o f  respected standards and accepted theories carried with it a frank admission o f the 
worst [...]. In the growing prevalence o f  mob attitudes and convictions -which were actually 
the attitudes and convictions o f  the bourgeoisie cleansed o f  hypocrisy -  those who 
traditionally hated the bourgeoisie and had voluntarily left the respectable society saw only 
the lack o f hypocrisy and respectability, not the content itself» (OT, 334).34
What Arendt recognizes in the intelligentsia’s celebration of cruelty and violent 
activism is but the spreading attitude o f  the mob, which in Part II of OT she defines as the 
nihilistic offspring o f the bourgeois power policy, stripped of its hypocritical double morality.
To address, as Isaac does, the moral bankruptcy o f the early decades o f the 20th 
century as nihilism, would implicitly entail, from Arendt’s perspective, judging this historical 
moment from the Archimedean (god-like) standpoint of some transcendent (moral) values, 
which prevented the spokesmen of humanism and liberalism from grasping the political 
meaning o f  the élite’s attraction to totalitarian movements, and its temporary fascination with 
the nihilistic attitude o f the mob.
The reason why Arendt is so severe toward the intellectual élite is not, as Isaac 
suggests, that its «fascination with destruction and [...] cynical repudiation of humanism 
played right into the hands of the nascent totalitarian movements [...][and] added fuel to the
34 My italics.
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fires that were consuming Europe»,35 but is instead to be found in the elite’s blindness to what 
lay below its cynical divertissements, as unoriginal re-editions of the mob’s dismissal o f  
traditional moral standards -  a dismissal which Arendt sees, through Hobbes, as lying at the 
core o f the bourgeois philosophy o f power.
According to the author, the intellectual élïte’s exaggerated exhibition o f  ^ morality, its  
disregard o f human values, turned the revolutionary défi against the bourgeois double 
morality into a grotesque «mask o f cruelty», and the «old game o f épater les bourgeois» (O T, 
334) into a parody -  in the Twenties, the «avant-garde did not know they were running their 
heads not against walls but against open doors, that a unanimous success would belie the ir 
claim to being a revolutionary minority [...]. The bourgeoisie could no longer be shocked; it 
welcomed the exposure o f  its hidden philosophy [...]. » (OT, 335).36 37
Thus, it is not to the intellectual élite, whose lack of sense o f reality and perverted 
selflessness are seen as going in the same direction o f the masses’ fictitious world and 
absence of self-interest (OT, 335), but it is rather the mob’s cynical attitude to which w e 
should focus our attention in order to grasp the continuity between modem (bourgeois) power 
politics and the nihilistic principle that «everything is permitted».
In Chapter III on «Total Domination», in the section Totalitarianism in Power, Arendt 
traces the nihilistic principle that «everything is permitted» back to 19 century bourgeois 
utilitarianism, emphasising how it was inherited and immediately taken for granted by  
totalitarian movements as the basis on which their methods o f domination could be used, 
perfected and crystallised (OT, 440). This aspect is similarly highlighted by Rauschning in his 
analysis o f the Nazi revolution («This revolutionism stops at nothing. Its tactical principle is 
that all things are permitted»), as the political outcome of a total devaluation of moral 
principles and traditional standards, culminating in unscrupulous cynicism.38 39
Now, unprincipled cynicism and absence o f  scruple are identified throughout OT as 
the marks o f the mob’s political attitude, which in the concluding pages of the section on A  
classless society (Part III) are the object of Arendt’s analysis of the temporary alliance 
between mob and intellectual élite, and o f their common fascination with totalitarian 
movements.
35 Jeffrey C. Isaac, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
36 My italics.
37 RD, p. 84. My italics.
38 RD, p. 99.
39 The echoes o f Berdiaev’s argument on the nihilism of the Russian revolutionaries are visible in the following 
passage: «The truth was that the transformation o f classes into masses and the breakdown o f the prestige and 
authority of political institutions had brought to Western European countries conditions which resembled those
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The mob’s cynicism and political radicalism, which Arendt addresses as the extreme 
enterprising spirit o f the underworld o f the bourgeois class (OT, 337), still participating o f  the 
latter’s recklessness in handling its private interests regardless o f  the common good (OT, 
336), was soon dismissed by the totalitarian movements, which the mob and the elite had 
initially supported and helped into power.40
What Arendt wants to emphasise, in the opposition between mob and totalitarian rule, 
is a clash between two different conceptions o f power. The nihilistic, i.e., unscrupulous and 
unprincipled, conviction that “everything is permitted”, contained in the 19th century liberal 
political philosophy, is realised in the mob’s aspiration that «the helpless masses would help 
them into power, would support them when they attempted to forward their private interests, 
that they would be able simply to replace the old strata o f bourgeoisie society and to instil 
into it the more enterprising spirit of the underworld» (OT, 337).
As the offspring of the bourgeois productive society, the mob is seen as still 
participating in the modem liberal concept of power, unleashed by Imperialist expansion. 
Now, in Arendt’s view,
[t]he trouble with totalitarian regimes is not that they play power politics in an especially ruthless way, 
but that behind their politics is hidden an entirely new and unprecedented concept o f  power, just as behind their 
Real-politk lies an entirely new and unprecedented concept of reality. (OT, 417) [My italics]
Totalitarianism in power dissolves «[wjhatever connection power had in the minds of 
Western man with earthly possessions, with wealth, treasures, and riches» (OT, 4 IS), thus, 
with the modem bourgeois concept o f power as related to, and unleashed by capital
accumulation:
Supreme disregard for immediate consequences rather then ruthlessness; rootlessness and neglect of 
national interests rather than nationalism; contempt for utilitarian motives rather than unconsidered pursuit of 
self-interest; “idealism”, i.e., their unwavering faith in an ideological fictitious world, rather than lust f o r  pow er
prevalent in Russia, so that it was no accident that their revolutionaries also began to take on the typically 
Russian revolutionary fanaticism which looked forward not to change in social and political conditions, but to 
the radical destruction o f every existing creed, value, and institution. The mob merely took advantage o f this new 
mood and brought about a short-lived alliance o f revolutionaries and criminals [...]. The disturbing alliance 
between the mob and the elite, and the curious coincidence of their aspirations, had their origin in the fact that 
these strata had been the first to be eliminated from the structure o f the nation-state and the framework o f class- 
society» (OT, 337).
40 «In all fairness to those among the elite [...] who at one time or another have let themselves be seduced by 
totalitarian movements, and who sometimes, because of their intellectual abilities, are even accused o f having 
inspired totalitarianism, it must be stated that what these desperate men of the twentieth century did or did not do 
h a d  no  influence on totalitarianism whatsoever, although it did play some part in earlier, successful, attempts of 
the movements to force the outside world to take their doctrines seriously. Wherever totalitarian movements 
seized power, this whole group of sympathizers was shaken off even before the regimes proceeded toward their 
greatest crimes. Intellectual, spiritual, and artistic initiative is as dangerous to totalitarianism as the gangster 
initiative of the mob, and both are more dangerous than mere political opposition.» (OT, 339) (my italics).
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-  these have all introduced into international politics a new and more disturbing factor than mere aggressiveness 
would have been able to do.
Pow er, as conceived by totalitarianism, lies exclusively in the fo rc e  produced through organization. 
(OT, 417-148) [My italics]
The replacement o f  material power (property and productive manpower) by organizational 
power is what Arendt conceives as essentially defining totalitarian regimes.41 
In the de-coupling o f efficiency and material force, o f the concept of power and the utilitarian 
calculation of material interests and profit motives, which defined it in modem power 
theories, totalitarian action becomes utterly unpredictable:
The inability o f the non-totalitarian world to grasp a m entality w hich Junctions independently o f  all 
calculable actions in  term s o f  men an d  material, an d  is com pletely indifferent to national interest and  the well­
being o f  its people , shows itself in a curious dilemma o f judgement: those who rightly understand the terrible 
efficiency o f totalitarian organization and police are likely to overestimate the material force of totalitarian 
countries, while those who understand the wasteful incompetence o f totalitarian economics are likely to 
underestimate the power potential which can be created in disregard of all material factors. (OT, 419).
The reading of the second Essay o f Nietzsche’s Genealogy o f Morals offers, in this 
respect, some important insights into our analysis o f  nihilism. Approaching the question of 
memory and promise, Nietzsche traces the concept o f  responsibility in man’s capability to 
answer and account for himself as future , which entails the human animal having been made 
into a necessary, uniform, peer among peers, orderly predictable and calculable being, 
capable o f thinking causally and o f anticipating the future (GM, § 1-2).
The “fabrication” o f this truly predictable animal has its means, according to 
Nietzsche, in the co-operative action o f  society («the social strait-jacket») and the morality of 
custom, as the «immense amount of labour o f man on himself during the longest epoch of 
human race», the highest product of which is the sovereign individual, as a autonomous, 
supra-ethical man who has freed himself from the morality o f  custom, becoming the master o f  
the free will, in other words, a man who has the extraordinary privilege of responsibility, 
being aware of his freedom and power over himself and his destiny.
41 «The totalitarian division of states in Have and Have-not countries is more than a demagogic device; those 
who make it are actually convinced that the power o f material possessions is negligible and only stands in the 
way of the development of organizational power. [...] [Stalin] honestly believed that the most precious treasures 
o f the Soviet Union were not the riches of its soil or the productive capacity of its huge manpower, but the 
“cadres" o f the party (i.e., the police), so Hitler, as early as 1929, saw the “great thing” o f the movement in the 
fact that sixty thousand men “have outwardly become almost a unity [...]». «[...] To Stalin constant growth and 
development o f police cadres were incomparably more important than the oil in Baku, the coal and ore in the 
Urals, the granaries in the Ukraine, or the potential treasures o f Siberia -  in short the development o f Russia’s 
full power arsenal. The same mentality led Hitler to sacrifice all Germany to the cadres of the SS; he did not 
consider the war lost when German cities lay in rubble and industrial capacity was destroyed, but only when he 
learned that the SS troops were no longer reliable» (OT, 418).
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Echoing this definition in her pages on the political emancipation o f  the bourgeoisie, 
Arendt described the bourgeois man, depicted in Hobbes* Leviathan, as a being without 
reason, without the capacity for truth and without free will, in other words, without the 
capacity o f  responsibility -  a sheer function of society, whose value is constantly re-evaluated 
by the latter «depending upon the law o f supply and demand», namely, upon some kind of 
calculation of material power (OT, 139).
By recognizing in the nihilistic attitude of the mob the unprincipled realisation o f the 
irresponsible, interest-driven and power-accumulating animal, implicit in the modern concept 
o f  power, as contained in the bourgeois philosophy of power (which has its highest 
formulation in the Leviathan), and as consciously embraced only in the Imperialist age, 
Arendt is clearly suggesting, against a  simplistic interpretation of totalitarian regimes as 
Nihilistic Revolutions o f Destruction, that the problem with totalitarianism lies precisely in 
the fact that it transcends the cynical break-down o f the moral strait-jacket o f  tradition.
The nihilistic principle that “everything in permitted**, which the totalitarian 
movements inherited from 19* century power politics, and which so attracted the mob and the 
intellectual élite in the post-war years, does not exhaust the description of totalitarian 
mentality. Arendt’s attention thus concentrates on what she defines as the idea of 
organizational omnipotence (OT, 418) -  the totalitarian belief that everything is possible.
In the “Concluding Remarks” to the first edition of the OT Arendt relates these two 
beliefs, that “everything is permitted” and “everything is possible”, to the «coming o f age» of 
modern man, which she describes as the “interruption”, or the loss of faith in, the great myths 
o f the origins -  the Judeo-Christian myth o f the Creation, as the foundation and source of 
authority for actual laws; or the universal cosmos, whose natural laws the man of the French 
Revolution would have to imitate and conform to.
The origins o f human history, transcending the historical process itself, provided a 
ultimate meaning which secured a sense which was independent of «the unreliable efforts of 
men and the unpredictable whims o f accident»:42 3 the difficulty of contemporary men, 
according to Arendt, lies in the fact that «we start from a fundamental distrust o f  everything 
merely given, a distrust o f  laws and prescriptions, moral and social, that are deduced from  a 
given, comprehensive, universal whole. This difficulty involves the sources of authority of 
law and questions the ultimate goals o f political organizations and communities; it forces us
42 Hannah Arendt, The Origins o f  Totalitarianism, Harcourt, Brace & Co., New York, 1951, p. 434.
43 Ibidem.
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not only to find and devise new laws, but also to find and devise their very measure, the 
yardstick of good and evil, the principle o f their source».44
In spite and against neo-humanist thinkers, the nature o f man is no longer a measure, 
which, according to Arendt, entails, at the political level, that, in order to draw up the 
constitution o f a  new body politic, «we shall have to create -  not merely discover -  a new 
foundation for human community as such».45 In this sense, Arendt’s Concluding Remarks are 
clearly resonant with Nietzsche’s pages on European nihilism, and in particular with fragment 
n. 12, on the de-valuation of cosmological values, already analysed by Heidegger in his 1940 
lecture.
As we have pointed out in Chapter 1, in section A o f fragment n. 12 nihilism is 
defined as a psychological state which occurs, in the first place, as the consequence o f man’s 
unsuccessful search for a meaning or sense in events - such meaning not being there to be 
found  in becoming, man resigns to the fact of having been prey of an illusion; furthermore, 
nihilism as a psychological condition takes place as a consequence o f the loss o f a whole, 
which provided man with a foundation and permanent source o f value. Finally, in its third and 
last form, nihilism is described by Nietzsche as incorporating the absence o f  belief in a 
metaphysical world, which culminates in the recognition o f  this world as the only one 
(rejecting the Platonic-Christian dualism o f true world and world of appearances) -  but, as a 
result, man finds the world, as it is, unbearable.
Now, in the Concluding Remarks Arendt writes:
[...] the first disastrous result o f man’s coming of age is that modern man has come to resent everything 
given, even his own existence -  to resent the very fact that he is not the creator of the universe and himself. In 
this fundamental resentment, he refuses to see rhyme or reason in the given world. In his resentment o f all laws 
merely given to him, he proclaims openly that everything is permitted and believes secretly that everything is 
possible. And since he knows that he is a law-creating being, and that his task, according to all standards of past 
history, is “superhuman”, he resents even his nihilistic convictions as though they were forced upon him by 
some cruel joke of the devil.46
The “coming o f  age” o f modem man coincides with the nihilistic loss o f belief in a 
metaphysical principle, from which all laws are derived {«everything is permitted»): here 
Arendt, echoing Heidegger, points to the «superhuman» task o f modem men as Cartesian, i.e. 
unconditioned, law-creating beings.
The crucial problem, in Arendt’s view, is that the nihilistic resentment o f  everything 
given, that is, all transcendent law descending upon, and being imposed to man by a
44 Ivi, p. 435-436.
45 Ivi, p. 436.
46 Ivi, p. 438.
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metaphysical principle, is brought to the extreme consequence o f  resenting sheer givenness as 
such («the few elementary things that indeed are invariably given to us, such as life itself, the 
existence o f man and the world» ). This latter form of resentment against sheer existence is, 
according to Arendt, the psychological basis o f  contemporary nihilism and the key to 
totalitarian organizational omnipotence, as the essential principle o f totalitarian domination.
In The Perplexities o f  the Rights o f  Man, in the chapter on The Decline o f  the Nation- 
State and the End o f  the Rights o f  Man (Part II o f OT), Arendt writes:
The more highly developed a civilization, the more accomplished the world it has produced, 
the more at home men feel within the human artifice -  the more they will resent everything they have not 
produced, everything that is mysteriously given them. (OT, 300-301) [My highlighting]
Further on, she identifies mere existence as that which is «mysteriously given us by birth»: 
«the shape o f our bodies and the talents o f our minds, [which] can be adequately dealt with 
only by the unpredictable hazards o f  friendship and sympathy, or by the great and 
incalculable grace o f love» (OT, 301).
According to Arendt, suspicion o f  mere existence is inscribed in the very definition of 
the political, in so far as the latter is identified throughout Western political thought with a 
form of organization:
Since the Greeks, we have known that highly developed political life breeds a deep-rooted suspicion of 
this private sphere, a deep resentment against the disturbing miracle contained in the fa c t that each o f  us is made 
as he  is -  single, unique, unchangeable. This whole sphere of the merely given, relegated to private life in 
civilized society, is a permanent threat to the public sphere, because the public sphere is as consistently based on 
the law of equality as the private sphere in based on the law of universal difference and differentiation. Equality, 
in contrast to all that is involved in mere existence, is not given us, but is the result of human organization  
insofar as it is guided by the principle o f  justice. [...]
Our political life rests on the assumption that we can produce equality through organization , because 
man can act in and change and build a common world, together with his equals and only with his equals. (OT, 
3 0 1)47 8 [My highlighting]
Echoing Nietzsche’s “aesthetic” definition of the political sphere (On the use and 
disadvantages o f  history for life), represented by the Greek polis, as a “horizon” drawn to de­
fine the surveyable, the clear from the unilluminated and dark, de-limiting a space in which 
the Greek political men expressed their non-necessary drives, in the HC Arendt defined the
47 Ivi. P. 438.
48 In her 1954 lecture on Philosophy and Politics: the Problem o f  A ction  a n d  Thought after the  French  
R evolution , Arendt observes how in Greek antiquity life, in and by itself, could never become the ariston , the 
best thing: exaggerated love of life (philopsychia) was held to be characteristic o f slaves only, that is, the worst, 
who loved that mortal and perishable thing (life) over all others, as opposed to the aristoi, the best men, who 
chose immortal fame (Library of Congress, Folder 1, pp. 4-5).
political space (polis) as «the space o f  appearance in the widest sense o f the word, namely, 
the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like 
other living or inmate things but make their appearance explicitly» (HC, 198*199), which is 
delimited by the stabilizing element o f  law.
It is precisely out of such acting and speaking together that, according to Arendt, the 
public realm arises - as organization (HC, 198). Arendt’s reference to the principle o f  
organization - which «has nothing to do with either work or labor but owes its origin to the 
strictly political sphere o f  life, to the fact o f man’s capacity to act and to act together and in 
concert» (HC, 123) -  in her analysis o f Totalitarian regimes is highly problematical, and 
draws us to the core o f «one o f  the oldest perplexities o f  political philosophy», which she 
traces in the Western conception o f law  and political organization, exposed in its devastating 
implications by the early 20th century mass phenomenon o f  statelessness and by the end of the 
so-called Human Rights:
The dark background of mere givenness, the background formed by our unchangeable and unique 
nature, breaks into the political scene as the alien  which in its all too obvious difference rem inds us o f  the  
limitations o f  human activity  -  which are identical with the limitations o f  human equality. The reason why highly 
developed political com munities such a s  the ancien t city-states or m odern nation-states, so often insist on ethnic 
homogeneity is that they hope to elim inate as f a r  as possible those na tura l and  always present differences a n d  
differentiations which by  themselves arouse dum b ha tred  mistrust, an d  discrimination because they indicate a ll 
too clearly those sphere  where men cannot act a n d  change at will, i.e. the  limitations o f  the human artifice. The 
“alien” is a frightening symbol of the fact o f difference as such, of individuality as such, and indicates those 
realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy. 
(OT, 301) [My highlighting]
The image of the “alien” as the residual o f a highly developed, i.e., organized, political 
community, as understood in the Western tradition o f political thought, from the ancient polis 
to the modem Nation-State, exposes the “immunizing” attempt to keep out life or mere 
existence, that lies at its core. 49 According to Dana Villa, totalitarianism is unprecedented and 
unquestionably modern in the «deeper sense that it gives exaggerated expression to what 
Arendt considers to be the defining spirit o f the age, namely, a hubristic belief in the limitless 
nature o f human power. For Arendt, the modem age is one o f boundless self-assertion 
growing out of a resentment o f the human condition, a resentment of the limits that define 
human existence (mortality, labour and natural necessity, earth-boundedness, etc.)».50
I would suggest that it is in the concepts of organizational power and organizational 
omnipotence that we measure the complexity of Arendt’s definition o f the totalitarian
49 See also Roberto Esposito, Immunitas. Protezione e negazione della  vita , Einaudi, Torino, 2002, p. 21.
50 Dana Villa, “Totalitarianism, Modernity, Tradition”, in Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essay’s on the Thought o f  
Hannah Arendt, Princeton University, New Jersey, 1999, p. 184.
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phenomenon, visible in the analysis o f her two-fold notion o f nihilism, which combines, on 
the one hand, the modem distrust o f all (moral and social) laws and prescriptions that are 
deduced from a given universal whole (early or modem nihilism as the belief that «everything 
is permitted»), and, on the other, the resentment or contempt for life which she associates to 
the belief that «everything is possible».
I suggest that the link between the totalitarian «everything is possible» and the notion 
o f resentment against mere existence exceeds the traditional approaches to the problem of 
nihilism as an exclusively modem and moral phenomenon, and brings the question o f nihilism 
to the very core o f the Western concept o f the political, precisely in its definition as 
organization within the limits o f  law («the result o f human organization in so far as it is 
guided by the principle o f  justice»).
3.2. R a d ic a l  N ihilism  a nd  C o n t e m p t  of s h e e r  Ex is t e n c e .
In the concluding chapter of Part II, on The Decline o f  the Nation-State and the End o f  
the Rights o f  Man, the loss of a universal whole (history or nature), from which to deduce 
laws and rights -  which Nietzsche describes as one of the conditions of nihilism as a 
psychological state - 51 and the consequent loss of the authority o f absolute and transcendent 
measurements o f religion or the eighteenth-century law of nature, is seen to coincide with, 
and bring about the reduction of law to the utilitarian equation o f right with “good or useful 
for” (the individual, the family, the people).52
Now, as she points out in the Concluding Remarks to the first edition, in a finite 
horizon devoid o f higher sense, of a law that is given to us and to which we must conform, the
51 Arendt describes the modem (nihilistic) condition o f loss of a transcendent and comprehensive sense or unity 
in terms that are close to Camus’s in the MdS: «Ever since a deeper knowledge of natural processes instilled 
serious doubts about the existence of natural laws at all, nature itself has assumed a sinister aspect. How should 
we be able to deduce laws and rights from a universe which apparently knows neither the one nor the other 
category?» (OT, 298).
52 «The crimes against human rights, which have become a speciality o f totalitarian regimes, can always be 
justified by the pretext that right is equivalent to being good or useful for the whole in distinction to its parts. 
(Hitler’s motto that “Right is what is good for the German people” is only the vulgarised form of a conception of 
law which can be found everywhere and which in practice will remain ineffectual only so long as older traditions 
that are still effective in the constitutions prevent this).» (OT, 298-299).
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utilitarian categories of our common-sense reasoning (right is what is “good for”), not secured 
by the stabilizing and limiting boundaries o f  tradition, can never prevent murder:53
For it is quite conceivable, and even within the realm o f practical political possibilities, that one fine day 
a highly organized a n d  m echanized hum anity  will conclude quite democratically -  namely, by majority decision 
-  that for humanity as a whole it would be better to liquidate certain parts thereof. (OT, 299)
Hitler’s attempt in this direction is possible precisely under the conditions of a break-down o f  
the balance, inherent in the very structure o f the modem nation-state, between national 
interests and the legal institutions, and the transformation o f  the state from an instrument o f  
the law into an instrument o f the nation ,54
It is in the highly civilized political context o f  nation-states, bound together as a fam ily  
o f nations, that the post-war mass phenomenon o f  stateless people -  people (minorities or 
refugees) who had lost the protection o f their national governments -  brought forth the 
structural incapability of the nation-states to provide and secure law under the conditions o f 
loss of citizenship (OT, 287): «[...] since the man without a state was “an anomaly for whom 
there is no appropriate niche in the framework o f the general law” -  an outlaw by definition -  
he was completely at the mercy o f  the police [...]» (OT, 283).55
Arendt traces the emergence o f a police, emancipated from law («it was no longer an 
instrument to carry out and enforce the law», OT, 287) and from government, as an 
independent ruling authority,56 in the interwar Western European crisis of the nation-state.
It is significant that she identifies totalitarian organizational power, in both Stalin’s 
and Hitler’s regimes, with the growth and development of police cadres (OT, 418). In contrast 
with non-totalitarian states, the power nucleus o f totalitarian countries is seen to reside in 
“super-efficient and super-competent” secret police, whose functions are essentially related to
53 «[...] we are forced to doubt the unchallenged existence of the basic tenets of morality upon which the whole 
structure of our life rests and which none of the great revolutionaries, from Robespierre to Lenin, ever seriously 
questioned», H. Arendt, The Origins o f  Totalitarianism  (1951), op. cit., p. 438.
insofar as the establishment of nation-states coincided with the establishment of constitutional 
government, they always had represented and been based upon the rule o f law as against the rule of arbitrary 
administration and despotism. So that when the precarious balance between nation and state [...] broke down, 
the disintegration o f  th is fo rm  o f  governm ent a n d  o f  organization o f  peoples came about with terrifying 
swiftness» (OT, 275). My italics.
53 «[...] the state, insisting on its sovereign right o f expulsion, was forced by the illegal nature of statelessness 
into admittedly illegal acts.» (OT, 283- 284)
56 «It goes without saying that the totalitarian regimes, where the police had risen to the peak of power, were 
especially eager to consolidate this power through the domination of vast groups of people, who, regardless of 
any offences committed by individuals, found themselves anyway beyond the pale of the law.» (OT, 288)
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the preparation o f  the totalitarian utopia o f world domination,57 and, primarily, to the 
realization o f the totalitarian fiction in one country (OT, 421):
The truth o f the matter is that totalitarian leaders, though they are convinced that they must follow 
consistently the fiction and the rules o f the fictitious world which were laid down during their struggle for 
power, discover only gradually the full implications of this fictitious world and its rules. Their fa ith  in  human  
omnipotence, their conviction that everything can be done through organization, carries them  into experiments 
which human im aginations may have outlined but human activity certainly never realized  Their hideous 
discoveries in the realm o f the possible are inspired by an ideological scientificality which has proved to be less 
controlled by reason and less willing to recognize factuality than the wildest fantasies o f prescientific and 
prephilosophical speculation. They establish the secret society [...] of the secret police [...] in order to  be able to 
carry out the indecent experimental inquiry into w hat is possible. (OT, 436) [My highlighting]
In totalitarian regimes, the secret police is a secret society, which, being in possession 
of the esoteric knowledge, i.e., knowledge concerning the operational methods of the cadres, 
the eventual selection of new categories of undesirables, and the conditions o f the 
concentration camps, is alone, in the whole totalitarian country, in a position to «communicate 
with each other about what actually constitutes the reality for all» (OT, 435):
Of course the population at large and the party members specifically know all the general facts -  that 
concentration camps exist, that people disappear, that innocent persons are arrested; at the same time, every 
person in a totalitarian country knows also that it is the greatest crime ever to talk about these “secrets”. 
Inasmuch as man depends for his knowledge upon the affirmation and comprehension o f his fellow-men, this 
generally shared but individually guarded, this never-communicated information loses its quality o f  reality and  
assumes the nature o f  a  mere nightmare. Only those who are in possession of the strictly esoteric knowledge 
[...] alone are in a position to believe in what they know to be true. This is their secret, and in order to guard this 
secret they are established as a secret organization. (OT, 435) [My italics]
All these textual elements suggest that, in the OT, the (secret) police of totalitarian 
regimes, as the nucleus o f organizational power, i.e. o f force produced through organization, 
develop through the identification with, and on the fundamental basis of, an essentially 
political principle freed from the institutional and legal boundaries of traditional authority. 
What we observe is an identification o f Politik and Polizei which is analogous to the 
identification pointed out by Agamben in his definition of Nazi bio-politics.58
57 «The emphasis on the police as the sole organ o f power, and the corresponding neglect of the seemingly 
greater power arsenal of the army, which is characteristic of all totalitarian regimes, can still be partially 
explained by the totalitarian aspiration to world rule and its conscious abolition of the distinction between a 
foreign country and a home country, between foreign and domestic affairs» (OT, 420).
58 Analysing the distinction between Politik and Polizei as developed in the 18* century science of the police 
(von Justi), which assigned to the former the negative task of fighting the internal and external enemies of the 
State, and to the latter the positive care of the life of its citizens; Agamben defines the biopolitical programme of 
the Nazi regime, and o f a large part of modem politics, by the identification o f politics with the police, and the 
care of life with the fight against the enemy - the immvnitarian paradigm pointed out by Esposito (in G. 
Agamben, H om o sacer. J lpo tere sovrano e la  nuda  vita , Torino, Einaudi, 1995, p. 163). According to Agamben, 
Arendt fails to grasp that it is precisely this identification of politics and the police (as care of life), and the 
consequent transformation of politics into the space of “naked life”, that legitimises and requires total 
domination (Ivi, p. 132).
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When Claude Lefort’s insists that Arendt’s «notion o f organization has nothing to do 
with the attempt to integrate the ruler and the ruled in “One” body», he is (unsuccessfully) 
challenging the Arendtian concept o f organization from the viewpoint o f incorporation:59 in 
OT Arendt describes the unprecedented totalitarian concept o f power, as a force produced 
through organization, in terms of a «kind of dematerialised mechanism whose every move 
generates power as friction or galvanic currents generate electricity» (OT, 418), therefore 
transcending, on the one hand, the modem form of the work-model of political action - which 
Villa designates as the “fabrication paradigm”, visible in the Platonic State as a “man writ 
large” (HC, 224) -  60 and, on the other, the homo laborans* “unitedness o f many into one” 
(HC, 214) as experienced in consumers’ societies.
Totalitarianism is, thus, not understood by Arendt in terms of incorporation but of total 
organization o f life, which pushes the nihilistic resentment o f  sheer givenness, inherent in the 
Western conception o f the political, to its extreme consequences.
No doubt, wherever public life and its law of equality are completely victorious, wherever civilization 
succeeds in eliminating or reducing to the minimum the dark background of difference, it will end in complete 
petrifaction and be punished, so to speak, for having forgotten that man is only the m aster, not the  creator o f  th e  
world . (OT, 302) [My italics]
The world that figures among these “elementary things” that are inevitably given, 
masteiy - as related to craftsmanship, which is grounded on the fundamental recognition o f  
the material limitation of human activity - is opposed to the concept o f creation, which 
designates the peculiar trait o f human action within the political realm o f human affairs, 
namely, its boundlessness.61
59 «Arendt fails to make a distinction between organization and incorporation. Organization implies the idea o f a 
supposedly rational society, whereas incorporation refers to the notion o f a collective body and appeals to a 
programme of social prophylactics. On the one side, the figure o f the enemy is the saboteur, on the other side, it 
is the figure of the parasite, the vermin», C. Lefort, “Thinking with and against Hannah Arendt”, in Totalitäre 
Herrschaft, op. cit., pp. 122-123.
60 It is interesting to observe that Arendt uses the image o f the power-accumulating machine, into which each 
member, deprived o f  his natural and human capacities and reduced to absolute powerlessness, is degraded to a 
cog (OT, 146), to describe Hobbes’ Leviathan  as the Artificial Man, or the Commonwealth as One Body. 
Although she is aware o f a «significant coincidence» o f the Hobbesian identification o f public and private 
interests with the «totalitarian pretense of having abolished the contradictions between individual and public 
interests», against a certain critical literature (especially Jean Vialatoux’s L a  Cité de Hobbes: théorie de l ’Etat 
totalitaire, essai su r  la  conception naturaliste d e  la  civilisation, published in 1935), Arendt is cautious in 
pointing out that «[h]owever, one should not overlook the fact that Hobbes wanted most o f all to protect private 
interests by pretending that, rightly understood, they were the interests o f  the body politic as well, while on the 
contrary totalitarian regimes proclaim the non-existence o f privacy» (OT, 139, n. 36). We could read this 
opposition between public and privacy in the light of Arendt’s distinction between two different concepts of 
power, m ateria l and organizational, thus interpreting the totalitarian non-existence of privacy as the paroxysmal 
de-material ising and all-destructive affirmation o f the political principle o f  organization.
61 This aspect already emerges in the OT: in Part II on Imperialism, creation is used to designate the act of 
foundation o f the body politic, as the beginning o f a new political community (OT, 138).
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I argue that between 1949 and 1954, through the gestation of Part III of OT and 
through her researches and lectures, which culminated in her political theory in the HC, 
Arendt comes to terms with, develops, and finally dismisses a certain definition o f the 
problem o f  nihilism as internal to, and inseparable from, a specific conception o f  the political 
-  namely, the philosophers’ (Platonic) concept of the political, at the roots of the Western 
tradition o f political thought.
In her 1954 essay on Tradition and the Modem Age, Arendt defines the «denial of 
everything given» as a radical nihilism, «of which the nineteenth-century rebellions against 
tradition as yet knew little and which arises only in the twentieth-century society» (TMA, 
34).“
In Kierkegaard’, Marx* and Nietzsche’s challenge to the tradition of Western 
religious, ethical and political thought, Arendt draws the attention to the “rebels’” awareness 
o f a series of new problems and perplexities, which had invaded the modem world, and which 
tradition was incapable to cope with (TMA, 27).
Against the “vulgarisation” of «what is commonly called nihilism» (TMA, 30), which 
identifies the latter with Nietzsche’s philosophical dismantling o f metaphysics, his attack 
against the «suprasensuous and transcendent ideas which, since Plato, had been supposed to 
measure, judge, and give meaning to the given» (BPF, 30), Arendt insists that
[y]et Nietzsche was no nihilist but, on the contrary, was the first to try to overcome the nihilism inherent 
not in the notions o f  the thinkers but in the reality o f  modern life. What he discovered in his attempt at “trans­
valuation” was that within this categorical framework the sensuous loses its very raison d ’être when it is 
deprived of its background of the suprasensuous and transcendent. (TMA, 30)
Throughout the essay, Arendt traces nihilism not in the “conscious rebellions” o f these 
thinkers - in Nietzsche’s, but also Kierkegaard’s and Marx’s enterprises- but instead in those 
traits of the modem world, which these authors attempted «to overcome and resolve into 
something old», by turning the tradition upside down (TMA, 29). What she suggests is that in 
choosing tradition as their antagonist, by intentionally breaking with it, these thinkers were 
essentially trying to dispel the darkness and cover that «ominous silence that still answers us 
whenever we dare to ask, not “What are we fighting against” but “What are we fighting 
fo r T ’» (TMA, 27) -  which is the ultimate senselessness of existence, as experienced in and 
springing from the incompatibility between the tradition and modernity. 62
62 My italics.
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Arendt focuses in particular on the incompatibility between the traditional 
(philosophical) conception o f  truth as revelation, entailing «the traditional unquestioning 
confidence in what has been given and appears in its true being to man’s reason and senses», 
and the modem «spirit of doubt and distrust which ultimately can trust only what it has made 
itself» (TM A,31).W
Bearing in mind Nietzsche’s definition o f nihilism as the devaluation o f the highest 
values, Arendt points to the thinker’s unawareness of the origin of the term “value” in the 
modem sociological trendy made visible in the new economic sciences (TMA, 33).
Echoing the pages on Hobbes’ philosophy o f  power in the OT, Arendt defines values 
as «social commodities that have no significance o f  their own but, like other commodities, 
exist only in the ever-changing relativity of social linkages and commerce. Through this 
relativization both the things which man produces for his use and the standards according to 
which he lives undergo a decisive change: they become entities o f exchange, and the bearer o f  
their “value” is society and not man [...]. The “good” loses its character as an idea, the 
standard by which the good and the bad can be measured and recognized; it has become a 
value which can be exchanged with other values, such as those o f expediency or o f power» 
(TMA, 32-33).63 4 The incompatibility between traditional values, as a measure for men’s 
thoughts and actions, and the modem dissolution of these transcendent standards into 
functional values, i.e., into «relationships between its members» (TMA, 32), is played, 
according to Arendt, in Nietzsche’s devaluation of values, as well as in Marx’s labour theory 
of value (Id.).
Nietzsche’s “dismantling” of the tradition under the banner of a de-valuation of the 
highest values, by challenging the social status of the latter, exposes, in Arendt’s view, the 
modem identification with, and dissolution o f traditional absolute standards (Ideas) into social 
values. 65 Therefore «when Nietzsche proclaimed that he had discovered “new and higher 
values”, he was the first to fall prey to delusions which he himself had helped to destroy, 
accepting the old traditional notion o f  measuring with transcendent units in their newest and 
most hideous form, thereby again carrying the relativity and  exchangeability o f  values into
63 My italics.
64 «The birth of the social sciences can be located at the moment when all things, “ideas” as well as material 
objects, were equated with values, so that everything derived its existence from and was related to society, the 
bonum and malum  no less than tangible objects» (TMA, 33).
65 «[...] at no time prior to the incipient Industrial Revolution was it held that values, and not things, are the 
result o f  m a n ’s  p roductive  capacity, or was everything that exists related to society and not to man “seen in his 
isolation. The notion o f “socialized men”, whose emergence Marx projected into the future classless society, is 
in fact the underlying assumption o f classical as well as Marxian economy» (TMA, 33).
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the very matters whose absolute dignity he had wanted to assert -  power and life and m an’s 
love o f his earthly existence» (TMA, 34-3S).66 67
In this sense, Arendt’s critique of Nietzsche can be seen as going in the same 
direction, and in a way anticipating, a more recent strand of interpretation o f the philosopher’s 
work, which identifies nihilism with the genealogical de-structuring of the traditional 
foundations of truth and domination, thus founding the concept of power in a boundless 
process o f  de-materialization or de-realization.61 According to Ferruccio Masini, the 
Nietzschean story o f the «great redemption» coincides with a story of human solitude -  the 
solitude o f the aristoi, whose “greatness” takes places in/as the interiorization o f power,68 
through the erosion o f  the traditional concept o f dominion, which discloses in its (nihilistic) 
withdrawal from human inter-relatedness the super-human perspective of measurelessness69
But if  the commentator traces in Nietzsche’s “Great Politics” a meta-critique of the 
political which in its nihilistic radicalisation reveals, not only the impossibility o f a 
foundation of the Subject, but also, most importantly, the foundationlessness o f the political 
itself, I suggest that Arendt goes one step further by developing, through her focus on 
nihilism, a meta-critique of the political, which exposes its (foundation-less) foundation as a 
specific concept o f  the political -  one which, in her terminology, belongs to, and must be 
traced back to, the Western tradition o f political philosophy.
What lies at the roots o f the question o f nihilism is ultimately the relationship between 
philosophy and politics -  a crucial concern in Arendt’s early Fifties’ research and lectures. 
However this is not in the sense, proposed by Francesco Fistetti, that this relationship 
undergoes a crucial evolution in the modem age, to the extent that, with the advent of 
totalitarian movements and ideologies, nihilism marks the entering or the realization o f some
66 My italics.
67 According lo Ferruccio Masini, «Nietzsche non pensa più in termini tradizionali di legittimazione del dominio 
e neppure in termini ideologici, sulla base cioè, di quella coercizione alla razionalizzazione che [...] rivendica il 
carattere della scienza moderna. [.„] Se Varistos è il potere sans phrases non legittimato, ma legittimante, non 
giustificato, ma giustificante, ciò si spiega col fatto che esso è fin izione della  dismisura, la dismisura di un 
compito, di un “essere superiore”: in altri termini: proprio in virtù del carattere sovrumano della sua 
responsabilità, esso finisce per ritirare dai rapporti reali la sua rivendicazione, interiorizzandola», in F. Masini, 
“Tradizione nichilista e metapolitica deiraristos nel pensiero di Friedrich Nietzsche”, in Filosofìa, religione, 
nichilismo, Morano, 1988, pp. 491,493.
64 «Questa irrealtà del potere, che fa coincidere la “storia della grande redenzione” con una storia di solitudine 
umana, appartiene, per quanto paradossale possa sembrare, al processo di disarticolazione delle strutture di 
dominio. La volontà di potenza combatte contro se stessa, nel senso che irrealizza il dominio facendo di esso 
[...] un “non-potere al potere”. [...] Nella nozione nietzscheana di “grandezza”, potenza si divarica dunque da 
dominio. I valori sono forme di dominio, la potenza, invece, non ha alcuna forma. Essa è bensì il senso di ciò che 
si presenta come valore -  si pensi alla genealogia degli “ideali ascetici” platonico-cristiani -  e quindi maschera a 
“volontà del nulla” che si nasconde in questi valori» (F. Masini, art. cit., pp. 493 and 495).
69 According to Masini, thè notion o f “will to power” carries thè nihilistic de-humanization of dominion, that is, 
its extractìon from thè context of human relations (F. Masini, art. cit.., p. 492).
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familiar philosophical categories (the old philosophical principle that “everything is 
permitted”) in the political realm,70 712but, instead, in the sense that nihilism coincides with, and 
exposes, the de-realization and internalisation of the political as conceived in the Western 
tradition o f  political philosophy.
As Hannah Arendt points out,
[f]or traditional philosophy it would have been a contradiction in terms to “realize philosophy” or to 
change the world in accordance with philosophy [...]. Philosophy might have prescribed certain rules o f action, 
though no great philosopher ever took this to be his most important concern. Essentially, philosophy from Plato 
to Hegel was “not o f  this world” (TMA, 23)
Marx’s intention to change the world and the consciousness of men -  according to the 
three famous sentences that “The philosophers have only interpreted the world differently; the 
point is, however, to change it”; Labor created man”; and “Violence is the midwife o f every 
old society pregnant with a new one” (TMA, 21) -  is, in Arendt’s view, a philosopher’s 
decision to abjure philosophy, which, although it explodes the tradition o f political philosophy 
from which it springs, is and essentially remains itse lf philosophical:
[...] The challenge to tradition, this time not merely implied but directly expressed in Marx’s statement, 
lies in the prediction that the w orld o f  common hum an affairs, where w e orient ourselves and  th ink in common- 
sense terms, will one  day become identical w ith  the realm o f  ideas where the philosopher m oves, or that 
philosophy, which has always been only “for the few”, will one day be the common-sense reality for everybody 
(TMA, 23-24)
Developing in her 1954 lecture Philosophy and Politics: The Problem o f  Action and  
Thought after the French Revolution an argument, that also recurs in other writings o f  the 
same period (The Concept o f  History and Concern with Politics in Recent European 
Philosophical Thought), Arendt observes that philosophy is the mother o f all Western 
sciences , although, among these, the science of Politics has always been a stepchild: what 
distinguishes Physics, Ethics, Metaphysics and Logics from Politics is, in Arendt’s own
70 «Il rapporto tra filosofia e politica varca una soglia decisiva nel mondo moderno allorché con l’avvento dei 
movimenti e delle ideologie totalitarie il nichilismo da principio (o insieme di principi) filosofico si tramuta in 
una sorta di fa tto re  dissolutivo  del vecchio ordine classista e in lievito po ten te  della trasformazione in società di 
massa, anonima e atomizzata. £ ' com e se an tiche e fam iliari categorie filosofiche fo ssero  divenute realtà  
tangibile [...]» (Francesco Fistetti, “Totalitarismo e Nichilismo in Hannah Arendt”, in Logiche e  crisi della 
modernità, a cura di Carlo Galli, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1991, p. 405). My italics.
71 «Politicai philosophy necessarily implies the attitude of the philosopher toward politics; its tradition began 
with the philosopher’s turning away from politics and then returning in order to impose his standards on human 
affairs. The end came when a philosopher turned away from philosophy so as to “realize” it in politics» (TMA, 
17-18).
72 H. Arendt, P hilosophy a n d  Politics, Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library Congress, folder 1, p. 3 (also in EU, 
430).
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words, the fact that the former are all connected to, and remain inspired by, the original 
wonder before and gratitude for the miracles of man and the universe.73
In contrast, political life is seen, from Greek times, as breeding a deep resentment 
against the disturbing miracle contained in the fact that each o f us is made as he is (OT, 301).
The sphere o f  the merely given, that is, of the temporally limited, instable and relative 
human world * the human condition as essentially miserable (the opposite o f the ariston) 
because it is affected by mortality - is conceived as a permanent threat to the public sphere, as 
the sphere of the specifically human possibility for “greatness”, where the aristoi -  the best 
men, as those who have chosen immortal fame -  distinguish themselves:74 «Greatness -  she 
writes in The Concept o f  History -  was easily recognizable as that which by itself aspired to 
immortality -  that is, negatively speaking, as a heroic contempt for all that merely comes and 
passes away, for all individual life, one’s own included» (BPF, 52).
It is in this heroic contempt o f mortality that Arendt detects the point of intersection 
between the Greek aspiration to self-immortalizing, as the foundation of the political life, and 
the philosophers’ election of contemplation as the best and highest form o f immortalizing 
oneself. The major shift, brought about by the latter, consisted in replacing the political notion 
o f  “immortal fame” by the philosophical concept of immortality, as conceived and pursued in 
complete isolation and independently from the human community.75
If we compare these pages with the ones on Marx’s prediction of a world o f human 
affairs identical with the philosopher's realm of ideas (TMA, 23), it is not difficult to 
recognize, intact under the exhortation to abjure philosophy (i.e., pure contemplation) in order 
to change the world, the philosopher’s contempt of the merely given, or resentment o f sheer 
existence.
This contempt or resentment lies at the core o f the very conception o f the political, 
which became dominant in the West and imposed itself, through the teachings o f Plato and 
Aristotle, in the Western tradition - as the philosopher's concept o f the political, grounded on 
his experience o f isolation and withdrawal from the common world o f men living and acting 
together (TMA, 17):
Our tradition of political thought began when Plato discovered that it is somehow inherent in the 
philosophical experience to turn away from the common world of human affairs; it ended when nothing was left 
o f this experience but the opposition of thinking and acting, which depriving thought of reality and action of 
sense, makes both meaningless. (TMA, 25)
73 Ivi, p. 3.
74 Ivi, pp. 4-5.
75 Ivi, p. 6. According to Arendt, political philosophy, as a branch o f philosophy, began with a profound conflict 
with «things that concern men insofar as they live together» (lvi, p. 3).
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If Marx’s thought explodes that tradition (TMA, 24) from which, according to Arendt, the 
thinker himself, like Kiekegaard and Nietzsche, was borrowing the conceptual tools in order 
to make sense o f the new phenomena o f the modem age (TMA, 29);76 7modernity, in a way, is 
seen as exposing a paradox that is internal to the great tradition of political philosophy, the 
destructiveness o f which becomes visible in the “twilight o f the idols” and the 20th century 
loss o f  raison d'etre.
Arendt relates the destructive character of the tradition at the moment o f  its coming to 
an end (TMA, 18) with its loss of authoritativeness, and its reduction to the (philosophical) 
separation between thinking and acting, as resting upon the Platonic fabrication model o f  
political action formulated in her 1953 lectures on Marx and the Tradition.
The interrelatedness between the nihilistic «everything is possible», the resentment or 
contempt of mere existence, which emerges in Arendt’s reflection on totalitarian domination 
in OT, and the de-realizing or de-materializing drive inherent in the (philosophers’) concept 
o f the political o f the Western Great Tradition, brought forth by her researches on philosophy 
and politics in 1952-54, is confirmed in an earlier version o f  her Concern with Politics in 
Recent European Political Thought:
[in] the nihilistic aspects of present political developments, which are so very obvious in the ideologies 
of all totalitarian movements and their inner conviction not only that “everything is permitted” but that 
“everything is possible”, that once you make an arbitrary principle the guide o f a consistent policy, everything 
goes -  in this contem porary nihilism the ph ilosopher was o n ly  too likely to  detect his own predicam ents. The 
predicaments of philosophy in the modem world.
Deploring the «laughable and hopeless state o f  the political sciences » in a letter to 
Heidegger (8th May 1954),78 against which she defines her own effort to «pursue issues that 
were already bothering me throughout the writing o f  the book on totalitarianism»,79 between 
1954 and 56, Arendt repeatedly traces the former in the so-called scientific effort to reduce 
the unknown or the new, i.e., totalitarian domination, to the known or the old (tyranny or one- 
party dictatorship), and to explain the tragic novelty o f  the event «by reducing it to historical, 
social, or psychological causes relevant for only one country, Germany or Russia» (UP, 313).
76 «Kierkegaard, Marx, and Nietzsche stand at the end of the tradition, just before the break came. [...] [They] 
are for us like guideposts to a past which has lost its authority. They were the first who dared to think without the 
guidance o f any authority whatsoever; yet, for better and worse, they were still held by the categorical 
framework of the great tradition.» (TMA, 28)
77 H. Arendt, “Concern with Politics in Recent European Political Thought”, Library of Congress, folder 1, p. 3. 
(My italics)
78 See also E. Young-Bruehl, op. cit., p. 283.
79 Hannah Arendt- Martin Heidegger, Letters 1925- 1975, Harcourt, 2004, pp. 120-121.
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In What is authority she explicitly denounced the «silent agreement in most 
discussions among political and social scientists that we can ignore distinctions and proceed 
on the assumption that everything can eventually be called anything else» (WA, 95-96), 
founded theoretically on the concept o f History as «process or stream or development» in 
which everything can become everything else.
Arendt’s three-fold inquiry into the ruler/ruled relationship as one of the possible 
forms among the different forms of constitution o f the political, into the productionist 
interpretation o f political action under the categories of end/means,* 81 and into relation 
between philosophy and politics, is inseparable, I argue, from her critique of the 19th century 
Philosophies o f History, in which she roots the post-war Neo-Conservative and Liberal 
political theories82 834as «two sides of the same coin, just as their progress-or-doom ideologies
S3correspond to two possible directions o f  the historical process as such».
According to Arendt, in the post-war context of political theory Liberalism and 
Conservatism are both concerned with «restoration» (of freedom or authonty). On the other 
hand, Catholic philosophers, such as Maritain, Gilson, Guardini and Pieper, whom Arendt 
defines as immune to Hegelianism, and who came «to know the problems of modem nihilism 
from their experiences with continental, particularly Central European, historicism [...]» (CP, 
434-435), propose an analogous return to the tradition, in the form of a dubious «restatement 
of old truths [...] the re-establishment o f a world that is past» (Id.)
In order to elucidate the meaning o f Arendt’s approach to the nihilistic aspects, which 
she detects in the contemporary political philosophy, on the backdrop of this debate, I suggest 
that we examine briefly the philosopher’s predicaments and their modem developments.
,0 «Starting with Montesquieu, an analysis of the types of states, with the goal o f uncovering where the concept 
of authority got into the political (“each body politic is composed o f those who rule and those who are ruled”)» 
(H. Arendt- M. Heidegger, Letters 1925- 1975, op. cit., p. 120).
81 « Perhaps starting with Marx on the one hand and Hobbes on the other, an analysis of the completely 
disparate activities that, from the perspective o f the vita contemplativa, have usually been lumped together in the 
vita activa: that is, work -  production — action, whereby work and action have been understood on the model of 
production: work became “productive”, and action was interpreted in an ends-means context.» (Ibid.)
82 See Arendt’s “Authority in the Twentieth Century”, The Review o f  Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4, October 1956, pp. 
404-405.
83 What is Authority? (BPF, 101). My italics.
84 Ibid.
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3.3. Unmasking the “aesthetic” paradigm of western political thought.
Arendt’s threefold enquiry, described in the letter to Heidegger, which she sketches «as an  
experiment” in the 1953 lecture on Karl Marx and the Western Tradition...», and which 
culminates in Part II and III o f  What is Authority?, individuates in «the Platonic-Aristotelian 
statement that every well-ordered community is constituted o f  those who rule and those who 
are ruled» (WA, 104), the origin and introduction o f the concept of domination -  of mastery
O f  A/
or rule, as belonging to the private sphere of the household (despotism) -  into the political 
realm:
In Plato, the despotism originating in the household, and its concomitant destruction o f the political 
realm as antiquity understood it, remained utopian. But it is interesting to note that when the destruction became 
a reality in the last centuries of the Roman Empire, the change was introduced by the application to public rule o f  
the term dom inus, which in Rome (where the family also was “organized like a monarchy”) had the same 
meaning as the Greek “despot”. Caligula was the first Roman emperor who consented to be called dominus, that 
is, to be given the name “which Augustus and Tiberius still rejected as if it was a malediction and an injury” , 
precisely because it implied a despotism unknown in the political realm, although all too familiar in the private, 
household realm. (WA, I06)85 67
The introduction o f  the private relationship master-slave (domination) into the public political 
sphere coincides, in Arendt’s view, with the Socratic school’s election o f law-making and 
city-building - «no longer or, rather, not yet action (praxis), properly speaking, but making 
(poiesis)», that is, activities in which «men “act like craftsmen”: the result of their action is a 
tangible product, and its process has a clearly recognizable end» (HC, 195) - to the highest 
rank of political life (Ibidem).
In Arendt’s argument, the despotic character o f Plato’s concept of law (“The law is the 
despot o f the rulers, and the rulers are the slaves o f the law” -  WA, 106), as well as the
85ln ancient Greece absolute rule in the public realm was represented by the two extreme cases of tyranny and 
military leadership in times of warfare, which actually coincided with the dissolution or suspension of public 
life: the latter being was bound to a temporary situation of emergency, while the former, as one-man rule by 
sheer violence, would deprive the citizens o f their faculty for political action, «which they felt was the very 
essence o f freedom» and o f the life o f the polis (WA, 105).
86 WA, 105.
87 In the drafts o f her lecture at Princeton University in 1953 on K arl M arx and the Tradition o f  Western 
Political Thought, Arendt prefers to use the term «forms of polities», instead of the modem concept of «forms 
o f government», to describe Aristotle’s analysis o f  political constitutions, because «the element o f rule did not 
strictly belong to it» (first draft, folder 1, p. 8). Rule (over slaves) did not belong to politics, but was conceived 
as the pre-political condition o f politeuein. Focusing her attention, in the same paper, on the «outstanding 
experiences in this public field of living together» that gave rise to «the few forms of government which have 
accompanied us throughout our history», she insists on the distinction between monarchy and kinship, «probably 
the oldest, certainly the most elementary form o f govemmenD), which rests on the experience o f action in the 
sense of beginning som eth ing  new. The latter, she writes, «makes and demands a king, fa basileus. not a  
monarch the holder o f  pow er over all) to start a new  enterprise [...]» (first draft, folder 2, p. 2), in “Karl Marx 
and the Tradition o f Western Political Thought”, Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library Congress, Speeches and 
Writings Files, 1923-1975.
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attempts in the political dialogues — The Republic, Statesman, Laws - to establish a rule of 
reason in the person of the philosopher-king, which would avoid tyrannical violence without 
renouncing to its coerciveness and binding force (WA, 108), confirm her thesis o f the Platonic 
substitution o f  the pre-political and private activity of making for acting, which in her view, 
represented the philosophic remedy to the frailty of human affairs, renouncing the «futility, 
boundlessness, and uncertainty of outcome» of praxis for the greater reliability o f poiesis 
(HC, 195).“
The attempt at neutralizing the unpredictability and boundlessness o f  human 
relationships is apparent in Plato’s effort to «establishing] reason as ruler in the realm of 
politics»,8 9 the political implications o f which Arendt traces in «the conflict between the 
philosopher and the polis, or in the hostility of the polis toward philosophy, which probably 
had lain dormant for some time before it showed its immediate threat to the life of the 
philosopher in the trial and death o f Socrates»:90
Politically, Plato’s philosophy shows the rebellion o f the philosopher against the polis. The philosopher 
announces his claim to rule, but not so much for the sake of the polis and politics [...] as for the sake of 
philosophy and the safety of the philosopher. (WA, 107) [My italics]
The compelling power, which would “shape” the human relationship into a ruler-ruled 
relationship - «The master, according to the discussion in the Statesman, knows what should 
be done and gives his orders, while the slave executes them and obeys, so that knowing what 
to do and actual doing become separate and mutually exclusive functions» (WA, 108-109) -  
is granted in Plato’s political theory by Ideas, as yardsticks for measuring human behaviour 
which are outside o f and beyond the sphere of human affairs (Id.).
Now, it is not without reason that Plato «had taken the key word o f his philosophy, the 
term “idea”, from the experiences in the realm of fabrication [...], whose process obviously
88 «How this remedy can destroy the very substance of human relationships is perhaps best illustrated in one of 
the rare instances where Aristotle draws an example of acting from the sphere of private life, in the relationship 
between the benefactor and his recipient. With that candid absence of moralizing that is the mark o f Greek, 
though not of Roman, antiquity, he states first as a matter of fact that the benefactor always loves those he has 
helped more than he is loved by them. He then goes on to explain that this is only natural, since the benefactor 
has done a work, an ergon, while the recipient has only endured his beneficence. The benefactor, according to 
Aristotle, loves his “work”, the life of the recipient which he has “made", as the poet loves his poem, [...]. This 
explanation shows clearly that he thinks of acting in terms of making, and of its results, the relationship between 
men, in terms of an accomplished “work” (his emphatic attempts to distinguish between action and fabrication, 
praxis and poiesis , notwithstanding).» (HC, 195-196)
89 «[...] the patient became subject to the physician’s authority when he fell ill, and the slave came under the 
command of his master when he became slave. It is important to bear these examples in mind in order to realize 
what kind o f coercion Plato expected reason to exert in the hands of the ¿/^-philosopher» (WA, 109).
90 « It was after Socrates’ death that Plato began to discount persuasion as insufficient for the guidance of men 
and to seek for something liable to compel them without using external means of violence. Very early in his 
search he must have discovered truth, namely, the truths we call self-evident, compels the mind, and that this 
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falls into two parts: first, perceiving the image or shape (eidos) o f the product-to-be, and then 
organizing the means and starting the execution» (HC, 225) - «[t]he Platonic wish to 
substitute making for acting in order to bestow upon the realm of human affairs the solidity 
inherent in work and fabrication becomes most apparent where it touches the very centre o f 
his philosophy, the doctrine of ideas» (Id.).
In the Republic the ideas perceived by the philosopher outside the cave are turned for 
political purposes into standards, measurements or rules o f  behaviour - variations o f the idea 
of “good”, in the Greek sense o f “good fo r"  or 'f it"  (HC, 225-226). The idea o f good, Arendt 
writes in The Human Condition is the highest idea o f  the philosopher-fa'wg, whose aim is to 
rule human affairs «with the same absolute, “objective” certainty with which the craftsman 
can be guided in making and the layman in judging individual beds by using the unwavering 
ever-present model, the “idea” o f bed in general» (HC, 226):
The construction of the public space in the image o f a fa b r ica ted  object, [...] carried with it only the 
implication o f ordinary mastership, experience in the art o f  po litics as in  a ll other arts, where the compelling 
factor lies not in the person of the artist or craftsman, but in the impersonal object of his art or craft. (HC, 227)
Arendt traces the roots o f all theories o f  domination in the Platonic separation o f 
knowing and doing, entailed by the doctrine o f Ideas, and in the «identification o f knowledge 
with command and rulership and o f action with obedience and execution» o f orders (HC, 
225).91
It is in Arendt’s critique o f the Platonic work-model o f action, which emerges from 
her analysis of fabrication (poiesis) as the pivotal term of the tradition o f political philosophy, 
that the political dangers of an “aestheticization” o f  politics in the Platonic sense are made 
apparent.
We observe an immediate echo o f  the analysis of the Platonic substitution of making 
for acting in HC in Arendt’s concern for the relationship between art and politics in What is 
Freedom?.
In the R epublic , the philosopher-king applies the ideas as the craftsman applies his rules and standards; 
he “makes” his City as the sculptor makes a statue; and in the final Platonic work these same ideas have even 
become laws which need only be executed. (HC, 227)
[..*] politics has often been defined as an art. This, o f  course, is not a definition but a m etaphor, and the 
metaphor becomes completely false if  one falls into the com m on error o f  regarding the sta te  or governm ent as a 
work o f  art, as a  k in d  o f  collective masterpiece.
91 «Since Plato himself identified the dividing line between thought and action with the gulf which separates the 
rulers from those over whom they rule, it is obvious that the experiences on which the Platonic division rests are 
those of the household, where nothing would ever be done if the master did not know what to do and did not 
give orders to the slaves who execute them without knowing.» (HC, 223)
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In the sense of the creative arts, which bring forth something tangible and reify human thought to such an extent 
that the produced thing possesses an existence of its own, politics is the exact opposite of art (WF, 153)
What we observe in Arendt’s definition of creative art is a strong emphasis on the 
notion o f reification - on the fact that the «compelling factor lies not in the person of the 
artist», but instead in the impersonal object of his art. In HC, reification coincides with 
fabrication (poiesis), following the (narrow) definition o f homo faber as the «artist who works 
upon hard material, such as stone or wood» (HC, 136, n.l). The artifice or final product of the 
work o f the artist’s hands (HC, 136), which enters the world and appears publicly -  it can be 
seen (HC, 173) - is an object, meaning literally “something thrown”, “put against” (HC, 137, 
n. 2):92 as she confirms in What is Freedom?, the stress in the definition o f creative arts is not 
so much on the freedom o f the artist (WF, 154), than instead on the fact that the artistic 
process itself «is not displayed in public and not destined to appear in the world. Hence, the 
element o f freedom, certainly present in the creative arts, remains hidden» - what appears and 
matters to the world is the final product, the work o f art itself (WF, 153-154).
Now, it is in the very creative process - eminently private, as Arendt points out - and 
not in the final product - the work o f  art as the “useless” object par excellence - that the 
teleological dimension, the end-means logic of the homo fabery the fact that in order to 
produce a certain object according to a  certain idea in the artist’s mind a certain material and 
tools or means are needed, is inherent. This remark is essential to grasp the implications of the 
Platonic identification of political action with a creative process, private and poietic, aiming 
at a higher final end -  the State as work o f art.
In the first chapter o f Willing, Arendt draws on Aristotle’s definition o f «poiein, as 
distinct from prattein, acting or praxis»:
[...] the craftsman who makes a “brazen sphere” joins together matter and form, brass and sphere, both 
of which existed before he began his work, and produces a new object to be added to a world consisting of man­
made things and o f things that have come into being independent of human doings. The human product, this 
“compound of matter and form” -  for instance, a house made o f wood according to a form pre-existing in the 
craftsman's mind (nous) — clearly was not made out of nothing, and so was understood by Aristotle to pre-exist 
“potentially” before it was actualised by human hands. (LM/W, 15)
As Arendt points out, poiein infringes the low ontological status o f the realm of 
prattein, the accidental and contingent realm of human action, by replacing its uncertainty and 
futility, apparent in the fact that “what is brought into being by action is that which could also
92 In HC Arendt insists on the objectivity o f the man-made world of things as that which allows men to retrieve 
their sameness or identity, «their ever-changing nature notwithstanding» (HC, 137): the relation between the 
notion o f subjectivity and the reifying process o f fabrication, with its emphasis on the (derivative) notion of 
sameness, as opposed to the uniqueness and plurality (difference) of the actor in the realm of human affairs, is 






be otherwise”, with the strong ontological notion o f  “potentiality”, «derived from the mode o f  
being peculiar to the nature o f living things, where everything that appears grows out o f  
something that contains the finished product potentially, as the oak exists potentially in the 
acom and the animal in the semen» (LM/W, 15).
The implications of Aristotle’s appeal to the sphere o f natural life, as the ontological 
foundation of the philosophical understanding o f poiesis, are made apparent in Arendt’s 
analysis o f  the natural functions («the labor o f man to provide nourishment and the labor o f  
the woman in giving birth», HC, 30), «subject to the same urgency of life», that is, subjected 
to necessity - «[n] attirai community in the household therefore was bom of necessity, and 
necessity ruled over all activities performed in it» (HC, 30):
What all Greek philosophers, no matter how opposed to polis life, took for granted is that freedom is 
exclusively located in the political realm, that necessity is primarily a pre-political phenomenon, characteristic o f  
the private household organization, and that force and violence are justified in this sphere because they are the 
only means to master necessity -  for instance, by ruling over the slaves -  and to become free. (HC, p. 31)
Arendt traces the substitution o f  praxis with a “poietic” notion of political action as rule («the 
notion that men can lawfully and politically live together only when some are entitled to 
command and the others forced to obey», HC, 222), in Plato’s separation o f archein 
(“beginning”) and prattein (achieving), conceived by the Greek as two interconnected modes 
o f political action.
Playing on the equivocal meaning o f archein/archon, Plato does away with the 
political freedom experienced in speech and deeds by the citizens o f the polis’,93 turning the 
beginner into a ruler who «does not have to act at all {prattein), but rules (archein) over those 
who are capable o f  execution» (HC, 223).94
93 In the first draft o f her lecture on Karl Marx and the Tradition, Arendt distinguishes a certain part o f
Aristotle’s thought, especially concerned with freedom and speech, from its Platonic appropriation: « [„.] the 
tradition which re-interpreted Aristotle’s definition o f man has eliminated from Aristotle all those insights into 
the nature o f politics and man’s political freedom which were inconsistent with Platonism. The chief difference 
between Plato and Aristotle in their political philosophies was that Plato, writing consciously in opposition to the 
political life of the decaying Greek city-state, did no longer believe in the validity of that kind o f speech which 
accompanied and was only the other side of political action. [...] The philosophical point was that perception o f 
truth to Plato was essentially speechless and could only be furthered, not attained, by dialegein. Essential in our 
context is that he, probably under the impression o f the fate o f Socrates and the limitations o f persuasion so 
glaringly exposed in his trial, was no longer concerned with freedom at all. When Aristotle connected
speech and freedom, he was on the firm ground o f the still existing tradition and experience, only that Plato 
remained victorious in the end [...]» (folder 2, p. 13)
94 «[...]it is decisive for Plato, as he says expressly at the end of the Laws, that only the beginning ( arche) is 
entitled to rule {archein). In the tradition of Platonic thought, this original, linguistically predetermined identity 
o f ruling and beginning had the consequence that all beginning was understood as the legitimation for rulership, 
until, finally, the element of beginning disappeared altogether from the concept of rulership. With it the most 
elementary and authentic understanding o f human freedom disappeared from  political philosophy» (HC, 224- 
225). My italics.
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In political philosophy, isolated mastership becomes the condition for a stable and 
permanent order in human affairs in which each citizen, although retaining some part in the 
handling of public affairs, «would indeed “act” like one man without even the possibility of 
internal dissension [...]: through rule, “the many becomes one in every respect”, except bodily
Af
appearance» (HC, 224). According to Arendt, Plato «was the first to design a blueprint for 
the making of political bodies», which remained the inspiration and frame of reference of all 
later «utopian political system which could be construed in accordance with a model by 
somebody who has mastered the techniques of human affairs» (HC, 227).95 6
As Dana Villa points out, «Arendt appropriates Heidegger’s genealogy of the technical 
sense o f action in order to highlight the tradition’s persistent attempt to overcome plurality, 
the politically most relevant expression o f the fmitude o f the human condition»: politics is 
reduced to a techne97 to an art or means by which a people is to be shaped according to an 
idea or ideal.98
The Platonic fabrication o f a political masterpiece, according to a model pre­
conceived in the mind of the ruling demiurge, «initiates a paradigm o f correspondence that, 
as Lyotard notes, delimits the Western tradition of political philosophy».99 The analogy with 
the artistic process, which is guided by «“ideas”, that is, by the “shapes” of objects, visualized 
by the inner eye o f the craftsman, who then reproduces them in reality through imitation» 
(WA, 110), enables Plato «to understand the transcendent character of the ideas in the same 
manner as he does the transcendent existence of the model, which lies beyond the fabrication 
process it guides and therefore can eventually become the standard for its success or failure» 
(Id.). It is precisely because they transcend the sphere o f human affairs that ideas become 
measures of human conduct:
In the parable o f the cave in The Republic, the sky of ideas stretches above the cave of human existence, 
and therefore can be its standard. But the philosopher who leaves the cave for the pure sky of ideas does not 
originally do so in order to acquire those standards and learn the “art o f  measurement” but to contemplate the 
true essence of Being [...]. The ideas become measures only after the philosopher has left the bright sky o f ideas 
and returned to the dark cave of human existence. (WA, 109)
95 My italics.
96 My italics.
97 «[...] the republic is to be made by somebody who is the political equivalent o f a craftsman or artist, in 
accordance with an established xexvr| and the rules and measurements valid in this particular “art” [...]», (BPF, 
112).
98 Dana Villa, FP, 246.
99 Ibidem. My highlighting.
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Arendt’s emphasis on a discrepancy «between the ideas as true essences to b e  
contemplated and as measures to be applied» (WA, 112), fully highlights the anti-political 
implications o f  Plato’s replacement o f  beauty with good as “supreme idea”.100
In The Human Condition she points out that «[w]hen Plato was not concerned w ith  
political philosophy (as in the Symposium and elsewhere), he describes the ideas as w hat 
“shines forth most” (ekphanestaton) and therefore as variations of the beautiful. Only in th e  
Republic were the ideas are transformed into standards, measurements, and rules o f behavior, 
all o f which are variations or derivations of the idea of the “good” in the Greek sense o f the  
word, that is, o f the “good for” or o f fitness. This transformation was necessary to apply th e  
doctrine o f ideas to politics [...]» (HC, 225-226). Ideas were not originally conceived to ru le  
and master the unpredictability of human affairs, but for “shining brightness” (WA, 113): 
«[a]s such, the ideas have nothing whatever to do with politics, political experience, and the  
problem o f  action, but pertain exclusively to philosophy, the experience o f  contemplation, and 
the quest for the “true being o f things”» (Id.).101 It is for the political purpose o f eliminating 
the character o f frailty from human affairs that, according to Arendt,102 Plato found it 
necessary to modify his doctrine o f ideas and declare the good -  in the sense o f “good for” 
and “fit” -  instead o f the beautiful, as the highest idea: «If the highest idea, in which all other 
ideas must partake in order to be ideas at all, is that offitness , then the ideas are applicable by  
definition, and in the hands o f  the philosopher, the expert in ideas, they can become rules and 
standards or, as later in the Laws, they can become laws» (WA, 113).
Now, what is relevant to point out for our own purpose is that, according to Arendt’s 
analysis, the rule o f the Platonic philosopher-king means the «domination o f human affairs by 
something outside its own realm» (WA, 114):
The lives o f the many in the cave over which the philosopher has established his rule are characterized 
not by contemplation but by speech, and Ttpcdjt;, action; it is therefore characteristic that in the parable o f  
the cave Plato depicts the lives o f the inhabitants as though they too were interested only in seeing: first the 
images on the screen, then the things themselves in the dim light of the fire in the cave, until finally those who 
want to see truth itself must leave the common world of the cave altogether and embark upon their new 
adventure all by themselves. (WA, 114) [My italics]
100 «We find in Plato either that this supreme idea is that of the beautiful, as in the Symposion, where it 
constitutes the topmost rung of the ladder that leads to truth, and in Phaedrus, where Plato speaks of the “lover 
of wisdom or of beauty” as though these two actually were the same [...]; or that the highest idea is the idea of 




The anti-political implications of the Platonic conflation o f artistic and political categories,103 
which deprive the realm o f human affairs of its own dignity by establishing the absolute 
priority of the solitary activity o f contemplation (seeing) over the plural and communal 
practice of speaking and acting (doing) - «by the assumption that what makes men human is 
the urge to see. Hence the interest of the philosopher and the interest of man qua man 
coincide» (WA, 115) -  are apparent, throughout Western political theory,104 105in
[t]he popular belief in a “strongman” who, isolated against others, owes his strength to his being alone 
is either sheer superstition, based on the delusion that we can “make" something in the realm o f human affairs -  
“make” institutions or laws, for instance, as we make tables and chairs, or make men “better” or “worse” -  or it 
is conscious despair o f all action, political and non-political, coupled with the utopian hope that it may be 
possible to treat men as one treats other “material”. (HC, 188),os
[Note 15, p. 188:] Recent political history is full of examples indicating that the term “human material” 
is no harmless metaphor, and the same is true for a whole host of modem scientific experiments in social 
engineering, biochemistry, brain surgery, etc., all of which tend to treat and change human material like other 
matter.
The strength o f the Platonic tropes o f the state as artwork and of politics as techne is 
measured by the fact that the break-down of the tradition did not undermine the logic of 
justification institutionalised by the Platonic dichotomy of theory and practice.106
Arendt emphasises that «an element of violence is inevitably inherent in all activities 
of making, fabricating, and producing, in other words, in all activities by which men confront 
nature directly, as distinguished from such activities as action and speech, which are primarily 
directed toward human beings. The building of the human artifice always involves some 
violence done to nature -  we must kill a tree in order to have lumber, and we must violate this 
material in order to build a table» (WA, 111). In her analysis of the substitution o f making for 
acting and «the concomitant degradation of politics into a means to obtain an allegedly 
‘'higher'1 end» in The Human Condition (HC, 229), Hannah Arendt stresses a pivotal shift in 
the development o f Western (Platonic) tradition:
It is true that violence, without which no fabrication could ever come to pass, has always played an 
important role in political schemes and thinking based upon an interpretation o f action in terms o f making; but 
up to the modem age, this element of violence remained strictly instrumental, a means that needed an end to 
justify and limit it, so that glorifications o f violence as such are entirely absent from the tradition o f political 
thought prior to the modem age. Generally speaking, they were impossible as long as contemplation and reason 
were supposed to be the highest capacities of man, because under this assumption all articulations o f the vita 
activa, fabrication no less than action and let alone labor, remained themselves secondary and instrumental. [...]
103 Dana Villa, FP, 246.
m  BPF, 110.
105 My highlighting.
106 «Western political theory, [...] has always demanded that action be grounded in some extrapolitical first (the 
cosmic order, natural or divine hierarchy, Reason and natural right, History, the greatest good for the greatest 
number, the emancipatory interest of the discursive community). As a result, it never really abandons the view 
that politics is a kind of plastic art, the “fashioning”, more or less violent, of a people in conformity with an 




Only the modern age s conviction that man can know only what he makes, that his allegedly higher capacities 
depend upon making and that he therefore is primarily homo faber and not animale rationale, brought forth the 
much older implications of violence inherent in all interpretations o f the realm of human affairs as a sphere o f  
making. This has been particularly striking in the series o f revolutions, characteristic of the modem age, all o f  
which -  with the exception of the American Revolution — show the same combination o f the old Roman 
enthusiasm for the foundation of a new body politic with the glorification o f violence as the only means for 
“making” it. (HC, 228) [My italics]
It is interesting to compare this passage with the earlier draft o f  the 1953 lecture on 
Karl Marx and the Tradition o f  Western Political Thought, where Arendt traces Marx’s 
distrust for ideology, as well as his dictum that «violence is the midwife o f every old society 
pregnant with a new one», to an important extent, to the impact of «the tremendous fact of the 
French and American Revolutions in which violence had brought about, not some haphazard 
slaughter [...], but an entirely new body politic which in its outlines, and in the case of the 
United States down to many details, had been drawn up by the philosophers and the 
ideologues, that is by those who perceived an idea and who needed nothing but the helping 
hand o f  violence to realize it».107
Beside the visible change in the perception o f  the American case, what is important to 
emphasize is the link provided by the Marx lecture between the pages on the Platonic work- 
model o f action and her analysis of totalitarian ideology, developed after 1953.108
In her essay On the Nature o f  Totalitarianism Arendt points to the «.arrogant 
emancipation from  reality and experience», which in her own view prepares the connection 
between ideology and terror:
[i]n$ofar as ideological thinking is independent o f existing reality, it looks upon all factuality as 
fabricated, and therefore no longer knows any reliable criterion for distinguishing truth from falsehood. (EU, 
350)
According to Arendt, «the ideological consistency reducing everything to one all- 
dominating factor is always in conflict with the inconsistency o f the world, on the one hand, 
and the unpredictability of human actions, on the other. Terror is needed in order to make the 
world consistent [...]; to dominate human beings to the point where they lose, with their 
spontaneity, the specifically human unpredictability o f  thought and action» (Id.).
The stress on the “logic o f the idea”, that is, on the totalitarian transformation of an 
“idea”, «which could be applied to the whole course of events» (UP, 317), into a premise in 
the logical sense - «[...] some self-evident statement from which everything else can be
107“Karl Marx and...”, draft 1, folder 2, p. 7. My highlighting.
,0* “Ideology and Terror” was first published in the Review o f  Politics in July 1953 before appearing in definitive 
form in the penultimate chapter of The Origins o f  Totalitarianism, cf. E. Young-Bruehl, op. cit., p. 516, n. 28.
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deduced in stringent logical consistency» (Id.) - in Understanding and Politics as well as in 
Ideology and Terror, confirms and brings to its extreme consequences the teleocratic model
i
of action, resulting from the (Platonic) conflation of the categories o f the political and of [
plastic arts.
As Dana Villa points out, «[w]ith the collapse o f transcendental grounds for the 
political, the logic o f correspondence and justification built into this [teleocratic] concept j
/  i"
turns inward. The result is that the fashioning or “Actioning” o f the community in conformity i
with the ideal o f Justice is transformed into an exercise in self-production»,109 culminating in r' {{
.¡i v.
the 20th century proj ects of “aestheticization” of the political.110
It is in the light of the “artistic politics of National-Socialism” that we fully grasp, with 
Villa,111 *the stakes o f Arendt’s rejection of the conflation o f art and politics realized by the 
Western tradition, as the philosopher’s predicament in the modem world - «[...] politics 
has often been defined as an art. This, o f course, is not a definition but a metaphor, and the ¡.
metaphor becomes completely false if  one falls into the common error or regarding the state 
or government as a work of art, as a kind o f collective masterpiece» (BPF, 153).113
109 Dana Villa, FP, 247. 1
1,0 See Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, La finzione del politico. Heidegger, l'arte e la politica, op. cit., p. 79. I
111 « The organicity of the political, originally laid down by Plato’s Republic, takes a new and extreme form: the '
figure of the subject who is simultaneously artist and work absorbs that o f  the aesthetically integrated state. The l ;l!
subject!vization of the state as artwork trope culminates in the totalitarian will to self-effectuation: the will to the ƒ
self-creation of a people characterized by full actualisation, complete self-presence. The only community capable }.
of achieving such self-presence is one from which plurality, difference, mediation, and alienation have been [
expunged [...]», Dana Villa, FP, p. 248. : !
m Goebbels’ favourite theme of politics as “the plastic art of the state” is confirmed in a letter to Furtwängler, ji'
published in Lokal-Anzeiger on the 11Ü1 April 1933, cited by Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe: «La politica è, essa pure, i
un’arte, forse addirittura l’arte più elevata e più vasta che esista, e noi, che diamo forma alla politica tedesca ■ .
moderna, ci sentiamo come degli artisti ai quali è stata affidata l’alta responsabilità di formare, a partire dalla
massa grezza, I 'immagine solida e piena del popolo. La missione dell’arte e dell’artista non è soltanto di unire,
va ben più lontano. È loro dovere creare, dare forma, eliminare ciò che è malato ed aprir la via a ciò che è sano. :
[...] L’arte non deve essere solo di qualità, deve anche sorgere dal popolo [...]» (in P. Lacoue-Labarthe, La
finzione del politico, op. cit., p. 80). All these elements are confirmed in an article, published in the Völkischer j :
Beobachter, and cited by Éric Michaud under the title “L’Art comme fondement de la force créatrice en f .
politique”, which reads: «11 existe un lien interne et indéfectible entre les travaux artistiques du Führer et son
Grand Œuvre politique. L'artistique est aussi à la racine de son développement comme politicien et homme j
d’État. Son activité artistique n’est pas simplement une activité de jeunesse due au hasard, [...] elle est le j,
postulat de son idée créatrice dans sa totalité. [...] Le Führer a donné au terme de politique le sens d’une
construction, et il n’a pu y parvenir parce que son idée politique s’est développée à partir des connaissances
tirées d’une activité artistique dont il a fait personnellement l’expérience créatrice.» (cited from Lionel Richard, f
in É. Michaud, «Nazisme et Représentation », in Critique,  Tome XLIII, No. 184. Décembre 1987, pp. 1019- f  ¡ i
1034. j;
1,3 Jean-Luc Nancy defines the “productionist” model of action («l'homme défini comme producteur [...] de sa
proper essence sous les espèces de son travail ou de ses œuvres [...] à la visée de la communauté humaine [...]
des êtres produisant par essence leur essence comme leur œuvre», in J.-L. Nancy, La Communauté désœuvrée,
op. cit., pp. 13-14) as “immanentism”: «[...] le lien économique, l’opération technologique et la fusion politique
(en un corps ou sous un chef) représentent ou plutôt présentent, exposent et réalisent nécessairement par eux-
mêmes cette essence. Elle y est mise en oeuvre, elle y devient son propre ouvrage. C’est ce que nous avons
appelé le « totalitarisme », et qui serait peut-être mieux nommé F « immanentisme » [...] [etj y voir l’horizon \
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In the light of these observations, we can now go back to Arendt’s analysis o f  
contemporary nihilism, and in particular o f the totalitarian ideologies as making visible, in her 
view, «the nihilistic aspects o f present political developments», identified in the «conviction 
not only that “everything is perm itted" but that "everything is possible”, that once you make 
an arbitrary principle the guide o f consistent policy, everything goes».114 15*
As Villa remarks, «totalitarianism yields a  supremely novel version o f politics as 
making»: destroying plurality by the means of ideology and terror, it moulds the political 
community as subject, as «One man o f gigantic dimensions» (“Ideology and Terror”), 
according to the Laws of Nature and History. The immanentisation of the teleological model 
o f acting as making finds in terror the tool for realizing the totalitarian law of movement, the 
irresistible logicality which no longer lies in some external essence, like the Platonic Ideas, 
but in the internal coerciveness o f  a process, interpreted in the solitude of the leader’s m il} 15
While resonating the philosopher’s predicaments, contemporary nihilism pushes the 
internal paradox o f the fabricating paradigm of political philosophy (logic of incorporation) 
to the extreme consequences, where the political realization o f the philosopher’s “idea” turns 
into the de-realization of the political, through the erosion o f the «reality» o f human com­
pearance.
This two-fold process can also be traced in Nietzsche’s aphorism 356 o f the Gay 
Knowledge, where the age o f  European nihilism is seen as bringing about the end of the 
plastic art trope o f  the body politic as an edifice built or fabricated by the masters or the great 
architects - «we modems» and nihilists are no longer the material for society.1,6
général de notre temps, qui encercle aussi bien les démocraties et leur fragiles parapets juridiques. » (Ivi, pp. 15- 
16).
114 Hannah Arendt, “Concern with Politics in Recent European Political Thoughr, Library of Congress, folder 
1, p. 3.
115 As Arendt writes in 1956 «[t]he Nazis, who especially in the later years developed a surprisingly precise 
terminology, proclaimed that the highest law in Germany is the will, not the order, of the Führen), in “Authority 
in the Twentieth Century”, Review o f  Politics, op. cit., p. 409.
1,6 As Dana Villa has extensively shown, Arendt’s theory o f political action can be read within the broad 
Nietzschean project o f overcoming Platonism: «Arendt was, o f course, sceptical of Nietzsche’s success on this 
score. Whatever we think o f her assessment o f Nietzsche’s “inverted Platonism” (an assessment clearly 
influenced by Heidegger), we are nevertheless compelled to recognize the anti-Platonic impulse behind her 
theory of political action. Following Nietzsche, Arendt views the Western tradition of political philosophy -  the 
“Socratic tradition” -  as deeply hostile to action and the contingency and plurality that characterize the realm of 
human affairs. The Platonic/ metaphysical prejudice against appearance and becoming takes an explicitly 
political form in the Platonic reinterpretation o f action as a kind o f making, a reinterpretation that aims at 
nothing less than an escape from politics altogether. Nietzsche and Arendt combat the reductionist character o f 
the teleological model o f  action, exposing the nihilistic consequences o f denying meaning or value to the realm 
of action and appearances.» (Dana Villa, “Beyond Good and Evil. Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of 
Political Action”, Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 2, May 1992,275-276).
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The paradox o f the «aesthetic» paradigm of the political is made fully visible in the 
totalitarian concept o f omnipotence, related in Arendt’s analysis, on the one hand, with the 
new and unprecedented concept o f organizational power, and, on the other, with ideology.
In the HC omnipotence is recognized as the attribute o f one god, as opposed to the 
gods in polytheism (HC, 201-202), identifying «the strength necessary for the production of 
things» with the boundless power necessary for action -« [ ...]  aspiration toward omnipotence 
always implies — apart from its utopian hubris -  the destruction of plurality» as an intolerable 
limitation (Id):
The fences enclosing private property and insuring the limitations of each household, the territorial 
boundaries which protect and make possible the physical identity of a people, and the laws which protect and 
make possible its political existence, are o f such great importance to the stability of human affairs precisely 
because no such limiting and protecting principles arise out of the activities going on in the realm of human 
affairs itself. The limitations o f  the law are never entirely reliable safeguards against action from within the 
body politic, just as the boundaries o f the territory are never entirely reliable safeguards against action from 
without. The boundlessness o f  action is only the other side o f its tremendous capacity fo r  establishing 
relationships, that is, its specific productivity; this is why the old virtue of moderation, of keeping within 
bounds, is indeed one of the political virtues par excellence, just as the political temptation par excellence is 
indeed hubris (as the Greeks, fully experienced in the potentialities of action, knew so well) and not the will to 
power, as we are inclined to believe. (HC, 191) [My italics]
In the light o f  these passages, totalitarian organizational omnipotence represents the 
monstrous combination o f boundless action, as experienced in the political realm but freed 
from all legal restriction (the modem nihilistic loss of authority), with the modem fabrication 
paradigm of the homo faber, pushing the political temptation o f hubris -  as related to the 
nihilistic resentment against sheer existence -  beyond all natural and material limitation 
toward changing, i. e., eradicating, life.
Agamben reproaches the absence of a bio-political perspective in Arendt’s analysis of 
totalitarian regimes, which, in his view, overlooks the fact that it is the radical identification 
o f politics with the space of “naked life” ( Unuda vita ") -  in and as extermination camps -  that 
legitimises total domination (rather than the other way round).117 *But what he fails to observe 
is that, in Arendt’s analysis, total domination, as global rule and total control over individual 
human beings, proceeds from, rather than precede as a conscious political aim, the
117 «Solo perché nel nostro tempo la politica è diventata integralmente biopolitica, che essa ha potuto costituirsi 
in misura prima sconosciuta come politica totalitaria», G. Agamben, Homo sacer, op. cit., p. 132.
1,8 Canovan carefully remarks that «totalitarianism represents not so much a conscious project as the set of 
grooves into which people are likely to find themselves sliding if  they come to politics with certain sorts o f  aims, 
experiences, and deficiencies, all o f them characteristic of modernity. Foremost among these aims is a quest for 
omnipotence, fuelled by the belief that everything is possible and by “the modem man’s deep-rooted suspicion 
o f everything he did not make himself’. The central experience is loneliness [...]. The key deficiency is the loss 
o f the world of common sense and reality» (Margaret Canovan, “Arendt’s theory o f Totalitarianism: a 
reassessment”, The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, D. Villa Ed., CUP 2000, p. 38).
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totalitarian quest for omnipotence, which is at the core o f  the biopolitical programme, not so  
much in the sense that the space o f (the care for) life is identified with politics, but ra th e r, 
from Arendt’s perspective, that the nihilistic resentment against sheer existence, at the root o f  
the creation o f  the political artifice, as the very condition for political action, pushes the la tte r  
to the extreme artificialization, and ultimate ex-termination, o f life itself.
The political taking care o f  life is visible in the extermination camps, as th e  
laboratories where changes in human nature are tested, i.e. the annihilation o f human d ign ity , 
spontaneity and unpredictability, for the sake o f  the consistency o f an ideological su p er- 
sense.119 The arbitrary system of selection on which the camps are built secures the in itia l 
steps in the process of total domination, which Arendt identifies in the destruction o f  th e  
juridical person (elimination o f civil rights, OT, 451), from which the destruction o f  the m oral 
person immediately follows («the alternative is no longer between good and evil, but betw een 
murder and murder», OT, 452),120 and which culminates in the eradication o f  m an ’s  
individuality, that is, o f the uniqueness o f the human person (OT, 453):121
[...] to destroy spontaneity, man’s power to begin something new out of his own resources, something 
that cannot be explained on the basis of reactions to environment and events. Nothing then remains but ghastly 
marionettes with human faces which all behave like the dog in Pavlov’s experiments, which all react with perfect 
reliability even when going to their own death, and which do nothing but react. This is the real triumph o f  th e  
system [...] (OT, 455).
«Pavlov’s dog, the human specimen reduced to the most elementary reactions, the bundle o f  
reactions that can always be liquidated and replaced by other bundles o f reactions that behave 
in exactly the same way, is the model “citizen" o f  a  totalitarian state» (OT, 456),122 123and can  
only be produced  to perfection in the camps. These are therefore the essential institutions fo r 
the realization and preservation o f the totalitarian regime’s unlimited power, as organizational
1,9 «It is chiefly for the sake of this supersense, for the sake of complete consistency, that it is necessary for 
totalitarianism to destroy every trace of what is we commonly call human dignity. For respect o f  human dignity 
implies the recognition of my fellow-men or our fellow-nations as subjects, as builders of worlds or cobuilders 
of a common world. No ideology which aims at [...] mapping out the course of all events of the future can bear 
the unpredictability which springs from the fact that men are creative, that they can bring forward something so 
new that nobody ever foresaw it» (OT, 458).
120 Arendt quotes from Camus’ 1946 lecture at Columbia University, published in Twice a Year (1947), the case 
of the Greek mother allowed by the Nazis to choose which o f her three children should be killed (OT, 452, n. 
154).
121 «The killing o f man’s individuality, of the uniqueness shaped in equal parts by nature, will, and destiny, 
which has become so self-evident a premise for all human relations that even identical twins inspire a certain
uneasiness, creates a horror that vastly overshadows the outrage of the juridical-political person and the despair 
of the moral person. It is this horror that gives rise to the nihilistic generalizations which maintain plausibly 
enough that essentially all men alike are beasts. Actually the experience o f the concentration camps does show 
that human beings can be transformed into specimens of the human animal, and that man’s “nature” is only 




power:123 «Such power can only be secured if literally all men, without a single exception, are 
reliably dominated in every respect o f their life» (OT, 456). Total power can be achieved and 
safeguarded only through the elimination of spontaneity and the (artificial) reproduction of 
man’s superfluity;123 24 it thus requires total domination and global rule as its essential 
condition:125 126
Human nature as such is at stake, and even though it seems that these experiments succeed not in 
changing man but only in destroying him, by creating a society in which the nihilistic banality o f homo homini 
lupus is consistently realized, one should bear in mind the necessary limitations to an experiment which requires 
global control in order to show conclusive results. (OT, 459)
In the Concluding Remarks to the first edition Arendt describes the totalitarian attack on
human nature, i.e. spontaneity and unpredictable capacity for new beginnings, as the attempt
to deprive men o f their human condition while keeping them alive -  the systematic production
1of living corpses as the mass-manufacturing of "abstract ” existence.
fliIt is in drawing the attention to the de-realizing, i.e., nihilistic, logic implicit m 20 
century terror, identified with the “aestheticizing” manipulation of the human condition - 
which is, in Agamben’s terms, the reduction of the form-of-life to the sheer abstraction of 
“naked life” -  that Arendt joins Camus. But, we could argue, while Camus in HR pointed to 
total terror as the murderous prerogative of the Rational or Totalitarian revolution, realized 
under the Soviet regime, Arendt applied the concept of total domination primarily to Nazi 
organization.
Totalitarian police cadres and extermination camps are conceived as the instruments 
for the realisation of a fictitious world, the ideological supersense,127 through the eyes of 
which the totalitarian systematic production o f senselessness exclusively «[makes] too much
123 «The world o f the dying, in which men are taught they are superfluous through a way o f life in which 
punishment is meted out without connection with crime, in which exploitation is practiced without profit, and 
where work is performed without product, is a place where senselessness is daily produced anew» (OT, 457).
124 «Men insofar as they are more than animal reactions and fulfillment o f functions are entirely superfluous to 
totalitarian regimes. [...] Total power can be achieved and safeguarded only in a world o f conditioned reflexes, 
o f marionettes without the slightest trace of spontaneity» (OT, 457).
125 «Precisely because man’s resources are so great, he can be fully dominated only when he becomes a 
specimen o f the animal-species man» (OT, 457) «In the realm of foreign affairs new neutral territories must 
constantly be subjugated , while at home ever-new human groups must be mastered in expanding concentration 
camps, or, when circumstances require liquidated to make room for others» (OT, 456).
126 «[...] the abstract existence of the inmates o f the concentration camps H. Arendt, The Origins o f
Totalitarianism (1951), op. cit., p. 434.
127 «While the totalitarian regimes are thus resolutely and cynically emptying the world o f the only thing that 
makes sense to the utilitarian expectations o f common sense, they impose upon it at the same time a kind of 
supersense which the ideologies actually meant when they pretended to have found the key to history or the 
solution to the riddles of the universe. Over and above the senselessness o f totalitarian society is enthroned the 
ridiculous supersense of its ideological superstition» (OT, 457).
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sense» - «[...] the problem with the camps is [...] that the execution o f the doctrine is too 
consistent» (OT, 457):
Ideologies are harmless, uncritical, and arbitrary opinions as long as they are not believed in seriously. 
Once their claim to total validity is taken literally they become the nuclei of logical systems in which, as in the 
systems o f paranoiacs, everything follows comprehensibly and even compulsorily once the first premise is 
accepted. The insanity o f such systems lies not only in their first premise but in the very logicality with which 
they are constructed. (OT, 457-458)
In the insane «stringent logicality» which governs the ideological fiction which commands the 
murderous production of a consistent world (OT, 458), Arendt traces the manifest connection 
between the totalitarian contempt for factuality and the modem man’s «deep rooted suspicion 
o f everything he did not make himself». The political “tautologies” of totalitarian ideologies 
provide a  “world” alternative to, and independent from, the parameters of common sense 
“reality” :128
The chief political distinction between common sense and logic is that common sense presupposes a  
common world into which we all fit [...]; whereas logic and all self-evidence from which logical reasoning 
proceeds can claim a reliability altogether independent o f the world and existence o f other people. [...] Only 
under conditions where the common realm between men is destroyed and the only reliability left consists in the 
meaningless tautologies o f the self-evident can this capacity become “productive”, develop its own lines o f  
thought, whose chief political characteristic is that they always carry with them a compulsory power o f  
persuasion. To equate thought and understanding with these logical operations means to level the capacity for 
thought [...] to its lowest common denominator, where no differences in actual existence count any longer, not 
even the qualitative difference between the essence o f God and men. (EU, 318)
For Arendt, as well as for Camus,129 130the « idea » from which the totalitarian ideology draws 
its consistent explanatory narrative is deaf and blind to the words and living appearances o f  
men: it is the consequence of a de-materialization o f the political, which boundlessly erases
the plurality and finitude of the human condition into the abstract existence of predictable 
specimens of the animal man, which as purely reacting beings need not be persuaded but 
dominated.
128 «We know how very close the people under totalitarian domination have been brought to this condition o f 
meaninglessness, by means of terror combined with training in ideological thinking [...] the peculiar and 
ingenious replacement o f common sense with stringent logicality, which is characteristic of totalitarian thinking, 
is particularly noteworthy. Logicality is not identical with ideological reasoning, but indicates the totalitarian 
transformation of the respective ideologies» (EU, 317)
129 As Dana Villa remarks, the teleocratic logic, at work in the Platonic concept of “idea” as transcendent truth, 
survives the contemporary break-down of traditional metaphysics (FP, 246-247): the measure o f its strength is 
given by the peculiar combination o f the totalitarian «logic o f the idea» with what Camus defines a “philosophy 
without objection” - nihilism. In his lecture at Columbia University in 1946, reported by the journalist and 
friend, Nicola Chiaromonte, and published in Twice a Year, Camus points to the logicality of nihilism as 
touching upon the very core of (modem) man and society (see Nicola Chiaromonte, “Albert Camus” in Tempo 
Presente, January 1960, in II tarlo della coscienza, Bologna, 11 Mulino 1992,217-222).
130 E, 402.
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The ultimate intériorisation o f the political life - the “superhuman” belief that 
everything is possible - thus coincides with an «aestheticizing» process, which gets rid not 
only o f the transcendent yardsticks o f  the tradition, but, also most essentially, o f the 
“material” limitation (the product), as the very condition which constitutes men, and out of 
which the political sphere first arose.131
I suggest, from this perspective, that Arendt’s own project of «aestheticization» of 
political action - 132 which both Villa and Bonnie Honig trace back to Nietzsche’s 
“aestheticism” - 133 can only partly be interpreted in the sense o f a «politique esthétique [...] 
sans le réification de l’action narrative en “œuvres”»:134 to do away with the dimension of 
incorporation, implicit in the aesthetic-poie/ic paradigm of the political action o f the 
philosophical tradition, leaves unchallenged the problem of the de-realizing logic implicit in 
the notion of political creation, as exposed by the radical nihilism o f a perspective of 
omnipotence.
The total «aestheticization» o f the political systematically brought about through terror 
in the absolute consistency o f totalitarian ideologies is ultimately related to the political 
temptation of hubris, rooted in the resentment against mere existence that lies at the core o f 
the Western concept of political action.
In the light of her critique o f  radical nihilism, I propose to explore Arendt’s 
«aesthetic» approach to the political as challenging the de-realizing or de-humanizing drives 
brought forth in OT toward the re-thinking of political creation.
131 In the totalitarian criminal attempt to change the nature of man she recognizes the «trembling insight that no 
nature, not even the nature o f man, can no longer be considered to be the measure of all things», “measure” 
meaning here a yardstick or a limit to the boundlessness of action. H. Arendt, The Origins o f  Totalitarianism  
(1951), op. cit., p. 434.
132 Dana Villa, « Beyond Good and Evil. Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization of Political Action”, in 
P olitical Theory, vol. 20, No. 2, May 1992,274-308. Developed in Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger. The Fate 
o f  the  Political, Princeton UP, 1996.
133 Bonnie Honig, Political Theory an d  the D isplacem ent o f  Politics, op. cit.
134 Julia Kristeva, Le génie fém inin. 1. Hannah Arendt, Fayard, Paris, 1999, p. 356.
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Chapter 4. “aestheticizing” the political.
It is in the light o f the Nietzschean “aestheticization of action” that we must understand, with 
Villa, Arendt’s solution to the question o f meaninglessness, formulated in What is 
Freedom? precisely as a shift from the fabrication paradigm o f  the tradition — illustrated by 
the Platonic model of “creative” arts (WF, 153) -  to a performative approach to action:
The performing arts, on the contrary, have indeed a strong affinity with politics. Performing artists — 
dancers, play-actors, musicians, and the like -  need an audience to show their virtuosity, just as acting men need 
the presence of others before whom they can appear; both need a publicly organized space for their “work”, and 
both depend upon others for the performance itself. Such a space o f appearances is not to be taken for granted 
wherever men live together in a community. The Greek polis once was precisely that “form of government” 
which provided men with a space of appearances where they could act, with a kind o f theatre where freedom 
could appear. (WF, 154).
By insisting on the “performative” self-containedness o f Arendt’s aestheticai political 
action, Villa seems nevertheless to underemphasize the permanence of the artistic metaphor -  
even though with a reversed sign - in which the public/political light is no longer on the final 
product, the work o f art as a thing, but rather on the performing action itself as entailing those 
elements o f plurality, contingency and publicity, that the Tradition o f Political Philosophy had 
attempted, from Plato onward, to expunge, and which in the post-metaphysical “twilight o f 
the Idols” re-emerge in all their finite unpredictability and boundlessness.
Villa’s emphasis on the limits to Arendt’s appropriation o f Nietzsche’ «masculine 
aestheticism», in the agonistic affirmation of the initiatory dimension human action, and in 
the recognition o f  the contingent character o f human affairs — a “modest” version of the 
Eraclitean “innocence” of becoming but limited to the political sphere - betrays a certain 
uneasiness in associating Arendt’s stress on art with Nietzsche’s pages on the artist in the 
Genealogy o f  Morals and the Gay Science.135 36
Hinting at two possible interpretations of the Nietzschean artist -  on the one hand, the 
artist as master, whose unconditional assent to existence is nothing other than the consent to 
violence and oppression, that culminates in domination and in contemporary glorification o f 
murder (HR, 486); and on the other, the artist as creator o f meaning within the anti-Platonic 
revaluation o f appearances, the emphasis being on the good-nihilistic transvaluation of values, 
which «consiste seulement à remplacer la valeur du juge par celle du créateur» in the respect
135 Cf., Villa, FP, 81.
136 Dana Villa, Politics, Philosophy and Terror, pp. 107-127.
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and passion o f what is (HR, 483) -  Camus comes very close to Arendt in denouncing the link 
between the master/slave relation o f dominion/oppression and the “temptation” to absolute 
nihilism, expressed in the plastic art trope.
Nietzsche’s pages in GM, II, §17, on the artists’ «terrible Egoism» that generates 
States through the “tyrannical” organization of human matter, find immediate echo in 
Arendt’s critique o f the teleocratic model of Western Political Philosophy. It is under the 
violent/repressive acts of these masters-creators that the pernicious plant o f “original”, i.e. 
Christian, nihilism originates, in the internal split o f the resentful “bad conscience” (GM, § 
18). What emerges here is the relation between the “organic” model of mastership, rooted in 
the Platonic understanding of politics as craftsmanship (plastic art trope o f the State as body 
politic), and the Christian concept o f Will, as taken over in Arendt’s Life o f  the Mind.
In this sense, Nietzsche’s “artist of violence” is to the philosopher’s genealogy of 
moral categories, what the ruler as craftsman (artist) is to Arendt’s genealogy of the political
117categories of the Western Tradition, rooted in the Platonic productionist model of action.
It is significant that in The Life o f  the Mind/Willing Arendt referred to Nietzsche, in 
terms that echo Camus’ letter to Parain in 1944 (E, 1680): «Clearly, what is needful is not to 
change the world or men but to change their way o f  "evaluating” it, their way, in other 
words, o f  thinking and reflecting about it. In Nietzsche’s own words, what must be overcome 
are the philosophers [...]» (LM/W, 170).137 38
The problem of “re-thinking” the world after and beyond the «immanent» logic of 
Totalitarian domination, brings forth the question o f how to re-think “thinking”, in the light of 
the murderous and anti-political implications o f the plastic art trope of Political philosophy.
This preoccupation is apparent in Arendt’s investigation into Kant’s unwritten political 
thought in the 1970 lectures.
137 Bonnie Honig rightly emphasizes the Nietzschean roots of Arendt’s anti-foundational critique of the 
Philosophic tradition: «Arendt’s theorization o f action echoes Nietzsche’s claim that the search for a doer 
diminishes the power of action by seeking a cause for action where there is none [...]. Arendt agrees with 
Nietzsche that there is no essential self, no given unity awaiting discovery and realization. There is no being  
behind the doing [...] Freedom is not a subject-centred condition. Arendt criticizes those who [...] take freedom 
out of the contingent world of action, attach it to the subject, and internalise it by attributing it to the will».137 In 
Willing Arendt remains, nevertheless, heavily indebted to the Heideggerian reading of the Will to  Pow er in 
terms of “reversed Platonism”. As we have seen, Camus comes close to the same conclusions in HR, when he 
denounces the metaphysical fallacy inherent in the Nietzschean divinisation of life (amor fa ll)  of the yes-saying 
Over-man: «La prédication de la surhumanité aboutissant à ta fabrication  méthodique des sous-hommes, voilà le 
fait qui doit sans doute être dénoncé, mais qui demande aussi à être interprété » (HR, 485).
138 My italics.
In the Fourth Session of her lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy Arendt 
distinguishes three different perspectives under which it is possible to consider, in Kant’ 
work, the affairs o f  men. She summarizes them as follows:
«[...] Human species = Mankind = part o f nature = subject to “history”, nature’s ruse = to be considered 
under the idea of “end”, teleological judgement, second part o f  Critique o f  Judgement.
Man = reasonable being, subject to the laws of practical reason which he gives to himself, autonomous, 
an end in him self [ . =  Critique ofPractical Reason and Critique o f Pure Reason.
Men = earthbound creatures, living in communities, endowed with common sense, sensus communis; 
not autonomous, needing each other’s company even for thinking [ . . . ] -  first part of the Critique o f  Judgement. 
aesthetic judgement.» (KL, 26-27). [My italics]
The rejection o f the first two perspectives in the light of a (Nietzschean) anti- 
foundational critique o f  the teleocratic model o f  the tradition, opens the space, in Arendt’s 
reflection, for developing the political implications o f  Kant’s critique of Taste (KL, 10).
It is in the Critique o f  Judgement that, I argue, Arendt finds the elements to overcome 
the dichotomy between theory and practice, at the roots o f the teleocratic paradigm o f  
Political Philosophy, and still at work in Kant’s political writings in the opposition 
' actor/spectator. The notion that «only the spectator but never the actor knows what it is all 
about -  she writes - is as old as the hills; it is, in fact, among the oldest, most decisive, notions 
o f  philosophy. The whole idea o f  the superiority o f the contemplative way o f life comes from 
\ this early insight that meaning (or truth) is revealed only to those who restrain themselves 
\ from acting» (KL, 55)
In the Thirteen Session she comes back to the question of the «partiality o f the actor, 
who, because he is involved, never sees the meaning o f the whole. This is true for all stories; 
Hegel is entirely right that philosophy, like the owl o f Minerva, spreads its wings only when 
the day is over, at dusk. The same is not true fo r  the beautiful or for all deeds in itself The 
beautiful is, in Kantian terms, an end in itself because all its possible meaning is contained 
within itself [...]» (KL, 77).1W
In the opening pages o f the HC Arendt examined the three ways o f life (bioi) which, 
according to Aristotle, «men might choose in freedom , that is, in full independence of the 
necessities of life» (HC, 12), which «have in common that they were concerned with the 
“beautifut\ that is, with things neither necessary nor merely useful: the life of enjoying bodily 
pleasures in which the beautiful, as it is given, is consumed; the life devoted to the matters of 
the polis, in which excellence produces beautiful deeds; and the life of the philosopher 139
139 My italics.
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devoted to inquiry into, and contemplation of, things eternal [...]» of everlasting beauty (HC,
13).
I f  the spectator is the bearer o f  meaning, and the spectator and the actor become one 
in beautiful deeds, acting creates meaning -  or rather, it performs it.
Comparing the pages on the work of art in the HC with the Eleventh and Thirteenth 
Sessions o f Arendt’s Kant Lectures, what we remark is a distinction between the categories of 
beautiful/ugly, as referring to things that can be seen, which have a shape, and her stress on 
beautiful deeds. Following Kant’s «observation, entirely correct, that the true opposite of the 
Beautiful is not the Ugly but “that which excites disgust”» (KL, 68), Arendt hints at the 
possibility to transcend the reifying dimension of creative arts, implicit in the categories o f 
beauty and ugliness -  which in HC are based on the adequacy or inadequacy of a thing to 
what it should look like, «that is, in Platonic language, [...] to the eidos or idea, the mental 
image, or rather the image seen by the inner eye, that preceded its coming into the world and 
survives its potential destruction» (HC, 173) -  escaping its teleological implications into an 
aesthetic understanding of the beautiful, conceived «in Kantian terms, [as] an end in itself 
because all its possible meaning is contained within itself» (KL, 77). The adjective “aesthetic” 
must be read here in the sense of the Kantian aesthetic or taste judgement, to which the very 
opposition beautiful/disgusting refers — «Kant says: “That is beautiful which pleases in the 
mere act o f judging it» (KL, 67).
Now, what Arendt points out, with Kant, is «the fact that, in matters of taste, “the 
beautiful, interests [us] only [when we are] in society...A man abandoned by himself on a 
desert island would adorn neither his hut nor his person...[Man] is not contented with an 
object if  he cannot feel satisfaction in it in common with others.” Or: “We are ashamed if our 
taste does not agree with others”» (KL, 67). The Kantian definition of the beautiful calls in 
the question o f the publicity and plurality which characterize the aesthetic judgement as 
defined in Arendt’s lectures - «Judgement, and especially judgements of taste, always reflects 
upon others and their taste, takes their possible judgements into account» (KL, 67).
As Arendt highlights in the Twelfth Session of her lectures, imagination, as the 
discriminatory inner sense that makes the absent immediately present, «says it-pleases or it- 
displeases. It is called taste because, like taste, it chooses. But this choice is itself subject to 
still another choice: one can approve or disapprove of the very act of pleasing» (KL, 69). 
Approving/disapproving pertain to the further level o f (aesthetic) judgement, which through 
the “enlarged thought” anchors itself in men’s community sense (sensus communis), as 
distinguished from the sensus privatus (sensation): this extra-sense that, as Arendt writes,
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«fits us in a community» is identified by Kant with the «common understanding o f m en... 
[which] is the very least to be expected from anyone claiming the name o f man» (KL, 70).
It is on this sertsus communis, as the «capability by which men are distinguished from 
animals and from gods» (Id.), that depends the very possibility o f communication: «The it- 
pleases-or-displeases-me, which as a feeling seems so utterly private and noncommunicative, 
is actually rooted in this community sense and is therefore open to communication once it has 
been transformed by reflection, which takes all others and their feelings into account» (KL, 
72).
Following Arendt’s analysis o f  Kant’s work, the judgement of the spectator -  whose 
«view carried the ultimate meaning o f  an event» (KL, 52) -  is aesthetical (KL, 53), and, as 
she points out, aesthetic judgement is always endowed with the characters o f plurality and 
publicity, meaning -  as opposed to scientific or philosophic truth - is never reached in 
isolation: «[Kant] believes that the very faculty o f thinking depends upon its public use; 
without “the test o f free and open examination”, no thinking and no opinion-formation are 
possible. Reason is not made “to isolate itself but to get into community with others”.» (KL, 
40) -  «unless you can somehow communicate and expose to the test of others, either orally or 
in writing, whatever you may have found out when you were alone, this faculty [thinking] 
exerted in solitude will disappear. In the words of Jaspers, truth is what I  can communicate. 
[...] what Kant demanded in the Critique o f  Judgement o f  judgements o f  taste, is “general 
communicability”» (Id.).
Here, I suggest, is where Arendt’s appropriation o f Kantian aesthetics meets Camus’
\ | definition o f the creator’s unity («la première exigence de l’esprit est [...] que cette unité soit 
!' communicable» (HR, 672), which in both authors entails the rejection o f  the de-realizing 
. «unité du pur  raisonnement» (Id .).140
140 In his 1948 reply to Emmanuel D’Astier de la Vigerie, polemically referring to the publication o f Merleau- 
Ponty Humanisme et Terreur, Camus denounced the approach o f the « philosophes-spectateurs » (E, 357), 
who justified the progressiveness of terror from the abstract, teleological, standpoint o f the Hegelian spectator 
outside and against the concrete existence of suffering human beings (Historicism). The artist is opposed to the 
philosophe-spectateur, precisely, for his capacity to resign the abstract viewpoint of the philosopher: defined as 
“être double”, the artist is capable of comprehension, that is, of thinking from  both sides. Arendt clearly uses the 
term “spectator” in the sense of Kant’s theory o f  aesthetic judgment when she writes of the philosopher «[h]ad 
he forgotten, because o f his “moral duty”, his insights as a spectator, he would have become what so many good 
men, involved and engaged in public affairs, tend to be -  an idealistic fool» (KL, 54). The aesthetic perspective 
o f the spectator (KL, 53), rooted in the faculty o f imagination, is opposed to the moral (abstract) perspective of 
practical reason, as the capacity of «comparing our judgement with the possible rather than the actual 
judgements o f others, and putting ourselves in the place o f any other man» (KL, 43), thus, realizing Kant’s 
notion of “enlarged mentality”.
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It is not without reason that both these authors refer to the figure o f Socrates.141 142In 
Kant’s lectures Socrates becomes the embodiment o f an aesthetic!performative paradigm of 
thought:
To think critically, to blaze the trail o f  thought through prejudices, through unexamined opinions and 
beliefs, is an old concern of philosophy, which we may date, insofar as it is a conscious enterprise, to the 
Socratic midwifery in Athens. [...] Socrates taught nothing; he never knew the answers to the questions he 
asked. He did the examining for examining’s sake, not for the sake of knowledge. [...] What he actually did was 
to make public , in discourse, the thinking process -  that dialogue that soundlessly goes on within me, between 
me and myself; he perform ed  in the marketplace the way the flute-player performed in a banquet. It is sheer 
performance, sheer activity. And just as the flute-player has to follow certain rules in order to perform well, 
Socrates discovered the only rule that holds sway over thinking -  the rule o f consistency (as Kant was to call it 
in the Critique o f  Judgem ent) [...]. (KL, 36-37)
Arendt defines critical thinking as an art (KL, 38) with clear political implications: 
according to Kant and Socrates, it «exposes itself to «the test o f free and open examination» 
(KL, 39) -  which makes it «in principle antiauthoritarian» (KL, 38), and this means that the j
142 Imore people participate in it, the better» (KL, 39).
Now, political thinking is for Arendt “representative” in the aesthetic sense, explored 
in the previous pages, of a (Kantian) “enlarged mentality” - «1 form an opinion by considering 
a given issue from different viewpoints, by making present to my mind the standpoints of 
those who are absent» (TP, 556), that is, I represent them through imagination -  the faculty of 
spontaneity in thinking:143 «What makes particulars communicable is (a) that in perceiving the 
particular a particular we have in the back of our minds [...] a “schema” whose “shape” is 
characteristic o f many such particulars and (b) that this schematic shape is in the back o f the 
minds of many different people. These schematic shapes are products of the imagination, 
although “no schema can ever be brought into any image whatsoever”. All single agreements 
or disagreements presuppose that we are talking about the same thing -  that we, who are 
many, agree, come together, on something that is one and the same for us all. » (KL, 83).144
Arendt’s remarks on the principles o f political action can be read in the light o f her 
pages on imagination and aesthetic judgement, taken from her 1970 seminar on Kant’s
141 As Taminiaux highlights, «ce que Arendt retrouve et célèbre en Kant, c’est très exactement ce qu’elle trouvait 
chez Socrate, et elle souligne la parenté entre la pensée critique et la maïeutique socratique, toutes réserves faites 
sur le projet kantien d’un système futur de la méyaphysique [...] », in J. Taminiaux, La fille  de Thrace e t le 
penseur professionnel, op. cit., p. 236.
142 The emphasis, in Arendt’s analysis of Kant’s work, is on communication: the faculty of thinking depends on 
its public use, and entails communicability, «[f]or it is a natural vocation of mankind to communicate and speak 
one’s mind, especially in all matters concerning man as such» (KL, 40). In a finite post-metaphysical horizon, 
«how much and how correctly would we think if we did not think in community with others to whom we 
communicate our thoughts and who communicate theirs to us!» (KL, 41).
143 «[...] sensations are private; also, no judgement is involved: we are merely passive, we react, we are not 
spontaneous, as we are when we imagine som ething a t will or reflect on it» (KL, 70):
144 My italics.
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Critique o f  Judgement: «The Critique o f  Judgement deals with reflective judgements as 
distinguished from determinant ones. Determinant judgements subsume the particular under a  
general ru le ;145 reflective judgements, on the contrary, “derive” the rule from the particular. 
In the schema, one actually “perceives” some “universal” in the particular» (KL, 83). The 
importance o f the schema in her view lies in that «sensibility and understanding meet in 
producing it through imagination. [...] In the Critique o f  Judgement we find an analogy to the 
“schema”: the example. [...] The example is the particular that contains in itself, or is 
supposed to contain, a concept or general rule. How, for instance, is one able to judge, to 
evaluate, as act as courageous? When judging, one says spontaneously, without any 
derivations from general rules, “This man has courage”. If one were a Greek, one would have 
in “the depths o f  one’s mind” the example of Achilles. Imagination is again necessary.» (KL, 
84).
In her 1967 essay Truth and Politics, courage figures among those political principles 
-  together with freedom, justice, and honor (TP, 558) -  whose «relatively transcendent 
qualities» distinguish them from the (unpolitical) transcendent truth o f philosophers (TP, 
559).
That “relatively transcendent” character can be understood in the light o f  What is 
Freedom?, in the sense of a “general” rule which does not operate from within the Self (as 
motives do) -  as a Platonic yardstick, contemplated with the “inner” eye of the mind -  nor 
from outside action itself -  some reified “universal”, external and independent from the actual 
realization of action (as in creative arts). Principles, in Arendt’s own words, « inspire, as it 
were, from without, and they are much too general to prescribe particular goals, although 
every particular aim can be judged  in the light of its principle once it has been started» (BPF, 
152).146 The Arendtian notion o f principle cannot be understood as long as we maintain 
ourselves in the poietic perspective, which informs the moral and political thought o f the 
Tradition. The shift to a “performative” understanding of political action -147 co-extensive, in 
Arendt’s view, with political principles -  entails the shift from determinant to aesthetical 
judgements, with their fully political dimensions o f plurality, publicity and contingency. The 
manifestation o f these (aesthetically conceived) principles «comes about only through action, 
they are manifest in the world as long as the action lasts, and no longer» (BPF, 152):
145 Which belong, as Taminiaux points out, to the sphere ofpoiesis (see, J. Taminiaux, op. cit., p. 242).
146 My italics.
147 «[...] the Greek always used such metaphors as flute-playing, dancing, healing, and seafaring to distinguish 
political from other activities» (BPF, 153).
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Such principles are honor or glory, love of equality, which Montesquieu called virtue, or distinction or 
excellence -  the Greek [...] “always strive to do your best and to be the best of a i r  but also fear or distrust
or hatred. Freedom or its opposite appears in the world whenever such principles are actualised; the appearance 
of freedom, like the manifestation o f  principles, coincides with the perform ing act. Men are free — as 
distinguished from their possessing the gift for freedom - as long as they ac t
Freedom as inherent in action is perhaps best illustrated by Machiavelli’s concept o f  virtu , the 
excellence with which man answers the opportunities the world opens before him in the guise of fo rtuna . Its 
meaning is best rendered by “virtuosity”, tha is, an excellence w e attribute to the perform ing arts (as 
distinguished from  the creative arts o f  making), where the accomplishment lies in the performance i ts e lf  a n d  not 
in an end product which outlasts the activity that brought it into existence and becomes independent of it.,4g 
(BPF, 152-153) [My italics]
Admitting that principles are to action what the “general rule” is to the particular, as 
unified through imagination in aesthetic judgement -  the moral and political implications of a 
focus on which, are recurrently emphasised by Arendt (TP, 556) -  representative or critical 
thought would not be possible without that community sense that secures human 
understanding. Critical thought «[...] implies communicability. Now, communicability 
obviously implies a community o f men» (KL, 40 ).148 49
Principles “anchor” the particularity of human deeds like the Kantian sensus 
communis- as that “common understanding of men” (KL, 70) acting in conditions o f  plurality 
and contingency - “anchors” (aesthetical) judgement in the community, «where the many who 
live together have their intercourse both in word and deed regulated by a great number of 
rapports -  laws, customs, habits and the like» (LM/W, 200).
As she confirms in Willing (LM/W, 199-200) «the principles inspiring the actions of 
the citizens vary in accordance with the different forms of government, but they are all, as 
Jefferson rightly called them, uenergetic principles” [...]». Now, according to Montesquieu, 
what transforms lawless individuals into citizens are not God’s Ten Commandments etc., but 
«men-made rapports, “relations” which , since they concern the changeable affairs o f mortal 
men [...] must be “subject to all accidents that can happen and vary in proportion as the will 
of men changes”» (W, 200).150
In 1951 Camus described in analogous terms revolt as energetic principle (HR, 427): I 
suggest that the emphasis on the “energetic” definition of principles of action discloses the
148 My italics.
149 Arendt is very clear in pointing out that «political freedom is possible only in the sphere o f human plurality, 
and on the premise that this sphere is not simply an extension of the dual I-Myself to the plural We. «Action, in 
which a We is always engaged in changing our common world, stands in the sharpest possible opposition to the 
solitary business o f thought, which operates in a dialogue between me and myself. Under exceptionally 
propitious circumstances that dialogue, [...] can be extended to another insofar as a friend is, as Aristotle said, 
“another Self’. But I can never reach the We, the true plural action (An error rather prevalent among modem 
philosophers who insist on the importance of communication as a guarantee o f truth -  chiefly Karl Jaspers and 
Martin Buber, with his I-thou philosophy -  is to believe that the intimacy o f the dialogue, the  “inner action” in 
which I “appeal” to myself or to the “other se lf’, Aristotle’s friend, Jasper’s beloved, Buber’s Thou, can be 
extended and become paradigmatic for the political sphere).» (LM/W, 200).
150 My italics.
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possibility o f an “aesthetic” interpretation o f the community, and of the relation, brought forth 
earlier in the text, of beauty and law, one, that is, which exceeds the “realist” and 
substantiating readings o f the Arendtian sensus communis and of Camus’ creative art.
As I intend to show, the comparative analysis with Camus’ pages on art and revolt 
brings into light the political significance o f a focus on beauty as intrinsically moral in the 
two authors’ attempts at rethinking the (political) community.151 Furthermore, as long as 
community is that which, in Arendt’s view, «arises wherever men live together [...] and it can 
be constituted in many different ways, all o f  which rest ultimately in some form of consent 
[...]. Consent entails the recognition that no man can act alone, that men i f  they wish to 
achieve something in the world must act in concert [...]» (LM/W, 201),152 the aesthetic 
perspective discloses, and is inseparable from, a tragic or “dramaturgic” concept o f  (political) 
agency.
4.1. Fo r  a  t r a g ic  m o d e l  of  (p o l it ic a l )  a c t io n .
I suggest that we compare the following passages, taken respectively from Camus’ HR 
and Arendt’s OR:
Au midi de la pensée, le révolté refuse ainsi la divinité pour partager les luttes et le destin communs. 
Nous choisirons Ithaque, la terre fidèle, la p en sé e  audacieuse et fru g a le , l'action lucide, la générosité de 
l’homme qui sait. Dans la lumière, le monde reste notre premier et notre dernier amour. Nos frères respirent sous 
le même ciel que nous, la ju stice  est vivante. Alors naît la jo ie  étrange qui aide à vivre et à mourir et que nous 
refuserons désormais de renvoyer à plus tard. (HR, 708). [My italics]
Sophocles in Oedipus a t Coionus, the play o f his old age, wrote the famous and frightening lines: [...] 
“Not to be bom prevails over all meaning uttered in words; by far the second-best for life, once it has appeared, 
is to go as swiftly as possible whence it came.” There he also let us know, through the mouth o f Theseus, the 
legendary founder o f Athens and hence her spokesman, w hat it w as that enabled  ordinary men, yo u n g  and old, t  
to bear life 's  burden: it w as the polis , the space o f men’s free deeds and living words, which could endow life ƒ 
with splendor [...] (OR, 285) [My italics] •
151 Simona Forti draws the attention to Lyotard’s critique o f an emphasis on the aesthetic judgment related to 
beauty in Arendt’s work, as still carrying in itself the (meta-physical) hope in an “harmonic integration”, in the 
reconciliation o f particularity and universality. This hope would, precisely, explain, in Lyotard’s analysis of 
Sensus C om m unis, the incapability o f the author to escape a “realist” and “social” approach to the question of 
common sense and the community (in S. Forti, “Hannah Arendt e la facoltà di giudicare: considerazioni su di 
un’eredità contesa”, Teoria Politica , III, n. 3, 1992, pp. 139 and 153, note 75). I suggest that if we read Arendt’s 
pages on aesthetic judgment next to Camus’ pages on revolt as creative art, the question o f beauty and of 
(Lyotard’s) “harmonious integration” can be reframed within what Camus calls men’s “desire for unity”. In this 
sense , liminality is inherent in the notion of beauty, exposing (against the measurelesness entailed by the 
aesthetic notion of the sublime) the morality of (political) action and freedom inter pares.
132 My italics.
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The «strange joy», which stems from revolt as creation, and coincides with men’s responsible 
undertaking of a generous and lucid action, and which helps men to bear life under the 
conditions o f mortality and plurality, is not different, I suggest, from the Arendtian joy  in 
appearing and acting together in public, and designates an identical moment: that, to use 
Arendt’s terminology, o f political action.
As Isaac rightly points out, reading Camus and Arendt together and «against one 
another [,..]provide[s] new and revealing interpretations of them both»:1531 suggest that by 
approaching revolt to the Arendtian notion o f political action, the former offers some 
elucidating insights into the relation between morality and politics, and especially, in the 
much debated question o f the «internal morality» of Arendt’s tragic model of political action, 
outlined in HC.
The rapprochement is justified by a passage in Thoughts on Politics and Revolutions, 
where Arendt explicitly declares that «[if] you look at the history of revolutions, you will see 
that it was never the oppressed and degraded themselves who led the way, but those who were 
not oppressed and not degraded but could not bear it that others were. [...] the moral factor -  
she writes in 1971 - has always been present [ ...]»  (CR, 204). What Arendt describes here is, 
precisely, the “founding” or disclosing moment of revolt, as described in Camus’ HR:
[...] la révolte ne naît pas seulement, et forcément, chez l’opprimé, mais [...] elle peut naître aussi au 
spectacle de l’oppression dont un autre est victime. Il y a donc, dans ce cas, identification à l’autre individu. Et il 
faut préciser qu’il ne s’agit pas d’une identification psychologique [i.e. what Arendt would address as 
« empathy »] [...]. U ne s’agit pas non plus du sentiment de la communauté des intérêts. [...] Il y a seulement 
identification de  destinées et prise de parti. L’individu n’est donc pas, à lui seul, cette valeur à défendre. Il faut, 
au moins, tous les hommes p o u r la composer. (HR, 426) [My italics]
I suggest that we draw on Camus’ notion o f revolt, precisely, to try and shed some light into 
the meaning o f the «moral factor», which Arendt traces within political action.
In the passage above, revolt brings about a value that is inherently « plural », relative 
and, in Camus’ own words, it pre-exists to action -  thus, contradicting those Philosophies o f 
History (and the polemical target is clearly French Existentialism) which situate value at the 
end of action (HR, 425). But, that this pre-existing value should be understood in a anti- or 
post-metaphysical sense, it is confirmed by Camus* pages on ressentiment in HR.
In the 1951 essay, Camus rejects Scheler’s identification o f revolt and ressentiment:
Le ressentiment est très bien défini par Scheler comme une auto-intoxication, la sécrétion néfaste, en vase c lost 
d’une impuissance prolongée. La révolte au contraire fracture l’être et l’aide à déborder. Elle libère des flots qui,
153 J. Isaac, op. cit.,p. 14.
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de stagnants, deviennent furieux. [...] À la source de la révolte, il y a [...] un principe d’activité surabondante et 
d’énergie. Scheler a raison aussi de dire que l’envie colore fortement le ressentiment. Mais on envie ce qu’on n’a 
pas, tandis que le révolté défend ce qu’il est. [...] La révolte n  'estpas réaliste. (HR, 427).
It is in the light of these remarks that the concept o f  a «communauté naturelle» of men 
(HR, 426), brought about by the act o f revolt, cannot be understood in the 
organicistic/teleocratic perspective (implicit in ressentiment). I suggest that the “energetic” 
interpretation o f  revolt explodes the substantiating interpretation o f the community: the 
latter is not some-thing to be achieved, it is already (there).
By opposing ressentiment * which Camus traces at the core of «la révolution du calcul 
qui, préférant un homme abstrait à l'homme de chair, nie l'être » (HR, 707) - 154 to love,155 
the “revolted” thought makes a good use o f nihilism in a  sense which couples Nietzsche’s 
aesthetic virtues - especially force de caractère and froide frugalité (E, 837), that Camus 
takes over in the notion of the creator’s ascèse - with the tragic finite thought o f the finite in 
the MdS.
The moral factor brought forth by revolt, I would argue, is that o f discipline: the 
Genealogy o f  Morals stands on the background, as the reference to Tertullian (GM, I, 15) 
suggests.156 Now, it is the Genealogy o f  Morals that closes the chapter on action in Arendt’s 
HC: we should not overlook the fact that, if  she poses political action under the sign o f  
Nietzsche, it is, precisely, for «his extraordinary sensibility to moral phenomena» (HC, 245).
We have extensively shown (Chapter 2) how the critique and “selective” appropriation 
of a certain part o f Nietzsche’s thought lies at the core of Camus’ identification o f revolt with 
a superabundant activity - as he defines creative action. In HC Arendt operates in analogous
154 Camus would associate the «techniques de la terreur» (HR, 428) to ressentim ent, from which he distinguishes 
man’s revolt against his finite condition.
153 Camus uses the terms « love/admiration » and « friendship » as interchangeable, and coincident with the 
movement o f revolt, as the passage on «[les] suicides de protestation, au bagne, parmi les terroristes russes dont 
on fouettait les camarades» (HR, 426 and HR, 576) clearly shows* Arendt, on the contrary, in HC distinguishes 
between love, as the most powerful o f all antipolitical human forces, which «destroys the in-between which 
relates us to and separates us from others» (HC, 242). In terms that echo the GM, she adds that «what love is in 
its own, narrowly circumscribed sphere, respect is in the larger domain o f  human affairs. Respect, not unlike the 
Aristotelian ph ilia  po litikë, is a kind o f “friendship” without intimacy and without closeness; it is a regard for a 
person from the distance which the space o f  the world puts between us, and this regard is independent of 
qualities which we may admire or o f achievements which we may highly esteem.» (HC, 243). According to 
Arendt, «the modem loss of respect, or rather the conviction that respect is due only where we admire or esteem, 
constitutes a clear symptom of the increasing depersonalization of public and social life» (Id.).
156 «Nietzsche et Scheler ont raison de voir une belle illustration de cette sensibilité [du ressentiment] dans le 
passage ou Tertullien informe ses lecteurs qu’au ciel la plus grande source de félicité, parmi les bienheureux, 
sera le spectacle des empereurs romains consumés en enfer. Cette félicité est aussi celle des honnêtes gens qui 
aillent assister aux exécutions capitales. La révolte, au contraire, dans son principe, se borne à refuser 
l’humiliation, sans la demander pour l’autre.» (E, 427). It is, precisely, this kind of spectacularity or theatricality, 
that, I would argue, Arendt refuses to admit in the courtroom: as she states in the opening pages Eichmann in 
Jerusalem , the court o f Beth H a ’cm , whose project recalled the structure o f a theatre, was the perfect site for the 
«show trial» of Adolf Eichmann (BE, 4).
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terms, disclaiming the German’s philosopher’s «modem prejudice to see the source o f all 
power in the will power of the isolated individual» (HC, 245), though retaining a certain part 
of Nietzsche’s moral reflection, namely, his critique o f the faculty o f promises.
Now, according to Arendt, the faculty of promising allows «to master this two-fold 
darkness o f  human affairs» - that is, the «basic unreliability o f men who never can guarantee 
today who they will be tomorrow» (HC, 244), and the unpredictability o f human action, or 
«the impossibility o f foretelling the consequences o f an act within a community o f  equals 
where everybody has the same capacity to act»157 (Id.) -  and, what is more important for our 
purpose, it is «the only alternative to a  mastery which relies on domination o f  one *s s e lf  and 
rule over others» (HC,244).158 In this sense, the faculty of promises «corresponds exactly to 
the exercise of a freedom  which was given under the condition o f  non-sovereignty» (Id .),159 
that is, under the conditions o f an-arche.
157 My italics.
158 My italics.
159 In the HC Arendt observes that «[t]he only way out of the dilemma of meaninglessness in all strictly 
utilitarian philosophy is to turn away from the objective world o f use things and fall back upon the subjectivity 
of use itself» (HC, 155) - that is, from within the homo faber's logic of ends and means the only way out o f the 
devaluation o f all things into means resides in the affirmation of an immanent “primo mobile”, the user as 
“higher end” -  a Subject, “measure o f all things” (HC, 155). What both Arendt and Camus reject as a solution to 
the nihilistic devaluation implicit in the teleocratic paradigm, is the very notion of Subject that supports the 
utilitarian thesis. They both situate themselves in the line o f Nietzsche’s “decentering” of the moral -  i.e. 
teleologic and metaphysical -  concept of the Self or Ego: in her commentary of The Will to Power, Arendt 
especially takes over the link, highlighted by Nietzsche, between the notions o f Self, Will, mastery and rule, thus 
tracing a direct continuity between the modem notion of the willing Ego and the Platonic “productionist” model 
of political action as rule, at work in Western Political Philosophy. For Nietzsche: «[...] the will is precisely that 
which treats cravings as their master and appoints to them their way and measure» (LM/W, 160).
Pointing, with Heidegger, to the commanding thought inherent in Nietzsche’s analysis o f the Will, 
Arendt takes over the Nietzschean genealogy o f the Self, originating in the internal split of the Will -  in the very 
fact that «we are in every given case at the same time those who issue the orders and those who obey them»: 
«[...] insofar as we obey -  she quotes from Beyond Good and Evil -  we experience the feelings of coercion, 
urging, pressing, resisting, which usually begin to manifest themselves immediately after the act o f willing; 
insofar however [,..] as we are in command [...] we experience a sensation of pleasure, and this all more 
strongly as we are used to overcoming the dichotomy through the notion o f the I, the Ego» (LM/W, 161): it is by 
identifying the “1” or “Self’ as a whole with the commanding part, and by anticipating that the resisting part will 
obey, that the internal and painful conflict o f the I-will-and-l-cannot is solved. Arendt’s critique of modem 
philosophic notion of Individual, developed in the concluding chapter of Willing, is rooted in the Nietzschean 
“deconstruction” of the Subject: «Just as thinking prepares the self for the role of spectator, willing fashions it 
into an “enduring I” that directs all particular acts o f volition. It creates the se ifs  character and therefore was 
sometimes understood as the principium individuationis, the source of the person’s specific identity» (LM/W, 
195). It is this individuation which, in Arendt’s view, breeds the most serious problems for the notion of 
freedom, in that the individual «fashioned by the will and aware that it could be different from what it is 
(character, unlike bodily appearance or talents and abilities, is not given to the self at birth) always tends to assert 
an “I-myself” against an indefinite ‘they’ -  all the others that I, as an individual, am not. Nothing indeed can be 
more frightening than the notion o f solipsistic freedom  -  the ‘feeling" that my standing apart, isolated from  
everyone else, is due to free  will (...)» (LM/W, 195-196).
The philosophic notion o f individual as an abstract, in-different Subject, is directly related to the 
modem political concept o f freedom as sovereignty, that is, to «the ideal o f a free will, independent from  others 
and eventually prevailing against them» (WF, 163). Now, according to Arendt, sovereignty is to political action 
what mastery is in the realm of making, which explains why «[t]he famous sovereignty of political bodies [...] 
can be maintained only by the instruments of violence. [...] Where men wish to be sovereign, as individuals or as
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In OR Arendt “genealogically” reconstitutes the origin o f the concept o f  freedom as a 
political phenomenon -  against the current identification o f  the term, generally accepted in 
political theory, o f political freedom with «the more or less free range o f non-political 
activities which a given body politic will permit and guarantee to those who constitute it» 
(OR, 22) -  in an-archy, that is, in the artificial horizon (o f Nietzschean memory) drawn by 
men, but entered by citizens {personae), within which the latter lived together under 
conditions o f no-rule (an-archein\ that is, among peers (OR, 23). An-archy should, thus, not 
be understood as sheer absence o f law: under such conditions, «isonomy» confirms the 
existence of a law, which grants equality and freedom,160 by allowing men to act and speak as 
peers.161
In the light o f  the opposition o f  the binomial freedom!anarchy and oppression/rule, 
Arendt distinguishes between liberation («to be free from oppression») and freedom as a 
political way o f  life (OR, 25):
The point o f the matter is that while the former, the desire to be free from oppression, could have been 
fulfilled under monarchical -  though not under tyrannical, let alone despotic -  rulership, the latter necessitated 
the formation of a new, or rather rediscovered form of government; it demanded the constitution o f a republic.
[...] the acts an d  deeds which liberation  dem anded  from [the men of the eighteenth-century 
revolutions] threw them  into public  business, where, intentionally or more often unexpectedly, they began to 
constitute that space o f  appearances where freed o m  can unfold  its charm s a n d  become a visible, tangible reality. 
[...] It was nothing less than the weight of the entire Christian tradition which prevented them from owning up to 
the rather obvious fact that they were enjoying  what they were doing far beyond the call of duty. (OR, 25-26) 
[My italics]
Arendt’s notes for a tutorial on Nietzsche in 1966 draw our attention to the equation 
«freedom= creation» in the philosopher’s definition o f  the Over-man.162 If we admit, in the 
light o f the passages quoted above, that the faculty o f promising is what allows Arendt to
organized groups, they must submit to the oppression  of the will, be this the individual will with which I force 
myself, or the “general will” of an organized group» (WF, 164) - the roots of which are in the Traditional 
(Platonic) substitution o f making for acting as the philosophic solution to  «the threefold frustration of action -  
the unpredictability o f  its outcome, the irreversibility o f the process, and the anonymity of its authors» (HC, 
220). In this sense, «[...] the faculty o f  the will and will-power in and by itself, unconnected with any other 
faculties, is an essentially nonpolitical and even anti-political capacity is perhaps nowhere else so manifest as in 
the absurdities to which Rousseau was driven [...]. Politically, th is identification o f  freedom with sovereignty is 
perhaps the most pern ic ious an d  dangerous consequence o f  the ph ilosophica l equation o f  freedom and  fre e  will» 
(WF, 164). The rejection o f the metaphysical fallacy o f the Subject, in Camus’ MdS as well as in Arendt’s Life 
o f  the Mind, and o f the teleocratic paradigm implicit in it, is grounded in both these authors on their personal 
appropriation o f Nietzsche’s aestheticism  - o f  what Mathieu Kessler defines as his anti-Platonic project of an 
“esthétique élargie” as a solution to the nihilistic, i.e. metaphysical, justification of action (see Mathieu Kessler, 
op.cit., 8- ff.).
,é0 «Isonomy guaranteed iaôrriç, equality, but not because all men were bom or created equal, but, on the 
contrary, because men were by nature [...] not equal, and needed an artific ia l institution, the polis, which by 
virtue o f  its vôpoç w o u ld  m ake them equal.» (OR, 23)
161 «The Greek held that no one can be free except among his peers [...]» (OR, 23).
162 The Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library o f Congress. Courses -  University of Chicago, III -  Tutorial on 
Nietzsche (1966), p. 11.
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think freedom under the conditions of no-rule - that is, outside and against the vertical 
structure o f dominion (master/slave relationship) -  promising, as the act of exchanging vows 
(among peers), is creative (action).
Arendt draws on the first two aphorisms of Dissertation II of the Genealogy in order to 
define the faculty o f promising. Now, in the opening lines of aphorism 2, the human animal is 
said to have been trained and disciplined into a moral agent, that is, into a creature able to 
make promises: the fruit of the disciplining process, performed on the prc-historic man 
through harsh and cruel measures of coercion and violence, is the «sovereign individual»:
If sovereignty is in the realm of action and human affairs what mastership is in the realm of malting and 
the world of things, than their chief distinction is that the one can only be achieved by the many bound together, 
whereas the other is conceivable only in isolation. (HC, 245). [My italics]
In this passage Arendt’s emphasis in the distinction between sovereignty and self­
domination is not so much on whether the former entails a quantum violence in order to come 
about, but, rather, on the fact that the former is brought about only under the conditions of 
concerted action (plurality) among peers (equality).
What distinguishes the coercion, which turns the forgetful human animal into a 
sovereign individual answerable for his own future, from the Self-inflicted violence 
perpetrated (and suffered) in isolation by a commanding (free) Will, is its origin, namely that 
acting together of the many bound together. The limit (rapport) of appearing-together is, thus, 
“carried” into sovereignty -  which, I suggest, should not be thought in terms of violence 
(vertical relation of dominion), but in terms of discipline, as tension.163
According to George Kateb,
Arendt has produced not a sufficient morality -  one must go outside even authentic politics to keep it 
sane -  but, instead, the outlines of a code o f  conduct. (...) It extracts from Nietzsche [...] some of his most 
generous teachings on how the free person gives his word and then keeps it, despite all difficulties; cancels debts 
owed him and thus in going beyond the law, acts mercifully; accords justice rather than acting out of revenge or 
ressentiment; is suspicious of, even dismayed by, the will to punish; and may be said to love his enemies by 
shrugging off the slights and hurts inflicted on him. (...) She takes from (Nietzsche) some invaluable insights 
into a code proper to free human beings as they undertake authentic political action. [...] Alas, one must repeat 
that even this great code cannot by itself suffice to resolve all the questions of morality as they have inev itably 
appeared historically. In sum, Arendt’s view of the place of morality in authentic politics remains 
unsatisfactory.164 [My italics]
163 «In so far as morality is more than the sum total of mores [...], it has, at least politically, no more to support 
itself than the good will to counter the enormous risks of action by readiness to forgive and to be forgiven, to 
make promises and to keep them. These moral precepts are the only ones that are not applied to action from the 
outside, from some supposedly higher faculty or from experiences outside action’s own reach. They arise, on the 
contrary, directly out o f  the w ill to live together with others in the mode o f acting and speaking, and thus they 
are like control mechanisms built into the faculty to start new and unending processes.» (HC, 245-246) (My 
italics).
164 George Kateb, “Political action: its nature and advantages", in Cambridge Companion to Arendt, op. cit., p. 
143.
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I would argue, on the contrary, that Arendt’s extraction of a code o f conduct from 
Nietzsche’s work — and, more precisely, from the philosopher’s remarks on the noble men’s 
conduct inter pares (GM, I, 10-11) -  in the post-metaphysical horizon o f modem and radical 
nihilism, not only is consistent with her rejection of the aesthetic constellation o f political 
action o f the Tradition, structured around the concept o f fabrication (poiesis), to which the 
concepts of rule and self-domination belong. In this sense, Nietzsche’s notion o f  creation, as 
an alternative to that o f production, provides the elements for an alternative aesthetic model 
o f political action among peers.
Moreover, I suggest that tragedy offers a key to the question of the internal morality o f 
political action. In the GM Nietzsche describes the free men, living together under conditions 
of no-rule, as good  men, strongly held in check by respect, custom, habit and gratitude, who 
behave towards their peers by showing resourcefulness in consideration, self-control, 
delicacy, loyalty, pride and friendship  (GM, I, 11). Ansell-Pearson situates creative (free) 
action beyond morality, in the separation between morality and politics, which in his view is 
the mark of Nietzsche and Arendt’s “aestheticizing” political thought;165 I would argue, 
instead, that the theatrical/performative paradigm o f  action is not devoid of a «substantive 
moral content».
In contrast, for both Arendt and Camus, the «moral factor» is inscribed in political 
action,166 and it can be understood in the light o f Nietzsche’s equation of Freedom and 
Creation. In Camus’ words, that there can be no freedom without some kind o f law: not an 
external or transcendent law, but internal and relative, in the sense o f the (Nietzschean) 
«aesthetic» morality, discussed in the previous Chapters.
From this perspective, I suggest that we read Arendt’s tragic or “dramaturgical” model 
o f political action -  repeatedly pointed out by Arendtian scholarls -167 in a moral s e n se d  
that is, as the adequate model to approach the “morality” o f political action as creative action.
165 «Unlike a moralist like Rousseau, for example, who saw the kind of theatrical action they esteem as immoral 
and hypocritical, they maintain that the essence o f politics is not the willing o f what is morally ‘right* and ‘just’; 
rather, creative action must place itself beyond morality, and is not to be judged by its consequences or by the 
standards o f conventional morality, but by the excellence contained in its performance. This is a highly 
aestheticist notion o f  action and freedom which is not without problems. The main problem is that, by 
conceiving politics as an aesthetic activity, in which actions are prized not for their moral ambitions and 
consequences, but simply in terms of their performative and glorious dimensions, action is deprived of 
substantive moral content» (K. Ansell-Pearson, op. cit., p. 44).
166 See, also, L.J. Disch, op. cit., p. 109.
167 See for instance, Allen Speight, “Arendt and Hegel on the tragic nature o f action”, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism, vol. 28, N. 5, pp. 523-536. And, also, Ramón Ramos Torre, “Homo tragicus”, Política y  Sociedad, 30 
(1999), Madrid, pp. 213-240.
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In GM, 1 ,10, Nietzsche defines respect as one o f the traits o f the free or “good” men, a 
sort of bridge to love: as opposed to the man of ressentiment, the free man honours his enemy 
as peer. In the Twofold prehistory o f  good and evil in Human, All too Human (I, 2, 45), 
Nietzsche would precise that the noble or free man does not regard the enemy as evil, for he 
can requite - « In Homer the Trojan and the Greek are both good. It is not he who does us 
harm but he who is contemptible who counts as bad»:
The concept o f good and evil has a twofold prehistory: firstly  in the soul of the ruling tribes and castes. 
He who has the power to requite, good with good, evil with evil, and also actually practices requital -  is, that is 
to say, grateful and revengeful -  is called good [...] As a good man one belongs to the “good”, a community 
which has a sense o f belonging together because all the individuals in it are combined with one another through 
the capacity for requital. As a bad man one belongs to the “bad”, to a swarm of subject, powerless people who 
have no sense of belonging together [...] am ass like grains of sand. G ood a n d  bad  is fo r  a  long time the same  
thing as noble and base, master and slave. [...] If, however, one of the good should do something unworthy of 
the good, one looks for excuses; one ascribes the guilt to a god, for example, by saying he struck the good man 
with madness and rendered him blind. -  Then in the soul of the subjected, the powerless. Here every other man, 
whether he be noble or base, counts as inimical, ruthless, cruel, cunning, ready to take advantage. Evil is the 
characterizing expression for man, indeed for every living being one supposes to exist, fo r  a god , for example. 
[...] When this disposition exists in the individual a  community can hardly arise, at best the most rudimentary 
form of community: so that wherever this conception o fg o o d  and evil reigns the downfall o f  such individuals, o f  
their tribes an d  races, is near. -  Our present morality has grown up in the soil of the ruling tribes and castes.168 69
What emerges in this aphorism is that, under the conditions of rule or master/slave 
relationship - which is, precisely, the soil out of which the present, i.e. Platonic-Christian, 
morality has grown -  all men are evil as all living being would appear to a God looking down 
and taking pleasure at the vision of the earthly “spectacle” (Tertullian). The relation between 
morality o f ressentiment and the god-like vision is all the more significant in the light o f the 
identification of modem nihilism with the abstracting God-like (i.e. Cartesian) perspective.
Now, we could argue that, from the perspective o f  the free, that is, from the 
perspective o f political action, which replaces rule by an-archy (equality or no-rule), thus 
breaking with the nihilistic god-like view, both antagonists - as the Trojans and the Greek in 
Homer’s poem - are good. More precisely, they are good-and-evih political action is 
inscribed in the moral framework of tragedy.
168 As Martha Nussbaum points out, in tragedy we find not just the recognition o f the fa c t  of exposure, which 
characterises human condition and human action, but also of its value (in The Fragility o f  Goodness, op. cit., p. 
20) -  a value, resumed in the notion o f excellence (Pindar), which touches upon the problem of the human 
ambition to rational self-sufficiency (Ivi, p, 18): «What both métis and Platonic self-sufficiency omit [and I 
would argue, sheds light into the Arendtian hero’s excellence] is a picture o f excellence that is shown to us in the 
traditional image of arete  as plant: a kind of human worth that is inseparable from vulnerability, and excellence 
that is in its nature other-related and social, a rationality whose value is not to attempt to seize, hold, trap and 
control, in whose values openness, receptivity, and wonder play an important part» (Ivi, p. 20).
169 F. Nietzsche, Human, A il  too Human, volume I, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 37. My italics.
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In 1952 a partial edition o f  Karl Jaspers’ book Von der Wahrheit (1947) was 
published, through Arendt’s mediation, in the United States, entitled Tragedy Is Not Enough. 
As the title suggests, the English translation principally concerned the section on the tragic 
(Tragik) from the voluminous work that the philosopher devoted to the question o f truth.170
Jaspers’ reflection on tragedy and the tragic -  on the tragic conscience and the 
liberation from the tragic -  sheds further light, in my view, on the (moral) meaning o f  
Arendt’s tragic model o f action and on the relation between nihilism, history/ Historicism, 
and the political, which is the object o f  the present work.
Jaspers distinguishes tragedy and tragic conscience, the latter making itself also 
manifest in novels. What characterises the tragic (as opposed to the pre-tragic or mythic) 
conscience, in the author’s view, is the breaking out o f the cyclical time o f the ever-recurring 
biological processes - life/death/rebirth in the endless metamorphosis of an immutable 
reality, the in-different and levelling zoè  -  into the time o f history. What marks the tragic, in 
Jaspers’ argument, is the “non-repeatability” disclosed in and by the unique moment o f  
decision: it resides in the awareness o f  a  kind o f immortality against the eternal recurrence o f  
natural becoming, one which is nevertheless immersed in a  finite existence that disappears 
entirely with death. This terminology is strikingly resonant with Arendt’s later reflection on 
historiography - especially Greek (Herodotus) -171 172in the 1956-58 essays and papers on the 
modem concept o f History. I suggest that Arendt’s notion of «immortalizing», as 
distinguished and opposed to the philosophic ideal o f immortality, and defining her 
understanding o f the political as the space o f a peculiar “immanent” immortality, is mediated 
in her 1953-54 papers by a pre-philosophical tradition o f  story-telling and story-writing, 
which is deeply imbued with what Jaspers calls the tragic.
It is significant that, in Jaspers’ definition, the tragic neither resides in the natural 
eternal recurrence o f sheer becoming, nor in men’s suffering and mortality per se, but is 
brought about against the background o f  the latter in and by the action or realisation o f an 
agent who is aware (tragic conscience) ,173 which at the same time is seen as inserting man’s
1701 will refer to the Italian translation o f this section, K. Jaspers, D el trag ico , traduzione di Itali Chiusano, 1959, 
Milano, II Saggiatore. Some extracts have also been published in K. Jaspers, Sulla verità, a cura di Umberto 
Galimberti, Editrice La Scuola, Brescia, 1974.
171 See her “The modem concept o f history”, T he Review  o f  Politics, October 1958, voi. 20, n. 4, pp. 570-571.
172 The relation between history and the tragic is clarified by Jaspers* tracing o f the tragic in a non-unity (the 
conflict between truths) or incompleteness: thus defined, the tragic “rescues’* the single phenomena from an 
annihilating reductio a d  w w m , «illuminating» the factual case (K. Jaspers, D el tragico, p. 70). In this sense, the 
tragic is not an absolute reality, but is inherently superficial, i.e. it remains on the surface, in the world of 
appearances («phenomena in time», Id.), or as Rustichelli says, it belongs to the sphere o f the “aesthetic”.
1 3 As for Camus (MdS, 196), what constitutes the tragic for Jaspers is the hero’s awareness, which is inseparable 
from a fundamental sense of “exile”, i.e. the impossibility of feeling at home in the world.
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«moral substance» in the tension between conflicting forces - 174 thus, displaying the hero’s 
greatness - and freeing from  the tragic, in the sense of man’s capacity to move out and 
beyond the tragic conscience.175 176
For our purpose it is essential, in my view, to focus our attention on two points of 
Jaspers’ analysis o f the tragic. Firstly, tragic action inserts itself in the struggle or tension 
between two conflicting forces which are both right each from their own perspective, and 
which both entail a (part of) truth. The defeat of the tragic hero marks the failure of the tragic 
action (as guilt), which sprang luminously from freedom as morally right and necessary -  the 
tragic actor acts in/out of truth and justice.116 In the same way that a foundation of truth acts 
in each o f the contending forces, truth itself is limited and, therefore, relative: the tragic 
conflict reveals a part o f injustice in everything. The affinity with Camus’ definition o f tragic 
conflict in the 1955 Conference Sur / ’avenir de la tragédie is striking:
les forces qui s’affrontent dans la tragédie sont également légitimes, également armées en raison. 
Dans le mélodrame ou le drame, au contraire, l’une seulement est légitime. Autrement dit, la tragédie est 
ambiguë, le drame simpliste. Dans la première, chaque force  est en m êm e temps bonne et mauvaise. Dans le 
second, l’une est le bien, l’autre le mal (et c’est pourquoi de nos jours le théâtre de propagande n’est rien d’autre 
que la résurrection du mélodrame). Antigone a raison, ma Créon n’a pas tort. De même Prométhée est à la fois 
juste et injuste et Zeus qui l’opprime sans pitié est aussi dans son droit. [...] la formule tragique par excellence : 
« Tous sont justifiables, personne n 'est ju s te » .  C’est pourquoi le chœur des tragédies antiques donne 
principalement des conseils de prudence. Car il sait que sur une certaine limite tout le monde a raison et que 
celui qui, par aveuglement ou passion, ignore cette  limite, court à  la  catastrophe pour fa ire  triompher un droit 
qu 'il croit être le seu l à avoir. Le thème constant de la tragédie antique est ainsi la limite qu’il ne faut pas 
dépasser. De part et d’autre de cette limite se rencontrent des forces également légitimes dans un affrontement 
vibrant et ininterrompu.177 178(T, 1705)
It is, precisely, in this liminal situation that, according to Jaspers, the poet detects and 
celebrates the greatness and dignity o f  the tragic hero, who through action makes a quid 
visible that transcends individual existence, as a strength or a principle: I suggest that it is
here, in the active affirmation, which in the moment o f  catastrophe displays the <<personality» 
o f the hero - 179 180or, in Arendtian terms, the “who” or the daimon o f the actor - that the «moral 
factor» acquires its full meaning as the manifestation within and through action o f an 
(energetic) principle, which transcends individual existence. In the peculiar transcendence, 
brought about by tragic action, Jaspers traces the inevitable self-overcoming of (liberation
174 K. Jaspers, Del tragico , op. cit., p. 51.
,7S Ivi, pp. 54-55.
176 Ivi, p. 31.
177 My italics.
178 Ivi, p. 32.
179 Ivi, p. 50.
180 See K. Jaspers, D el tragico, op. cit., p. 32. We find an analogous relation between (horizontal) transcendence, 
as the exceeding and obliteration o f individual existence, and revolt as energetic principle of action in Camus’ 
Remarque sur la révolte.
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from) the tragic, implicit in the very definition o f tragic conscience: it is significant that 
Jaspers would identify the overcoming o f the tragic, and thus this transcendence, with true 
«humanity», in the sense o f that solidarity and fraternity (communion of free men) formulated 
by Lessing in Nathan the Wise.™
The second point concerns the philosopher’s distinction between tragic conscience 
(and its self-overcoming) and an absolute or pure tragic(ness), which in Jaspers’ view is 
totally alien to the great tragedies, only emerging in certain works by Euripides and in 19th 
century drama. Jaspers uses the term «absolute or pure tragic(ness)» with a strong negative 
connotation as synonymous o f despair, empty (moral) indifference and pure aesthetic 
contemplation.18 82 He explicitly links this absolute form of tragic, which is only the perversion 
of the tragic vision,183 to the pride o f the «nihilistic man», rising out o f tragic greatness into 
sheer «taste for absurdity», will to destruction, hatred of the world and o f humanity coupled 
with a resentment against one’s own despised existence.184 Absolute or pure tragic(ness) is 
disclosed by the obliteration of tragic conflict, when the tragic is deprived o f its 
complementary pole, thus remaining isolated: the echoes o f Camus’ definition o f  absolute 
nihilism, enacted by Caligula’s negation o f contradictors and contradictions, are apparent 
here. Now, according to Jaspers, the «realization» o f the tragic conscience in action, which 
overcomes the tragic impasse bringing men together in mutual recognition, is the opposite o f  
despair. In the light o f these considerations we can fully grasp the meaning o f his remarks on 
OR in his letter to Arendt on May, the 16th 1963, where Jaspers highly praises
the greatness to which you [Arendt] give expression [in OR] [which] is a source o f encouragement. 
Ultimately, the w hole is yo u r  vision o f  a  tragedy that does not leave yo u  despairing: an element o f  the  tragedy o f  
humankind. [...] The literature that you cite [...] comes to your aid, introduces elements that you incorporate into 
the simplicity and greatness of this vision. I want to continue reading and not skip a single page. It is easy fo r  m e  
because I  think I  a lready have a firm  fo o tin g  in the central id e a \ . . . \  And this book you have dedicated to the 
two of us! I’m very grateful.l8S
181 K. Jaspers, D el tragico , op. cit., p. 55.
182 Ivi, p.12.
183 Ivi, p. 68.
184 Ivi, p. 68.
185 Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Correspondence. 1926-1969, op. cit., p. 505. In the same letter Jaspers remarks 
on to Arendt’s wonderful «insight into the nature o f political freedom and your courage in loving the dignity of 
man in this arena. [...] I sense the influence o f Heinrich [Blücher]’s character and life experience, and in reading 
this book [OR] I think o f both of you.» (Ivi, p. 504). We know from an exchange of letters between Jaspers, 
Arendt and Blücher (1950 -1953), that in December 1949-Januaiy 1950 Blücher had read and deeply appreciated 
Wahrheit, to which he devoted a letter (29th o f January 1950), and included as obligatory reading for his students 
in 1953 (Letter to Jaspers’, 21st December 1953, Arendt-Jaspers, Correspondence, op. cit., p. 235). It is 
significant that as an attentive reader of W ahrheit, Blücher should indicate Camus’ HR as essential for the 
critique o f nihilism in 1952. In his 1950 letter (see Within Four Walls, op. cit., pp. 120-122), Blücher also refers 
to Jaspers’ «interpretation o f N athan the Wise [which] will give you [Arendt] much pleasure. That is the point at 
which one truly discovers the real meaning in Lessing.» (Ivi, p. 122). In 1959 Arendt devoted to Lessing, tragedy
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iIt is to the structure of tragedy, as outlined above, that Arendt resorts when touching 
upon the problem o f good and evil, as the crucial preoccupation of men asserting or re­
asserting human dignity without any resort to institutionalised religion (OR, 76). According 
to Arendt, «the depth of this problem could hardly be sounded by those who mistook for 
goodness the natural, “innate repugnance of man to see his fellow creature suffer“ (Rousseau), 
and who thought that selfishness and hypocrisy w ere the epitome of wickedness» (OR, 76).
Rousseau’s identification of goodness with compassion, as the «most natural human 
reaction to the suffering of others» (OR, 74), which, in Arendt’s words, came to play a crucial 
role in «the minds and hearts of those who prepared and of those who acted in the course of
>A/
the French Revolution» (Id.), is posed by the author at the core of the Declaration of the 
Rights o f Man.
By tracing the source of political power and the foundation of the body politic in 
man’s natural rights, that is, «upon his rights insofar as he is nothing but a natural being (...) 
his right to the necessities of life» (OR, 105), the French Declaration assumed the latter not as 
«some pre-political rights that no government and no political power has the right to touch 
and to violate, but as the very content as well as the ultimate end of government and power» 
(Id.). The ab-solute goodness o f the “innocent” natural man is, thus, introduced in the political 
realm, with devastating effects.
Arendt draws on Melville and Dostoyevsky as the two writers who showed «openly 
and concretely, though of course poetically and metaphorically, upon what tragic and self- 
defeating enterprise the men o f the French Revolution had embarked almost without know ing 
it» (OR, 77), by introducing absolute goodness, through the axiom of man's natural goodness 
and the related passion of pity, into the course of human affairs.
As she points out, the actions of the men of the French Revolution, from Rousseau to 
Robespierre, brought to the fore the question, which the political actors would not even 
imagine (Id.), o f the dangers inherent in goodness beyond virtue or absolute goodness.
Melville’s Billy Budd tells the meaning of the story which eventually resulted from 
their actions, by imagining a “natural man” endowed with a barbarian innocence and 
goodness, conceived on the model of a “return”: the return of Jesus among men, namely of 
the love o f goodness as the inspiring principle of all (political) actions (OR, 76-78). 186
and humanity her essay On Humanity in Dark Times: Thoughts about Lessing when she was awarded the 
Hambourg Lessing Prize.
186 Properly speaking, we could argue that those who prepared and those who acted in the course of the 
Revolution are not the same as those who began it, whom Arendt identifies with those who were primarily 
concerned with freedom and human dignity.
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What brings about the tragic in Billy Budd  is not, as Arendt points out with Jaspers 
and Camus, the confrontation between absolute good  - Billy Budd’s goodness beyond virtue - 
and absolute evil - Claggart’s wickedness beyond vice, or «depravity according to nature» 
which «partakes nothing of the sordid and the sensual» (OR, 78), but the crime that turns the 
“angel o f God” Billy Budd into a  wrongdoer. The violent act with which Billy Budd 
eliminates nature’s depravity (OR, 78), is, precisely, what ex-poses the hero as good-and-evil, 
justifiable and unjust. Tragedy begins, according to Arendt, when
“virtue” in the person of Captain Vere is introduced into the conflict between absolute good and 
absolute evil. [...] Virtue -  which perhaps is less than goodness but still alone is capable “o f embodiment in 
lasting institutions” -  must prevail at the expense o f the good man as well; absolute, natural innocence, because 
it can only act violently, is “at war with the peace o f the world and the true welfare o f mankind”, so that virtue 
finally interferes not to prevent the crime o f evil but to punish the violence o f absolute innocence. Claggart was 
“struck by an angel o f God! Yet the angel must hang!” The tragedy is that the law is made for men, and neither 
for angels nor for devils. Laws and all “lasting institutions” break down not only under the onslaught of 
elemental evil but under the impact of absolute innocence as well. The law, moving between crime and virtue, 
cannot recognize what is beyond it, and while it has no punishment to mete out to elemental evil, it cannot but 
punish elemental goodness even if the virtuous man, Captain Vere, recognizes that only the violence of this 
goodness is adequate to the depraved power of evil. The absolute -  and to Melville and absolute was 
incorporated in the Rights of Man -  spells doom to everyone when it is introduced into the political realm. (OR, 
78-79)
Not only Arendt identifies virtue with the (Socratic) «it is better to suffer wrong than 
to do wrong», but she opposes the former to compassion as the anti-political annihilation of 
that pathos o f a distance, which Nietzsche would see as distinctive o f the free m en’s conduct 
inter pares, and which is made visible in the free m en’s acting and speaking together, using 
argumentative reason and persuasion in order to fen d  o f f  temptations (OR, 82).
Precisely because Billy Budd’s natural goodness, as an absolute goodness without 
virtue, is beyond temptation and beyond the worldly support o f  the given word (Id.), the hero 
«would not have been able to refute the accusations o f  the “elemental evil” that confronted 
him; he could only raise his hand and strike the accuser dead» (Id.);
Melville reversed the primordial legendary crime, Cain slew Abel, which has played such an enormous 
role in our tradition o f political thought, but this reversal was not arbitrary; it followed from the reversal the men 
o f the French Revolution had made o f the proposition o f original sin, which they had replaced by proposition of 
original goodness. [...] How was it possible that after “the rectification of the Old World’s hereditary 
wrongs...straightway the Revolution itself became a wrongdoer, one more oppressive than the Kings?’ 
[Melville] found the answer [...] in that goodness is strong, stronger perhaps even than wickedness, but that it 
shares with “elemental evil” the elementary violence inherent in all strength and detrimental to all forms of 
political organization. (OR, 82-83)1*7 187
187 «It is as though [Melville] said: Let us suppose that from now on the foundation stone o f our political life will 
be that Abel slew Cain. Don’t you see that from this deed of violence the same chain of wrongdoing will follow, 
only that now mankind will not even have the consolation that the violence it must call crime is indeed 
characteristic of evil men only?» (OR, 83)
280
In 1952 Camus wrote an introduction to the work o f Hennan Melville in Les écrivains 
célèbres, where he addressed the writer as «PHomère du Pacifique» (T, 1909). But his 
Ulysses «ne retrouve jamais Ithaque. La patrie où Melville aborde aux portes de la mort et 
qu'il immortalise dans Billy Budd est une île déserte. En laissant condamner à mort le jeune 
matelot, figure de beauté et d’innocence, qu’il aime tendrement, le commandant Vere soumet 
son cœur à la loi. Et dans le même temps, par ce récit sans fa ille  qu 'on peut placer au rang 
des tragédies antiques, le vieux Melville nous annonce qu’il accepte pour la première fois, 
que soient tuées l’innocence et la beauté afin qu’un ordre soit maintenu et que le navire des 
hommes continue d’avancer vers un horizon inconnu. » (Id.).
The « ordre terrible » evoked here calls upon Camus' definition o f tragedy in the 1955 
Conference: « il y a tragédie -  he writes -  lorsque l’homme par orgueil (ou même par bêtise 
comme Ajax) entre en contestation avec l’ordre divin, personnifié dans un dieu ou incarné 
dans la société. Et la tragédie sera d ’autant plus grande que cette révolte sera plus légitime et 
cet ordre plus nécessaire » (T, 1706) :« [ ...]  tragédie idéale, et particulièrement la grecque, est 
d'abord tension puisqu’elle est l'opposition, dans une immobilité forcenée, de deux
1 SRpuissances, couvertes chacune des doubles masques du bien et du mal (Id.).
I propose to re-contextualise the reference to tragedy, in the work of Camus and 
Arendt, as responding to the authors’ need to rethink freedom, and thus, political action 
within (and beyond) the horizon of nihilism, and outside the reconciliatory narratives o f the 
contemporary Philosophies of History.
As Camus points out in HR, the tragic hero in ancient Greek literature, from Achilles 
to Oedipus and to Antigone, revolts in the name o f a tradition, an order, which remains 
uncontested (HR, 439). The question o f modem tragedy, on the contrary, is inseparable from 
the problem of the 20th century crisis o f civilization (T, 1703), or what Arendt would address 
as loss o f authority, and is intimately related to the question o f the «irrepresentable 
plurality»* 189 190of (political) freedom -  as Camus would say in an interview in 1949: «La liberté 
est une angoisse collective et ne peut être exprimée que d’une manière ample, sans 
limitations. L'unique forme que je  connaisse pour exprimer l ’angoisse de l’homme en quête
ionde liberté collective est la tragédie ».
m  My italics.
189 See Esposito, R. (a cura di), La pluralità irrappresentabile. Il pensiero politico di Hannah Arendt, 
QuattroVenti, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, 1987.
190 Interview to the “Serviço Nacional de Teatro” in Rio de Janeiro in July 1949. (F. Bartfeld, Albert Camay 
voyageur et conférencier, op. cit., p. 91).
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It is significant that in the Carnets in October 1945, Camus would resort to the literary 
form o f tragedy to resume the political enjeu o f the Resistance beyond the moral vacuum o f  
Nietzscheanism among his generation, and the break internal to the French Left faced with the 
totalitarian outcomes o f the Socialisme réel in the immediate aftermath o f the War:
Si le monde est tragique, si nous vivons dans le déchirement ce n’est pas tant à cause des tyrans. Toi et 
moi savons qu'il y  a une liberté, une justice, une jo ie  profonde et partagée, une communauté enfin dans la lutte 
contre les tyrans. Lorsque le mal domine il n’y a pas de problème. Quand l’adversaire a tort, ceux qui 
combattent sont libres et pacifiés. Mais le déchirement vient parce que des hommes qui veulent également le 
bien de l ’homme le veulent pour tout de suite ou le fixent à trois générations, et que cela suffît à les séparer pour 
jamais. Quand les adversaires ont également raison, alors nous entrons dans la tragédie. Et au bout de la tragédie, 
tu sais ce qu’il y a ?
C. -  Oui, il y a la mort. [...J(CII, 148-149) [My italics]
United by a taste for justice and freedom, which provided the men of the Resistance 
with an “aesthetic”, that is, relative and unfounded, justification for action against 
Hitlerism/the Plague, beyond the nihilistic tabula rasa of higher (transcendent) values that the 
latter embodied, the 1945 révoltés had known the « joie profounde et partagée» o f acting 
together for freedom, a community founded by the struggle against oppression.
But for Camus, as for Arendt, it is not the opposition against (absolute) evil, which 
makes a tragedy: we should not omit to underscore that L'État de siege, his play about 
freedom in an age divided between victims and executioners (T, 1732), was conceived in the 
structure o f the Spanish Autos sacrament ales, which he defines in 1955 as «un spectacle où la 
vérité unique est solennellement proclamée» (T, 1706), that is, properly speaking, not a  
tragedy but a mystère or a moralité.
The tragic knot lies in the «Ils ont tous raison» (Cil, 147), which opposes the 
professional revolutionaries, who defer freedom to the end o f History, in order to realize 
(absolute) justice, to the artists as «témoins de la liberté» (C il, 148), who defend friendship as 
the first (political) virtue, against a murderous policy which destroys men’s capacity for 
«estime» (Id.), and the living inter-esse. It is not without reason that Camus would choose this 
opposition as the tragic core o f  the 1949 play Les Justes, which dramatizes the figure of the 
«meurtriers délicats» among the 1905 Russian revolutionaries.
The exceptional position o f this play in the conjunction between Camus’ reflection on 
the political developed in HR and his theory and practice o f  theatre - as emerges in the 1955
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conference on L ’Avenir de la tragédie -  touches, precisely, upon the much debated question 
of the literary status o f Les Justes as tragedy.191
In the preface to the American edition of his plays, Camus explicitly declared his 
attempt at obtaining «une tension dramatique par des moyens classiques, c’est-à-dire 
l’affrontement de personnages égaux en force et en raison» (T, 1733).192 193The tragic model can 
be traced in the con-frontation between the characters of Stepan and Kalyaev (T, 323), who 
both choose out o f  a profound sense ofjustice  to fight against injustice, historically embodied 
by slavery and oppression o f the Russian people under Tzarist despotism (T, 338). In this 
sense, they are both right, «[t]ous sont justifiables, personne n ’est juste» (T, 1705) -  the 1905 
Russian revolutionaries chose terror to force their way into history and rea-lize justice and 
bonheur, in this sense their action partakes of injustice. It is not in the sense of the 1955 
Avenir de la tragédie that, I would argue, the «meurtriers délicats» - as Camus defines 
Kalyaev and Dora, to distinguish them from the nihilist Stepan -  are, therefore, justes, but 
rather at the limit in the sense o f the 1949 presentation o f Simone Weil’s L'Enracinement, 
where the author refers to the capacity o f  «penser juste , [...] voir juste» (E, 1700) as the only 
possible “return” to the tradition, in the sense of the finite and relative perspective of la chair 
and of human dignity, as the act o f striking roots.
The delicate murders, as Camus calls the 1905 Russian terrorists in HR, live to its 
extreme dénouement the contradiction between «penser juste» and «penser mal», under the
conditions o f loss o f  the world. I suggest that Les Justes may be read not so much in the light 
of Arendt’s Human Condition,194 but, rather, in that o f the 1959 On Humanity in Dark Times: 
Thoughts about Lessing: it is possible to trace a correspondence between Jaspers* remarks on 
tragedy and the tragic, Camus’ pages on «Les meurtriers délicats» in HR and Arendt’s essay 
on Lessing.
The central question of the play has been correctly underlined in the relation between 
love, revolutionary thought and the political: the notion offraternity recurs from the opening 
lines of Les Justes (T, 309) as that «brotherly attachment to other human beings which springs 
from hatred of the world in which men are treated “inhumanly”» (MDT, 12-13). As Arendt 
writes, brotherhood among persecuted groups is the manifestation of humanity in dark times,
191 According to M. Weyembergh, «Camus se trompe en voulant faire des Justes une tragédie. La pièce constitue 
selon moi la commémoration du moment fondateur de la révolte [...]» (Maurice Weyembergh, « Théâtre et 
politique chez Albert Camus », in Camus et le théâtre, op. cit., p. 46).
192 My italics.
193 In the 1949 conference Le temps des meurtriers Camus explicitly pointed out that «on est un meurtrier parce 
qu’on pense mal» (F. Bartfled, op. cit., p. 53).
194 See M. Weyembergh, « Théâtre et politique chez Albert Camus », op. cit., p. 46.
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namely, among people who «under the pressure o f persecution [...] have moved so closely 
together that the interspace which we have called the world (and which of course existed 
between them before the persecution, keeping them at a  distance from one another) has 
simply disappeared» (MDT, 13).195
Now, according to Arendt, loss o f the world entails the «atrophy o f  all the organs with 
which we respond to it - starting with the common sense [ ...]  and going on to the sense o f 
beauty, or taste, with which we love the world» (Id.): Kalyaev is a  poet, who entered 
revolution in the name of his love o f  life, of beauty and o f le bonheur (T, 322). His 
personality and greatness, in accordance with Jaspers, are made visible in the realization o f  an 
action, which he feels necessary («Ils ont fait de nous des assassins», T, 323) and inexcusable 
(HR, 575): by compensating the death o f  a  man with his own life, he aims at «recréer une 
communauté de justice et d’amour» (HR, 572). It is sacrificing his own life that Kalyaev, and 
Dora after him, bring about a «bonne et [...] juste  action [...] celle qui reconnaît ces limites» 
(T, 1733) and remember the value o f  human life and dignity exposed in the act o f  revolt. In 
this peculiar transcendence («Elle est le reflet, historique cette fois, du “nous sommes”», HR, 
578) «l’esprit de révolte rencontre, pour la dernière fois dans notre histoire, l’esprit de 
compassion» (HR, 573) : the resonance with Lessing’s reflection on fraternity and 
compassion allows us to trace in his «It suffices to be a man» (MDT, 12) - against the 19th and 
20th century nihilistic attempts o f de-personalisation - the tragic knot, played out in the in- 
eliminable tension between la chair and the idea (justice), in Les Justes}96
Thus, in Arendtian terms, the play re-enacts through the suffering o f the hero the 
origin o f the political, identified with the horizontal transcendence of the revolted “Nous 
sommes”, as the recognition o f a  communion among human beings qua men.197 Nevertheless, 
the (tragic) failure o f Kalyaev’s terrorist act is by no means a political commencement: the 
emergence of a humanity in dark times -  which justifies Camus’ explicit admiration for his 
heroes, Kalyaev and Dora (T, 1733) -  remains, properly speaking, a pre-political condition
195 T, 321. See, also, HR, 574.
196 The reading of Les Justes alongside Jaspers’ pages on tragedy confirms the role played by classical drama, 
and by Greek tragedy in particular, in Camus’ text. Tragedy «[met] en jeu  le destin humain tout entier dans ce 
qu’il a de simple et de grand» (T, 1733). The greatness and courage of the hero, made visible in the realization 
o f his destiny through suffering and death, brings about the overcoming o f the tragic conscience, as a constant 
questioning, in the affirmation of an order, a right, and the love o f men (see Jaspers, Del tragico, op. cit., 69). 
«Même dans la destruction, il y a un ordre, il y a des limites» (T, 338). This is, precisely, the (anti-foundational 
and post-metaphysical) «sacred» disclosed by the death of these «delicate murders» (cf. M. Weyemberg, 
« Théâtre et politique chez Albert Camus », op. c it, pp. 54-55).
197 See MDT, 20.
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for the possibility o f that «new beginning», which is the political acting and speaking in 
concert.
What is, nevertheless, essential to point out for our purpose is that, for both Camus and 
Arendt, if  tragedy culminates in death and punishment, «ce qui est puni, ce n 'est pas le crime
1 Q jl
lui-même, mais l ’aveuglement du héros qui a nié l ’équilibre et la tension » (T, 1707).
The emphasis on the coincidence o f the hero’s blindness with his speechlessness, at 
the centre o f Arendt’s analysis o f Billy Budd and of Camus’ tragedy Le M a le n te n d u brings 
into focus the relation between language and solidarity, which both authors situate at the 
centre of their political reflection.
4.2. T r a g e d y  a n d  La n g u a g e .
In On Revolution Arendt draws on Dostoevsky’s Grand Inquisitor in order to elucidate 
her understanding o f  solidarity as the alternative to pity, that «perversion o f compassion», 
which «taken as the spring of virtue, has proved to possess a greater capacity for cruelty than 
cruelty itself» (OR, 85).
She points out how «sentiments, as distinguished from  passion and principle, are 
boundless» (Id.): by introducing the passion of compassion into the openness o f the market 
place, Robespierre is no longer capable to direct his passion toward specific suffering and to 
focus on particular persons,198 200 thus, his compassion turns into the boundless emotion of
pity.201
Since the days o f the French Revolution, it has been the boundlessness of their sentiments that made 
revolutionaries so curiously insensitive to reality in general and to the reality o f persons in particular, whom
198As de Aguila points out, quoting Martha Nussbaum, the tragic fault is “a wrong action committed without any 
direct physical compulsion and in full knowledge o f its nature, by a person [or a community] whose ethical 
commitments would otherwise dispose him [or them] to reject the ac t The constraint comes from the presence of 
circumstances that prevent the adequate fulfillment of two valid claims”. But this, in Socrates* belief 
(Euthyphro), is repugnant to reason: it is “absurd” (R. de Aquila, op. cit, p. 16-18).
199 In the preface to the 1958 American edition o f  his four tragedies, Camus described Le Malentendu as an 
attempt to create a modem tragedy, by expressing the historic and geographical claustrophobia o f France under 
the Nazi occupation (1941): «Un fils qui veut de faire reconnaître sans avoir à dire son nom et qui est tué par sa 
mère et sa sœur, à la suite d’un malentendu, tel est le sujet de cette pièce. Sans doute, c’est une vue très 
pessimiste de la condition humaine. Mais cela peut se concilier avec un optimisme relatif en ce qui concerne 
l’homme. Car enfin, cela revient à dire que tout aurait été autrement si le fils avait dit : « C’est moi, voici mon 
nom. » Cela revient à dire que dans un monde injuste ou indifférera, l  ’homme peut se sauver lui-même, et sauver 
les autres, par l ’usage de la sincérité la plus simple et le mot le plus juste. »(T, 1731). (My italics)
200 Arendt, like Camus, emphasizes the idealism o f the Grand Inquisitor, whose pity had depersonalized the 
suffering men, dissolving their singularity into the abstract totality o f a suffering mankind (OR, 80-81).
201 In similar terms Camus speaks of the «pitié froide» o f the Grand Inquisitor (E, 470) in KR
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they felt no compunctions in sacrificing to their “principles”, or to the course of history, or to the cause o f 
revolution as such. While this emotion-laden insensitivity to reality was quite conspicuous already in Rousseau's 
own behaviour, his fantastic irresponsibility and unreliability, it became a political factor o f importance only 
with Robespierre, who introduced it into the factional strife o f the Revolution. (OR, 85-86) [My italics]
The principle o f absolute purity on which, according to Camus, the French Revolution 
attempted to build history is visible in its concept o f virtue: «Qu’est-ce que la vertu, en effet? 
Pour le philosophe bourgeois d’alors, c ’est la conformité à la nature et, en politique, la 
conformité à la loi qui exprime la volonté générale» (HR, 531-532). But then, nature «telle 
qu’on la rencontre chez Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, [...] aussi est un principe abstrait » (HR, 
532 note*), and Saint-Just’s pure law is the unrealistic and de-realising refusal to take into 
account the frailty o f human institutions, pointed out by Montesquieu, as arising from the 
boundlessness o f  human action, which Arendt traces in the human condition of natality.
As opposed to the passion o f compassion and to the sentiment of pity, solidarity 
operates, in Arendtian terms, as a principie o f action (OR, 84), brought forth in the pathos o f 
distance, which constitutes the inter-esse o f  the «aesthetic» community o f peers:
[...] it is out of solidarity that [men] establish deliberatively and, as it were, dispassionately a 
community o f interest with the oppressed and exploited. The common interest would then be the “grandeur of 
man”, or “the honor o f the human race”, or the dignity o f man. [...] solidarity , though it may be aroused by 
suffering, is not guided by it, and it comprehends the strong and the rich, no less than the weak and the poor, 
compared with the sentiment of pity, it may appear cold and abstract, for it remains committed to “ideas” -  to 
greatness, or honor, or dignity -  rather than to any “love” of men. [...] But pity, in contrast to solidarity, does 
not look upon both fortune and misfortune, the strong and the weak, with an equal eye; without the presence o f 
misfortune, pity could not exist, and it therefore has just as much vested interest in the existence o f the unhappy 
as thirst for power has a vested interest in the existence o f the weak. (OR, 84)
What emerges from these passages is that the «equal eye», which Arendt relates to 
solidarity, as the condition for the recognition o f human greatness, honour and dignity, is not 
identified with a levelling or simplifying view, in the sense - metaphorically formulated by 
Camus in terms o f  «drame ou mélodrame» (T, 1705) - o f a Manichean dichotomization and 20
202 «La vertu absolue est impossible, la république du pardon amène par une logique implacable la république 
des guillotines. Montesquieu avait déjà dénoncé cette logique comme l’une des causes de la décadence des 
sociétés, disant que l'abus de pouvoir est plus grand lorsque les lois ne le prévoient pas. La loi pure de Saint-Just 
n’avait pas tenu compte de cette vérité, vieille comme l ’histoire elle-même, que la loi, dans son essence, est 
vouée à être violée» (HR, 533). This passage resonates with Arendt’s analysis of action in HC : « Action [...] no 
matter what its specific content, always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force 
open all limitations and cut across all boundaries. Limitations and boundaries exist within the realm of human 
affairs, but they never offer a framework that can reliably withstand the onslaught with which each new 
generation must insert itself.» (HC, 190-191).
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reduction o f the complexity o f human affairs to the moral(izing) opposition Good versus
Evil.203 2045
As Martha Nussbaum points out in The Fragility o f  Goodness, tragedy traces «the 
history o f a complex pattern o f  deliberation» and «lays open to view the complexity, the
A A i
indeterminacy, the sheer difficulty o f  actual human deliberation»: the refusal o f  the
simplifying and abstract «alibi o f the (Evil) Enemy», thus, finds in the tragic paradigm of 
action an adequate model to rethink morality within the political, in the sense of a politics of
dignity.
Now, according to Benhabib, in OR Arendt does not distinguish between the morally 
good and the morally right, and excluding the “purity o f heart” from politics, she separates 
morality from politics.206 2071 argue, on the contrary, that the tragic confrontation between Billy 
Budd, as the illustration of absolute moral good (the “purity o f heart” of the French 
Revolutionaries), and Captain Vere, as the embodiment o f virtue (thus, distinguished from the 
moral good, and rather identified with the morally right) illustrates, precisely, the complexity 
of human deliberation as inseparable from political action - free action among peers thus 
being intrinsically moral, in the sense brought forth by tragedy.
Moreover, I suggest that the tragic paradigm provides an alternative model to (re)think 
human action and freedom outside and against the fabrication paradigm, which is operative in 
the politics o f the Western Tradition, as a politics of achievement.
The “unmasking” of the aesthetic paradigm of the political, consistently with the effort 
to think through the problem of modem and radical nihilism at the core o f the Western 
tradition of political thought, lays open a fundamental alternative, formulated by Arendt in 
the opening pages o f  her chapter o f  Action in HC -  namely, between the (aesthetic) political
AM
constellation o f achievement and the (aesthetic) political constellation o f dignity (HC, 181).
203 In the 1957 Conference on L ’Artiste et son temps, Camus explicitly uses the term to address a categorizing 
and absolute thought, as opposed to the artist’s finite thought of the finite, identified (Arendtianly) with the 
capacity to com-prehend: «S'il [l’artiste] jugeait absolument, il partagerait sans nuances la réalité entre le bien et 
le mal, il ferait du mélodrame. Le but de l’art, au contraire, n’est pas de légiférer ou de régner, il est d’abord de 
comprendre. » (E, 1091).
204 «Tragic storytelling serves not to settle questions but to unsettle them, and to inspire spontaneous critical 
thinking in its audience.» (L. Disch, op. c it, pp. 111-112).
205 Paolo Flores d’Arcais, “Hannah Arendt e il totalitarismo nelle democrazie”, Micro-Mega, /ilmanacco di 
Filosofia, 5/2003, p. 135.
206«The moral good, virtue, concerns indeed those dispositions, traits of character, emotions, and intentions that 
lead to virtuous conduct. The morally right concerns our public actions and interactions that affect, influence, 
and reflect upon the moral dignity and worth of the other as a public being», Seyla Benhabib, “Judgment and the 
Moral Foundations of Politics in Arendt’s Thought”, Political Theory, Vol. 16, N. 1, February 1988, p. 46.
207 Two constellations, which are related to the twofold etymology o f  the word “action” as archein (“to begin”, 
“to lead”, finally “to rule”) and prattein (“to pass through”, “to achieve”, “to finish”) (HC, 189).
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Human dignity is identified by Arendt with the “who” disclosed in deed and words - 
«[...] all those whom the war had failed to make known and had robbed thereby, not o f 
their achievement, but o f their human dignity» (HC, 181), the «unique and distinct identity o f 
the agent» (HC, 180) being lost wherever speech is reduced to “mere talk” or propaganda, and 
where the disclosure is limited to the deed, that is, to achievement.
Significantly, Arendt describes the w/io, which constitutes man’s dignity and 
uniqueness, as opposed to what (he made) , by recurring to the term «hero» in the Homeric 
acceptation o f «free man who participated in the Trojan enterprise and about whom a story 
could be told» (HC, 186): the Nietzschean reminiscence immediately calls upon the condition 
o f (primus) inter pares (HC,189), thus pointing to the original interdependence o f  the actor as 
beginner (as opposed to the actor as ruler) on others for action (plurality) (HC, 189-190),208 09 
and to his courage «without which action and speech and therefore, according to the Greeks, 
freedom, would not be possible at all» (risk) (HC, 186-7).
It is the emphasis on the revelatory quality o f action and speech in disclosing «the 
agent and speaker» (the “who”) (HC, 187), that offers an adequate account o f the primacy 
accorded by Arendt to theatre or drama (as play-acting), as the «political art par excellence» 
(HC, 188), over all the other various «forms of reification in art works which glorify a deed or 
an accomplishment» (HC, 187), bringing forth «the specific content as well as the general 
meaning o f action and speech» (Id.).
Thus, imitation or mimesis, as a  kind o f repetition (HC, 187), is an aesthetic or artistic 
“reification” or representation in the specific sense not of a fixation, or re-presentation as 
accomplishment, but o f a constantly renewed pres-ence in the re-enacting of the living flux o f 
acting and speaking of the actor(s) on stage.210 But, as Arendt points out,
the imitative element ties not only in the art o f the actor, but, as Aristotle rightly claims, in the making 
and writing o f the play, at least to the extent that the drama comes fully to life only when it is enacted in the 
theatre. Only the actors and speakers who re-enact the story’s plot can convey the full meaning, not so much of 
the story itself, but o f the “heroes” who reveal themselves in it. (HC, 187)
I suggest that we look for the meaning o f this pres-ence in Arendt’s appropriation of 
Greek tragedy. In HC she draws on tragedy to confirm her distinction between imitation
208 «This disclosure of “who” in contradiction to “what” somebody is -  his qualities, gifts, talents, and 
shortcomings, which he may display or hide -  is implicit in everything somebody says and does. [...] the “who”, 
which appears so clearly and unmistakably to others, remains hidden from the person itself, like the daimôn in 
Greek religion which accompanies each man throughout his life, always looking over his shoulder from behind 
and thus visible only to those he encounters» (HC, 179-180).
209 See HR, 700.
210 For this interpretation I draw on Adriana Cavarero’s distinction between presenza and rappresentanza in her 
analysis of theatrical metaphor (in Micro-Mega, 1996, op. cit, p. 147-148).
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(mimesis) and story(-telling), in the sense, precisely, that «the story’s direct as well as 
universal meaning», i.e. the content o f  action and speech, is revealed by the chorus, «which 
does not imitate and whose comments are pure poetry» (HC, 187), «whereas the intangible 
identities», i.e. the “who” that constitutes human dignity, «of the agents in the story, since 
they escape all generalization and therefore all reification, can be conveyed only through an 
imitation in their acting» (HC, 187-188).
This distinction is all the more interesting if  we consider that Arendt conceives the
^11dramatist’s playwriting as part and parcel of imitation, not of poetry (or story-telling): 
imitation is playwriting and the actor’s art. This distinction, I suggest, allows us to rethink 
the tension, pointed out by critics, «between an associative, communal, democratic, 
deliberative Arendt who admires the episodic revivals of political freedom, and an Arendt 
“captured” by the Greek model o f greatness, heroism, agonism, and aestheticized politics».
What 1 propose is to approach the question o f tragedy not from the viewpoint o f the 
Pythagorean spectator, or of the Chorus, but of the “hero”, that is, from the perspective of 
mimesis. The focus on imitation, while reconsidering tragedy from the (Nietzschean) 
perspective o f creation (as opposed to that o f the spectator), situates Arendt’s recourse to this 
literary genre within her attempt to think a post-metaphysical “aesthetic” paradigm o f the 
political outside and beyond the fabrication model o f the Western tradition o f political 
thought, which both Arendt and Camus trace in the concept of “achievement”.
It is not without reason that in HC tragedy is invoked to support Arendt’s analysis o f 
the “hero” as (tragic) actor and sufferer, exposed, that is, in the «already existing web of 
human relationships, with its innumerable, conflicting wills and intentions» (HC, 184), as 
opposed to the “author” or maker o f (his) story, which is at the core o f the Platonic-Christian 
tradition of political thought and o f the modem philosophies o f History.
The latter misconstrue the story resulting from action as a «fictional story, where 
indeed an author pulls the strings and directs the play. The fictional story reveals a maker 21*
211 Ï do not agree with Françoise Collin, who groups storytelling and novel writing together with tragedy as 
mimesis of the hero’s deed (see F. Collin, «N’être. Evénement et représentation», Politique et pensée. Colloque 
Hannah Arendt; Petite Bibliothèque Payot, Paris, 1996, p. 149.
2,2 J. Peter Euben, « Arendt’s Hellenism », CCA, 161.
212 «It is noteworthy that Plato, who had no inkling o f the modem concept of history, should have been the first 
to invent the metaphor o f an actor behind the scenes who, behind the backs o f acting men, pulls the strings and is
responsible for the story. The Platonic god is but the symbol for the fact that real stories, in distinction from 
those we invent, have no author, as such, he is the true forerunner of Providence, the “invisible hand”, Nature, 
the “world spirit”, class interest, and the like, with which Christian and modem philosophers o f history tried to 
solve the perplexing problem that although history owes its existence to men, it is still obviously not “made” by 
them.[...l The invisible actor behind the scenes is an invention arising from a mental perplexity but 
corresponding to no real experience.» (HC, 185).
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[...]. The real story in which we are engaged as long as we live has no visible or invisible 
maker because it is not made. The only “somebody” it reveals is its “hero” . [...] 
somebody is or was we can know only by knowing the story o f  which he is him self the hero -  
his biography [...]»  (HC, 186).
I suggest that tragedy and the metaphoric constellation o f theatre are invoked as an 
alternative way o f dealing with the past, and specifically, of taking into account 
beginning/foundation, outside and against the tradition,214 whose break-down in the 20th 
century had been systematically removed by (Neo)-Conservative and Liberal theorists 
through an accurate work o f “restoration”.215 «[Liberalism  and conservatism present 
themselves as the political philosophies which correspond to the much more general and 
comprehensive philosophy o f  history o f  the nineteenth century» (WA, 101), and, as such, are 
founded on the metaphysical fallacy (the fiction) o f the author/maker that lies at the core o f 
the (Platonic) fabrication paradigm o f the political.216
It is significant that, in Arendt’s understanding, human action abolishes the sequence 
o f temporality, «as though the actors were thrown out the temporal order and its continuity» 
(OR, 207), shattering all the attempts o f  causal thinking (the «reliable chain o f  cause and 
effect», Id.) to immunize reality against the (un-orderly) unpredictable and unexpected. The 
Arendtian “hero” is, thus - like Camus’ lucid  man exposed to the dis-ordering disclosure of 
the absurd - outside the linear time o f History, o f what Walter Benjamin addresses as «the 
idea of messianic time» 217
In his reconstruction of a «politics o f tragedy» in Arendt’s work, Pirro fails, in my 
view, to read the author’s scattered references to tragedy in the specific context o f  her critique 
o f the Historicist/nihilist paradigm o f the political.218 The inter- and intra-textual analysis
2,4 «[. ..] the undeniable loss of tradition in the modem world does not entail a  loss of the past, for tradition and 
past are not the same, as the believers in tradition on the one side and the believers in progress on the other 
would have us believe [...]» (WA, 94).
215 «Both liberalism and conservatism [...] are primarily concerned with restoration, with restoring either 
freedom or authority, or the relationship between both, to its traditional position. It is in this sense that they form 
two sides o f the same coin, just as their progress-or-doom ideologies correspond to the two possible directions of 
the historical process as such; if one assumes, as both do, that there is such a thing as a historical process with a 
definable direction and a predictable end, it obviously can land us only in paradise or in hell.» (BPF, 101).
2,6 Our reading is confirmed by Allen Speight, in his article on “Arendt and Hegel on the tragic nature of action”, 
according to whom «the dramaturgical character o f  [Arendt’s] view of action has an important tie to Hegel’s 
philosophy o f agency, also, and in some of its features is perhaps even more strongly modelled on -  or in 
contention with -  Hegel than with Heidegger.» (in Philosophy and Social Criticism , 28 (5), 2002, p. 524. My 
italics.
217 W. Benjamin, “Trauerspiel and Tragedy”, in Selected Writings, Vol. 1, 1913-1926, The Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, London, England, 1996, p. 56.
218 By relating tragedy to judgment, and pointing to «politics as a kind o f tragic theatre», Pirro maintains that 
«Arendt’s tragic framework serves the aim of promoting political freedom by evoking the life affirming rewards
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attempted in these pages, on the contrary, brings forth tragedy as the most adequate form to 
think the peculiar “time outside (historical) time” disclosed by human action.
It is significant that in his 1916 essay on «Trauerspiel and Tragedy», Benjamin 
situated in the actions o f great individuals the crucial point in which «historical time passes 
over into tragic time»: «In art, historical greatness can assume the form only o f tragedy».219 It 
is in the notion o f greatness that tragedy and the aesthetic/performative model o f action 
acquire their lull meaning outside and against the teleological and reifying logic o f 
achievement (HC, 206) o f the modem philosophy of History.
The opposition between a fabrication model (politics o f  achievement) and a 
performative model (politics o f dignity) is reflected in the opposition between the organic 
metaphor and the theatrical metaphor in the interpretation of revolutions. As Arendt points out 
in OR:
It is quite characteristic that, of the two similes currently used for descriptions and interpretations of 
revolutions, the organic metaphor has become dear to the historians as well as to the theorists of revolution -  
Marx, indeed, was very fond of the “birth-pangs o f revolutions” -  while the men who enacted the Revolution 
preferred to draw their images from the language o f  the theatre. The profound meaningfulness inherent in the 
many political metaphors derived from the theatre is perhaps best illustrated by the history of the Latin word 
persona. In its original meaning, it signified the mask ancient actors used to wear in a play. [...] The mask as 
such obviously had two functions: it had to hide, or rather to replace, the actor’s own face and countenance, but 
in a way that would m ake it possible fo r  the voice to  sound  through. (OR, 102)
The relation between persona and the idea that the political actor, as “beginner” o f  
revolutions, is expected by the law to play a part on the public scene «with the provision [...] 
that his own voice would be able to sound through» (Id.),220 brings to our attention a co­
implication o f the theatrical metaphor {persona), the tragic figure o f  the “hero” and speech.
This co-implication is confirmed, and acquires a specific meaning, in OR where the 
systematic negation of persona, and the reduction o f the legal persona to a deceitful mask
available to those who exercise freedom» (Robert Pirro, H annah A rendt and  th e  P olitics o f  Tragedy, Northern 
Illinois UP, 2001, p. 87). But such reading would simply contradict Arendt’s concept of judgment: as Simona 
Forti points out, «une teoria del giudizio politico che servisse ad orientare l’azione ¡menzionandola a partire da 
un’idea, riconnettendo cosi i due termini, ripercorrebbe quegli stessi binary che la Arendt aveva voluto 
abbandonare. Se, insomma, l’azione attraverso il giudizio attualizzasseun pensiero, seguirebbe una china, 
eseguirebbe un programma: la facoltà del giudizio farebbe di nuovo dell’agire la “conseguenza applicata”, la 
semplice esecuzione di un sapere [...] si ripresenterebbe, sotto sembianze diverse, quella stessa logica mezzi-fini 
in opposizione alla quale il pensiero arendtiano trova significato.» (in S. Forti, «Hannah Arendt e la facoltà di 
giudicare: considerazioni su un’eredità contesa», art. c it , p. 145).
2,9 W. Benjamin, “ Trauerspiel and Tragedy”, op. cit., p. 55.
220 « [ ...]  it was in this twofold understanding o f a mask through which a voice sounds that the word persona  
became a metaphor and was carried from the language of the theatre into legal terminology. The distinction 
between a private individual in Rome and a Roman citizen was that the latter had a persona , a legal personality 
[...]; it was as though the law had affixed to him the part he was expected to play on the public scene, with the 
provision, however, that his own voice would be able to sound through.» (OR, 102).
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(hypocrisy),221 brought about (in two opposite directions) by the French Revolution under the 
Reign o f Terror and by totalitarian terror, is seen as coinciding with speechlessness, that is, 
with the impossibility of communication.222 Now, «[s]peechless action would no longer be 
action because there would no longer be an actor, and the actor, the doer o f deeds, is possible 
only if he is at the same time the speaker o f  words. The action he begins is humanly disclosed 
by the word [.. .]»223 24(HC, 178).
The emphasis on language or speech, implicit in Arendt’s recourse to the theatrical 
metaphor and in her claim that imitation (mimesis) is playwriting and the actor’s art, is further 
confirmed by Camus through his ow n experience as actor, director and dramatist. As he 
declared in an interview, «le théâtre s’embrasse de peu de choses: de la toile pour le décor, 
et, pour la pièce, des caractères et un langage» (T, 1747-8).225
It is significant that Camus would devote a chapter to theatre and the (absurd) actor in 
MdS, as the illustration of his tragic finite thought o f  the finite (see Chapter 1).226 The word
221 «Linguistically, the Greek iwroKpiniç, in its original meaning as well as in its late metaphorical usage, 
signified the actor himself, not the mask, the ïipôoaMcov, he wore. In contrast, the persona , in its original 
theatrical sense, was the mask affixed to the actor’s face by the exigencies of the play [...]. The point of this 
distinction and the appositeness of the metaphor lie in that the unmasking o f the “person”, the deprivation of 
legal personality, would leave behind the “natural” human being, while the unmasking o f the hypocrite would 
leave nothing behind the mask, because the hypocrite is the actor himself insofar as he wears no mask.» (OR, 
103).
2"  According to Arendt, the men of the French Revolution «had no conception of the persona, and no respect for 
the legal personality which is given and guaranteed by the body politic.» (OR, 104). By liberating the «natural 
man in all men», that is, liberating the man’s natural goodness and absolute innocence, through the Rights of 
Man (Id.), the French Revolution, «by the unending hunt for hypocrites and through the passion for unmasking 
society», eventually tore away «the mask o f the p erso n a  as well, so that the Reign of Terror [...] spelled the 
exact opposite of true liberation and tru e  eq u a lity»  (Id.). The product of the reduction of politics to nature 
operated by the French Revolution through the Declaration of the Rights of Man is illustrated by Melville’s Billy 
Budd, the absolutely good and innocent man who, by lack of words, is forced to act violently by his very 
incapability to persuade. We could argue that the natural and absolutely innocent man, depicted by Melville, 
finds its historical incarnation in the figure of the refugee, significantly described by Arendt in terms of 
«absolute innocence» in C ollective R esp o n sib ility  (RJ, 150).
223 My italics.
224 Emission de Renée Saurel, « Douze auteurs en quête de personnages », non datée (probablement 1945-46).
225 As he would point out in the Preface to the American edition of his plays, the question of language is pivotal 
in the dramatist creation: «Faire parler le langage de la tragédie à des personnages contemporains, c’était au 
contraire mon propos. Rien de plus difficile à vrai dire puisqu’il faut trouver un langage assez naturel pour être 
parlé par des contemporains, et assez insolite pour rejoindre le to n  tragique» (T, 1731). It is (also) in this sense 
that Camus defined L e M alentendu  «une tentative pour créer une tragédie m oderne» (Id.)
226 In MdS the actor embodies the contradictoriness o f the absurd condition, expressing through his body the 
tragic conflict between the human demand for unity and permanence - «cette vaine tentative, cet entêtement sans 
portée» to attain everything, to live everything (MdS, 161) -  and human finitude: «C’est là que Facteur se 
contredit: le même et pourtant si divers, tant d ’âmes résumées par un seul corps» (Id.). In this sense the actor 
embodies the formula A A, by which Raymond Gay-Crosier defines the structure o f irony as «affirmative 
negation». Now, «l’ironie est la conscience (au double sens d’une mise en garde et d’une mise en evidence) de 
[...] la  mise en p a ro les» , which takes place under the sign of openness and provisional ity of discourse (R. Gay- 
Crosier, «L’ironie comme acte référentiel. La négation affirmative -  étude fonctionnelle», in A lbert Camus: 
paradigm es d e  l'iro n ie  — révo lte et néga tion  a ffirm a tive , op. cit., p. 12). Moreover, «si la référence ironique nie 
le référent (A^A) parce qu’elle refuse de le « re-présenter », elle «présente» néanmoins son refus comme 
affirmation d’un discours et d ’un sens pluriel (A=A) qu’elle livre à l’interprétation libre de l’interlocuteur ou du
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«théâtral [...] recouvre toute une esthétique et toute une morale»227 (MdS, 160), which is the 
finite morale de la quantité, founded on the absurd awareness o f the ultimate unfoundedness 
of a «univers qui sacrifie tout à l’apparence, et n’est fait que pour l’œil » (MdS, 161).
For Camus, as well as for Arendt, the actor’s performing art proves «[à] quel point le 
paraître fa it l'être» (MdS, 159) - «le corps est roi» (MdS, 160):
La convention du théâtre, c’est que le cœur ne s’exprime et ne se fait comprendre que par les gestes et 
dans le corps -  ou par la voix qui est autant de Pâme que du corps. La loi de cet art veut que tout soit grossi et se 
traduise en chair. (MdS, 160)228 29
Now, the perspective o f la chair, which is the mark o f Camus’ finite thought o f  the 
finite, shatters the teleological perspective, that reduces gesture to a means for an end, 
bringing about the moral self-containedness o f the actor’s performance.
In an interview in 1958 Camus defined theatre as the highest of literary genres (T, 
1726), «une histoire de grandeur racontée par des corps» (T, 1718): it is the actor, once 
more, who represents the living principle, the constantly-repeated-beginning, o f the unity o f 
re-enactmg and playwriting through speech.
I suggest that the “spectacularity” o f Eichmann’s trial is opposed to the theatrical 
disclosure o f the tragic hero, which in Arendt’s report is exemplified by the trial o f Shalom 
Schwartzbard in Eichmann in Jerusalem230 and can be imputed to the incapability o f the Nazi 
functionary to become a “hero”, that is, to reveal his person (whoness) through words.
Eichmann is not a (tragic) villain, in the sense o f a Iago or a Macbeth, or in the sense 
o f the calculating wickedness of a Richard III.231 What distinguishes him from the traditional 
villains of modem tragedies is his incapacity to remember -  memory being, together with the
lecteur. Ainsi l’ironie nie la possibilité d’une réification du référent pour d’autant mieux en affirmer sa 
textualisation » (Ivi, p. 17). Not only Camus situated his whole work under the sign o f irony, but his predilection 
for this type of structure is confirmed by the notes in the Carnets (May 1936), where the author introduces the 
theme of dédoublem ent to describe the capacity of the intellectual to assume two (or more) different and opposite 
viewpoints at the same time, and to critically examine each position through the exercise of doubt, keeping 
himself in a constant and positive tension between the various perspectives. We read in his notebooks in 
November 1942: «Pascal: l’erreur vient de l’exclusion» (CH, 58). In this sense, the actor, who embodies the 
tragic thought o f the MdS, is the illustration o f the critical two-sided thought which is the condition for the 
«enlarged mentality».
227 My italics.
228 Camus situates the absurd actor in the post-metaphysical and nihilistic horizon under Nietzsche’s word: «Ce 
qui importe, [...] ce n’est pas la vie étemelle, c’est l’étemelle vivacité» (MdS, 162).
229 The personal combination o f play-writing with a reflection on the role o f the actor emerges in Camus’ words 
in an interview in 1958 : «[...] l’Acteur [...] est le principal, le principe, l’âme incarnée du spectacle. Voir un 
acteur entrer dans son rôle, l’habiter, l’entendre p a rler de la voix m êm e qu ’on ava it entendue dans le  silence e t la  
so litu d e , c’est la plus grande joie qu’on puisse rencontrer dans ce métier » (T, 1718).
230 BE, 265.
231 In “Trauerspiel and Tragedy” Walter Benjamin significantly distinguishes classical tragedy from 
Shakespearian tragedy, pointing out that while the latter deals with the tragedy o f fate, Shakespeare deals «with 
the trag ic  hero, the tragic action.»  (in W. Benjamin, Selected  W ritings, op. cit., p. 56).
293
faculty o f promise, the distinctive feature o f the sovereign individual defined above which 
is inseparable from his fundamental incapability to think from  the standpoint o f  somebody 
else. And thoughtlessness is related, since the beginning o f  the report, to the functionary’s 
incapability to speak and communicate, that is, to formulate other than clichés or “empty 
words” -  the words and presence o f  others would not touch him.23,2
As Arendt points out in Some Questions o f  Moral Philosophy, the «trouble with the 
Nazi criminals was precisely that they renounced voluntarily all personal qualities, as if  
nobody were left to be either punished nor forgiven» (RJ, 111). According to the tragic model 
outlined above, punishment o f the tragic crime always concerns the who o f the agent, rather 
than the what (he has done): by refusing to think by themselves what they were doing, and by 
refusing to remember what they did, the Nazi criminals failed to constitute themselves into 
somebodies, to disclose their whoness: «By stubbornly remaining nobodies they prove 
themselves unfit for intercourse with others who, good, bad, or indifferent, are at the very 
least persons» (RJ, 112).
If  we assume that theatricality and tragedy are related in Arendt’s work to the author’s 
critique o f the Western tradition o f  political thought, and to her performative “aestheticism”, 
and that for Arendt, as well as for Camus, there can be no anachronistic return to the 
tradition,23 33 234I suggest that theatricality and tragedy operate toward, and must be understood in 
the light of, an anti-conservative and anti-Historicist effort, common to both these authors, to 
recover the arché of the political - the beginning/principle or, to use the Weilian expression, 
taken over by Arendt, the root o f human action and common dignity.
And this origin or root, I argue, is not something to be re-presented or glorified as a 
deed (a “w/iaf”) on stage, but is ex-posed in action and speech as the unfounded foundation of 
“law” as limit, which is brought about in the tragic «penser juste».235
In Some Questions o f Moral Philosophy what distinguishes Eichmann from the villain, 
«as somebody who is in despair and whose despair sheds a certain nobility about him» (RJ,
232 BE, 49.
233 «conservatives [...] clung to tradition and the past as to fetishes with which to ward off the future, without 
understanding that the very emergence o f revolution on the political scene as event or as threat had demonstrated 
in actual fact that this tradition had lost its anchorage, it beginning and principle, and was cut adrift» (OR, 161).
234 For Arendt, as well as for Camus, to «regain what former times called the dignity or the honor o f  m an» - that 
is not of mankind, a notion especially dear to modem Philosophies o f History, but o f « being human» in its 
plural singularity (RJ, 48) -  is to eliminate «the pernicious word “obedience” from our vocabulary o f moral and 
political thought» (Id.).
35 «[...] comme l’écrit Paul Ricœur commentant la lecture à 'A ntigone  par Nussbaum : « Un appel à bien 
délibérer (eubouiia) traverse obstinément la pièce : comme si « p en ser ju s te  » était la réplique cherchée à 
« souffrir le terrible » (pathein to  dem on) », Jacques Taminiaux, L a fille  d e  Thrace et te penseur pro fessionnel 
A rend t et H eidegger, op. cit., p. 136.
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94-95) - illustrated in Shakespeare’s tragedies, or in the character of the Emperor in Camus* 
Caligula -  is remembrance, as man’s capacity to “return” to the past event, to think back to 
and through it. While the villain «has to face himself again and [his] curse is that he cannot 
forget» (RJ, 95),236 237the greatest evildoers «don’t remember because they have never given 
thought to the matter, and, without remembrance, nothing can hold them bach» (Id.):
The danger, [...] not only for myself, whose speech, having forfeited the highest actualization o f the 
human capacity for speech, will therefore become meaningless, but also for others who are forced to live with a 
possibly highly intelligent and still entirely thoughtless creature, is very great If  l refuse to remember, I am 
actually ready to do anything -  just as my courage would be absolutely reckless if  pain, for instance, were an 
experience immediately forgotten. (RJ, 94).
The stabilizing force o f remembrance is inseparable from an imaginative thinking o f 
past events, which according to Arendt moves «in the dimension o f depth, striking roots» (RJ, 
95) and takes place in the form o f (retelling  the past in a story.238
Striking roots, thus, entails a capacity of dealing with the past through words: the 
greatest or banal evil is not radical, according to her, precisely because it has no roots, «and 
because it has no roots it has no limitations, it can go to unthinkable extremes and sweep over 
the whole world» (RJ, 95).
Arendt explicitly argues that it is the process o f  thought, actualizing «the specifically 
human difference o f  speech» (Id.), that constitutes the person -  the “who” constantly revealed 
again and anew, as opposed to the “what” (someone’s gifts, qualities, intelligence) - the true 
“subject” o f punishment, as exposed in the tragic plot, and o f the (Christian) notion of 
pardon.239
We could conclude, therefore, with Arendt, that the political concern o f tragedy «is not 
whether the act of striking somebody unjustly or of being struck unjustly is more disgraceful» 
(RJ, 93) - the tragic wisdom of the blind (Edipus is resumed, precisely, in the «Tout est bien» 
(T, 1709) as a savoir de non savoir - «The concern -  for both Camus and Arendt - is 
exclusively with having a world in which such acts do not occur» (RJ, 93).
236 The same is beautifully expressed in the words o f Caligula (T, 59).
237 My italics.
238 Remembrance, like thinking, is a speech process, which takes place through the reconsidering o f the past 
event in the form of «telling it to myself as a kind of story, preparing it in this way for its subsequent 
communication to others» (RJ, 93-94). Arendt emphasizes once more the plural dimension inherent in the 
Socratic-Platonic conception of the process of thinking as silent dialogue, as two-in-one (RJ, 96). In Réflexions 
sur la guillotine Camus would point out, in terms that echo Arendt’s, the abstracting and murderous relation 
between meaninglessness and loss of imaginative thought: «Quand l’imagination dort, les mots se vident de leur 
sens: un people sourd enregistre distraitement la condamnation d’un homme.» (E, 1023).
239 «In granting pardon, it is the person and not the crime that is forgiven» (RJ, 95), as in tragedy it is the 
blindness of the hero and not the crime that is punished: «in rootless evil there is no person left whom one could 
ever forgive» (Id.)
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Now, «[t]hinking and remembering [...] is the human way of striking roots, of taking 
one’s place in the world into which we all arrive as strangers» (RJ, 100): by pointing to the 
«redundancy to speak o f a moral personality» (Id.), Arendt clearly suggests that a morality 
stems from, and resides in the «roctf-stinking process o f thinking» and remembering as that, 
which brings forth limits to individual conduct - not imposed on him from the outside, but 
self-set limits (RJ, 101). It is significant that she would identify, through Socrates, the loss of 
this capacity with a  loss of creativity (Id.).
This notion o f  self-set limits and morality may be read in the light o f her analysis o f 
promise, which in OR she traces at the foundation o f  the Roman societas, as an exchange of 
words through which human beings endowed with memory, thus with a certain reliability and 
accountability for the future, throw «islands o f certainty» and stability in an ocean of 
uncertainty without recourse to transcendent sanction or absolute (OR, 169,175).
Montesquieu’s concept o f  law as rapport, reviving the strictly Roman sense o f the 
term,240 thus provides an understanding o f  limit which is alternative to the traditional one - 
implicit in the concept o f law as boundary imposed from outside and above - 241 law/rapport 
evokes a mutual con-tact inter pares, allowing to think action under conditions o f equality: 
«no more than “rules” or regies which determine the government of the world and without 
which a world would not exist at all» (OR, 189).242 243
It is significant that in a note in January 1952 Arendt would identify injustice as a 
violating act, which destructs the inter-esse that constitutes the world, and she would invoke 
Dike -  in terms that strikingly recall Camus’ Nemesis in HR - in order to restore the shattered 
balance, the tension brought forth exclusively in/as rapport (limit).
240 Both the Greek vójío^, with its stress on the “artificiar* man-made nature of the boundaries that drew the 
limits of the political space,240 and the Roman lex, originally meaning «’’intimate connection” or relationship, 
namely something which connects two things or two partners whom external circumstances have brought 
together» (OR, 188), according to Arendt needed no transcendent source o f authority, that is, were not conceived 
as being imposed from above (OR, 187).
241 Law as “commandment”, of Jewish origin, which according to Arendt entails authority (OR, 189), and is 
inscribed in the ruler/ruted vertical relationship.
242This citation is all the more relevant if  we consider that, in Arendt’s view, this concept o f  law emanates from 
Montesquieu’s concern with action rather than with “the nature o f government” (HC, 190, n. 17), and this is, 
precisely, the perspective disclosed by imitation {mimesis). Moreover, the affinity of this concept o f  law with the 
finite perspective o f  the tragic thought, that emerges in Camus’ political writings, from MdS to HR, is 
particularly striking in the following passage taken from OR: «Neither religious nor natural laws, therefore, 
constitute for Montesquieu a “higher law”, strictly speaking; they are no more than relations which exist and 
preserve different realms o f being. And since, for Montesquieu as for the Romans, a law is merely what relates 
two things and therefore is relative by definition, he needed no absolute source of authority and could describe 
the “spirit o f he laws” without ever posing the troublesome question of their absolute validity.» (OR, 189).
243 From her Denktagebuch 1950 bis 1973, translated by Luca Savarino in Micro-Mega. Almanacco di Filosofa, 
5/2003, p. 34.
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It is the focus on the world, or on that «irreplaceable in-between» men (MDT, 4), not 
as object of possession and preservation in its orderly fixation, but as relational “space”, that, 
in my view, makes tragedy most suitable to think a fictitious (“aesthetic”) space of equality 
freed from the logic o f retaliation, which Nietzsche, from his incompIete-nihiWsiic emphasis 
on the will to power, had conceived as the distinctive feature o f  the free men, but which 
remains anchored to the perspective o f what-ness.
Tragic punishment, on the contrary, replaces the (political) perspective o f the what by 
that of who as always already including plurality -  a plurality that the crime (injustice) 
destroys together with the person (the “who”).
It is in this sense that, in On Humanity in Dark Times, Arendt draws the attention to 
Lessing’s reflection on tragic pleasure, the source of which he traces in all passions (as «even 
the most unpleasant, are as passions pleasant” because “they make us...more conscious o f our 
existence , they make us feel more real”», MDT, 6) as affects «in which we are affected by 
ourselves just as in the world we are ordinarily affected by other people» (Id.).
According to Arendt, Lessing was «concerned with the effect upon the spectator, who 
as it were represents the world, or rather, that worldly space which has come into being 
between the artist or writer and his fellow men as a world common to them» (MDT, 7).
Arendt «deliberately mention[s] tragedy because it more than any other literary forms 
represents a process o f  recognition» (MDT, 20) through repetition, not in the sense of an 
obsessive and stabilizing reiteration/reification of the what (the deed), but rather, in the sense 
o f  a de-stabilizing re-suffering (passion passive) by memory or recollection of «the network 
o f  individual acts» (MDT, 20), which carries the relationality (plurality) or liminality o f the 
who into the event or significant whole -  in Camus’ terms, the artist or writer’s «unity» - in 
the form of an «ever-recurrent narration» (MDT, 21).
The link between the perspective o f  the “hero” (actor) and that o f the tragic choir (as 
spectator) - or, to say in Arendtian terms, between acting and thinking - is, thus, brought about 
by the artist’s word, which creates the world ( inter-esse) o f men.
Artistic creation, in the nihilistic horizon of what Nancy describes as the « interrupted 
m yth »,24 546 retains the theoria (vision) of ancient Greek tragedy, identified with a «pensée aux 
deux visages, [qui] laisse presque toujours courir en contre-chant, derrière ses mélodies les 
plus désespérées, la parole étemelle d’Œdipe qui, aveugle et misérable, reconnaîtra que tout
244 «[♦■•] for Lessing the essence of poetry was action [...)» (MDT, 6). My italics.
245 My italics.
246 In J.-L. Nancy, La communauté désœuvrée, op. cit.
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est bien. Le oui s ’équilibre au non» (HR, 439). Tragedy, thus, exposes that philosophy o f 
limit, brought about by revolt, which closes Camus* political reflection in HR.
It is, precisely, from the perspective o f a politics of dignity - as a politics of the who, 
opposed to the politics o f possession and achievement (of the what) - that I suggest we 
reconsider Arendt’s emphasis on the political role o f  the storyteller and the poet, as well as 
Camus’ affirmation o f the political role o f the artist, as stemming from a common concern for 
the world, conceived by both authors as existing in/as relation  against all ideological 
simplification of reality to a total and totalising sum o f  abstract entities (Man, the individual 
and its -ism , the objective Enemy).
In the concluding chapter o f OR, Arendt would oppose to the post-war Liberal and 
Conservative political theories, in their incapability to understand the political and moral 
breakdown o f the 20th century, and to rethink the political outside the categories o f a tradition 
shattered by the totalitarian experience, thus, incapable to abandon the «beaten paths o f 
ideologies» (OR, 225), to the two-sided view o f the poets, as guardians of the «lost treasure» 
o f revolutions (OR, 284).
The latter is “rooted” in the two-faced (ambiguous) character of the political arche as 
founding /beginning, coupling the complete arbitrariness of human action with men’s need to 
throw some “islands” of stability, to “cut out” horizons of durability to save their words and 
deeds from their mortality or futility (OR, 222).
We could argue that, for both Arendt and Camus, the murderous drives o f the (bio­
political) contempt o f sheer existence, which the two authors designate in terms o f absolute or 
radical nihilism, and both recognize at the core o f traditional politics, as a politics o f what- 
ness or achievement, can be overcome only from a perspective (theoria) that does not reduce 
existence to abstract and fictitious object or material (silhouettes), in the hands of the political 
Architect,247 but which takes into account «the datum o f the human condition» as ex-istence, 
that is, from the «a radical phenomenology o f the fundamental materiality o f human beings 
who are incarnated singularities, existing here and now» - 248 which is the artist’s aisthetic or 
tragic perspective o f la chair, disclosed by Camus in the MdS.
Replacing sheer existence, as mere abstraction, by the relational or liminal being-in- 
the-world (the revolted «Nous sommes»), tragic thought discloses the ever-repeated 
possibility o f  a politics o f dignity (of the who), against all «pseudo-scientific nonsense -  *24
247The fabrication/ architectural model o f  political (revolutionary) action, from Robespieire (OR, 210) to Hitler 
(cf. Miguel Abensour, “Architecture et régimes totalitaires”).
24* A. Cavarero, “Politicizing Theory”, P o litica l T heory, August 2002, p. 528.
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particularly in the social and psychological sciences» (OR, 222) -  as Camus would wntc in 
1955: «[...] au-delà du bien-être, vers l ’honneur de vivre» (E, 1748).249 2501
This, I would argue, is precisely the pivot of Camus’ series of articles devoted to the 
Algerian crisis in Express between 1955 and 56. As he would write to Pierre Lcbar in 1952. 
ever since his 1939 report on La misère de la Kabylie for the daily paper Alger-RcpuhUcam. 
«je n’ai jamais mené réellement d’autre lutte politique» than the one against colonialism/^
In an article, «La table ronde» (18th October 1955), Camus clearly opposes two 
concepts of the political: the first one, embodied by the politics of déshonneur and 
exploitation (CAC6, 59), perpetuates the impasse of terrorism and colonial repression through 
a series of «marchandages impuissants, destinés à maintenir au pouvoir des hommes qui ont 
apparemment choisi le métier de politicien pour n ’avoir pas de politique»1*1 (CAC6. 70); the 
other is, precisely, a politics of recognition of «personnes», founded on the radical 
phenomenology, which we have addressed as aisthetic thought,252 2534a thought of la ctuiir 
opposed to all simplifying ideology of the abstract «invisible enemy».255
The plea in favour o f a round table, that would gather all the parlies involved • «les 
représentants du gouvernement, ceux de la colonisation, et ceux des mouvements arabes 
(U.D.M.A., Ulémas, et les deux tendances du M.T.L.D.) » (CAC6, 45-6) - as a concrete
«I# «
solution to the «épreuve de force généralisée» (CAC6,44), must be understood, I suggest, 
in the light o f the writer’s effort to replace the totalitarian principle of collective responsibility 
(CA C6,44) by that o f personal responsibility, at the core of the political.
249 My italics.
250 C ahiers A lbert Camus 6. A lbert Camus éditorialiste à L'Express (mai 1955-février 1956, Paris, Gallimard, 
1987 (from now on CAC6), p. 13.
251 My italics.
252 In « Le vrai débat » (Express, 4 June 1955) Camus insists, in terms that are very close to Arendt's thoughts on 
Revolution, that «l’idée de revolution ne retrouvera sa grandeur et son efficacité qu'à partir du moment où elle 
renoncera au cynisme et à l’opportunisme dont elle a fait sa loi au XX siècle, [...] [et) mettra au centre de son 
élan la passion irréductible de la liberté» (CAC6, 34). Camus traces the «chances d’une rénovation créatrice* 
(Id.) in (direct) continuity with the thought that animated the political engagement in the Resistance, thus, 
pointing to the common effort of the French Left to resign conformism by gathering uses forces, sa volonté de 
lucidité et son exigence de justice autour de l’idée de liberté, alors peut-être renaîtra la solidarité qui fut la notre 
et que, pour ma part, je n ’ai jamais oubliée ni humiliée.» (CCA6, 35). Between 1954 and 55 Camus took a clear 
position in the favour of Pierre Mendès France. As P. Smets points out, the «Front républicain lui paraissait être 
une force susceptible de revitaliser la gauche libérale, d’imposer des réformes sociales cl d’infléchir la mentalité 
des Français vers plus de fraternité en Algérie [...] » (CAC6,21).
253 «Le monde aujourd’hui est celui de l ’ennemi invisible; le combat y est abstrait et c’est pourquoi nen ne 
l’éclaire et ne l’adoucit. Voir l’autre, et l’entendre, peut donner un sens au combat, et peut-être aussi le rendre 
vain » (CAC6,70).
254 «[.„] l’action terroriste et la répression sont, en Algérie, deux forces purement négatives, vouées toutes deux
à la destruction pure, sans autre avenir qu’un redoublement de fureur et de folie » (CAC6,43).
The principles of equality and difference are, thus, at the root of Camus’ concept of a 
Franco-Arab federation, conceived as an association o f  persons (CA C6,48) -  a person being 
defined by the twofold capacity to express herself and to make herself heard (CAC6,49).
For Camus, as well as for Arendt, the table becomes the metaphor of the “political 
space”, as opposed to the State, where men mutually recognize each other as persons, by 
being seen and heard. Colonialism, he argues, brought about the de-personalisation o f the 
Arab people by reducing the latter to utter despair, silence and wretchedness,255 which equally 
deprived France o f  its interlocutor (CAC6,49).
Camus repeatedly addresses the endless sequence o f terrorist attacks and repressive 
measures as «tragedy». The tragic dimension o f  the spiral o f violence is visible in the article 
«Les raisons de l’adversaire» (Express, 28th October 1955):
Quand l’opprimé prend les armes au nom de la justice, il fa it  un p a s  su r la  terre de l ’in justice . Mais il 
peut avancer plus ou moins et, si telle est la loi de ¡’histoire, c’est en tout cas la loi de l’esprit que, sans cesser de 
réclamer justice pour l’opprimé, il ne puisse l’approuver dans son injustice, au-delà de certaines limites. Les 
massacres des civils, outre qu’ils relancent les forces d’oppression, dépassent justement ces limites, et il est 
urgent que tous le reconnaissent clairement. (CAC6, SO) [My italics]
The emphasis on dialogue among persons,256 257which traces freedom in the recovery o f equality 
in difference, is at the core of Camus’ proposal o f a federal solution of the Algerian crisis, 
disclosed and made possible only by «le courage de reconnaître les raisons de l’adversaire qui 
présentement le combat à mort» (CAC6, 81-82), that is, by the capacity to understand and 
take into account (comprehension through imagination) the perspective of the other -that is, 
through a tragic theoria.
The artist, «whose business is to f in d  and make the words we live by» (OR, 284), 
precisely by virtue o f being “creator” and guardian o f m en's world (intéressé) through 
words, is the bearer o f this tragic theoria:
What saves the affairs o f  mortal men from their inherent futility is nothing but th is incessant ta lk  about 
them , which in its turn remains futile unless certa in  concepts, certa in  g u ideposts fo r  fu tu re  rem em brance, and  
even  fo r  sheer reference, arise out o f  it. (OR, 222) [My italics]
The stress on the political relevance o f words beyond nihilism, is what emerges in 
Arendt’s essay on Benjamin - «naming through quoting became for him the only possible and 
appropriate way o f dealing with the past without the aid o f  tradition»251 (MDT, 204).
255 «Le peuple arable, déraciné de son passé, sans perspective d’avenir, immobilisé dans un perpétuel présent n’a 
plus d’autre choix que le silence et la violence» (CAC6,48).
56 In the articles of E xpress Camus uses the term “person” to address Algeria as a people (CAC6,51).
257 My italics.
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Benjamin’s critical method is seen as replacing the perspective o f  the what with a perspective 
of the who:25* now, it is significant that this «man in dark times» would situate the tragic «in 
the laws governing the spoken word between human beings. [ ...]  Tragedy is not just confined 
exclusively to the realm of dramatic speech; it is the only form proper to human dialogue. 
That is to say, no tragedy exists outside human dialogue, and the only form in which human 
dialogue can appear is that of tragedy. [ ...]  In tragedy, speech and the tragic arise together, 
simultaneously, on the same spot. [...] It is the pure word itself that has an immediate tragic 
force».258 59
Arendt and Camus both highly praised the poet René Char: Arendt quotes his 
aphorisms in the concluding pages of OR to «testify to the involuntary self-disclosure, to the 
joys o f  appearing in word and deed» (OR, 285),260 2613experienced by the author during the 
Resistance; while Camus traces in his work the renaissance o f  that «dure et rare tradition » of 
tragic wisdom, which runs from Empedocles to Nietzsche (E, 1163-64).
In Char's « condensation furieuse de l’image, un épaississement de la lumière qui 
l’éloigne de cette transparence abstraite que nous ne réclamons le plus souvent que parce 
qu’elle n’exige rien de nous» (E, 1164), according to Camus, «[V]homme et Vartiste, [...] 
marchent du même pasy [...] trempés hier dans la lutte contre le totalitarisme hitlérien, 
aujourd’hui dans la dénonciation des nihilismes contraires et complices qui déchirent le 
monde». It is m his work that the co-implication o f the tragic and beauty acquires its full 
(im)political meaning: « En plein combat, voici un poète qui a  osé nous crier : « Dans nos
ténèbres, il n’y a pas une place pour la beauté. Toute la place est pour la beauté ». Dès cet 
instant, face au nihilisme de son temps et contre tous les reniements, chaque poème de Char a 
jalonné une route d'espérance. (E, 1165).
258 «Against tradition the collector pits the criterion o f genuineness; to the authoritative he opposes the sign of 
origin. To express this way of thinking in theoretical terms: he replaces content [i.e. the what] with pure 
o rig ina lity  or authenticity [...]» (MDT, 199)






T r a g e d y  a n d  A e s t h e t ic  P o l it ic s  
- C o n clu sio n  -
Camus noted in his Carnets in 1947 :
Les reproches parce que m es livres n e  m etten t p a s en  r e lie f l ’aspect politique. Traduction : ils veulent 
que j e  m ette en scène d es partis. Mais moi, j e  n e  m ets p a s en  scène que des individus, opposés à la  m achine 
d 'È ta t, parce que je sais ce que je  dis. (Cil, 233-4). [My italics]
I suggest that the reference to tragedy and theatricality in the work of Albert Camus 
and Hannah Arendt challenges the traditional approaches to the question o f (political) 
representation,264 providing some important insights into what is currently acknowledged as 
the «measured anarchism» o f the former, and the «new republicanism» of the latter,265 26
reconsidering their federalist “solutions” in the light o f  their common effort to re-think the 
political beyond nihilism.
The mise en scène o f the (modem) tragic conflict between individuals and the machine 
o f the State — retold and re-enacted on stage in the con-frontation between freedom (revolt) 
and order (religious/metaphysical or political)- ex-poses, in my view, the problem, which 
Esposito addresses through the concept o f  «irrepresentable plurality», o f the possibility of 
reframing political action outside and against the logic o f  incorporation, traced by both Camus 
and Arendt at the core o f totalitarian domination.
In their reflections on the absolute or radical nihilism at work in the totalitarian 
«factories o f corpses», as laboratories o f  the limitless «everything is possible», which realize 
the manipulation and artificialization of the human condition into sheer existence, Arendt and 
Camus exceed the traditional approaches to nihilism, which confined the phenomenon to a
264 R. de Aguila suggests to interpret the tragic tension between necessity and liberty in the sense of a political 
conflict between two opposite models: the rules o f necessity in the “reason of state”, aiming «to overcome the 
tensions and contradictions o f political action», on the one hand, and the virtit (as knowledge and courage) of the 
political actor acting in plurality and competition, on the other. Identifying the “path of necessity” with the 
emancipatory tradition, from Jacobinism to Leninism, and the radical movements (nationalism, fascisms), de 
Aguila remarks that «this way of thinking about politics has attained security and certainty at the expenses of 
liberty». This latter can be secured, he suggests, only in a political context o f plurality and competition, which 
open the space for what he defines as “tragic choice”, in the sense o f a capability to conceive alternative courses 
of action. (R. de Aguila, op. cit., pp. 16-ff.)
265 R. Gay-Crosier speaks o f a « measured anarchism » in Camus* work (in R. Gay-Crosier, A lbert Camus : 
Paradigm es de l ’ironie —révo lte  e t négation a ffirm a tive , Éditions Paratexte, Trinity College, Toronto, Canada, 
2000), while Margaret Canovan insists on Arendt*s “new republicanism” (in H annah Arendt. A Reinterpretation  
o f  H er P olitica l Thought, Cambridge UP, 1992, pp. 201-fï).
266 R. Esposito, (a cura di), L a p lu ra lité  irrappresentabile. II pensiero  p o litico  d i H annah A rendt, Urbino, 
Quattroventi, 1987. See also, R. Esposito, “La modemità tra politico e “impolitico”, in Logiche e  crisi della 
m odernité, C. Galli Ed., op. cit., p. 159- 172.
302
moral défaillance in the European panorama of the 19th century fin  de siècle, and trace 
nihilism at the core o f the Western concept o f the political qua «aesthetic».
I would not agree with Denise Souche-Dagues, according to whom Camus’ HR 
confirms and may be inscribed in a «scepticisme envers l’engagement politique de type 
sartrien [qui] exprime dans les années Cinquante bien plus qu’un scepticisme à l’égard de 
l’Histoire: un véritable désespoir [...]» .267 As I have attempted to show, the 
distinction/opposition between totality and unity in HR - which can be read together with 
Arendt’s distinction between incorporation and (political) organization in HC -  brings into 
focus a tension between two alternative aesthetic paradigms o f the political -  namely, 
between a /?oieric/architectural paradigm, structured on the vertical model of dominion 
(ruler/ruled, master/slave, executioner/victim), and submitted to the logic of the body/matter 
(le corps); and a theatrical/performative/creative paradigm, associated to an horizontal model 
o f political action inter pares under conditions of honour, courage and greatness, among 
persons.
It is, precisely, the notion o f person that allows, in both Arendt and Camus’ work, to 
escape the transcendentalist dialectic o f representation, as (self)-representation of a subject, 
structured on a Manichean opposition between represented and representation, 268 between 
image/subject (mask) and body/object (nature).269
The co-incidence of the fallacious logic of incorporation/incorporeality as rooted in 
the fictional notion o f the body (corps)y in the sense of an abstract (sheer) existence separated 
from its form or idea, runs through the pages o f HR, and is explicitly denounced by Arendt in 
the twofold movement o f French Terror, which incorporates the “natural man” by stripping 
o ff  the mask of the disguised traitor; and of Totalitarian (Bolshevik) Tenor, whose 
incorporeal “Objective Enemy” de-realizes the living human beings through the application to 
an arbitrarily selected people of an ideologically fabricated mask (OR, 95-ff).
The recourse to the tragic notion o f  “hero” to (re)introduce the moral perspective o f 
the person into the political discourse can, thus, be read in the light of Nancy’s threefold
267 D. Souche-Dagues, N ihilism es, PUF, 1996, p. 221.
268 See Jean-Luc Nancy, Ê tre singulier p lu rie l, op. cit., p. 91-ff.
269 Tragedy can thus be conceived, with Nancy, not as a “space” o f re-presentation  (which would imply an 
ontology of subjectivity, which the absurd or tragic thought explodes), but rather as the unfounded non-space 
opened up as aisthetic presen t or fic tio n a l space, in which and through which the actor’s body (la chair) says the 
impossibility o f the re-presentation of the community as totality -  the impossibility o f the community-as-work- 
of-art, that re-presents itself as work to the public’s vision (see J.-L. Nancy, SM, 61-67). In this sense, tragedy re­
enacts on stage the être-partagé, the original liminality and relationality of the being-in-the-world: the insertion 
o f  an absolute claim within the liminal realm o f human com-pearance destroys ex-istence by attempting to 
introduce the in-finite into the finite -  the fury that finitizes the infinite, (cfr. Nancy, EL, 72-73).
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distinction among the world of myth, as the world of the given pre-supposition, the world of 
onto-theoiogy, as the world of the posed or produced pre-supposition - which is undermined 
by the bad infinity o f its poietic (end/means, cause/effect) logic, and has its ultimate 
denouement in nihilism - and the (political) perspective o f  «creation» as the reverse o f 
nihilism.270 271
It is, precisely, by situating Camus’ and Arendt’s appropriation o f tragedy and 
theatricality on the backdrop o f their rejection o f the logic o f  incorporation/incorporeality, 
consistently with their analyses o f absolute or radical nihilism, that, I suggest, their political 
thought, and especially the republican and anarchic elements, repeatedly pointed out by their 
critics, acquire a specific meaning, as an attempt to do away with the «presence» o f the 
object/truth (which, I would point out, should not be confused with the two author’s emphasis 
on the need to “save” factual truth against the de-realizing effects o f ideology), and to replace 
it with the «present» (hic-et-nunc) o f a thought o f no-presupposition.
The analysis o f Camus’ MdS in Chapter 1 has brought into focus a peculiar aisthetic 
or tragic perspective, which I have traced back to the author’s effort to define a good  use o f 
nihilism, in the sense of a finite thought o f the finite - as a thought, precisely, of no- 
presupposition.272 273
The tragic does away with the identity o f Object/Truth/Body and provides, from 
Camus’ 1942 writings to the late Fifties articles, the categories for re-thinking the political at 
the «point zero» o f politics, reformulating the question o f the possibility o f  political action 
from the (philosophically inconceivable) perspective o f la chair, which takes into account
the inherent plurality and liminality o f  man’s absurd être au monde?1*
270 The question is resumed by J.-L. Nancy as follows: «Le monde du mythe, et du polythéisme, est le monde de 
la présupposition donnée. L’onto-théologie -  la suspension du mythe — est au contraire l’ordre de la 
présupposition posée : activement posée comme affirmation du Dieu unique et/ou comme thèse de l’être. Dès 
lors qu’elle n’est pas donnée, mais posée, la présupposition contient aussi le principe de sa propre déposition, 
puisqu’elle ne peut rien présupposer comme une cause (ni, donc, comme une fin), ou comme une production, 
sans repousser d’autant les limites du monde. [...] En d’autres termes, si le nihilisme correspond à 
l’accomplissement de l’onto-théologie selon la logique d’un infini («m auvais») de la présupposition, en 
revanche une pensée de la « création » constitue l’exact revers du nihilisme, conformément à la logique d’une 
présupposition nulle (qui équivaut aussi à un « bon » infini, ou infinité actuelle). Le ex n ih ilo  ne contient rien de 
plus, mais rien de moins, que l’ex- de l’ex-istance ni produite ni construite, mais seulement étante [...] Et cet ex 
n ih ilo  fracture de l’intérieur le noyau dur du nihilisme. Ni donné ni posé, le monde est seulement présent [...].» 
(J.-L. Nancy, L a création du  m onde ou la  m ondialisation , op. cit., p. 94-95).
271 See note 245.
272 On tragic thought as a thought of no-presupposition, see S. Givone, D isincanto  d e l m ondo e  pensiero  tragico, 
Milano, 1989.
273 Esposito has recently drawn thè attention to thè radicai alternative between thè organic metaphors o f thè body 
politic and thè disclosure o f  a perspective o f la  chair, in thè sense o f thè inherently plural carnai existence freed 
from all totalizing hypostasis: «Proprio il collasso dei regimi totalitari [...] porta questa dialettica 
apparentemente inesauribile di scorporazione e reincorporazione ad un punto di non ritorno al di là del quale si 
apre un nuovo orizzonte di senso: ciò che finalmente si profila è la possibilità di portare in superficie quella
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It is from the tragic perspective o f la chair that Camus’ political engagement, from 
Combat to the articles for Express, joins Arendt’s political reflection, from Approaches to the 
“German Problem ” to OR and Civil Disobedience. The two authors bring forth a horizontal 
conception o f political (interaction, centred on a notion of law as rapport or limit, which 
breaches the vertical structure o f authority/dominion (whose nihilistic implications they both 
denounce), founded on the immunitarian identification o f the body politic with an organism 
protected and de-limited by «boundaries».
The emphasis on grand style and creation in Camus’ HR, as well as on Arendt’s 
political appropriation o f Nietzsche’s moral reflection in the Genealogy, provides, in this 
sense, essential insights into an aesthetic concept of the political, which re-thinks the problem 
o f representation, namely o f the relation between individual and State, from the “relative” 
perspective o f a thought o f no-presupposition.
Ankersmit’s recent attempt to define an Aesthetic politics,276 found - not “founded” or 
fabricated - in the aesthetic gap between represented and representation, answers to a similar 
concern to tackle the question of the relation individual/State from an alternative perspective, 
which would escape the totalitarian drifts o f incorporation — exemplified, in the author’s 
view, on the one hand, by mimetic representation, visible in the Nazi Politics as Total Art; 
and by direct democracy, identified with Rousseau’s general will, on the other.
Ankersmit’s criticism of the Liberal, Republican and Communitarian traditions o f 
contemporary political philosophy,277 points to two aspects, which he traces at the core o f  all 
three perspectives, namely that «the individual is always considered to be the basis or 
“ foundation” o f the social and political order; and no clear distinction is made between the 
social or pre-political, and the political order», with the result that individualism «goes 
together in all these three traditions of contemporary political philosophy with the absence o f  
an effective barrier against the complete politicization o f  all interhuman relationships».
“came primordiale” cui nessuna filosofìa ha finora saputo dare un nome [...]» (R. Esposito, Immuri it as, op. cit.,
&.l43)-As I have shown, the emphasis on contingency, risk, finitude, unpredictability in Camus’ MdS, and confirmed 
in the definition of the pensée de Midi as a philosophy of limits in HR, is echoed by Arendt’s pages on action in 
HC.
275 Esposito insists on the co-implication of Law and Force/power, as the transcendental presupposed and 
execution of the former, as the mark of the traditional relation between I us and the political, which rests on the 
immunitarian reduction of life to sheer matter, to be preserved and ordered within the legal confines of the body 
politic (State) (in R, Esposito, Immunitas, op. cit., 12-ff.).
276 F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics. Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value, Stanford UP, California, 
1996.
277 Ivi, p. 7.
278 Ivi, p. 7.
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In his concern to secure the body politic against what he describes as the seductions o f 
totalitarianism, inherent in much pre-nineteenth century political thought,279 Ankersmit 
opposes to sheer individualism the «recognition o f the existence o f a sphere that cannot have 
its foundation in the individual and that possesses its own autonomy with regard to the 
individual citizen», as the most effective protection against the totalitarian conflation o f state 
and society - «Our real freedom is a freedom rather “found” than “founded” (or “made”)».280
It is in the attempt to save the “brokenness” o f  the political domain, and the relative 
autonomy between state and society, against the totalizing “unity” brought about by the 
totalitarian aestheticization of the political, that Ankersmit appeals to «the insurmountable 
aesthetic barrier between the represented and its representation», visible in the work o f  art, to 
define the nature o f  political power, and, thus, its legitimacy, as “found” (not founded) in the 
unbridgeable aesthetic gap between the State (the representation) and the electorate (the 
represented).281
His definition o f  an “Aesthetic Politics”, as opposed to Totalitarian forms o f political 
representation (Total State) and direct democracy (Total Society), lies on the insight that 
visual arts offer «a substitute for reality [which] admittedly evokes an “illusion” o f reality, but 
which nevertheless remains distinguishable from reality itself»,282 283 thus aesthetic 
representation entails a difference, rather than an identity, between the represented and the 
representative.
Not only this difference or aesthetic gap (to use Ankersmit’s formula) emerges in 
Camus’ analysis o f creative unity and grand style, in the Chapter on art and revolt in HR, as 
inseparable from the tragic awareness o f the absurd touching-upon o f la chair,,283 but it is also 
the pivot o f  Arendt’s “dramaturgical” model o f political action in HC.
What Ankersmit, nevertheless, seems to overlook, but emerges from the comparative 
analysis o f the two abovementioned authors, is that the so-called “aesthetic gap” between the 
representative (as figura  pietà) and the individuality represented, cannot per se constitute a 
bulwark against the immunitarian logic o f incorporation: the focus on organization in 
Arendt’s analysis o f totalitarian terror exposes the nihilistic dimension at the core o f political 
action, as its permanent possibility (hybris).
279 Ibidem.
280 Ivi, p 8.
281 Ivi, p. 18.
282 Ivi, pp. 45-46.
283 Esposito insists on thè concepì o f «différence charrtelle» inherent in thè sensory toucher. «Questa 
impossibilità di co-appartenenza, o di co-donazione simultanea -  che rende il chiasma tra mano toccante e mano 
toccata sempre sospeso -h a  Peffetto di disfare ogni possibile identificazione tra carne e corpo» (R. Esposito, 
Immunitas, op. cit., p. 142).
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By rethinking the “aesthetic gap” not as a “hollow” space between the individual and 
his representative, but as the limit ( r a p p o r t ) ,on which each man is, in the rich sense that 
both Camus and Arendt lend to the term being as creative (“aesthetic”) unity of a plural 
singularity (person), the question o f representation, and more specifically o f the relation 
between the individual and the political community is reformulated within the two-sided 
tragic theoria of a balance or tension, re-enacted by the tragic hero, between freedom and 
order, boundlessness and organization, as the two sides of political action as inherently 
aesthetic.
The opposition between a poietic model of the political community, traced by the 
«unité césarienne, que fonde un chef»,* 285 as head/dominion in the vertical power structure of 
master/slave; and the horizontal model o f a «communauté sans chef Iiée par I'image 
obsédante d ’une tragédie», already recurred around 1937 in Batailie’s Chroniques 
nietzschéennesP6  2871 suggest that (modem) tragedy - o f which Caligula is one o f Camus’ most 
beautiful attempts, highly praised by Bataille himself - exposes the échec of the immunitarian 
logic of se-curitas, bringing forth an aisthetic corn-prehension o f the limit (T, 1705), not 
imposed from outside and above, according to the vertical structure of judge/law/nihilism, but 
as the horizontal relation of exposedness to risk, which constitutes the fact o f existence, 
irreducible to the bio-political notion o f sheer existence or “naked life”.
It is, precisely, the tension between these two paradigms - the immunitarian paradigm 
of le corps, as the de-vitalized product o f an intellectual abstraction, associated to a 
logocentric and hierarchically ordered political structure o f dominion (male principle); and the 
communitarian paradigm of la chair (female principle),289 290relegated outside the body politic 
as its pre-logical and non-mediated root o f  a horizontal aisthetic relatedness -  which, I would 
argue, is played in the words of the women’s Choir in L *état de siege.
2M The closed space o f the theatre (the stage) makes visible the finite circle o f the human condition in Camus’ 
Remarque sur la révolte (E, 1696).
285 Bataille, Chronique nietzschéenne, in Jacques Le Ridier, Nietzsche en France, PUF, Paris, 1999, p. 170.
286 According to Le Ridier, «[ici], la tragédie au sens nietzschéen de Naissance de la tragédie, liturgie esthétique 
qui soude la communauté éthique et politique, se recoupe avec la tragédie au sens hégélien (dans la 
Phénoménologie de l 'esprit) de l’opposition du Particulier et de PUniversel (l’État).» (in Jacques Le Ridier, 
Nietzsche en France, p. 170).
287 «Les limites. Ainsi je  dirais qu’il y a des mystères qu’il convient d’énumérer et de méditer. Rien de plus » 
(CH, 162).
288 ïn La mer au plus près (1953) Camus wrote : « Délicieuse angoisse d’être, proximité exquise d’un danger 
dont nous ne connaissons pas le nom, vivre, alors, est-ce courir à sa perte ? À nouveau, sans répit, courons à 
notre perte. » (E, 886).
289 For this reading 1 draw on Adriana Cavarero’s article «Il corpo politico corne organismo», Filosofia Politica, 
Anno VII, numéro 3 -  dicembre 1993, pp. 391 -414.
290 In the 1958 préfacé to the American édition o f  his plays, Camus would describe l'État de siégé as «celui de 
mes écrits qui me ressemble le plus» (T, 1732).
The tragic wisdom of these spectators/narrators coincides with the awareness o f the 
limit or measure that lies in the tension between the abstract principle (man/Diego) and the 
aisthetic principle (female/Victoria):
L e s  f e m m e s
Malheur sur luil Malheur sur tous ceux qui désertent nos corps] Misère sur nous surtout qui sommes les 
désertées et qui portons à longueur d’années ce monde que leur orgueil prétend transformer. Ah ! puisque tout 
ne peut être sauvé, apprenons du moins à préserver la maison de l’amour ! Vienne la peste, vienne la guen-e et, 
toutes portes closes, vous à côté de nous, nous défendrons jusqu’à la fin. Alors, au lieu de cette mort solitaire, 
peuplée d’idées, nourrie de mots, vous connaîtrez la mort ensemble, vous et nous confondus dans le terrible 
embrassement de l’amour ! Mais les hommes préfèrent l’idée. Ils fuient leur mère, Us se détachent de l’amante, 
et les voilà qui courent à l’aventure, blessés sans plaie, morts sans poignards, chasseurs d ’ombres, chanteurs 
solitaires, appelant sous un ciel muet une impossible réunion et marchant de solitude en solitude, vers 
l’isolement dernier, la mort en plein désert ! (T, 298)
In the light o f  these considerations, the tragic formula «Tout est justifiable, personne 
n ’est juste» (T, 1705) breaches the Manichean dichotomy, at the core o f the traditional 
concept o f the political, and revived in the early Fifties in certain Neo-Conservative political 
analyses, o f  a mortal struggle between Good and Evil, which justified the meurtre utiles and 
entails an aisthetic understanding o f the political community imperatively founded («La 
tragédie -  writes Camus in ’45 -  n’est pas une solution», C il, 153) on souffrance,291 92 
complicité, amitié/fraternitê (menacée) ,293 liberté.
The tragic judgement «Tout est bien» (T, 1709) is the epilogue of Oedipus’ savoir de 
non savoir, resuming the aisthetic awareness o f what Camus calls «le mystère de l ‘existence» 
(T, 1708), which is the enigma/miracle o f natality.294 But it is also the word that dis-closes the 
political horizon o f the 20th century:
L’homme d’aujourd’hui qui crie sa révolte en sachant que cette révolte a des limites, qui exige la liberté 
et subit la nécessité, cet homme contradictoire, déchiré, désormais conscient de l’ambiguïté de l’homme et de 
son histoire, cet homme est l ’homme tragique par excellence. Il marche peut-être vers la formulation de sa 
propre tragédie qui sera obtenue le jour du Tout est bien. (T, 1709).
291 F. Bartfeld, Albert Camus voyageur et conférencier, op. cit., p. 57.
292 As Nussbaum points out, we can see « the passional reaction, the suffering, as itself a piece o f practical 
recognition or perception, as at least a partial constituent of the character’s correct understanding of his situation 
as a human being. [...] There is a kind o f knowing that works by suffering because suffering is the appropriate 
acknowledgement o f the way human life, in these cases, is» (in Martha Nussbaum, The fragility o f goodness, 
cit., p. 45).
293 Fraternité - term belonging to the sphere of aisthesis, was only recently taken up by Jean Luc Nancy in his 
attempt to re-think the political beyond the nihilistic impasse. J.L. Nancy, Le sens du monde, op. cit., p. 178.
294In L ’Avenir de la tragédie Camus writes : « La seule purification revient à ne rien nier ni exclure, à accepter 
donc le mystère de l’existence, la limite de l’homme, et cet ordre enfin où l’on sait sans savoir. "Tout est bien", 
dit alors Œdipe et ses yeux sont crevés. Il sait désormais, sans jamais plus voir, sa nuit est une lumière, et sur 
cette face aux yeux morts resplendit la plus haute leçon de l’univers tragique. »(T, 1708). See on this point A. 
Cavarero, Tu che m iguardi, tu che mi racconti, op. cit., pp. 18-ff.
308
The word is (in) the law; it says the fragile and finite compearance o f men, 
recovering, against the resentful and nihilistic drives o f  «la morale haineuse»,295 2967the limits o f 
the absurd experience, articulated around the three terms (all belonging to the constellation of 
aisthesis) of tragic bonheur, beauté, dignité/amowr/p<5 as the finite condition(s) for a political
♦ » ^07être-ensemble founded on «le courage, la parole claire et l’amitié».
There is no doubt that Ankersmit’s understanding o f mimetic representation, as having 
its origin in the fallacy that the perfect representation (mimesis) should be so accurate a copy 
o f  reality, that we ought not to be able to tell representative and represented apart -  leading to 
the conclusion that «we could just as well do with represented reality alone and abandon 
representation as a dangerous and useless detour», which opens the way to the totalitarian 
immanent community -298 is unmistakeably antithetical to Arendt’s acceptation o f mimesis in 
her theatrical concept o f  the political, although it rests on a similar intuition that political 
reality is not a given pre-ceding, the object o f a re-presentation, but that it «only comes into 
being after and due to representation».299 30
The question, raised by Ankersmit’s book, is precisely the one, pointed out by
4 A A
Esposito, concerning the possibility o f rethinking the political in the anti-foundational 
horizon of the end o f re-presentation. By relating both mimetic (totalitarian) representation
295 G. Bataille, « La morale du malheur: La Peste », artc it, p. 15. The legalization of violence and murder, at 
work in totalitarian terror, as well as in the notions o f just war and death penalty, as the immunitarian outcome o f 
a nihilistic and aesthetic effort to eject suffering and death, turns the état de siege, as a “state o f exception or 
state of emergency”, into the very paradigm of the political. See on this point Giorgio Agamben, État 
d ’exception. Homosacer, Seuil, 2003.
296 In 1943-44 Camus notes in the Carnets: «Essai sur la Révolte. Après avoir fait partir de l’angoisse la 
philosophie : la faire sortir du bonheur, id  Régénérer l’amour dans le monde absurde, c’est en fait régénérer le 
plus brûlant et le plus périssable des sentiments humains (Platon : « Si nous étions des dieux, nous ne 
connaîtrions pas l’amour »). [...] Mais cet amour est en dehors de l’étemel. C'est le plus humain des sentiments 
avec ce que le mot comprend à la fois de limitation et d’exaltation. C’est en cela que l ’homme ne se réalise que 
dans l ’amour parce qu 'il y  trouve sous une form e fulgurante l'image de sa condition sans avenir (et non comme 
disent les idéalistes parce qu'il approche une certain forme d’étemel). Le type : Heathcliff. Tout ceci illustration 
du fait que l’absurdité a sa formule dans l’opposition entre ce qui dure et ce qui ne dure pas. » (Cil, 75). My 
italics.
297 A. Camus, « Nous autres meurtriers », Franchise, n. 3, nov-dec. 1946, in F. Bartfeld, Albert Camus voyageur 
e t conférencier, op. cit., p. 48.
294 « [ . . . ]  the mimetic theory o f (political) representation is, in feet, not a theory o f representation at all, but a 
theory against representation.» (F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, op. cit., p. 44).
299 On the backdrop of a post- or anti-metaphysical critique of the (Platonic) theory o f truth as correspondence, 
Ankersmit seems to come close to Arendt in posing the co-extensiveness o f reality and representation, for which 
he invokes Danto’s view o f artistic representation: «[Danto] urges us to accept the more interesting view that 
“something is real” when it satisfies a representation o f itself, just as something only becomes a “bearer o f  a 
name” when it is named by a name. In other words, reality does not exist as such until there is a representation o f  
that reality» (F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, op. cit., 47). This, as we have seen, is the conclusion, which 
Camus arrives to in the chapter on Revolt and Art in HR, that lies at the core o f his concept of grand style and 
creative unity, the political relevance of which is repeatedly pointed out by Camus in his 1950’s writings on the 
role o f the artist and his struggle against ideologies.
300 R. Esposito, «Hannah Arendt tra “volonté” e “rappresentazione”: per una critica del decisionismo», La 
p lu ralita irrappresentabUe, op. cit., p. 47-48.
309
and direct democracy (identified with the exercise of Rousseau’s general will) to a logic of 
incorporation (identity), and by linking the latter to referentiality and transcendentalism 
(political metaphor), as the frame o f  the Western concept o f political power;301 Ankersmit 
situates Aesthetic Politics outside the transcendentalist logic o f power as speaking about (the 
Foucauldian power o f  language, rooted in the political metaphor as giving meaning to 
reality).302 What he suggest is that Aesthetic Politics is disclosed by, must be thought within, 
the constantly re-opened “space” o f a language o f  power::303
No less than language itself, the language o f power is a subtle and refined structure that permits us to 
tell any number o f stories without presupposing any one o f them.304 305
The denunciation o f the posedffabricated sub-stance, as the traditional object (as
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meamng/truth) o f re-presentation; and the underscoring o f the nihilistic drives inscribed in 
the Western concept o f  political organization, justify, in my view, a re-reading o f  Albert 
Camus’ and Hannah Arendt’ political appropriation o f tragedy and theatricality as disclosing 
a peculiar version o f aesthetic politics, 306 against and beyond the contemporary impasse o f 
the (bio)political.307
301 «[...] Western political philosophies imply and emphasize referentiality; they are always theories about a 
supposedly theory-independent political reality, and from this metaphorical distance they tell u show best to deal 
with it. Here I would like to recall the tendency o f Western political philosophy to see political power as 
representative o f something outside itself (whether it be God, the nature o f the body politic, or the people). In 
other words, the distance between political language and a heliotropically defined political reality is in the 
Western tradition not merely a fine epistemological point about the relation between words and things: this 
distance is the birthplace o f the kind of political power we know in the West» (F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic 
Politics, op. cit., 291).
302 F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, op. cit., p. 292.
303 Ankersmit takes over Roland Barthes’ study on the Japanese use o f sign (the haiku) as situated in a semantic 
void, an openness that provokes a circulation of language and meaning, which stands in strong opposition to 
Western referentiality («Language in the West wants to erase itself by being transparent with regard to an 
underlying reality to which it refers and that is represented by it [...]).» (F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, op. 
cit., 292).
304 F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics, op. cit., p. 293.
305 Nancy traces the conception o f meaning (sens) and its loss/appropriation as object/truth at the core o f all our 
politics of denouement in self-sufficiency (autosuffisance), be that in the form o f (totalitarian) “fusion” or of 
atomisation (J.-L. Nancy, SM, 173).
306 The idea, which Ankersmit poses at the core o f the concept of Aesthetic Politics, « that reality does not exist 
in the proper sense of the word until we have placed it, so to speak, before us at a distance, and it is this which is 
effected in and by representation», leads, I would argue, in two distinct directions: the one, articulated in 
Ankersmit’s book, which assumes the State as the primary political problem, and the main focus of an aesthetic 
political philosophy freed from the reference to ethics in the contemporary moral vacuum (moral nihilism); and 
the other, that emerges in the works of Arendt and Camus, which takes over certain aspects of the Republican 
and anarchic thought. It is significant that Ankersmit poses (or opposes) aesthetic political philosophy as a 
mutation, rather than as the adversary, o f republicanism. Pointing to the «elective affinity» between 
republicanism and ideology, the latter being an instrument for achieving identification of the citizens with the 
collectivity, Ankersmit argues that «the death o f ideology seems to have destroyed this biotope of republicanism. 
Citizens have now lost the possibility of linking their own station of life to the public interest in the meaningful 
way ideology always used to suggest. [...] As a consequence, with the death o f ideology the relationship
310
In the closing pages of HR, it is the aesthetic law of discipline which “transfigures” the 
traditional dichotomy between individual (as atom or “stranger”) and the machine of the State 
(as «colléctivité ennemie») into the tragic community o f the «Nous sommes», disclosed in 
and by the action o f revolt (E, 700). The politics o f dignity is a “declination” of Aesthetic 
Politics, which defines a new individualism in/at the limit, which the aesthetic judgment of 
revolt brings into light, and which the action for freedom discloses as the “space” o f  a 
touching-upon, ex-posing the inexorably plural singularity of men.
Camus1 political thought develops out o f the experience o f the Resistance, as the 
historical event of the spontaneous upsurge and organization o f  political action for freedom. 
The republic provides, in this sense, both Camus and Arendt with a horizontal model of 
political action among peers (freedom) versus the vertical model o f politics of force and 
oppression (dominion) (OR, 227).
The question o f the Republic is at the core o f the political thought of the Resistance, 
from the juridical perspective -  with the declaration o f the illegality of the Vichy Government 
in the manifest of Brazzaville (27th October 1940), which had its political foundation in the 
violation of «le droit de libre disposition du peuple» -307 08 and from the philosophico-political 
viewpoint, combining to a patriotic appeal to the French republican tradition in the struggle 
against the Nazi occupant, a revolutionary élan toward a radical political and social change.309
The image o f republican patriotism, which emerges in Camus* articles for Combat, 
and is traced in the pivotal motive of the sacrifice o f the resistants/revo//ér in the struggle 
against the enemy, is refracted by the lenses o f tragedy into a complex «crystallisation» of 
elements.
Camus worked throughout all his life on his tragedy Caligula, from his juvenile 1941 
text to the 1957 version for the Festival o f  Angers. The experience of the war and o f  his 
“segregation” in France during the occupation contributed to the re-writing of the character of
between the state and the citizen took on the form best described as « living apart together ». » (F.R. Ankersmit, 
Aesthetic Politics, op. cit., p. 351-2).
307 See on this respect R. Esposito, «Il Nazismo e noi», Micro-Mega. Almanacco di Filosofia, 5/2003, op. cit., p. 
165-174.
308 According to B. Mirkine-Guetzévitch, the Brazzaville document «est non seulement républicain dans le sens 
formel, constitutionnel ; il l’est aussi par son inspiration, de par ses références à Gambetta, à Jules Ferry » (in Les 
idées politiques et sociales de la Résistance (Documents clandestins -  1940-44), PUF, Paris, 1954, p. 45). 
According to the author the notion of Republic founded on the «droit des gens à disposer d’eux-mêmes» is the 
source of a series o f constitutional paralogisms, from the Declaration o f the 20th April 1943 and the 9th August 
1944 institution of republican legality over the continental territory. (Mirkine-Guetzévitch speaks of an «absence 
d ’épanouissement républicain» between ’43 and ’44 : «Le catalogue des libertés françaises est mince, la 
présentation en est faite avec une sécheresse qui aurait satisfait peut-être les démocrates polynésiens, mais qui est 
propre à décevoir la nation qui, dès 1789, avait défini les principaux concepts de liberté », Ivt, p. 46).
309 Les idées politiques et sociales de la Résistance, op. cit., 46-49.
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Cherea, who in the post 1941 versions reminds o f «une sorte de prototype de la résistance au 
totalitarisme» (T, 1738). But it is important to observe that the identification of Caligula as 
«pure» or Absolute Evil -  which has its anti-tragic counterpart in the pure Goodness of 
Scipion -310 is re-comprised, through the confrontation with Cherea, into the good-and-evil 
structure o f two forces «également légitimes, également armées en raison» (T, 1705).
The limit on which Cherea and Caligula con-front and touch upon each other is the 
revolt against the nihil o f foundation, which disclosed the tragic dilemma experienced by 
Camus in the years o f the German occupation, and attested in LAA, in the conclusion, to 
which the Résistants were driven by totalitarian terror, that «il faut bien frapper quand on ne 
peut réfuter» (T, 35).311
I suggest that, in his murderous attempt to rea-lize the truth of the Absurd or the 
absurd être-à as Truth/Object,312 the emperor Caligula embodies the fallacy of the poietic 
paradigm o f  political action implicit, made visible in the bad logic o f absolute nihilism (T, 
75), which culminates in the logical or superior suicide (MdS, 183), that is, in tenor.
In this sense, Caligula resumes the Bataillan tragédie illimité o f the sovereign thought 
(pensée souveraine), which annihilates the utilitarian categories o f  teleological thinking and 
destroys the re-assuring immunitarian world o f se-curitas. But in his monstruous mise en 
œuvre of the impossible, Caligula falls back on the ideal (bio-political) quest for happiness: 
his madness is the immunitarian logic of political power pushed to its ultimate consequences.
Now, what both Camus and Arendt point out, and clearly emerges in Caligula, is that 
hybris (radical nihilism) is a possibility inherent in political action qua action, as the tragic or 
aesthetic rapport-limit between its boundlessness and its quest for order (organization).
Jmmunitas, in this sense, must be grasped in the reverse o f political action: Caligula’s 
je u  sans limites, exterminating contradictors and contradictions (T, 23), re-presents in this 
sense the simplifying logic of 20th century and 21st century («immunitarian») politics, which
310Caligu!a to Scipion: «Tu ne peux pas comprendre cela. Tu es d’un autre monde. Tu es pur dans le bien, 
comme je suis pur dans le mal » (T, 58).
311 Questioned by the Emperor («Cherea, pourquoi ne m’aimes-tu pas?»), Cherea replies : «[...] parce que je te 
comprends trop bien et qu’on ne peut aimer celui de ses visages qu’on essaie de masquer en soi » (T, 77). The 
mask becomes here the vehicle of the practical impasse in which the critical capacity to « think on both sides » 
leaves man. Specular to Caligula’s “logical attitude” is the “lyrical attitude” o f the young poet Scipion, whose 
absurd capacity to understand everything (T, 83), to which the Emperor initiated him by killing his father, leads 
him to withdraw in isolation and inactivity. Scipion refuses to participate in the conspiracy against Caligula, 
finding refuge in dénuement, already described in Noces as the annihilation of the self in the sensory and sensual 
fusion with Nature.
312 «[...] tout, autour de moi, est mensonge, et moi, je  veux qu’on vive dans la vérité!» (T, 16).
312
eradicates the aisthetic toucher-à,313 that constitutes ex-istence, as men’s partage of an absurd 
condition - 314 expressed in the MdS by the conqueror’s communauté de la lutte, rooted in the 
aisthetic morale de la chair, which runs through the political writings, from the 1944 articles 
o f Combat onwards.
The limitless power o f law - what Bataille fails to point out is,315 316precisely, that, as 
Emperor, Caligula is the law, repeating the vertical structure o f dominion God (master)/ men 
(slaves) - coincides with the systematic exercise of le malheur on the part o f Caligula/the 
Plague, aiming at the ultimate, God-like, eradication o f  death and suffering. The quest for the 
moon represents the absolute attempt to reverse, thus perverting, the absurd evidence of the 
finite human condition, «Les hommes meurent et ils ne sont pas heureux» (T, 16). In this 
sense, Caligula is the anti-tragic figure par excellence.317 *It is the confrontation between 
Caligula and Cherea that discloses the tragedy, playing the “inclusive” {et...et...) or dramatic
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logic, traced at the core of the aisthetic thought o f the MdS, on which the tragic choice is 
grounded.319
313 Camus wrote in his notebooks in 1943: «L’absurde, c’est l’homme tragique devant un miroir (Caligula). Il 
n’est donc pas seul. Il y a le germe d’une satisfaction ou d’une complaisance. Maintenant il faut supprimer le 
miroir». (Cil, 94) The same image recurs in the Introduction to l’HR: «D’une certaine manière, l’absurde qui 
prétend exprimer l ’homme dans sa solitude le fait vivre devant un miroir. Le déchirement initial risque alors de 
devenir confortable. La plaie qu’on gratte avec tant de sollicitude finit par donner du plaisir. [...] Si donc il était 
légitime de tenir compte de la sensibilité absurde, de faire le diagnostic d’un mal tel qu’on le trouve en soi et 
chez les autres, il est impossible de voir dans cette sensibilité, et dans le nihilisme qu’elle suppose, rien d’autre 
qu'un point de départ, une critique vécue, l’équivalent, sur le plan de l’existence, du doute systématique. Après 
quoi, il faut briser les jeu x fixes du miroir et entrer dans le mouvement irrésistible par lequel l ’absurde se 
dépasse lui-même» (HR, 418-419) (my italics).
3.4 Caligula’s monologue at the looking-glass is the emblem of the historical and political situation of the 20th 
century, described by Camus as the age o f polemic and insult: «Des milliers de voix, jour et nuit, poursuivant 
chacune de son côté un tumultueux monologue, déversent sur les peuples un torrent de paroles mystificatrices. 
Mais quel est le mécanisme de la polémique ? Elle consiste à considérer l’adversaire en ennemi, à le simplifier 
par conséquent et à refuser de le voir » (In F. Bartfeld, Albert Camus voyageur et conférencer, Archives Albert 
Camus, n. 7, Paris, Lettres Modernes, 1995, p. 60).
3.5 G. Bataille, « La morale du malheur: La Peste », Critique, Juin-Juillet 1947, n. 13-14.
316 As F. Bartfeld observes, « la faute tragique », as an act o f violation o f the existing order, is conceived by 
Aristotle as the result of an error, and not of a moral guilt : it coincides with «l ’ignorance ou la méconnaissance 
systématique de cette limite qui semble inséparable de la nature humaine et que la révolte, justement, révèle. Les 
pensées nihilistes, parce qu’elles négligent cette frontière, finissent par se jeter dans un mouvement 
uniformément accéléré. Rien ne les arrête plus dans leurs conséquences et elles justifient alors la destruction 
totale ou la conquête indéfinie.» (HR, 697), see Fernande Bartfeld, L ’effet tragique, op. cit.. In hîs notes for the 
play «Caligula ou le sens de la mort», the Emperor warns: «Non, Caligula n’est pas mort. 11 est là, et là. Il est en 
chacun de vous. Si le pouvoir vous était donné, si vous aviez du cœur, si vous aimiez ta vie, vous le verriez se 
déchaîner, ce monstre ou cet ange que vous portez en vous. Notre époque meurt d’avoir cru aux valeurs et que 
les choses pouvaient être belles et cesser d ’être absurdes. Adieu, je rentre dans l’histoire où me tiennent enfermé 
depuis si longtemps ceux qui craignent de trop aimer.» (T, 1735). In the concluding pages of HR, Camus 
employs an analogous image to refer to the aèso/u/e-nihilistic temptation of contemporary thought (HR, 704).
3,7 «seule, l’hybris n’est pas tragique; (...]» see Paul Ricoeur, Philosophie de la volonté, II. Finitude et 
culpabilité. La symbolique du Mal, Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1960,209.
31 g The formula «dialectic or dramatic logic» is used by Robert Champigny to define the logic o f the absurd 
(tragic) thought of the MdS, as thought o f the absurd contradiction “in existence”. It refers to a type of logic that 
requires a spatial-temporal (existential) “support” in order to be thought, as opposed to the formal and a-temporal
313
The recourse to the category o f the tragic to define an alternative model o f  political 
action, distinguished from the strategic and republican models o f Western modem political 
thought, confirms the irreducibility, brought forth in our analysis, o f the horizontal 
paradigm o f  action not only to the political narratives o f reconciliation (Liberal and 
Communist political theories, as rooted in the modem Philosophy of History), founded on the 
concepts o f  (scientific) certainty, rational mastery and progress, but also to the republican or 
anarchic thinking, often imputed to both Arendt and Camus.
The tragic exposes the aesthetic dimension of the political not through the trope o f 
distance (<metaphor), as aesthetic “gap” or “hollow” space between the individual and the 
State,319 2021 32but through the aesthetic law as limit or measure (discipline), as that “space” o f 
touching-upon (<distanced proximity) which is (in) the inter-esse o fpersons acting together.
Not a Hobbesian mask, worn or stripped off at will, to display the pre-supposed 
individuality o f the private (natural) man, but the public/moral person as daimon, m en’s very 
(inter-)relatedness ( limit or rapport) actively “drawn” in words and deeds.
As Cavarero points out, in the theatrical coincidence of being and appearing the totally 
«exhibitive» character o f identity is brought forth not as the outward position o f some internal 
^«¿-stance, but as non-residually expressive. The who (the persona) is not the man-made 
(fabricated) pre-supposed o f political action, but its creation, which shatters the temporal
sequence o f poiesis (before/after, cause/effect, act/potentiality), which is the m ark o f 
Historical (teleocratic) thinking.
character o f conceptual logic, see R. Champigny, Compositions philosophiques et concepts, in Albert Camus 
1980 -  Second International Conference, Gainesville, University Presses of Florida 1980,50-ff.
319 Although he is aware o f  the intimate affinity with Caligula, Cherea chooses to «lutter contre une grande idée 
dont la victoire signifierait la fin du monde » (T, 34). In this sense he is the bearer of the tragic lesson -  in 
ancient tragedy assigned to the Chorus -  that there is a limit «qu’il ne faut pas franchir, et passé la quelle c’est la 
mort ou le désastre» (T, 1705). Rafael de Aguila defines as tragic a choice between two alternative courses of 
action, which affirms - without solving it - the conflict between two equally valid claims or perspectives, see R. 
de Aguila, MachiavelWs Theory o f Political Action: Tragedy, Irony and Choice, Working Papers, European 
University Institute Press 2001). While Caligula dissolves the tragic conflict («un affrontement vibrant et 
ininterrompu») between human revolt (freedom) and the necessity o f a finite condition, becoming himself God 
and plague, Cherea restores it by revolting against the emperor’s frenzy in the name of a need for security (T, 77* 
78), which he feels common to all men.
320 Summarizing the tragic model of political action by the capability o f “choosing among the alternative courses 
of action (which are tragically in conflict with morals and with one another)” in the midst of contingency and 
risk, which aims at maintaining plurality and competition through a balance between “compassion” and irony, de 
Aguila raises he problem o f the relation between the tragic and the republican model, grounded on the 
development and maintenance o f ‘‘plurality and competition, under the conditions of risk and uncertainty” (R. de 
Aguila, MachiavelWs Theory o f Political Action: Tragedy, Irony and Choice, op. cit.). See also Michael Brint, 
Tragedy and Denial. The Politics o f Difference in Western Political Thought, Westview Press, 1991.
321 F.R. Ankersmit, Aesthetic Politics. Political Philosophy Beyond Fact and Value, op. cit., p. 358.
322 A. Cavarero, Tu che m i guardi, tu che m i racconti, op. cit., p. 36.
323 To refrase Bonnie Honig’s commentary of the Arendtian notion of action and identity, taken over by 
Cavarero (in A. Cavarero, Tu che mi guardi, tu che m i racconti, op. cit., p. 36.)
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The coherence and continuity between the (im)political perspective o f creation and the 
federalist solution, outlined by both Camus and Arendt, becomes, thus, apparent. In OR 
Arendt defines communal councils, which spontaneously emerged in the early stages o f  the 
French Revolution, as the first organs o f «a republic which never came into being» (OR, 249): 
not only they were «organs of order as much as organs o f  action» (OR, 266), thus exposing
the political aesthetic drive for stability as the reverse o f  the futility o f (political) action; but 
they brought into being a federal principle o f political organization «practically unknown in 
Europe and, if known, nearly unanimously rejected»(OR, 249).
As Canovan points out, the problem with anarchic schemes for permanent revolution 
lies in their blindness to the two-sidedness o f political action: «Arendt was not in the least 
attracted by formless anarchy or “dropping out”», 324 25 and, like Camus from the Combat years 
onward, she conceived «a pyramidal structure of representatives sent on from lower to higher 
councils» as «a practical alternative to the party method o f representation»,326 and to the 
obsolete and anachronistic form of the Nation-State restored after the collapse o f the 
totalitarian regimes.
The paradox o f action, which is the paradox of “aesthetic” politics, is pointed out by 
Camus in the pages on Bakounin’s anarchism, to whom he pointed, in his letter to Libertaire, 
to provide some vital insights to revive contemporary libertarian thought. By rejecting all 
form of abstraction (principles and doctrines) in favour o f the pure freedom o f «l’homme 
entier, identifié entièrement à sa révolte [...] le brigand, chef de jacquerie, [...] ses modèles 
préférés sont Stenka Razine et Pougatchev» (HR, 565), Bakounin reduced revolt to «sa vérité 
biologique» (Id.), stripped of all law - «Mais un monde sans lois est-il un monde libre, telle 
est la question que pose toute révolte» (Id.).
Political action is, thus, at the limit, ex-posed in/ as «aesthetic» unity or creation: it 
does not expel nihilism, but contains it as its reverse, recognizing it as no-thing to be 
concealed, or empty space to be filled with fabricated meanings (subject to the vertical 
relation o f dominion). Words are, in this sense, the com-munal limit, the root (arkè) brought
324 My italics. As she points out, «it was indeed their aspiration to lay down the new order that brought them into 
conflict with the groups of professional revolutionaries, who wished to degrade them to mere executive organs o f  
revolutionary activity» (OR, 266).
325 M. Canovan, Hannah Arendt, op. cit., p. 234. Although «[t]here are certain paragraphs in the writings o f the 
Utopian Socialists, especially in Proudhon and Bakunin, into which it has been relatively easy to read an 
awareness o f the council systems. Yet the truth is that these essentially anarchist political thinkers were 
singularly unequipped to deal with a phenomenon which demonstrated so clearly how a revolution did not end 
with the abolition o f state and government but, on the contrary, aimed at the foundation of a new state and the 
establishment of a new form of government» (OR, 265).
326 M. Canovan, Hannah Arendt, op. cit., p. 236.
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forth by the artist and the storyteller, in which tragedy and the political touch upon each other, 
in the fragile balance «entre les pôles du nihilisme extrême et d ’un espoir illimité» (T, 1707). 
In the letter «Révolte et conformisme», published in the review Arts in november 1951, 
Camus wrote:
Il n ’y  a pas un bon et un mauvais nihilisme, il n’y a qu’une longue et féroce aventure dont nous sommes 
tous solidaires. Le courage consiste à le dire clairement et à réfléchir dans cette impasse pour lui trouver une 
issue. (E, 734) [My italics]
316
abbreviations
HC Arendt, Hannah, The Human Condition, The University o f Chicago Press, 1998.
BT ______ , The Burden o f Our Time, Seeker & Warburg, London, 1951.
OT ______ , The Origins o f  Totalitarianism, London, 1967.
BPF ______ , Between Past and Future, Penguin Books, New York, 1993 (reprint of the
Viking Press edition, New York, 1968).
TMA ______ , “Tradition and the Modem Age”, in Between Past and Future, Penguin
Books, New York, 1993 (reprint o f  the Viking Press edition, New York, 1968)
TP ______ , “Truth and Politics”, in The Portable Hannah Arendt, Peter Baher Ed.,
Penguin Books.
EU _______ , Essays in Understanding, Jerome Kohn Ed., Harcourt Brace&Co., New
York, 1994.
UP ______ , “Understanding and Politics”, in Essays in Understanding, op. cit.
CP ______ , “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought”, in
Essays in Understanding, op. cit., pp. 428- 447.
WA ______ , What is A uthority?, in Between Past and Future, op. cit., pp.91-141.
WF ______ , What is Freedom?, in Between Past and Future, op. cit., pp. 143-171.
OR ______ , On Revolution, Greenwood Press, 1968.
LM/T ______, The Life o f  the Mind\ L Thinking, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978.
LM/W _____ , The Life o f  the Mind\ I I  Willing, Seeker & Warburg, London, 1978.
BE ______ , Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality o f  evil, Harmond Sworth,
Penguin Book, 1977
KL ______ , Lectures on K ant’s Political Philosophy, The Harvester Press, Brighton,
1982.
RJ ______ , Responsibility and Judgment, Edited by Jerome Kohn, Schocken Books,
NewYork, 2003.
MDT ______ , Men in Dark Times, Harcourt, Brace&World, Inc., New York, 1968
T Camus, Albert, Œuvres Complètes I -  Théâtre, récits nouvelles, Paris, Gallimard 1985
E ______ , Œuvres Complètes I I -  Essais, Paris, Gallimard 1972.
HR  ______ , L ’homme révolté in Albert Camus, Œuvres Complètes IJ, cit.
M dS  ______ , Le mythe de Sisyphe, in Albert Camus, Œuvres Complètes II, cit.
CI ______ , Carnets, vol. I, Mai 1935- Février 1942, Paris Gallimard, 1962.
CII ______ , Carnets, vol. II, Janvier 1942- Mars 1951, Paris, Gallimard, 1964.
CIII ______ , Carnets, Vol. III, Mars 1951 -  Décembre 1959, Paris, Gallimard, 1989.
CAC2 ______ , Cahiers Albert Camus, 2. Le premier Camus suivi des écrits de jeunesse,
Paul Viallaneix (Ed.), Paris, Gallimard, 1972.
CAC3 ______ , Cahiers Albert Camus, 3. Fragments d ’un combat 1938-1940, Paris,
Gallimard, 1978.
CAC4 ______ , Cahiers Albert Camus, 4. Caligula. Version de 1941, A. James Arnold Ed.,
Paris, Gallimard, 1984.
CAC6, ________ , Cahiers Albert Camus 6. Albert Camus éditorialiste à /Express,
Gallimard, Paris, 1987.
CAC8 _______ , Cahiers Albert Camus 8. Camus à Combat, édition établie, présentée et
annotée par J. Lévi-Valensi, Gallimard, Paris, 2002.
V P I, II Nietzsche, Friedrich, La Volonté de Puissance, voll. I, II. Texte établi par 
Friedrich Würzbach, traduit de l’allemand par Geneviève Bianquis, Paris, Gallimard, 1995.
317
SS Nicolas Berdiaev, Les sources et le sens du communisme russe, traduit du russe
par Lucienne Julien Caïn, Paris, Gallimard, 1951.
RD Rauschning, Hermann, Germany’s  Révolution o f  destruction, W. Heinemann
Ltd., London-Toronto, 1939.
SM Nancy, Jean-Luc, Le sens du monde, Paris, Galilée, 2001.




Arendt, Hannah, The Burden o f  Our Time, Seeker & Warburg, London, 1951.
_____ , The Origins o f  Totalitarianism, London, 1967.
_____ , “Karl Marx and the Tradition o f Western Political Thought”, Hannah Arendt Papers
at the Library Congress, Speeches and Writings Files, 1923-1975.
_____ , “Concern with Politics in Recent European Political Thought” lecture, 1954 -  Hannah
Arendt Papers at the Library o f  Congress.
_____ , “Concern with Politics in Recent European Philosophical Thought”, in H. A., Essays
in Understanding 1930-1954, Harcourt Brace&Co., 1994, p. 428-447.
_____ , “Authority in the Twentieth Century”, The Review o f  Politics, Voi. 18, No. 4, October
1956,403-417.
_____ , The Human Condition, The University of Chicago Press, 1998.
_____ , On Revolution, Greenwood Press, 1968.
_____ , Between Past and Future, Viking Press, New York, 1961/68
_____ , Essays in Understanding 1930-1954, Harcourt Brace&Co., 1994.
_____ , Men in Dark Times, Harcourt, Brace&World, Inc., New York, 1968.
_____ , Eichmann in Jerusalem: a report on the banality o f  evil, Harmond Sworth, Penguin
Book, 1977.
______ / ‘Revolution and Freedom: A Lecture“, in Zwei Welten: Sigfried Moses zum
funfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag, Bitaon, Tel Aviv, 1962, pp. 578-600.
_____ , “Truth and Politics”, in The Portable Hannah Arendt, Peter Baher Ed., Penguin
Books.
_____ , Crises o f  the Republic, Harcourt Brace Jovanovic, New York and London, 1972.
_____ , Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, The Harvester Press, Brighton, 1982.
_____ , The Life o f the Mind. I. Thinking, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978
_____ , The Life o f the Mind. 11. Willing, Seeker & Warburg, London, 1978.
______ , Responsibility and Judgment, Edited by Jerome Kohn, Schocken Books, NewYork,
2003.
______ , Within Four Walls: the Correspondence between Hannah Arendt and Heinrich
Blucher, 1936-68, New York, Harcourt, 2000.
Arendt, Hannah -  Jaspers, Karl, Correspondence, 1926-1969, New York, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, 1992.
Arendt, Hannah, Martin Heidegger, Lettere 1925-1975, Torino, Edizioni di Comunità, 2001.
II. ALBERT CAMUS
Camus, Albert, Œuvres Complètes I -  Théâtre, récits nouvelles, Paris, Gallimard 1985
_______, Œuvres Complètes 11-Essais, Paris, Gallimard 1972.
_______, Carnets, vol. I, Mai 1935- Février 1942, Paris Gallimard, 1962.
_______, Carnets, vol. II, Janvier 1942- Mars 1951, Paris, Gallimard, 1964.
_______, Carnets, Vol. III, Mars 1951 -  Décembre 1959, Paris, Gallimard, 1989.
319
______ , Cahiers Albert Camus, 2. Le prem ier Camus suivi des écrits de jeunesse, Paul
Viallaneix (Ed.), Paris, Gallimard, 1972.
______ , Cahiers Albert Camus, 3. Fragments d'un combat 1938-1940, Paris, Gallimard,
1978.
______ , Cahiers Albert Camus, 4. Caligula. Version de 1941, A. James Arnold Ed., Paris,
Gallimard, 1984.
_______ , Cahiers Albert Camus 6. Albert Camus éditorialiste à l 'Express, Paul F. Smets Ed.,
Gallimard, Paris, 1987.
_______ , Camus à Combat, Cahiers Albert Camus. 8, J. Lévi-Valensi (Ed.) Paris, Gallimard,
2002.
Albert Camus voyageur et conférencier, Archives Albert Camus 7, Fernande Bartfeld Ed., 
Lettres Modernes, Paris, 1995.
Albert Camus- Pascal Pia, Correspondance 1939-1947, Paris, Fayard/Gallimard, 2000
III. SECONDARY LITERATURE.
Albert Camus : parcours méditerranéens, Actes du Colloque de Jérusalem (10-13 novembre 
1997), in Perspectives, revue de l’Université de Jérusalem, Éditions Magnes, Jérusalem, No. 
5,1998.
Agamben, Giorgio, Homo sacer. 71 potere sovrano e la nuda vita, Torino, Einaudi,1995.
________ , Mezzi senzafine, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 1996.
________ , L aperto. L *uomo e l'animale, Torino, Bollati Boringhieri, 2002.
Amiot A.-M., Mattéi, J.-F. (Eds.), Albert Camus et la philosophie, Paris, PUF, 1997. 
Ankersmit, F.R., Aesthetic Politics. Political Philosophy beyond Fact and Value, Stanford 
UP, 1996.
Ansell-Pearson, Keath, An Introduction to Nietzsche as political thinker, Cambridge UP, 
1994.
Arnold, A. James, “Camus lecteur de Nietzsche”, in Fitch, Brian T., Albert Camus 9. La 
pensée de Camus, La Revue des Lettres Modernes, Paris, Minard, 1979, 95- 99.
_____ , «Pourquoi une édition critique de Caligula», in Albert Camus 1980. Second
International Conférence, February 21-23, 1980, University Presses o f Florida, Gainesville, 
pp. 179- 186.
Audin, Marie-Louise, Pour une sémiotique du Mythe de Sisyphe de Camus: thèmes et 
métaphores au service de Vabsurde. Thèse de doctorat d’état en Lettres et Sciences 
Humaines, Université de Nancy II, 1984/85.
Bailly, Jean-Christophe et Nancy, Jean-Luc, La comparution. Politique à venir, Christian 
Bourgois Editeur, 1991.
Bartfeld, Fernande, L 'effet tragique. Essai sur le tragique dans l'œuvre de Camus, Champion- 
Slatkine, Paris-Genève, 1988.
Bataille, Georges, On Nietzsche, The Athlone Press, London, 1992.
______ , « La morale du malheur: La Peste », Critique, n. 13-14, Juin-Juillet 1947.
Benhabib, Seyla, “Judgment and the Moral Foundations o f Politics in Arendt’s Thought”, 
Political Theory, Vol. 16, N o.l, February 1988, 29-51.
_______ , The Reluctant Moderninsm o f  Hannah Arendt, Sage, 1996.
320
Benjamin, Walter, **Trauerspiel and Tragedy” and “The Role o f  Language in Trauerspiel and 
Tragedy”, in Selected Writings, Volume 1, 1913-1926, Harvard UP, 1996.
Berdiaev, Nicolas, Les sources et le sens du communisme russe, traduit du russe par Lucienne 
Julien Cain, Paris, Gallimard, 1963.
_______ , "La verità filosofica ed il vero deirintelligencjia", in Berdjaev et aL, La svolta.
Vechi. Vintelligencjia" russa tra il 1905 e il *17, Jaka Book, 1970, pp. 13-32.
_______ , La concezione di Dostojevskij, Roma, Einaudi, 1945.
_______ , L'idea russa. I  problemi fondamentali del pensiero russo (XIX e inizio X X  secolo),
Milano, Mursia, 1992.
_______ , Nuovo Medioevo, Roma,Fazi, 2000.
_______ , Gli spiriti della rivoluzione russa, Milano, Mondadori, 2001.
Bereto, Claudio, “Albert Camus: la fede tragica”, in “Mito e Fede ”. Studi in onore di Giorgio 
Perno, a cura di H.M. Baumgartner, F. PerTarotti, C. Scillironi, Morcelliana, Brescia, 1998. 
Berry, David, A History o f  thè French Anarchist Move ment, 1917-1945, Greenwood Press, 
Westport-London, 2002.
Birchall, Ian, “Camus contre Sartre: quarante ans plus tard”, in Albert Camus et les extrêmes 
et l'équilibre. Actes du Colloque de Keele, 25-27 Mars 1993, Amsterdam-Atlanta, 1994.
Brée, G., Camus and Sartre, Crisis and Commit ment, Calder&Boyars, London, 1972.
Braun, Lev, Witness o f  Decline. Albert Camus: Moralist o f  the Absurd, Fairleigh Dickinson. 
Brint, Michael, Tragedy and Déniai. The Politics o f  Différence in Western Politicai Thought, 
Westview Press, 1991
Camus et le lyrisme, Actes du Colloque de Beauvais (31 mai-1 Juin 1996), SEDES, Paris, 
1997.
Camus et le théâtre, Actes du Colloque tenu à Amiens 31 Mai-2 Juin 1988, IMEC Éditions, 
Paris, 1992.
Camus et la politique. Actes du colloque de Nanterre (5-7 Juin 1985), L’Harmattan, Paris, 
1986.
Canovan, Margaret, “Arendt’s theory of totalitarianism: a reassessment”, in The Cambridge 
Companion to Hannah Arendt, Dana Villa Ed., Cambridge UP, 2000, pp. 25- 43.
_______ , Hannah Arendt: A Re-interpretation ofher Politicai Thought, Cambridge UP, 1992.
Castoro, Piero, Albert Camus. Il pensiero meridiano, Besa Editrice, Lecce, 1996.
Cavarero, Adriana, “Nascita, orgasmo, politica”, in MicroMega, Almanacco di Filosofìa
1996, pp. 141-149.
_______ , Il corpo in figure. Filosofia e politica della corporeità, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2000.
_______ , “Politicizing Theory”, Politicai Theory, voi. 3 No. 4, August 2002,506-532.
_______ , Tu che mi guardi, tu che mi racconti. Filosofia della narrazione, Feltrinelli, Milano,
1997.
Caves, Jean, « Le Nihilisme Européen et les Appels de P Orient », Philosophies, No. 1 (15 
mars 1924) et No. 2 (15 Mai 1924).
Chabot, Jacques, Albert Camus, « la pensée de midi », ÉdiSud, Aix-en-Provence, 2002. 
Chiaromonte, Nicola, “Albert Camus”, in Id., The Worm o f  Consciousness, New-York 
London, 1976.
Crosby, D., The Specter o f  the Absurd. Sources and Criticisms o f  Modem Nihilism, State 
University ofNew York Press, 1988.
Collin, Françoise, « N ’être. Événement et représentation », Politique et pensée. Colloque 
Hannah Arendt, Paris, Petite Bibliothèque Payot, 1996,129- 155.
Dini, Vittorio, “Totalitarismo e Filosofia. Un concetto fra descrizione e comprensione”, in 
Filosofìa Politica, XI, n. 1, aprile 1997.
321
Domenach, Jean-Marie, Le retour du tragique, Éditions du Seuil, Paris, 1994.
Dunwoodie, Peter, “Chestov et Le Mythe de Sisyphe”, in La Revue des Lettres Modernes: 
Albert Camus 4. Sources e t influences, textes réunis par B.T.Fitch, n. 264-270 (1971), 43-50. 
Egyed, Bela, “Tracing Nihilism: Heidegger to Nietzsche to Derrida”, in Nietzsche and  the 
Rhetoric o f  Nihilism. Essays on interprétation, Language and Poiitics, T. Darby, B. Egyed, B. 
Jones (Eds.), p. 1-14.
Engel, Vincent, “Ni Dieu ni néant: pour une éthique camusienne de la solidarité”, Ethica, vol. 
4, no. 1(1992), pp. 83-99.
Esposito, Roberto, “Il nazismo e noi”, Micro-Mega. Almanacco di Filosofia, 5/2003, pp. 165- 
174.
_______ , Immunitas. Protezione e negazione della vita, Torino, Einaudi, 2002.
_______ , Communitas. Origine e destino della comunità, Torino, Einaudi, 1998.
_______ , L Erigine della politica. Hannah Arendt o Simone Weil?, Roma, Donzelli Editore,
1996.
Esposito, R., Galli, C., Vitiello, V. (a cura di), Nichilismo e politica, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 
2000.
Esposito, R. (a cura di), La pluralità irrappresentabile. Il pensiero politico di Hannah Arendt, 
QuattroVenti, Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici, 1987.
R. Esposito, C. Galli (Ed.), Enciclopedia del pensiero politico , Laterza, Bari, 2000.
Euben, J. Peter, “Arendt’s Hellenism”, in The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt, 
Dana Villa Ed., Cambridge UP, 2000, pp. 151-164.
Favre, Franz, « Quand Camus lisait Nietzsche », Albert Camus 20, « Le premier homme » en 
perspective, La revue des lettres modernes, Paris, Minard, 2004
Fédier, François, Totalitarismo e nichilismo. Tre seminari e una conferenza, Ibis, Como- 
Pavia, 2003.
Ferry, L.-Pisier-Kouchner, E., “Théorie du totalitarisme”, section I de “Le Totalitarisme”, in 
Traité de science politique. 2. Les régimes politiques contemporains, Paris, Presses 
Universitaires de France, 1985.
Fisichella, Domenico, Totalitarismo. Un regime del nostro tempo, Roma, La Nuova Italia 
Scientifica, 1987.
Fistetti, Francesco, “Totalitarismo e Nichilismo in Hannah Arendt”, in Logiche e crisi della 
modernità, a cura di Carlo Galli, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1991.
Flores d1 Arcais, Paolo, Hannah Arendt. Esistenza e libertà, Roma, Donizelli, 1995.
_____________ , “L’assurdo e la rivolta: Albert Camus filosofo del finito”, in Micro-Mega -
Almanacco di Filosofia, 1996,201-223.
_____________ , L'individuo libertario, Torino, Einaudi, 1999.
_____________ , “Hannah Arendt e il totalitarismo nelle democrazie”, in Micro-Mega.
Almanacco di Filosofia, 5/2003, pp. 110- 135.
Forti, Simona, 77 totalitarismo, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 2001.
____ , “Biopolitica delle anime”, Filosofia Politica, anno XVII, n. 3, dicembre 2003, pp. 397-
417.
____ , “Hannah Arendt e la facoltà di giudicare: considerazioni su un’eredità contesa”, Teoria
Politica, Vili, n. 3,1992, pp. 123-155.
Friedrich, Cari J. (ed.), Totalitarianism. Proceedings o f  a Conférence held at the America 
Academy o f  Arts and Sciences, March 1953, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1954.
Friedrich C. J., Curtis M., Barber B. R., Totalitarianism in perspective: three views, Pali Mail 
Press, London, 1969.
322
Fülop-Miller, Réné, The Mind and Face o f  Bolshevism. An Examination o f  Cultural Life in 
Soviet Russia, London&New York, Putnam's Sons, 1927.
Garelli, Ginaluca, Filosofie del tragico, Milano, Mondadori, 2001.
Gay-Crosier, Raymond, “Les enjeux de la pensée de Midi”, in Albert Camus: parcours 
Méditerranéens. Actes du Colloque de Jérusalem, 10-13 Novembre 1997, Perspectives, n. 5, 
1998,93-108.
_________ , Raymond, “Philosophie”, in La Revue des Lettres Modernes. Albert Camus 12 -
La Révolte en question, Paris, 1985,149.
_________ , Albert Camus: Paradigmes de l ’ironie -  révolte et négation affirmative,
Paratexte, Toronto, 2000.
Gastaldi, Virginio Paolo, “Totalitarismi, Intellettuali e Guerra Fredda”, in U Politico, LXIV, 
n .3 ,1999.
Givone, Sergio, Disincanto del mondo e pensiero tragico, Milano, Il Saggiatore, 1989.
______ , Storia del nulla, Sagittari Laterza, 1995.
Glatzer Rosenthal, Bemice, Nietzsche in Russia, Princeton University Press, 1986.
Gleason, Abbott, Totalitarianism. The inner history o f  Cold War, New York, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1995.
Guérin, JeanYves, Camus. Portrait de l ’artiste en citoyen, Bourin, 1993.
______ , “Actualité de la politique camusienne”, in Albert Camus. Les extremes et l 'équilibré.
Actes du Colloque de Keele, 25-27 Mars 1993, Amsterdam-Atlanta, 1994,103-114.
______ , (sous la direction de), Camus et la politique. Actes du Colloque de Nanterre, 5-7 Juin
1985, L’Harmattan, Paris, 1986.
______ ,“Camus, Albert” and “Combat” in Sirinelli, J.F., Dictionnaire de la vie politique
française au XXe siècle, PUF, 1995.
Haar, Michel, Nietzsche et la métaphysique, Gallimard, Paris, 1993 
____ , Par-delà le nihilisme, Paris, PUF, 1998.
Halberstam, Michael, Totalitarianism and the Modem Conception o f  Politics, Yale 
University Press, New Haven and London, 1999.
Heidegger, Martin, ÎI nichilismo europeo, Milano, Adelphi, 2003.
________ , «The word of Nietzsche: “God is dead”», in The Question Concerning
Technology, translated by William Lovitt, New York, Harper, 1977.
Honig, Bonnie, Political Theory and the Displacement o f  Politics, Cornell UP, 1993.
Isaac, Jeffrey C., Arendt, Camus, and Modern Rebellion, Yale University Press, New Haven- 
London, 1992.
____ , “Arendt, Camus, and Postmodern Politics”, in Praxis International, 9,1989-90,48-71.
Kateb, George, “Political action: its nature and advantages”, in The Cambridge Companion to 
Hannah Arendt, Dana Villa Ed., Cambridge UP, 2000, pp. 130-148.
Kessler, Mathieu, Nietzsche et le dépassement esthétique de la métaphysique, PUF, Paris, 
1999.
Kohn, Jerome, « Freedom : the priority o f the political », in The Cambridge Companion to 
Hannah Arendt, Dana Villa Ed., Cambridge UP, 2000, pp. 113-129.
Jaspers, Karl, Del tragico, Milano, II Saggiatore, 1959.
Judt, Tony, Past Imperfect. French Intellectuals, 1944-1956, University of California Press, 
Berkeley/Los Angeles/Oxford, 1992.
Jünger, Ernst -  Heidegger, Martin, Oltre la linea, Franco Volpi (Ed.), Milano, Adelphi, 1998. 
Kershaw, Ian, The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems and Perspectives o f  Interpretation, Arnold, 
London, 2000.
Kristeva, Julia, Le génie féminin. I. Hannah Arendt, Paris, Fayard, 1999.
323
Kurinas, Tarmo, Nietzsche ou l'Esprit de contradiction : étude sur la vision du monde du 
poète philosophe, Paris, Nouvelles Editions Latines, 1980.
Lacoue-Labarthe, Philippe, La finzione del politico . Heidegger, l'arte e la politico, Genova, Il 
Melangolo, 1991.
______________ , “L’antagonisme”, in Gaède, E. (Ed.), Nietzsche, Hölderlin et la Grèce. Actes
du Colloqui organisé p ar le Centre de Recherches d'Histoire des Idées (Nice, Février 1985), 
Les Belles Lettres, 1987,49-60.
Lefort, Claude, “Thinking with and against Hannah Arendt”, in Totalitäre Herrschaft und 
republikanische Demokratie. Fünfzig Jahre The Origins o f  Totalitarianism von Hannah 
Arendt, Antonia Grunenberg (Hrsg.), Peter Lang, 2003.
_____ , “La question de la démocratie”, in Essais sur le politique, Paris, Seuil, 2001, pp. 17-
32.
_____ , « Hannah Arendt et la question du politique », in Essais sur le politique, Paris, Seuil,
2001, pp. 64- 78.
_____ , Écrire à l'épreuve du politique, Paris, Calmann-Lévy, 1992.
_____ , «The Logic o f  Totalitarianism», in The Political Forms o f  Modern Society.
Bureaucracy, Democracy, Totalitarianism, John B. Thompson Ed., Cambridge, Polity Press, 
1986.
Le Ridier, Jacques, Nietzsche en France : de la f in  du XIXe siècle au temps présent, PUF, 
Paris 1999.
Lévinas, Emmanuel, Alcune riflessioni sulla filosofia dell'Hitlerismo, con un saggio di 
Miguel Abensour, Quodlibet, Macerata, 1996.
Lévi-Valensi, Jacqueline, “Entre La Palisse et Don Quichotte”, Camus et le Lyrisme, textes 
réunis par J. Lévi-Valensi et A. Spiquel, Sedes, Paris, 1997,35-42.
Lévi-Valensi, J. -  Garapon, A. -  Salas, D., Eds., Albert Camus. Réflexions sur le terrorisme, 
Nicolas Philippe, Paris, 2002.
Linz, Juan J., Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes, Lynne Reiner Publishers, Boulder 
London, 2000.
Maffesoli, Michel, Au creux des apparences : pour une éthique de l'esthétique, Paris, Plon, 
1990.
Maitron, Jean, Le mouvement anarchiste en France. II. De 1914 à nos jours, Paris, Gallimard, 
1975.
Masini, Ferruccio, “Tradizione nichilista e metapolitica delParistos nel pensiero di Friedrich 
Nietzsche”, in Filosofia, religione, nichilismo: studi in onore di Alberto Caracciolo, Napoli, 
Morano, 1988.
Medina, Ramirez Angel, La filosofia tragica de Albert Camus. El transito del absurdo a la 
rebelion, Analecta Malacitana, 2001.
Michel, Henri, Mirkine-Guetzévitch, Boris, Les idée politiques et sociales de la Résistance 
(Documents clandestins -  1940-1944), PUF, Paris, 1954.
Modler, Karl W., Soleil et mesure dans l 'Oeuvre d'Albert Camus, L’Harmattan, Paris 2000. 
Montinari, Mazzino, “La Volonté de Puissance " n 'existe pas, Editions d’Eclat, Paris, 1996. 
Münster, Amo, Nietzsche et le nazisme, Editions Kimé, Paris, 1995.
Morot-Sir, Eduard, « L 'Homme Révolté: entre non et oui », in La Revue de Lettres Modernes: 
Albert Camus 12 - la révolte en question, textes réunis par R. Gay-Crosier, sous la direction 
de B. T. Fitch, Paris, Minard, 1985, 35-64.
________ , « Logique de la limite, esthétique de la pauvreté: théorie et pratique de l’essai », in
R. Gay-Crosier (Ed.), Albert Camus 1980. Second International Conference, February 21-23, 
1980, University Presses o f  Florida, Gainesville, 1981,189-209.
324
Moulakis, Athanasios, Simone Weil and îhe Poiitics o f  Self-denial, University o f Missouri 
Press, 1998.
Nancy, Jean-Luc, Une pensée finie , Galilée, Paris, 1990.
______ , The Inoperative Community, University Minnesota Press, Minneapolis London,
1991.
______ , L 'expérience de la liberté, Paris, Galilée, 1988.
______ , L ’esperienza délia liberté, Torino, Einaudi, 2000.
______ , Le sens du monde, Paris, Galilée, 2001.
______ , La création du monde ou la mondialisation, Paris, Galilée, 2002.
______ , La communauté désœuvrée, Christian Bourgois Editeur, 1999. (Italian translation, La
comunità inoperosa, Napoli, Cronopio, 2003).
______ , “Tre frammenti su nichilismo e politica”, in Nichilismo e Polit ica, a cura di R.
Esposito, C. Galli, V. Vitello, Bari, Laterza, 2000, pp. 5- 40.
Nancy, Jean-Luc, “Entre la destruction et l’extinction”, in Traversées du nihilisme, Paris, 
éditions Osiris, 1993-94, pp. 105-111.
Nietzsche, Friedrich, L *Origine de la Tragédie ou Hellénisme et pessimisme, traduit par Jean 
Mamold et Jacques Morland, Paris, Mercure de France, 1901.
________ ,Ecce Homo, Paris, Mercure de France, traduit par Henri Albert, 1909.
________ , Crépuscule des Idoles, suivi de Le cas Wagnert Nietzsche contre Wagner,
L  ’Anthéchrist, traduit par Henri Albert, Mercure de France, 1941.
________ , Humain, trop humain, Mercure de France, 1921
________ , Human, Ali Too Hum an, Cambridge UP, 1986.
________ , Œuvres Posthumes, traduit par Henri Jean Bolle, Paris, Mercure de France, 1934.
_________, La Volonté de Puissance, vol. I et II, Texte établi par Friedrich Wûrzbach, traduit
de l ’allemand par Geneviève Bianquis, Paris, Gallimard, 1935 et 1995.
________ , Le Nihilisme Européen, Introduction et traduction par A. Kremer-Marietti,
Editions Kimé, Paris, 1997.
_______ , On the Genealogy o f  Morality, Cambridge UP, 1994.
Nussbaum, Martha C., The fragility o f  goodness. Luck and ethics in Greek tragedy and  
philosophy, Cambridge UP, 1986.
Parker, Emmett, The Artist in the Arena, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison-Milwaukee, 
1965.
Pirro, Robert, Hannah Arendt and the Poiitics o f  Tragedy, Northern Illinois University Press,
2001.
Politique et pensée. Colloque Hannah Arendt, Miguel Abensour et al. Ed., Paris, Petite 
Bibliothèque Payot, 1997.
Rauschning, Hermann, Germany *s Révolution o f  destruction, W. Heinemann Ltd., London- 
Toronto, 1939.
Rey, Pierre-Louis, Camus une morale de la beauté, SEDES, Paris, 2000.
Ricœur, Paul, Philosophie de la volonté. Finitude et culpabilité IL La symbolique du mal, 
Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 1960.
Rosset, Clément, Le principe de cruauté, Paris, Minuit, 1988.
_____ , Logique du pire. Eléments pour une philosophie tragique, Paris, Quadrige PUF, 1993.
Rustichelli, Luigi, La profondità délia superficie: senso del tragico e giustificazione estetica 
dell ’esistenza in Friedrich Nietzche, Milano, Mursia, 1992.
Santori, Elisabetta, “Albert Camus: la came e la parola”, MicroMega, marzo 1997.
Sirinelli, Jean-François, Dictionnaire de la vie politique française au X X  siècle, PUF, 1995.
325
Sojcher, Jacques, La Question et le sens, esthétique de Nietzsche, Paris, Aubier Montaigne, 
1972.
Sprintzen, David, Camus. A critical examination, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 
1988.
Strong, Tracy B., “Nietzsche’s Political Aesthetics”, in Gillespie, M.A.- Strong, T.B. (Eds.), 
Nietzsche’s New Seas. Explorations in Philosophy. Aesthetics and Politics, University o f 
Chicago Press, 1988,153- 174.
_____ , F. Nietzsche and the Politics o f  Transfiguration, University o f  Illinois Press, 2000.
_____ , “Nietzsche’s political misappropriation” in Cambridge Companion to Nietzsche, CUP,
1996, pp. 119-147.
Szondi, Peter, Saggio sul tragico, Torino, Einaudi, 1999.
Taminiaux, Jacques, La fille  de Thrace et le penseur professionnel. Arendt et Heidegger, 
Paris, Editions Payot, 1992.
_________, Le théâtre des philosophes. La tragédie, l ’être, l ’action, Million, Grenoble, 1995.
Tarchi, Marco, “Il totalitarisme nel dibattito politologico”, in Filosofia Politico, XI, n. 1, 
aprile 1997.
Todd, Olivier, Camus une vie, Gallimard, Paris, 1996.
Tarrow, Susan, Exile from  the Kingdom: A Political Reading o f  Albert Camus, University o f 
Alabama Press, 1985.
Torre, Ramon Ramos, “Homo tragicus”, Politico y  Sociedad, 30 (1999), Madrid, 213-240. 
Traverse, Enzo, Le Totalitarisme. LeXXe siècle en débat, Seuil, Paris, 2001.
Trundle, Robert C. Jr., Beyond Absurdity. The Philosophy o f  Albert Camus, Lanham-New 
York-London, 1986.
Tsao, Roy T., “The three phases o f  Arendt’s theory o f  Totalitarianism”, in Totalitäre 
Herrschaft und republikanische Demokratie. Fünfzig Jahre The Origins o f  Totalitarianism 
von Hannah Arendt, Antonia Grunenberg (Hrsg.), Peter Lang, 2003.
Vattimo, Gianni, “Heidegger filosofo della democrazia”, in Micro-Mega. Almanacco di 
Filosofia, 5/2003, pp. 55-61.
_______ , Nichilismo ed emancipazione. Etica, politico,diritto, Garzanti, 2003.
_______ , Dialogo con Nietzsche. Saggi 1961-2000, Garzanti, 2000.
_______ , “Nihilism: Reactive and Active”, in in Nietzsche and the Rhetoric o f  Nihilism.
Essays on interpretation, Language and Politics, T. Darby, B. Egyed, B. Jones (Eds.), p. 15-
21.
______ , “I due sensi del nichilismo in Nietzsche”, in Filosofia, religione, nichilismo, Morano,
1988, p. 481-489.
Vemant, Jean-Pierre, Tra mito e politico, Raffaello Cortina Editore, Milano, 1998.
Vemant, J.-P.-Vidal-Naquet, P., Saggi su Mito e Tragedia, Einaudi Scuola, Milano, 1998. 
Villa, Dana, “Beyond Good and Evil. Arendt, Nietzsche, and the Aestheticization o f Political 
Action”, Political Theory, Vol. 20, No. 2, May 1992,274- 308.
____ , Arendt and Heidegger. The Fate o f  the Political, Princeton UP, 1996.
____ , Politics, Philosophy, Terror. Essays on the Thought o f  Hannah Arendt, Princeton UP,
1999.
Walker, David H., “In an out o f history: Albert Camus”, in French Cultural Studies, 22 
February 1997, 103-116.




Weyembergh, Maurice, « Révolte et ressentiment », in La Revue de Lettres Modernes: Albert 
Camus 12 - la révolte en question, textes réunis par R. Gay-Crosier, sous la direction de B. T. 
Fitch, Paris, Minard, 1985, 65-82.
_________ , « Camus et Nietzsche: évolution d’une affinité », in R. Gay-Crosier (Ed.), Albert
Camus 1980. Second International Conference, February 21-23, 1980, University Presses o f 
Florida, Gainesville, 1981,221-232.
_________ , « Albert Camus et K. Popper. La critique de 1’historisme et de l’historicisme », in
Albert Camus ou la mémoire des origines, De Boeck Université, Paris-Bruxelles, 1998, 137- 
150.
_________ , « Camus et Arendt. Temporalité et politique », in Albert Camus ou la mémoire
des origines, De Boeck Université, Paris-Bruxelles, 1998,151-164.
________ , « Théâtre et politique chez Albert Camus », in Camus et le théâtre, op. cit., p. 46.
Young-Bruehl, Elisabeth, Hannah Arendt 1906-1975. Per amore del mondo, Bollati 
Boringhieri, Torino, 1994.
Wemer, Eric, De la violence au Totalitarisme. Essai sur la pensée de Camus et Sartre, 
Calmann-Lévy, Paris.
Willhoite, Fred H. Jr., Beyond Nihilism : Albert Camus * Contribution to Political Thought, 
Louisiana State UP, Baton Rouge, 1968.






q p m p fa M P I f l l l U r t J Ï T
M
■ ■ ■ s b b h ™
“*“***'
âëiMüaînîÎJiî ù; rUiiÙîiiijkëikkiüüîîdîîînii ÌìUiìmHUiUÌUùirfiìilÙìùìUìììiùiàiUtòì^ ì^ Ui^ i ^  U îi» UfUiìiìii »? h t ìjiùiìrt i t*ì>i JììUìUì ÙìHòI íiiHH+iíitóHíiÍMZÜj
[J
Hi
i-i
8
A3
V
